The Transmission of the Islamic Tradition in the Early Modern Era: The Life and Writings of Aḥmad Al-Dardīr by Mosaad, Walead Mohammed
 1 
The Transmission of the Islamic Tradition in the Early Modern Era: The 
Life and Writings of Aḥmad Al-Dardīr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted by Walead Mohammed Mosaad to the University of Exeter as a 
thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arab and Islamic Studies 
 April 2016 
 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without 
proper acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved 
for the award of a degree by this or any other University. 
 
 
 
Signature: ………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................. 6 
Abstract ................................................................................................................. 7 
Chapter One: Introduction ................................................................................ 10 
Background and Methodology ................................................................................ 16 
Review of the Literature ........................................................................................... 33 
Political and social climate in Ottoman Egypt at the time of al-Dardīr .............. 42 
Cultural and Intellectual Climate at the time of al-Dardīr ..................................... 50 
Primary Sources ....................................................................................................... 55 
Al-Dardīr’s Writings .................................................................................................. 58 
Overview of Al-Dardīr’s Biography ......................................................................... 61 
Conclusion................................................................................................................. 68 
Chapter Two:  Al-Dardīr and the Foundations of the Islamic Educational 
Paradigm ............................................................................................................. 70 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 70 
Intellectual Genealogies, Hermeneutics and Sunni Authoritativeness.............. 78 
Arabic Hermeneutics............................................................................................ 88 
The Thabat of al-Dardīr and his Education ............................................................ 96 
Al-Dardīr and the Tradition of Taḥqīq................................................................... 107 
Definitions .......................................................................................................... 111 
Tarjīḥ (weighted preference) of opinions within the Ash‘arī school .................. 113 
Exposition of Differences between Ash‘arī and Māturīdī Theologies ............... 115 
Al-Dardīr’s Understanding of Orthodoxy and Orthopraxy ................................. 116 
Relationship of Rational Affirmations and Spiritual Realisations ...................... 120 
Chapter Three: Al-Dardīr’s Sufi-Theology: Synthesis of Kalām and 
Taṣawwuf Epistemologies .............................................................................. 124 
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 124 
Al-Dardīr’s Sources of Knowledge ....................................................................... 126 
 4 
The Ontology of the Intellect .............................................................................. 127 
The Epistemology of the Intellect ...................................................................... 130 
The Ash‘arī Tradition in the Later Period ............................................................. 135 
Al-Dardīr’s Understanding of God and His Divine Attributes ........................... 144 
The Waḥdāniyya (Oneness) of God .................................................................. 151 
Causation and Divine Omnipotence .................................................................. 154 
Divine Essence and Divine Existence ............................................................... 160 
Ta‘alluqāt (Cosmic Connections) and ‘Ilal (existential causes)......................... 164 
Al-Dardīr’s Synthesis and the Sharī‘a-Ṭarīqa-Ḥaqīqa Paradigm ....................... 175 
Waḥdat al-Wujūd ............................................................................................... 176 
Hierarchical Approaches to Tawḥīd ................................................................... 181 
Ṭarīqa and Ḥaqīqa ............................................................................................. 184 
Chapter Four: Tarjīḥ and al-Dardīr’s Methodology Regarding the Fiqh 
Tradition ............................................................................................................ 193 
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 193 
Jurisprudence and Madhhabism .......................................................................... 196 
The Synopsis-Commentary-Gloss genre (mukhtaṣar-sharḥ-ḥāshiya) in the 
Mālikī Tradition ........................................................................................................ 203 
Al-Dardīr’s Commentary on the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl.......................................... 221 
Khalīl’s Terminology in the Mukhtaṣar .............................................................. 223 
Other Commentaries of the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl ............................................... 228 
Analysis of al-Dardīr’s Major Commentary on the Mukhtaṣar .......................... 230 
Al-Dardīr’s Mukhtaṣar: Aqrab al-Masālik ............................................................. 244 
Al-Dardīr’s Methodology of Legal Plurality Minimisation .................................. 253 
Chapter Five:  Al-Dardīr: ‘Ālim, Sufi, and Intercessor for the Masses ...... 259 
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 259 
The ‘Ulamā’ in the Ottoman Egypt of al-Dardīr ................................................... 274 
Al-Dardīr: Quietest or Activist? ............................................................................. 280 
Al-Dardīr the Mufti and Leader of al-Azhar .......................................................... 290 
Al-Dardīr the Sufi Murshid ..................................................................................... 297 
Conclusion............................................................................................................... 309 
 5 
Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 312 
Appendix: Translation of al-Dardīr’s Minor Creed....................................... 317 
Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 319 
 
 6 
Acknowledgements  
First and foremost, I acknowledge God, the Bestower of all blessings, both 
manifest and hidden, and the One who reminds us that he who does not 
thank and acknowledge the instruments of His will has not truly thanked Him.  
If I were to enumerate all of the people who have contributed to the facilitation 
of the undertaking of this study, a separate dissertation would be required.  
However, incapacity to reach perfection in its entirety should not leave one to 
abandon the endeavour altogether.  Therefore, I would like to thank my 
supervisor, Professor Ian Richard Netton, who graciously accepted my thesis 
proposal and always offered words of encouragement and insight.  My second 
supervisor, Professor Robert Gleave, also read portions of the manuscript and 
provided helpful feedback. 
 The many mentors and teachers whose guidance was instrumental 
throughout this process include Dr. Mahmud Misri, Dr. Ahmad Taha Rayyan, 
Dr. Ali Gomaa, and Habib Ali al-Jifri. Special thanks are due to Dr. Karim 
Lahham and Matthew Schulman, who read an entire draft of this thesis and 
offered invaluable criticism.  The staff at the National Archives in Cairo, the 
Suleymanie and ISAM libraries in Istanbul, the British Library, the Princeton 
University Library, and the New York Public Library, where much of this 
dissertation was written, were helpful in providing space and access to their 
research materials.  There were many who provided moral support throughout 
years of residence in the US, UK, UAE, and Egypt, but above all, my parents 
continued to encourage and support despite long periods between visits. I 
would also like to thank my five children, Abdulrahman, Abdullah, Selma, 
Muhammed, and Ahmed, who managed with an absentee father but 
nevertheless are the best children any parent could hope for, due in large part 
to my wife, life partner, and confidant of over twenty-two years, Nelly, whom I 
thank for bearing the brunt of the sacrifices needed to make my journey of 
scholarship possible, offered words of wisdom and encouragement, comfort 
and solace, and believed in me when I often didn’t believe in myself. 
 7 
Abstract  
 
This thesis examines the role of tradition and discursive knowledge 
transmission on the formation of the ‘ulamā’, the learned scholarly class in 
Islam, and their approach to the articulation of the Islamic disciplines.  The 
basis of this examination is the twelfth/eighteenth century scholar, Aḥmad ibn 
Muḥammad al-Dardīr, an Egyptian Azharī who wrote highly influential 
treatises in the disciplines of creedal theology, Mālikī jurisprudence, and 
taṣawwuf (Sufism).  Additionally, he occupied a prominent role in the urban 
life of Cairo, accredited with several incidents of intercession with the rulers 
on behalf of the Cairo populace.  
This thesis argues that a useful framework for evaluating the 
intellectual contributions of post-classical scholars such as al-Dardīr involves 
the concept of an Islamic discursive tradition, where al-Dardīr’s specific 
contributions were aimed towards preserving, upholding, and maintaining the 
Islamic tradition, including the intellectual “sub-traditions” that came to define 
it. 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to al-Dardīr, the social and 
intellectual climate of his era, and an overview of his writings.  Chapter 2 
analyses the educational paradigm that preceded al-Dardīr, and affected his 
approach to the Islamic disciplines.  We then focus our attention to al-Dardīr’s 
contribution to the Islamic educational paradigm, in the form of taḥqīq 
(verification).  Chapter 3 analyses al-Dardīr’s methodology in the synthesis of 
the rational and mystical approaches to knowledge located within the Islamic 
disciplines of creedal theology and Sufism.  Chapter 4 analyses al-Dardīr’s to 
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the Mālikī fiqh tradition, specifically his methodology of tarjīḥ (weighing of 
juristic evidence between different narrations).  Chapter 5 examines his 
societal roles, and the influence of tradition on his relationships with the ruling 
elite, the ‘ulamā’ class, and the masses.  The thesis ends with a conclusion 
that summarises the results of all of the above. 
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A Note on Transliteration 
The system of transliteration used in this thesis generally follows that of the 
Library of Congress.  However, I do not distinguish between alif and alif 
maqṣūra  (e.g. lā vs. ilā ), and I use ‘iyy ’ in place of ‘īy ’ for the medial long 
vowel plus consonant (e.g. al-Miṣriyya vs. al-Miṣrīya ). In alphabetical 
lists, (al-) is ignored at the beginning of a name, but not in the middle. The tā’ 
al-marbūṭa is not delineated, save when in an iḍāfa construction, in which 
case it is represented with a ‘t’ (e.g. zubda vs. zubdat al-fann). 
Arabic words are transliterated except when an anglicised word is 
commonly used (e.g. imam for imām; mosque for masjid). Likewise is the 
case of dynasties (e.g. Abbasid for ‘Abbāsid). Familiar geographical names 
such as Medina and Mecca are given in their common spelling; other 
geographical names are transliterated. Transliterated words are italicised, 
except for proper nouns.
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This thesis examines the role of tradition and discursive knowledge 
transmission on the formation of the ‘ulamā’, the learned scholarly class in 
Islam, and their approach to the articulation of the Islamic disciplines.  The basis 
of this examination is the twelfth/eighteenth scholar, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-
Dardīr, an Egyptian Azharī who wrote highly influential treatises in the 
disciplines of creedal theology, Mālikī jurisprudence, and taṣawwuf (Sufism).  
Additionally, he occupied a prominent role in the urban life of Cairo, accredited 
with several incidents of intercession with the rulers on behalf of the Cairo 
populace.1  This thesis argues that a useful framework for evaluating the 
contributions of post-classical scholars such as al-Dardīr involves the concept of 
an Islamic discursive tradition.  Anjum, in his analysis of Asad’s conceptual 
framework, states2: 
…the Islamic discursive tradition is characterized by its own rationality or styles of reasoning — 
couched in its texts, history, and institutions. This is not to say that there is some rationality, 
logic, or philosophy essentially Islamic and thus impenetrable to the outsiders, but that certain 
theoretical considerations and premises emanating from the content and form of the 
foundational discourses (the content and context of the scriptures, the historical experience of 
Islam in its formative years, etc.) come to characterize the tradition, and so anyone wishing to 
argue within the Islamic tradition, must start with them, even if only to argue against them. 
 
Considering “styles of reasoning couched in its own texts” is essential to 
understanding a figure such as al-Dardīr, who did not make ground-breaking 
insights, in the manner of the juristic methodology of al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 204/820), or 
the kalām doctrine of al-Ash‘arī (d. 324/936), or the practical Sufism of al-
Ghazālī (d.505/1111), or even that of later scholar such as al-Sha‘rānī (d. 
973/1565). Rather, his contributions are best understood via his upholding of 
tradition, and transmitting it in a manner that would ensure its survival and 
                                             
1 See ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī, 'Ajā'ib Al-Āthār Fi Al-Tarājim W'al-Akhbār (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub 
al-Miṣriyya, 1998), 2:12-13,149-50. 
2 Ovamir Anjum, "Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors," 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, no. 3 (2007): 8. 
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continuity.  Specifically, the notion that Islamic intellectual thought was 
concerned with uncovering the divine intent in the sacred texts, as well as 
communicating that uncovered divine intent is tantamount to understanding the 
writings and societal roles of the ‘ulamā’ after the formative and classical 
periods, two historical eras which have been the focus of much of the literature, 
with the Ottoman period specifically still largely understudied.3  Al-Dardīr, as a 
post-classical scholar, participated in and contributed to several intellectual 
traditions, as each Islamic discipline developed via paradigmatic shifts that 
came to characterise the overall trajectory of the transmission and articulation of 
Islamic knowledge.  This thesis argues that such a framework can also be 
useful for evaluating the relationship of a ‘ālim such as al-Dardīr with various 
elements of society, for these paradigmatic shifts also characterised the societal 
roles of the ‘ulamā’.  Additionally, this thesis argues that this presents a more 
useful framework for examining post-caliphal and post-classical Islamic 
knowledge than the positing of reform/revival motifs (predicated on the notion of 
a decline followed by a revival), or using creativity/innovation as criteria for 
determining the significance or lack thereof of an Islamic figure, or essentialising 
the motivations and roles of the Islamic ‘ulamā’ over disparate historical eras 
and local environments.  Furthermore, it is the contention of this thesis that 
conceptual frameworks within the Islamic tradition itself are useful for identifying 
                                             
3 There have been recent efforts to examine Islamic scholarship in the Ottoman period, such as 
Khaled El-Rouayheb, "Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century : Scholarly 
Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,, 
2015); R. S. O'Fahey, Enigmatic Saint : Ahmad Ibn Idris and the Idrisi Tradition, Northwestern 
University Press Series in Islam and Society in Africa (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University 
Press, 1990); John Obert Voll, "Abdallah Ibn Salim Al-Basri and 18th Century Hadith 
Scholarship," Die Welt des Islams 42, no. 3 (2002); Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufi Visionary of 
Ottoman Damascus : ʿAbd Al-Ghanī Al-Nābulusī, 1641-1731 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2005)., but as is demonstrated later in the introductory chapter, most of these works have 
focused upon a finite set of particular themes, such as reform/revival, Neo-Sufism, and the 
individual phenomenon of the atypical scholar.  This study endeavours to offer a fresh 
perspective, namely one that is predicated on evaluation of scholarship as part of a larger 
diachronic continuum. 
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scholarly contributions in the post-classical period.  Moreover, the tools of 
tradition transmission and articulation provide a means by which 
authoritativeness in Sunni Islam can be posited.  These tools also developed in 
a similar trajectory to render authoritativeness subject to the same factors that 
affected transmission and articulation. In the case of al-Dardīr, these 
frameworks correspond to the concepts of taḥqīq (verification or realisation), 
tarjīḥ (judicial preference), and tabsīṭ (simplification and popularisation).  All of 
these concepts are located within the Islamic tradition, though they may have 
much in common with their potential counterparts in other knowledge 
traditions.4  They developed over the course of the formation of the Islamic 
disciplines and found their apogee during the time of al-Dardīr in the 
twelfth/eighteenth century, after which the establishment of the modern nation 
state and accompanying knowledge/education systems challenged, and to 
some extent, marginalised the traditional methods of knowledge transmission 
and acquisition.5  These disciplines interacted in large part with external 
environmental factors, particularly in the post-formative period, after the work of 
canonisation and institutionalising was completed, and the focus then shifted to 
synopsis, abridgement, verification, and overall re-articulation for successive 
generations of scholars and students alike.  Though political environmental 
factors cannot be altogether discounted, this study focuses on the factors within 
the individual traditions themselves, tracing their intellectual histories via 
successive paradigmatic shifts to arrive at the solidification and culmination of 
the disciplines in the centuries after the establishment of the madrasa system in 
                                             
4 Such as Shils’ notion of “critical intelligence”, which shares some connotations with taḥqīq.  
See Edward Albert Shils, Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 215. and 
chapter 2 of this study in the section on taḥqīq. 
5 See A.L. Tibawi, Islamic Education: Its Traditions and Modernization into the Arab National 
Systems, (London: Luzav and Company LTD, 1979); J. Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to the 
History of Education in Modern Egypt (London: Luzac, 1939). 
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post-Ayyubid Egypt.  Therefore, al-Dardīr functions as a serviceable 
representative of the tradition, especially in light of his prominence within al-
Azhar, an institution that came to represent the intellectual as well as societal 
Islamic tradition in Ottoman Egypt.  
 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-‘Adawī al-Dardīr (d. 1201/1786)6, in many 
ways typified the religious scholarly elite of his day.  He came from humble 
beginnings in rural Egypt, as did many, if not most of his scholarly 
contemporaries.  He memorised the Qur’ān at an early age and then went on to 
Cairo to study at the prestigious Azhar mosque-university.  He was trained in 
the core disciplines, including Arabic language, theology, jurisprudence, tafsīr, 
ḥadīth, and taṣawwuf.7  Knowledge transmission in the late twelfth/seventeenth 
century in Cairo of al-Dardīr was typified in the master/apprentice style of study 
where the shaykh “read” the synopsis text to his students, usually gathered 
around him at a particular pillar in the Azhar mosque, or one of the surrounding 
madrassas.  When the student had “mastered” enough of the core texts in the 
major Islamic disciplines, and given ijāza, or certification to do so by his 
teachers, he could then proceed to have a circle of his own students.8 In this 
regard al-Dardīr did not differ from his contemporaries.   
However, al-Dardīr’s rise to prominence is such as that within a few 
decades of his death his books were studied from Morocco to Eastern Arabia, is 
atypical.9  Al-Dardīr has also been mentioned as a “renewer” (mujaddid)10 of the 
                                             
6 See biographical entry in: al-Jabartī, 'Ajā'ib Al-Āthār Fi Al-Tarājim w'al-Akhbār, 2:223-25; 
Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī, Al-Mu’jam Al-Mukhtaṣ (Beirut: Dar al-Bashā'ir, 2010), 122-24; Muḥammad 
Makhlūf, Shajarat Al-Nūr Al-Zakiyya (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘a al-Salafiyya, 1349 a.h.), 516-17. 
7 See the hagiographical entries of ‘Alī al-Ṣa’īdī, Aḥmad al-Damanhūrī, Muḥammad al-Ḥifnī, etc. 
in ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī, 'Ajā'ib Al-Āthār Fi Al-Tarājim W'al-Akhbār, (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-
Miṣriyya, 1998). 
8 See Rachida Chih, "Autorité Religieuse Et Rôle Public D’un Ouléma D’al-Azhar Au Xviiie 
Siècle : Vie Et Carrière Du Cheikh Ahmad Al-Dardîr (1715-1786)," (2012); J. Heyworth-Dunne, 
An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt (London: Luzac, 1939), 25-76. 
9 Muḥammad Ibrahīm ‘Alī, Iṣṭilāḥ Al-Madhhab ‘Ind Al-Mālikiyya (Dubai: Dār al-Buḥūth l'il-Dirāsāt 
al-Islāmiyya, 2000), 599. 
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Islamic twelfth century.11 His contributions are best understood via his approach 
to the three “core” disciplines that are used as the measure for any scholar: fiqh 
(jurisprudence), kalām (creedal theology), and taṣawwuf (Sufism).12   
Al-Dardīr was the foremost scholar of the Mālikī school of law during his 
lifetime and assumed the position of Mufti of the Mālikiyya after the death of his 
teacher, Alī al-Ṣa‘īdī (d. 1189/1775).13  Perhaps al-Dardīr’s most notable 
contribution was his commentary on the principal didactic Mālikī law text of the 
time, Mukhtaṣar Khalīl, a terse, but yet verbose and enigmatic text studied by 
Mālikī jurisprudents from Morocco to Eastern Arabia.  Al-Dardīr’s commentary 
found widespread and broad acceptance; his lucid and simplifying style lifted 
the veil over Khalīl’s turgidity.  Additionally, he focused on identifying and 
clarifying the dominant opinions, something his predecessors arguably 
achieved with a lesser degree of success. 
 Similarly, his approach to kalām, or creedal theology, was characterised 
by lucidity and simplification.  His didactic text on theology, al-Kharīda al-
Bahiyya also found widespread acceptance and was adopted by many Azhar 
‘ulamā’ as the standard primer in creedal theology.  At a time when rival 
creeds14 to the dominant Ash‘arī school of theology were emerging in Arabia 
and parts of India, al-Dardīr’s explication of the standard Sunni creed in post-
                                                                                                                                    
10 The mujaddid tradition is based on the Prophetic ḥadīth that states that at the beginning of 
every century, a person will be sent by God to renew “yujaddid” the matter of their religion.  
Some Muslim scholars have posited that there can be multiple renewers for the same century.  
Some of the better-known renewers are al-Shāfi‘ī for the second century and al-Ghazālī for the 
fifth century.  See also: Ella Landau-Tasseron, "The "Cyclical Reform": A Study of the Mujadid 
Tradition," Studia Islamica 70 (1989). 
11 Abd al-Ḥayy al-Kattāni, Fihras Al-Fahāris W’al-Athbāt, (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1982)., 
393 
12 These three correspond in the Gabriel ḥadīth to the “stations” (maqām) of islām, īmān, and 
iḥsān.  This is expounded upon in the section concerning al-Dardīr’s Sufism. 
13 See biographical entry 1364 in: Makhlūf, Shajarat Al-Nūr Al-Zakiyya, 492-93. al-Kattāni, 
Fihras Al-Fahāris W’al-Athbāt, 2:712-13. entry 370 in: Muḥammad Khalīl ibn ʿAlī Murādī, Kitāb 
Silk Al-Durar Fī Aʿyān Al-Qarn Al-Thānī ʿAshar, (al-Qāhirah: Maktabat al-ʿArabī, 1291), 3:198-
99. 
14 Such as the Wahhābī theology in Arabia and Neo-Traditionist (Ahl al-ḥadīth) reformism in 
India. See A. Dallal, "The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850," 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 113, no. 3 (1993). 
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Fatimid Egypt15 may have been a factor in countering challenges to the Ash‘arī 
creed that materialised in the early nineteenth century.16 
 Sufism, or taṣawwuf, was for al-Dardīr, and many others like him, the 
crowning achievement of the Prophetic mission.  It symbolised the essence of 
the Muhammadan message, as exemplified in the Prophetic tradition: “I have 
not been sent except to perfect excellence of morals and character.”17  Indeed, 
the spirit of taṣawwuf pervaded al-Dardīr’s works, even those not specifically 
concerned with the discipline, such as jurisprudence and ḥadīth, to a degree 
that would cause one to conclude that elucidating taṣawwuf was the overriding 
objective in all of his writings.  This seems to be part of a larger intellectual trend 
that witnessed the re-appropriation of Sufism by the traditional ‘ulamā’ as a 
spiritual discipline from whom they referred disparagingly to as the mutaṣawiffa 
(would-be Sufis) in the eighteenth century, in a manner more closely aligned 
with the textual precepts of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth, a trend not specific to Egypt, 
but rather extended from North Africa to Arabia18.  The implications for this 
phenomenon form the basis for the study of al-Dardīr’s approach to Sufism. 
                                             
15 A perusal of the hagiographical entries of the ‘ulamā’ in Ayyubid, Mamluke, and Ottoman 
Egypt reveals that they were overwhelmingly Ash‘arī in theology, though they had different 
jurisprudential affiliations.  The Māturīdī creed also found its way into Ottoman Egypt in 
particular, but only found resonance with Ḥanafī scholars, such as Kamāl ibn Humām 
(861/1457), who were nonetheless always a minority in comparison with the Shāfi‘ī and Mālikī 
Ash‘arīs. See: Muḥammad al-Amīn  al-Muḥibbī, Khulāṣat Al-Athar Fī ‘Ayān Al-Qarn Al-Hāadī 
‘Ashar, (Beirut: Maktabat Khayyāṭ, 1966); Muḥammad Khalīl ibn ʿAlī Murādī, Kitāb Silk Al-Durar 
Fī Aʿyān Al-Qarn Al-Thānī ʿAshar, (al-Qāhirah: Maktabat al-ʿArabī, 1291). 
16 Such as the reformist Wahhābī movement in Arabia and the Salafī movement spear headed 
by Muḥammad Abduh in Egypt. See chapters 2 and 3 respectively in: Samira Haj, 
Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition : Reform, Rationality, and Modernity, Cultural Memory in the 
Present (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009). 
17 “Innamā buʼithtu li-utammima makārim al-akhlāq” Narrated by al-Bukhāri. See Muḥammad ibn 
Ismāʿīl Bukhārī and Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā, Al-Adab Al-Mufrad (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmīyah, 1990). 
18 The mutaṣawwif is a term used by “sharī‘a minded” scholars to characterise Sufi shaykhs, 
who, in their view, do not uphold the principles of sharī‘a.  See the discussion on Neo-Sufism in: 
R. S. O'Fahey and Bernd Radtke, "Neo-Sufism Reconsidered," in Sufism: Critical Concepts in 
Islamic Studies, ed. Lloyd Ridgeon (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); John O. Voll, "Neo-Sufism 
Reconsidered Again," Canadian Journal of African Studies 42, no. 2/3 (2008). Neo-Sufism is 
considered more thoroughly in the section al-Dardīr’s role as Sufi murshid is chapter 5. 
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Background and Methodology 
 
The notion of “tradition”, apposite when speaking of the Islamic 
intellectual disciplines, remains problematic.  There is no particular equivalent in 
the Islamic Arabic lexicon, with taqlīd sometimes serving as a surrogate, but 
failing to encompass the complexities of “tradition” in the Western canon.  
Tradition in the Western canon is often juxtaposed with “modernity”, another 
problematic term, whereas taqlīd is contrasted with ijtihād (independent juristic 
reasoning), which addresses a limited aspect of the Islamic intellectual tradition.  
Further complicating matters is the fitness of the decline thesis, which roughly 
posits that the Islamic intellectual sciences19 underwent a sort of decline and 
stagnation in the post-classical period as compared to the creativity and 
innovation of the formative and classical periods. 
Talal Asad, from an anthropological perspective, sought to address the 
problem of defining Islam by invoking the concept of “discursive tradition”, 
borrowing somewhat from Alasdair MacIntyre, defined tradition as20:  
…consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the 
correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is established, has a 
history. These discourses relate conceptually to a past (when the practice was instituted, and 
from which the knowledge of its point and proper performance has been transmitted) and a 
future (how the point of that practice can best be secured in the short or long term, or why it 
should be modified or abandoned), through a present (how it is linked to other practices, 
institutions, and social conditions). An Islamic discursive tradition is simply a tradition of Muslim 
discourse that addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a 
particular Islamic practice in the present. 
 
Related to the issue of Islamic tradition, is the issue of “orthodoxy”, yet 
another problematic term borrowed from the Western canon, but one that Asad 
also seeks to address by relating it to the power to enforce, stating: “orthodoxy 
                                             
19 Our concern here is primarily decline in terms of the apparent lack of originality and vitality in 
the Islamic intellectual sciences since the 7th/13th century, and less so with decline as relates to 
the conditions for knowledge production in the 12th/18th century.  While the two modalities are 
related this study endeavours to offer an alternative to the decline thesis specific to the former.  
For a thorough critique of the latter modality, see Darling’s introduction entitled “The Myth of 
Decline” in: Linda T. Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection Finance and 
Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1560-1660 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 1-21. 
20 Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington, D.C: Center for Contemporary 
Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986), 14. 
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is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship - a relationship of 
power. Wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust 
correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect 
ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy.”21 
While the conceptual framework offered by Asad seems to solve some of 
the inconsistencies in the frameworks of Zein, Geertz, and Gellner,22 it 
nevertheless inadequately addresses the motivations of the upholders of the 
tradition, and by what criteria tradition can be established, challenged, or even 
dispensed with.  This may be due in large part to the limitations of studying 
Islam from an anthropological perspective.  Nonetheless, for the purposes of 
this study, we will attempt to define and utilise the concept of tradition that does 
address the manner by which the tradition(s) can be formed and subsequently 
transmitted.  
As stated previously, there is no equivalent term for tradition in the 
Islamic canon.  However, from a conceptual standpoint, examining aspects of 
the Islamic literature can form a worldview regarding the idea of tradition.  The 
oft-quoted ḥadīth: “I have left for you two things, that if you hold steadfast to, 
you will never go astray: the book of God (the Qur’ān) and the Sunna of your 
Prophet.”23  This direct quote of the Prophet Muḥammad, if taken at face value, 
indicates that in the absence of a living upholder of tradition (the Prophet 
himself) then the community is to turn to his scriptural legacy: the Qur’ān and 
ḥadīth.  In another ḥadīth, however, he states, “Scholars are the heirs of the 
Prophets, [as] Prophets have not left behind gold nor silver, but rather 
                                             
21 Ibid., 15. 
22 See Anjum, "Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors." 
23 Mālik Ibn Anas, Muwaṭṭa Mālik, (Cairo: Muṣtafa Bāb al-Ḥalabī, 1985), 2:480. 
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knowledge, and whoever takes from it has taken a formidable share.”24  Taken 
together, the early Muslim ‘ulamā’ emphasised the importance of direct audition 
with a teacher, and not mere reliance on one’s own understanding of the Qur’ān 
and ḥadīth.   The significance of the sanad was stated by the scholar of the 
formative period, ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Mubārak25 (d. 181/797): “Isnād is from the 
dīn, and without isnād, then anyone can say anything.”26  The sanad 
represented the price of entry into the realm of formal scholarship and a 
confirmation of the ability to uncover the tradition, and often contribute to it.  In 
contrast to Asad’s notion of orthodoxy existing where the power to enforce it 
existed, it is our contention that orthodoxy, or authority, or the ability to 
delineate the tradition i.e. what is Islam, and what is not, is something the 
‘ulamā’ held to be discoverable, and hence knowable and existing, regardless 
of societal power structures, but only by those who have the prerequisite level 
of scholarship to “discover” it. 
The early debate amongst Muslim jurists regarding the mujtahid and his 
ability to perceive the truth (hal kul mujtahid muṣīb?) illustrates this point of 
discoverability of the tradition.27  Though arguments for whether every qualified 
mujtahid accesses the truth by merely exerting his ijtihād, or the “truth” is only 
one, and hence not every mujtahid will be correct in his interpretations, the 
underlying principle is that the “truth”, at least in matters where no epistemic 
conclusiveness exists, is something to be discovered by the mujtahid. In 
                                             
24 Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-ʿArabī and Muḥammad ibn ʿĪsá Tirmidhī, ‘Ariḍat Al-Aḥwadhī 
Bi-Sharḥ Saḥīḥ Al-Tirmidhī, (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, N.D.), 4:414. 
25 For biography, see recent study: Feryal E. Salem, "'Abd Allah B. Al-Mubarak between Hadith, 
Jihad, and Zuhd: An Expression of Early Sunni Identity in the Formative Period" (Thesis (Ph D ), 
The University of Chicago, Division of the Humanities, Department of Near Eastern Languages 
and Civilizations, 2013., 2013). 
26 Also amongst the first lines of al-Dardīr’s thabat: Aḥmad al-Dardīr, "Thabat Al-Dardīr," ed. 
Maktabat Jāmi‘at al-Riyāḍ (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1284 A.H.). 
27 See discussion in: Yaḥyā ibn Mūsā Rahūnī, ʿUthmān ibn ʿUmar Ibn al-Ḥājib, and al-Hādī ibn 
Ḥusayn Shubaylī, Tuḥfat Al-Masʼūl Fī Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar Muntahā Al-Sūl (Dubai: Dār al-Buḥūth 
lil-Dirāsāt al-Islāmīyah wa-Iḥyāʼ al-Turāth, 2002), 4:253-60. 
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matters where epistemic conclusiveness does exist, by virtue of the agreement 
of all mujtahids, due to the conclusive and unequivocal reading of the proof-
texts (the Qur’ān and ḥadīth), then this is necessarily known by mujtahids and 
non-mujtahids alike.  The “tradition”, then is circumscribed by the consensus (at 
least in the Sunni tradition) of the qualified mujtahids.  This much is fairly 
straightforward, and whose argument can be found in any of the classical works 
of uṣūl al-fiqh (juristic methodology).  However, the means and methods by 
which the truth may be discovered, aside from the qualifications of the mujtahid, 
are not as straightforward.  Most manuals on uṣūl al-fiqh contain introductory 
sections on the interpretive rules for deciphering the language (Arabic), of the 
Qur’ān and Sunna.  While much attention has been devoted to the four-source 
theory28 of Islamic legal reasoning, the rules and principles for interpreting the 
texts of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth are essential in describing the methodology by 
which the Qur’ān and ḥadīth are interpreted.  Dichotomous issues such as literal 
and figurative meanings, general and specific connotations, and pronounced 
(manṭūq) and connotative (mafhūm) meanings form the core of these linguistic-
interpretive issues.  Presumably, scholarly consensus takes as an apodictic 
foundation the authority of these linguistic-interpretive rules, such as that no 
secondary fiqh ruling or interpretation could clearly contravene these rules.  
Hence, the “borders” of the Islamic tradition are delineated by consensus on 
individual legal and theological rulings as well as the rules of interpretation by 
which these rules are derived.  Moreover, authority is not merely a list of 
theological doctrines and jurisprudential rulings, but also the methodology by 
which these doctrines and rulings were derived.  The authority of consensus lies 
in the idea, that despite differing methodologies in deriving rulings and 
                                             
28 The Qur’ān, Sunna, Qiyās, and ‘Ijma‘.  See Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal 
Theories : An Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl Al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
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doctrines, the qualified ‘ulamā’ nonetheless reach similar conclusions in their 
attempts to uncover the divine intent.  Similarly, their conclusions that are 
limited to a set of different, though not at all dissimilar doctrines and rulings, are 
a form of consensus that circumscribe the Sunni tradition. 
Nevertheless, tradition seems to be in opposition to the idea of “reform” 
or “renewal.”  However, if one considers the definition of “reform” or “renewal” 
within the Islamic tradition itself, the ḥadīth narrated in the Sunan of Abī Dāwūd, 
commonly referred to as the ḥadīth of tajdīd, must be referenced: “Verily Allah 
will send to this community at the onset of each one hundred years someone 
who will renew their dīn (religion).”29  In his commentary on this ḥadīth, al-Ābādī 
deciphers its meaning as: “reviving that which has been forgotten and neglected 
from the practical application of the Qur’an and Sunna, as well as what follows 
from their commands and principles.”30  One can then reasonably infer that 
tajdīd, from the perspective of Muslim scholars themselves, makes two 
assumptions: 1) that the practice of Islam amongst the faithful is liable to wane 
and fall in disrepair simply by the passage of time, and 2) that as this happens 
periodically a divine self-correction takes place by way of individuals who 
“renew the faith” for the believers.  Thus, rather than introduce unprecedented 
transformations into Islamic practice as some definitions of reform would 
suggest, renewal in the insider Islamic discourse involves re-establishing a 
status quo of sustainable practice, not the dismantling of it.  In this sense, al-
Dardīr could be considered a mujaddid (renewer) of sorts, as his efforts in 
articulating what had become a very large and perhaps unwieldy corpus of 
Islamic knowledge by the twelfth/eighteenth century in a manner that served not 
                                             
29 Muḥammad Ashraf al-Ṣiddīqī Ābādī, ‘Awn Al-Ma‘būd ‘Alā Sharḥ Sunan Abī Dāwūd (Beirut: 
Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2005), 1959. 
30 Ibid,1960. 
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just the specialists, but the masses as well, specifically in the three core 
disciplines of creed, jurisprudence, and Sufism.31  
Considering the arguments stated above, our definition of tradition for the 
purposes of this study is: 
The set of transmitted principles, norms, customs, methodologies, and 
reflected in the intellectual disciplines whose legitimacy is conferred by their 
commitment to uncovering the intent of the divine commandments as revealed 
in the Qur’ān and prophetic ḥadīth, the range and bound of which is 
circumscribed by scholarly consensus.    
Furthermore, the concept of sub-traditions, as discussed by Anjum, 
stating that these sub-traditions as: “conscious, rational mode of participating in 
an Islamic discursive tradition rather than as an unthought or unconscious deep 
structure waiting to be discovered by modern scholars.”32  As is discussed later, 
these sub-traditions, specifically the three core intellectual sub-traditions of 
creed, jurisprudence, and Sufism came to define authority and orthodoxy in the 
post-classical period, as reported by al-Dardīr.  The principal schools of 
theology: the Ash‘arī and Māturīdī, the four schools of jurisprudence, and the 
sharī’a bound Sufism of the Khalwatī, Qādirī, Shādhilī, and other orders came to 
define both authority, orthodoxy, and orthopraxy as means to accessing the 
larger Islamic tradition defined by the principles of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth, as 
well as the hermeneutical structures for their interpretation.  Spevak notes “that 
Sunnī orthodoxy is a methodology as much as it is a set of core creedal and 
legal points.”  He further argues that the “archetypal Sunnī scholar”, such as the 
focus of his study, al-Bājūrī (d. 1276/1860), is one in a continuum of archetypal 
scholars, characterised by their mastery of the three core disciplines mentioned 
                                             
31 For more on the tajdīd tradition, see: Ella Landau-Tasseron, "The "Cyclical Reform": A Study 
of the Mujadid Tradition," Studia Islamica 70 (1989). 
32 Anjum, "Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors," 662. 
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above.  Spevack, while outlining the broad lines of what he refers to as the 
“ikhtilāf-ijma‘ spectrum” and the general methodologies of theology, law, and 
Sufism, does not explore the specific facets of these core disciplines nor the 
evolving pedagogies in transmitting the Islamic tradition, as this study 
endeavours to do.33 
Regarding the issue of revival and reform in the eighteenth century 
specifically, a healthy debate initially arose in German academia concerning the 
emergence of an Islamic revival based upon a ḥadīth propelled “neo-Sufism” 
spearheaded by such geographically diverse figures such as Shah Walī Allah 
al-Dihlawī (d. 1176/1762) in India, Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī (d. 1205/1791) in Egypt, 
Abdullah ibn Sālim al-Baṣrī (d. 1134/1722) in the Hejaz, and Aḥmad ibn Idrīs (d. 
1253/1837) in the Maghreb.34  Though the debate is far from being settled, with 
proponents on either side of the “revival” thesis, it is nonetheless revealing that 
the debate is framed in terms of reform/revival or lack thereof.  This revival 
thesis contrasts with the Islamic ethos towards innovation (bid‘a) in matters of 
religion, often seen as corruptive by the ‘ulamā’.  The ‘ulamā’ in the pre-modern 
Islamic world were primarily concerned with the preservation of tradition, as 
embodied in the texts of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth, as well as the ancillary tools 
needed for their interpretation..  Both the content and its method of transmission 
constituted the authoritativeness of the tradition.  Therefore, a complete break, 
or rejection, of prior textual authority and its interpretive methods would have 
been anathema to the notion of authoritativeness. In the early nineteenth 
century a reformer like Muḥammad ‘Abdu was opposed by Muḥammad ‘Ilīsh, a 
                                             
33 See: Aaron Spevack, "The Archetypal Sunni Scholar: Law, Theology, and Mysticism in the 
Synthesis of Al-Bajuri" (Bston University, 2008). 
34 See Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, vol. 1760–1840 (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1979). Voll, "Abdallah Ibn Salim Al-Basri and 18th Century Hadith Scholarship."; 
Stefan Reichmuth, The World of Murtada  Al-Zabidi (1732-91): Life, Networks, and Writings 
(Cambridge: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2009). 
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member of the traditional Azhar vanguard, not for his imperative to introduce 
reforms in and of itself, but rather the manner by which he sought to do so, by 
rejection of previous authoritative tradition in the form of the four madhhabs in 
favour of interpreting the Qur’ān and ḥadīth by a personal interpretive method, a 
task that ‘Ilīsh thought he was not qualified to do, for his lack of training and 
deference to his intellectual predecessors.35 
 Indeed, the notion of “progress”, in the sense of increasing moral and 
ethical refinement was one very much alien to pre-modern societies, both in the 
East and the pre-Enlightenment West.  As Shils states: “It is not often that 
gratitude is expressed to those who have maintained institutions in the state in 
which they received them.  Their founders are praised; innovators are praised, 
but not those who have maintained what the innovators created.”36  
Both reformers and traditionalists frequently cite the ḥadīth of the Prophet 
Muḥammad regarding the superiority of the earlier generations as clear 
evidence of the inevitability of increasingly decadent times.37  Moreover, the 
gradual loss of knowledge due to the demise of scholars whose numbers are 
not replenished, and thereafter replaced by charlatans and demagogues is 
another theme cited in the Prophetic ḥadīth.38  No doubt this weighed heavily on 
the minds of successive generations of Muslim scholars and the ruling elite.  In 
the early Islamic period a reliance on oral transmission of both the Qur’ān and 
the ḥadīth was reinforced with written compilations and transmissions, though 
the authoritative transmission remained an oral one.39  As one early scholar 
                                             
35 I. Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolution of Modern Sunni 
Islam (London: Taurus Academic Studies, 2009), 93-98. 
36 Shils, Tradition, 2. 
37 Narrated in Bukhārī’s collection: “Khayr al-qurūn qarnī thumma al-ladhīna yalūnahum thumma 
al-ladhīna yalūnahum” Muḥammad ibn Isma‘īl al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhārī. (Cairo: Dār al-
Sha‘b, N.D.), 5:2-3. 
38 See the chapter on fitan (tribulations) in: ibid., 9:58-76. 
39 See Chase F. Robinson, Islamic Historiography, Themes in Islamic History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 176-77. 
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stated: “Knowledge was in the hearts (ṣudūr) and then recorded in lines (suṭūr), 
but the hearts remain its keys.”40   
Gradually the texts came to include not only the Qur’ān and ḥadīth, but 
also secondary texts that interpreted the meanings of the primary texts.  These 
secondary texts are what Schoeler refers to as muṣannafāt (authored books), 
which included earlier works that informed the later ḥadīth compilations that 
would develop into the canonical books (al-Bukhārī, Muslim, etc.), as well as 
books in other disciplines such as theology.  These books were subdivided by 
chapter and arranged according to subject matter.41  A premium was then 
placed on the veracity of the text via the soundness of the transmission.  As for 
the soundness of the conclusions and judgements documented therein by the 
author, a different set of criteria was needed. This led to the development of a 
culture of scholasticism, not unlike its counterpart in Europe.42  These 
secondary texts represented the continuous interpretive interaction of Muslim 
theologians and jurisprudents with the Islamic tradition, as well as forming the 
basis of the discursive relationship between successive generations of scholars.   
While the Qur’ān and ḥadīth always maintained their pre-eminence, the 
secondary interpretive texts documented the cumulative and discursive 
relationship of the human agents – the ‘ulamā’ – with the primary texts.  Specific 
regional traditions and historical factors provided a depth and fluidity to the 
tradition, so that a polemical theological treatise written in the fourth/tenth 
                                             
40 Abdullah Ibn Abī Jamri, Bahjat Al-Nufūs. (Cairo: Maṭbʼat al-Ḥalabī, 1981), 1:194. 
41 Gregor Schoeler, The Genesis of Literature in Islam : From the Aural to the Read (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 68. 
42 See George Makdisi and American Council of Learned Societies., The Rise of the Colleges : 
Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 
245-58. 
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century in Central Asia could be modified and explicated for seminary students 
in eleventh/seventeenth century Cairo.43 
For reasons that will become more apparent, renewal in the Islamic 
discourse, especially during the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, was 
characterised by a renewal in the manner of the preservation of tradition more 
than a renewal by way of undiscovered insights into the Islamic disciplines 
themselves.  As Graham notes about societies of the Islamic world: “greater 
value is…placed upon continuity with perceived traditional norms of great 
antiquity.”44  For example, Ibrāhīm al-Laqqānī (d.1041/1632), the seventeenth 
century Egyptian theologian, is credited with penning arguably the most 
authoritative mukhtaṣar (didactic text) in ‘ilm al-kalām (creedal theology), which 
remains the text of choice in many Islamic seminaries to the present day.  In the 
first few lines, he cites the impetus for writing Jawharat al-Tawḥīd (the Jewel of 
Monotheism) where he states: 45  
The knowledge of the foundational [principles] of religion  
 Is compulsory [but] in need of clarification 
But as a result of verbosity aspirations have waned 
 So abridgement has become essential 
 
The waning of aspirations that al-Laqqānī refers reflects his evaluation of 
student proclivities of his age.  To ensure the successful transmission of 
theological knowledge, which he sees as foundational, he deemed it necessary 
to simplify and abridge the manner by which it was taught.  The wide 
acceptance of al-Laqqānī’s text is demonstrated by the abundance of scholars 
both during his lifetime and even centuries onward that penned commentaries 
                                             
43 Such as in the kalām tradition, where most polemical works written against the Mu‘tazilites 
authored by Persian and Central Asian scholars such as al-Taftāzānī and al-Isfarāyinī, and later 
epitomised by Egyptian scholars such as al-Laqqānī and al-Dardīr.  This is more thoroughly 
explored in chapter 3. 
44 William A. Graham, "Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation " The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 23, no. 3 (1993): 499. 
45 Jawharat al-Tawhīd, lines 5-6 Abd al-Salām  al-Laqqānī, Itḥāf Al-Murīd Bi Jawharat Al-Tawḥīd 
(Aleppo: Maktabat Dār al-Falāḥ, 1990). 
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and glosses on the hundred-line poem.46   As a general trend, the emergence of 
the mukhtaṣar as a pedagogical text was firmly established by the thirteenth 
century.47  Though some researchers have argued that the impetus for the 
mukhtaṣar tradition was a desire to codify legal rulings to ensure uniform court 
verdicts, it remains to be seen how this would apply to the other disciplines 
(such as theology, grammar, and legal methodology) that were also subject to 
the mukhtaṣar tradition.48 
The significance of al-Dardīr’s contributions is then best characterised as 
a revival in terms of pedagogy and scholarly transmission, specifically in the 
disciplines of Mālikī jurisprudence and creedal theology.  His contributions to 
Sufism might be best summarized as a re-appropriation of the discipline of 
Sufism (taṣawwuf) and its inclusion in mainstream theological discourse 
regarding epistemology.  While classical works of Sufism may have been 
studied at al-Azhar and the madrassas, such as al-Risāla al-Qushayriyya, al-
Jabartī documents (and even laments) the proliferation of popular Sufism 
uninformed by the scholarly circles of al-Azhar.49 It is demonstrated in the third 
chapter that al-Dardīr’s explication of creed, most emphatically in 
epistemological terms, is completely synthesised with Sufi erudition and 
cognition, in a manner that extended beyond the work of his immediate 
predecessors, such as al-Laqqānī and al-Sanūsī.  
Moreover, the alleged renewer of the Khalwatī order in Egypt, the Syrian 
scholar Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī, who was the spiritual guide of al-Dardīr’s own guide, 
Muḥammad al-Ḥifnī, introduced an understanding of Sufism that found wide 
                                             
46 Such as the commentaries of Abdul-Salām al-Laqqānī (d. 1078/1667), Aḥmad al-Ṣawī (d. 
1241/1825), and Ibrahīm al-Bayjūrī (d. 1276/1860). 
47 M. Fadel, "The Social Logic of Taqlīd and the Rise of the Mukhtaṣar," Islamic Law and 
Society 3 (1996). 
48 Ibid.  
49 See, for example: al-Jabartī, 'Ajā'ib Al-Āthār Fi Al-Tarājim W'al-Akhbār, 2:154-55. 
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appeal amongst al-Azhar’s educated elite (in addition to being the inspiration for 
sub-orders in Sudan and North Africa).  He condemned what he deemed to be 
innovative and marginally heretical practices that had found their way into 
popular Egyptian Sufism.  He also was a major exponent of Akbarian Sufism50, 
like ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha‘rānī (d. 973/1565)51, before him, as he was a direct 
student of ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 1143/1731)52 in Damascus.  As a 
result, a more disciplined taṣawwuf emerged informed by creedal theology, as 
well as informed by Akbarian Sufism.  Al-Dardīr expanded upon this in his major 
work on creedal theology, al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya (The Radiant Pearl), where he 
includes several lines customarily reserved for treatises on taṣawwuf.53 This 
theme is further explored in its relevant section.54  In this sense, al-Dardīr can 
be viewed as a Sufi reformist of sorts, for his efforts in re-appropriating ṭarīqa 
based Sufism from practitioners considered to be lacking in their knowledge of 
the exoteric disciplines of kalām and fiqh.  From this perspective he is similar to 
al-Ghazālī before him, who reconciled ascetic Sufism (i.e. prior to the formation 
of the ṭarīqas) with the exoteric disciplines.  The main contrast between them 
can perhaps be summarised in that al-Ghazālī sought to legitimise Sufism 
according to the precepts of the sharī‘a, whereas al-Dardīr sought to reform the 
                                             
50 Akbarian Sufism permeates the thought of al-Dardīr and his direct predecessors.  The 
disclosure of God via the microcosm of the human condition and the macrocosm of the celestial 
world, the equation of God’s essence with a sole existence, and literalness of the divine 
attributes are some of its defining characteristics that al-Dardīr incorporates into his articulation 
of Islamic theology.  For Ibn ‘Arabī’s system of epistemology and cosmology, see Chittick’s: 
William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge : Ibn Al-ʿarabi's Metaphysics of Imagination 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); The Self-Disclosure of God : Principles of 
Ibn Al-ʿarabī's Cosmology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). 
51 See Michael Winter, Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt: Studies in the Writings of 
ʿAbd Al-Wahhab Al-Sharani (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982). 
52 See Sirriyeh, Sufi Visionary of Ottoman Damascus : ʿAbd Al-Ghanī Al-Nābulusī, 1641-1731. 
53 He includes repentance, remembrance of God, and spiritual purification – all topics 
traditionally covered in the realm of Sufism. 
54 Chapter 3. 
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practice of Sufism as embodied in the ṭarīqa, and therefore re-legitimise it 
according to the sharī‘a, after a period of perceived manipulation and decline.55 
Al-Dardīr represents perhaps the final articulation of an intellectual 
tradition before the paradigm changing effects of modernity shaped the early 
nineteenth century, and the subsequent trajectory of the Islamic tradition until 
contemporary times.  For the purposes of this study, the concept of the tradition 
defined above forms the framework by which al-Dardīr’s life and writings are 
analysed, in an effort to answer questions regarding his contributions to the 
Islamic tradition, his efforts to maintain it and preserve it, and specifically in light 
of the socio-cultural circumstances of his day.  Moreover, when speaking of the 
intellectual tradition, it may be more useful to speak of traditions, where the use 
of the plural reflects minor intellectual traditions under the broader concept of a 
major translocal, and networked transhistorical intellectual Islamic tradition.  The 
foundational texts and their interpretive methodologies form the binding 
underpinnings of this major tradition, as Sunni Muslims have at least always 
agreed upon the authoritativeness of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth, as well as the need 
for interpretive methodologies, though they may differ as to the operational 
principles of these methodologies. These sub-traditions, as reflected in the 
various Islamic disciplines, each contain their own terminologies, historical 
development, and scholars.  
Indeed, within al-Dardīr, we find all three traditions, i.e. of kalām, 
jurisprudence, and taṣawwuf, in perhaps their most mature form, owing to the 
weight of the cumulative tradition, without a sense of inner angst or 
contradiction, or even syncretism between disparate epistemological systems, 
as they all share the same epistemology and return to the same overarching 
                                             
55 See, for example, al-Bakrī’s critique of Sufis: Muṣṭafā Bakrī, Al-Suyūf Al-Ḥidād Fī ‘Anāq Ahl 
Al-Zandaqa Wa'l-Ilḥād (Cairo: Dār al-Āfāq al-‘Arabiyya, 2007). 
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tradition of Islam in general, which includes mechanisms for tolerance in 
diversity of readings and interpretation of the primary texts of the Qur’ān and 
ḥadīth.  
 The sub-traditions within the “larger” tradition of Islam underwent 
different developmental trajectories, though they often share the local and 
sociological circumstances that influenced said development. It is demonstrated 
in chapter four, for example, that the tradition of Mālikī fiqh underwent a unique 
developmental trajectory distinctive from that of the Shāfi‘ī or Ḥanafī traditions, 
an important factor to consider when examining al-Dardīr’s contributions to the 
Mālikī tradition.  This developmental trajectory was steered by factors unique to 
the eponymous imam, such as his method of teaching, the city of Medina, as 
well as the socio-political factors that affected the lands where Mālikī law 
became dominant.  The same can be said of the kalām tradition and the 
taṣawwuf tradition, which are also analysed in detail as relates to the works of 
al-Dardīr. 
 Furthermore, the use of the conceptual framework of tradition 
transmission is not limited to the intellectual disciplines but is also useful in 
analysing the public and social roles of the gatekeepers of tradition, the ‘ulamā’.  
The role of the ulamā’ as a distinct social group has been examined by many, 
but none in the sense of not merely being upholders of tradition, but rather the 
tradition of the ‘ulamā’ themselves, i.e. their interaction with society, and how 
society views them.  The ‘ulamā’ did not emerge as a distinct social identity until 
after the political schism that affected the tail end of the era of the “rightly 
guided caliphs” with the Umayyad tribe beginning their dynastic rule in earnest 
in the aftermath.  Consequently, a tradition of alternately shunning and 
engaging the “sultan” developed amongst the ‘ulamā’, who began to form a 
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distinct identity as several treatises were written advising the approach towards 
engaging the rulers, with sections of the Sufi pious literature dedicated to the 
topic.56   
A tradition developed amongst the ‘ulamā’, as regards their roles in their 
societies, and official roles such as teacher, mufti, qāḍī, and the like developed, 
as well as unofficial roles such as shaykh and Sufi murshid.  By placing al-
Dardīr in the specific narratives for the societal roles he occupied an analysis of 
his specific contributions are accessed against the cumulative discursive 
traditions specific to the occupations of the ‘ulamā’. 
By examining al-Dardīr’s life and works, an important aspect of 
eighteenth century Islamic scholarship and education can be uncovered, 
particularly in light of the “decline” thesis, that postulates Islamic learning 
suffered and waned from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries after reaching its 
apogee in the high period of the Abbasids.  Hence, al-Dardīr’s life from birth to 
death is examined in full, including his formative years (as a window into Islamic 
learning in the eighteenth century), his rise to prominence in Cairo as a member 
of the Azharī elite, and role as intercessor for societal grievances.  Dardīr’s 
oeuvre of some nineteen works (of which many remain extant in manuscript 
form) will be examined for style, content, and contribution to the respective 
disciplines.    
Therefore, in order to assess al-Dardīr’s contributions and impact, the 
intellectual and social milieu during his time as well as a period of time before 
his appearance is necessary.  The four main aspects of this study, namely, al-
                                             
56 See for example: ‘Abd Allāh  Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and Zakī Aḥmad, Al-Adab Al-Kabīr Wa-Al-Adab 
Al-Ṣaghīr  (Bayrūt: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2003); ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad Māwardī and Muḥammad Jāsim 
Ḥadīthī, Kitāb Naṣīḥat Al-Mulūk (Baghdād: Dār al-Shuʼūn al-Thaqāfīyah al-ʿĀmmah, 1986).  For 
studies regarding the role of the ‘ulamā’ with the caliphs and political authorities, see: 
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam : Custodians of Change 
(Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002); Knut S. Vikør, Between God and 
the Sultan : A History of Islamic Law (London: Hurst & Co., 2005). 
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Dardīr’s education and upbringing, his role as jurisprudent, as theologian, and 
finally as Sufi guide and public servant, are all explored from historical 
perspectives as well as contemporaneous trends in each respective field.  
Though each of the three core disciplines of theology, jurisprudence, and 
Sufism are usually treated as separate and distinct areas of inquiry, it is our 
assertion that they are inextricably related, especially when viewed from the 
prism of the Islamic intellectual tradition.  This may be particularly relevant in the 
later Islamic tradition, as much overlap in the Islamic disciplines in the works of 
the ‘ulamā’ attest to this.57  These themes form the basis of chapters two and 
three and are further explored there. 
To assess the contributions of al-Dardīr, the main research questions are 
as follows: 
1) How did al-Dardīr interact with the Islamic tradition, and what degree of 
influence did the interpretive tradition have in informing this interaction? 
2) How did al-Dardīr’s approach to the transmission of knowledge reflect 
the educational paradigm established by the discursive Islamic tradition, 
and in what were the means he sought to faithfully and successfully 
transmit it? 
3)  How did al-Dardīr epitomise the core Islamic disciplines of creedal 
theology, jurisprudence, and taṣawwuf? 
4) To what degree did the societal roles exercised by al-Dardīr reflect a 
tradition of engagement, collusion, or cooperation with the political elites? 
 
                                             
57 See the works of al-Sha’rānī and al-Nābulusī, for example: Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha‘rānī, Al-
Kibrīt Al-Aḥmar Fī ‘Ulūm Al-Shaykh Al-Akbar (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1998); ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb ibn Aḥmad Shaʿrānī and ʿAbd al-Wārith Muḥammad ʿAlī, Al-Yawāqīt Wa-Al-Jawāhir Fī 
Bayān ʿAqāʼid Al-Akābir. (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1998); ‘Abd al-Ghanī Nābulusī, Al-
Anwār Al-Ilāhiyya Sharḥ ‘Aqidat Al-Sanūsiyya, ed. ‘Umar ibn Muḥammad al-Shaykhlī, (Amman: 
Dār al-Nūr al-Mubīn, 2015). 
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This study identifies what was typical and indicative of late eighteenth 
century Islamic scholarship, particularly in the pedagogical method and 
transmission of knowledge.  Al-Dardīr’s social commentary comes across 
occasionally in his works of jurisprudence, and to a lesser extent, his works on 
Sufism, where he often comments on contemporary violations of Islamic 
principles, most often directed at the ruling elite, as well as other ‘ulamā’ who 
fail to live up to al-Dardīr’s moral and ethical standards.  These commentaries 
form the basis of the final chapter dealing with al-Dardīr’s societal roles and 
relationships.  
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Review of the Literature58 
 
While it appears that no Western study has specifically explored the life 
or writings of Aḥmad al-Dardīr, the former rector of al-Azhar, ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm 
Maḥmūd, authored a single volume on the subject.59 Maḥmūd primarily uses 
the occasion of chronicling al-Dardīr’s life to extol the virtues of taṣawwuf, as 
was his pattern in several other biographies he penned on prominent Sufi 
figures.60 He includes mostly anecdotal accounts of al-Dardīr’s exploits and also 
expounds on al-Dardīr’s positions regarding some of the various Sufi stations 
and terminology.  Therefore, Maḥmūd’s 163-page treatise (of which about half 
is devoted to excerpts from al-Dardīr’s Tuḥfat al-Ikhwān) cannot be considered 
a proper academic study of al-Dardīr’s life and works.  Additionally, an 
unpublished Masters dissertation written by a student of al-Azhar University in 
Cairo includes only a brief synopsis of al-Dardīr’s life while devoting the bulk of 
the study to a critical edition of al-Dardīr’s work on taṣawwuf, Tuḥfat al-
Ikhwān.61  
Western scholars have paid scant attention to al-Dardīr and his works.  
Most references to al-Dardīr in the literature refer to his role as Sufi guide and 
heir apparent to the revitalised Khalwatī order in Egypt.62  The dearth of 
references to al-Dardīr, or his contemporaries, for that matter, is not surprising 
considering that the Ottoman period is vastly understudied, especially the 
                                             
58 This literature review examines the general secondary literature regarding intellectual and 
social trends in the Ottoman era from a general perspective.  Secondary literature pertaining to 
specific analyses of the Islamic traditions of theology, jurisprudence, and Sufism is more 
thoroughly examined in the relevant chapters. 
59 Abd al-Ḥalīm  Maḥmūd, Abū Al-Barakāt Sayyidī Aḥmad Al-Dardīr (Cairo: Dar al-M'ārif, 2001). 
60 Such as his biographies of Abū Madyan Shu‘ayb (d. 594/1198), Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 283/896) 
and Aḥmad al-Badawī (d. 675/1260). 
61 Muḥammad Fuḍālī Zaynī, "Taḥqīq Kitāb Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān" (al-Azhar, 1981). 
62 See for example: Rachida Chih, Mayeur-Jaouen, Catherine, Le Soufisme À L'époque 
Ottomane, Xvie-Xviiie Siècle, Cahiers Des Annales Islamologiques (Le Caire: Institut français 
d'archéologie orientale, 2007).  Chih has also penned an introduction on al-Dardīr specifically: 
(Rachida Chih, "Autorité Religieuse Et Rôle Public D’un Ouléma D’al-Azhar Au Xviiie Siècle : 
Vie Et Carrière Du Cheikh Ahmad Al-Dardîr (1715-1786)," (2012). 
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religious and cultural aspects of the Arab Ottoman provinces.  Some recent 
scholarship has begun to lift the cloud surrounding this aspect of Islamic and 
Near Eastern history, most notably by the French scholar Andre Raymond and 
his student Nelly Hanna as regards the period’s social history.63 Hanna explores 
the development of the literary middle class in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century Egypt, specifically one that progressed outside the customary confines 
of the scholarly and ruling elite.64  She notes that the ‘ulamā’ of the Ottoman 
period in Egypt began writing in a looser, more accessible manner so as to 
appeal to a nascent literate middle class comprised of artisans and traders who 
were members of the growing Sufi ṭarīqas.  However, Hanna appears to stretch 
her conclusions when identifying the “radical intellectual”, using the writings of 
an “Abū Dhākir” from an untitled manuscript as the sole example.  She 
concludes that Abū Dhakir’s criticism of the abstract “fatwa” of the ‘ulamā’ and 
their acquisition of knowledge by way of isnād only are reason enough to 
declare the emergence of “modernity” prior to the nineteenth century, in 
opposition to the dominant narrative.   
In this manner she seems to follow a similar path as Peter Gran, who 
attempted in his much-maligned project to establish an indigenous basis for 
modernity independent of European influence.65  Yet the argument seems 
suspect; in the case of Hanna, the distinction between fatwa and theoretical 
jurisprudential scenarios found in many fiqh manuals appears to be lost, 
thereby weakening her argument, as many of the ‘ulamā’ opposed theoretical 
argumentation. The fatwa, on the other hand, is a religious edict issued in 
                                             
63 See for example: André Raymond, Cairo (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University 
Press, 2000); Nelly Hanna, In Praise of Books : A Cultural History of Cairo's Middle Class, 
Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century, Middle East Studies Beyond Dominant Paradigms 
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2003). 
64 In Praise of Books : A Cultural History of Cairo's Middle Class, Sixteenth to the Eighteenth 
Century. 
65 See Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760–1840. 
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response to a specific case posed by the solicitor.   Gran assumes that a 
parallel enlightenment of sorts in the Arab East began in earnest in the 
eighteenth century and formed the basis for its own modernity that took hold in 
the nineteenth century.  However, he offers little evidence for this except his 
perception of increased attention to ḥadīth studies, based upon their extant 
numbers in Cairo’s manuscript libraries.  He then postulates that the revival of a 
Māturīdī theology coupled with a renewed interest in ḥadīth as a movement 
away from the highly deterministic Ash‘arī Aristotelian theology, and hence, a 
movement towards a more man-centred and capitalistic cosmology. From there, 
he posits that the socio-economic factors that precipitated the European 
Enlightenment were also in effect for the Muslim world.  He attributes the 
emphasis placed on the study of ḥadīth, by which he asserts by the virtue of the 
number of copies of al-Bukhārī’s compendium in the Egyptian National 
Archives, as a shift from a theocentric paradigm to a homocentric one.  
Notwithstanding the questionable methodology for positing the ḥadīth emphasis 
(al-Bukhārī’s compendium was similar to the Qur’ān in that it was a liturgical 
book that was commonly read in majālis and times of crisis), there is no 
indication that Muslim theology underwent such a shift.  Gran also does not fail 
to make the same assumptions as other Western scholars in search of the 
Muslim Enlightenment, namely that such a phenomenon exists to begin with. 
 Additionally, Gran makes numerous historical mistakes, such as 
claiming that Muṣṭafā al-Ṣawī was the khalīfa of al-Dardīr, when in fact it was 
Aḥmad al-Ṣawī.  He also assumes that the shaykh of the branch of the Khalwatī 
order to which al-Dardīr was affiliated was a fusion of the older Egyptian 
Khalwatī order and the Bakriyya family of ashrāf (descendants of the Prophet 
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Muḥammad who also had their own order), when in fact they were two separate 
entities.66 
Jane Hathaway offers a general overview of the Ottoman provinces, 
outlining political, economic and religious-intellectual developments during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.67  She cites some of the burgeoning 
intellectual trends of the late eighteenth century such as “neo-Sufism” and 
Wahhabism.  Yet, like many of her predecessors, she subscribes to the idea of 
a centuries long tension between Sufism and Islamic orthodoxy that finally 
reached a “rapprochement” in the late eighteenth century with the rise of the 
Khalwatī order in Egypt and its subsequent espousal by the majority of the 
Azharī ‘ulamā’.  It remains to be seen, however, if the nature of the Egyptian 
‘ulamā’ justifies such a view of tension and subsequent rapprochement in light 
of the fact of a continuous adoption and advocacy of Sufism from at least the 
Mamlūk era.68  Marsot provides an insightful social and culture history of the 
various social classes in eighteenth century Egypt; she points to the essential 
role of the ‘ulamā’, and asserts: “economic, social, religious, or even minor daily 
activities could not be conducted without them.”69  She also alleges that many 
of the more prominent members of the ‘ulamā’ class were able to enrich 
themselves via their caretaker roles of religious endowments as well as their 
                                             
66 For a more thorough exposition of Gran’s errors, see: P. De Jong F. and Gran, "Review: On 
Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760-1840," International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 14, no. 3 (1982); Gabriel Baer, "Review: [Untitled]," Journal of the Economic and 
Social History of the Orient 25, no. 2 (1982). 
67 Jane Hathaway, The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800 (Harlow, England ; New 
York :: Pearson Longman, 2008). 
68 The athbāt (scholarly lineages) of scholars such as al-Dardīr and al-Ḥifnī indicate that Sufism 
was well established amongst the ‘ulamā’ from at least the time of the late Mamlūk era scholar, 
Zakariyyā al-Anṣarī (d. 926/1520), whose epithet of “Shaykh al-Islām” indicates his standing 
amongst the ‘ulamā’.  This theme is elucidated further in Chapter 3. 
69 Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, Women and Men in Late Eighteenth-Century Egypt, Modern 
Middle East Series Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995). 
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established links with the Mamlūk elites.70  While such enrichment is not 
expressly characterised as usurpation, it is nonetheless clearly implied.  She 
does also point out the more noble stances of some of the ‘ulamā’, such as Alī 
al-Ṣa‘īdī al-‘Adawī, al-Dardīr’s teacher and kinsman.  
Michael Winter offered a pioneering study of the most significant early 
Ottoman Egyptian scholar and Sufi master, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha’rānī (d. 
973/1565).71  He describes the relationship between the ‘ulamā’ and the Sufi 
orders, depicting the palpable tension between them.  Though many of the 
‘ulamā’ were themselves members of Sufi orders, or even their leaders, the 
Ottoman era witnessed the rise of a “popular” or “folk” Sufism that often 
operated outside of the purview of the scholarly elite.  Though Winter does not 
offer a definitive explanation as to the reason for such a phenomenon, he cites 
the transformation of the Khalwatī order from “non-orthodox Turkish Sufism” to 
one characterised as a “bastion of orthodoxy with unrivalled supremacy 
amongst the ‘ulamā’ of al-Azhar.”72  Winter also tempers Marsot’s stance on the 
‘ulamā’ somewhat by declaring: “…few strong-minded ulama [sic], who shunned 
the company of the rulers and turned down their benefits, were respected and 
even feared by the emirs.”73  
The “decline and revival” thesis espoused by Gran is not dissimilar to the 
“reform and revival” thesis of Voll and the German academic, Schulze.  Both 
theses assume a preceding period of dormancy, if not outright decline, 
coinciding with the onset of Ottoman rule in Egypt in the early to mid sixteenth 
century.   In the case of Voll, scholarly circles in the Hejaz (Mecca and Medina) 
                                             
70 "The Political and Economic Functions of the 'Ulamā' in the 18th Century," Journal of the 
Economic and Social History of the Orient 16, no. 2/3 (1973); Women and Men in Late 
Eighteenth-Century Egypt. 
71 Michael Winter, Society & Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt : Studies in the Writing of 'Abd Al-
Wahhab (New Brunswick, [N.J.]: Transaction, 2007). 
72 Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule: 1517-1798 (London: Routledge, 1992), 133. 
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that sparked a renewed interest in ḥadīth sciences and a realignment of Sufism 
with Sunni orthodoxy were responsible for various Islamic “revivals” in West 
Africa, North Africa, Egypt, and the hinterlands of Arabia.74   
Schulze, like Gran, specifically searches for roots of an “Islamic 
Enlightenment” of the eighteenth century that parallels the European version of 
the same century.  However, as pointed out by Peters, the starting point for 
such a thesis is suspect as it assumes that similar cultural, social, and 
intellectual factors affecting the European Enlightenment were also relevant for 
an Islamic one, when no tangible evidence exists for such an assumption.75  
Voll, unlike Gran and Schulze, sees the process of reform and renewal as a 
cyclical one in the Islamic world, echoing the sentiments of the arguably the 
world’s first social historian, Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406), who theorised in his 
Muqaddima that civilised societies eventually grow decadent and weaken, 
opening a vacuum for more intrepid political movements hailing from the less 
civilised interior and countryside to reinvigorate society and reset the clock until 
they too become decadent and are replaced by a more zealous movement.76  
Such a theory could be argued for the so-called decline of the Islamic world 
after the sixteenth century, but it fails to explain how the more zealous 
Ottomans managed to precipitate the cultural and intellectual decline in the 
Arab provinces despite their political ascendancy in Europe and Asia Minor prior 
to the early eighteenth century.  Among Western historians, even those who 
                                             
74 Often referred to as “Neo-Sufism”, a term first coined by Fazlur Rahman. See Fazlur 
Rahman, Islam & Modernity : Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago ; London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982); John Obert Voll, "Islam as a Special World-System," 
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75 See Reinhard Schulze, "Das Islamische Achtzehnte Jahrhundert: Versuch Einer 
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challenge the Orientalist paradigm, the paradigm of “decline and 
revival/renewal” remains the dominant motif. 
Khaled El-Rouayheb makes a critical point regarding the decline/revival 
thesis – namely that it assumes a preceding period of decline in order for a 
revival to occur; he further challenges the notion that the seventeenth century 
was a period of decline by examining the perceived renewed interest in the 
Arab world of the rational sciences, including manṭiq (logic); as well as the 
resurgence of hitherto non-Arab Sufi orders in the Arab lands such as the 
Nakhshabandiyya, Khalwatiyya, and Shattariyya.77  El-Rouayheb also posits 
that historians have assumed a decidedly “Arab-centric” view on the period 
between the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries and have virtually ignored the 
contributions of the ‘ulamā’ in Persia and India.78  Yet, he seems to make two 
implicit assumptions: 1) that a renewed interest in logic and the rational 
sciences constitutes a “fluorescence”; and 2) that the decline thesis may still be 
applicable with a change of dates – from the seventeenth century to the 
sixteenth century.79  While intellectual trends in the sixteenth century are 
outside the scope of this study, it appears that the vestiges of nineteenth 
century Orientalism remain influential – a “decline” must have occurred 
sometime – but without definitive evidence to pinpoint either its time or location 
within the Islamic world.  Though it is undeniable that the intellectual and 
cultural aspects of a region are affected by its political and economic fortunes, 
                                             
77 See Khaled El-Rouayheb, "Was There a Revival of Logical Studies in Eighteenth-Century 
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78 Ibid. 
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Islamic societies have demonstrated a remarkable resiliency to external 
disturbances.  While it remains the conventional wisdom to consider the 
influence of the political and economic background of any historical era, 
exaggerating the significance of such factors while making particular 
assumptions about their effects will invariably lead to skewed results and faulty 
conclusions. 
Several recent attempts have been made at shedding new light on the 
late Ottoman period in Egypt via the study of other prominent intellectual 
figures.  Perhaps one of the more comprehensive works is that of Stefan 
Reichmuch, in his dedicated study of al-Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī, the Indian sharif and 
prolific scholar of language, ḥadīth, and taṣawwuf.80  Reichmuch chronicles al-
Zabīdī’s life story and travels, his many scholarly and pious networks, and his 
contribution to eighteenth century Islamic intellectual life via his main two 
contributions, glosses on the Ihyā ‘Ulūm al-Dīn of al-Ghazālī and the lexicon of 
al-Fayruzabādī, al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ.  Reichmuth asserts that al-Zabīdī 
spearheaded a particular intellectual revival that was characterised by a 
rededication to ḥadīth studies, in particular the neglected art of ḥadīth narration 
in the scholarly salon (majlis); and by a renewed focus on expositing the 
cardinal principles of taṣawwuf and reconciling it with the core tenets of 
orthodox Islam.  He also attempts to identify common trends in eighteenth 
century intellectual life in general, remarking that al-Zabīdī’s thought and 
methodology parallel intellectual trends of the European enlightenment: 
“Zabīdī’s endeavours to harmonise the different strands of religious, literary and 
naturalist scholarship which were available to him at his time can be compared 
with the European encyclopaedic and lexicographical enterprises which are 
                                             
80 See Reichmuth, The World of Murtada  Al-Zabidi (1732-91): Life, Networks, and Writings. 
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commonly regarded as the crucial feature of the European intellectual 
landscape of that period.”81   
This study endeavours to address the issues of the eighteenth century 
Muslim world in terms of its intellectual landscape, via the scholarship of al-
Dardīr, according to a cognitive framework derived from within the tradition, in 
an attempt to offer a new perspective on the intellectual value of early modern 
Islamic scholarship. 
  
                                             
81 Reichmuth, The World of Murtada  Al-Zabidi (1732-91): Life, Networks, and Writings, 333. 
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Political and social climate in Ottoman Egypt at the time of al-Dardīr 
The eighteenth century in Egypt was a period of both stability and tumult, 
a period of both triumph and loss, and a period of both continuation and 
renewal.  Perhaps Dickens’s locution referring to the same time period in 
England and France – it was the best of times and the worst of times – is 
equally applicable to this land across the Mediterranean.82  Though Egypt was 
clearly an Ottoman province, the Ottomans themselves were hard-pressed to 
maintain sovereignty over their most important and productive possession.  The 
Mamlūk beys had reasserted their authority, establishing the “shaykh al-balad” 
as the de-facto ruler, effectively relegating the Ottoman viceroy to mere tax 
collector and prisoner of the citadel, rarely venturing out of the royal palace.  
This development, which was concomitant with costly Ottoman wars in Eastern 
Europe and weakening of the central authority, left the Egyptianised Mamlūks to 
fill the power vacuum.  They did not fail to seize the opportunity.  This 
arrangement suited both Ottomans and Mamlūks for a time in the early 
eighteenth century, when a period of relative stability ensued and Egypt 
enjoyed a surplus trade balance in its role as primary supplier of coffee and 
cotton to Europe.  It is even suggested that eighteenth century Egypt was more 
profitable to the Porte than the seventeenth, when it fully held the reigns of 
power without Mamlūk interference.  Ottoman officials were able to benefit from 
illegal and exorbitant tax collecting from a hapless populace as long as a milieu 
of competition was maintained between the Mamlūk houses, which were the 
                                             
82 The first line from Charles Dickens’s famous novel, A Tale of Two Cities. 
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instruments of collection.83  Al-Dardīr laments this development and declares its 
illegitimate nature on several occasions.84 
 However, several developments rendered the status quo untenable.  
Chief amongst these was the increasing hubris and greed of the Mamlūk beys, 
who began instituting unfavourable tax schemes on both European imports 
arriving in Egyptian ports, as well as on the hapless peasantry, who were 
finding it increasing difficult to maintain a living under the iltizām tax farm 
system.  This was a direct result of their consolidation of power under the 
leading Bey, complete with the honorific title of Shaykh al-Balad, even gaining 
recognition from the Porte as the de-facto ruler of Egypt.  This regime of state-
sponsored oppression climaxed during the duumvirate reign of Ibrāhīm Bey (d. 
1232/1817) and Murād Bey (d. 1215/1801) after the death of their master 
Muḥammad Bey “Abū al-Dhahab” (d. 1189/1775) during a military campaign in 
Palestine on behalf of the Ottoman sultan against provincial chieftains who had 
their own designs on autonomy from Ottoman suzerainty.  Muḥammad Bey 
differed from his predecessor, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr (d. 1187/1773) in that he 
pursued a more conciliatory tone with the Sublime Porte and avoided open 
insurrection, as ‘Alī Bey had done, who had minted his own currency, and more 
importantly, withheld the annual tribute to Istanbul.  Upon the death of Abū al-
Dhahab, Ibrāhīm and Murād assumed power along the lines of traditional power 
as established by ‘Alī Bey with Ibrāhīm assuming the office of Shaykh al-Balad 
and Murād as Amīr al-Hajj.85 
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 It was during the reign of Ibrāhīm and Murād, which lasted until 
Bonaparte’s invasion in 1798, that Egypt experienced its most oppressive 
Mamlūk regime during the Ottoman period.  Ibrāhīm and Murād pursued a 
similar policy to ‘Alī Bey, seeking outright independence from the Ottoman 
Sultan, while also evoking the ire of French merchants and Egyptian peasants, 
who were subject to exorbitant taxes to fund the on-again off-again rivalry 
between the two beys.  Some have even suggested that this was the true 
motivation for the French invasion that ended the duumvirate reign.86  Before 
the French invasion however, the Ottoman Sultan sent his premier admiral, 
Ghazi Ḥasan Pasha, in 178687 to reassert the Porte’s suzerainty in Egypt.  
Ḥasan’s forces were able to drive out the two beys and banish them to the 
marginalised confines of Upper Egypt, and install their preferred Bey, Isma‘īl as 
the new shaykh al-balad in Cairo.  However, the victory was short-lived, as the 
admiral was recalled to Istanbul to lead the costly Ottoman campaign against 
the Russians, and Ibrāhīm and Murād were ultimately able to drive out their rival 
and re-establish their duumvirate.  Thus, their reign of exorbitance and 
usurpation did not again come to a halt until it breathed its last with Napoleon’s 
invasion in 1798, ushering in a new era of foreign rule in Egypt that would 
continue until the free officers’ military coup in 1952. 
 Categorising the social classes in Egypt, and more specifically, Cairo, 
presents a formidable challenge.  Most historians allege three broad categories: 
the ruling elite, who include both the high ranking Ottoman officials and the 
Mamlūk notables; the large peasant and artisan class; and the intermediary 
class of the religious elite, the ‘ulamā’.  Marsot follows the traditional line of 
thinking on this issue and posits that the ‘ulamā’ formed “a group which though 
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87 Also the year of al-Dardīr’s death. 
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belonging to the elite nonetheless had no direct authority in the state, save in 
religious and legal matters, and which while stemming from the people yet was 
not identified either with the mass or with the rulers.”88  Marsot further states 
that the relationship between the ruling elite and the ‘ulamā’ was a tenuous one 
characterised as a battle of wits, for the ‘ulamā’ had no powers of real coercion 
save for their ability to rouse and placate the crowd.89  This particular narrative 
is one that has survived for decades, as scholars who have written more 
recently more or less uphold its foundations.90  However, Marsot seems to 
neglect or underemphasise scholars such as al-Dardīr and al-Ṣa‘īdī, whom al-
Jabartī considers as examples of scholars of principle who often commanded 
the respect and admiration of the ruling class, beyond a fear of their ability to 
rouse the crowd.91  
Al-Dardīr, his teachers, al-Ḥifnī, al-Ṣa’īdī, and virtually all of the rectors of 
al-Azhar, as well as those ‘ulamā’ who assumed other positions of authority, 
were all born outside of Cairo.  Many came from Lower Egypt, the fertile Nile 
delta, such as al-Ḥifnī, as well as Upper Egypt, such as al-Dardīr and al-
Ṣa’īdī.92  Al-Ḥifnī, for example, copied manuscripts for a living early in his 
career.  It was only after gathering the attention of a wealthy Mamlūk patron, 
presumably, was he able to dedicate himself fully to lecturing, writing, and 
otherwise transmitting that which he had spent decades acquiring.93    
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 The ease by which village boys of both Upper Egypt and the Nile delta 
could enter into the scholarly elite of Cairo underlines the egalitarian nature of 
Islamic learning, as well as the social mobility provided by Islamic learning, 
even as late as the latter part of the eighteenth century.  In fact, it remained the 
only institution in Ottoman Egypt, or any of the other Arab provinces for that 
matter, where such egalitarianism held sway.  The structure of the elite Ottoman 
corps as well as the Mamlūk notables made no provision for such “social 
mobility.”  Even in the Sufi orders, many of which were dominated by particular 
families, such as the Bakriyya and Wafā’iyya, leadership was determined via 
hereditary lines.  During the latter part of the nineteenth century, and even until 
the present day, we find that many, if not the majority of Sufi leadership 
positions are inherited along familial lines.  It is perhaps for this reason, even 
partially, that the Azhar elite commanded great respect from both rulers and the 
ruled, as well as wielding significant power in influencing public opinion.  
Additionally, the ‘ulamā’ also composed the sole indigenous elite of Egyptian 
society, a situation that continued until the Free Officers’ revolution of 1952. 
 Outside of al-Azhar and the circles of the scholarly elite, there were two 
main families that formed the aristocracy of Egyptian Sufism: the Bakriyya (not 
to be confused with branch of Khalwatī Sufism that was founded by Muṣṭafā al-
Bakrī, though they share the same name), and the Wafā’iyya.  The Bakriyya 
were descendants of the first caliph, Abū Bakr (d. 12/634), and also claimed to 
be descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad via his grandson, al-Ḥasan (d. 
50/669).  The Wafā’iyya were also descendants of the Prophet, but via his 
grandson al-Ḥusayn (d. 61/680).   Winter alleges that the Wafā’iyya were the 
more prestigious family, but were later surpassed by the Bakriyya, as the title of 
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naqīb al-ashrāf, or head of the sharifan nobles, was monopolised by the 
Bakriyya in the seventeenth century.94 
Most studies of the social history of the period concentrate on either the 
military or the intellectual elites.  However, the disposition and nature of the 
unlearned classes, who formed the majority of the population, remains elusive.  
Pinpointing literacy rates, for example, is exceedingly difficult.  However, as the 
scholarly population in the late eighteenth century was observed by the French 
to number around 5000 (who were most certainly literate), and an additional 
5000 of the wealthy bourgeoisie (most likely literate), and a further 15,000 
artisans, shopkeepers, and retailers (most probably literate), then a minimal 
literacy rate of 25-33% can be assumed for Cairo’s male population (with a total 
population of 80,000).95  Reliable figures for the female population and the 
Egyptian countryside are even more elusive, but Lane remarked that he 
encountered a kuttāb school in every village he visited and that he found some 
mixed gender kuttāb schools as well as others dedicated for girls.96  Whatever 
the case may be, it is doubtful that literacy rates for any other segment of the 
population were higher than the one third to one fourth estimated for Cairo 
males. 
A reading of al-Jabartī as well other anecdotal histories of the same time 
or similar time period, such as Lane’s Manners and Customs leaves the reader 
with the impression that ritual heteropraxy was fairly common amongst the 
uneducated, especially under the tutelage of Sufi shaykhs.  These claims also 
appear to be substantiated by al-Dardīr in several of his works, especially those 
pertaining to creedal theology.  The spiritual predecessor of al-Dardīr, Muṣṭafā 
                                             
94 Winter, Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule: 1517-1798, 138-40. 
95 Figures taken from Raymond, Cairo, 207-8. See also Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to the 
History of Education in Modern Egypt, 10. 
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al-Bakrī, also alludes to this phenomenon in his works on taṣawwuf, where he 
laments the prevalence of false Sufi practitioners who assume the dress and 
idiolect of the shaykhs, and use their position of influence to enrich 
themselves.97  Al-Jabartī also does not fail to capture this phenomenon, as his 
annals are littered with accounts of eccentric individuals captivating the interest 
of many of Cairo’s urban poor, whom he disparagingly refers to as awbāsh 
(riffraff).98  Being a member of the scholarly elite, this comes as no surprise; yet 
similar contempt is not palpable in either the writings of al-Dardīr or al-Bakrī.  
Rather, their criticism is directed towards the charlatans where they emphasize 
the need for following authentic scholarship.  They speak to the murīds, or 
would-be disciples, urging them to take heed and avoid the pitfalls of the Sufi 
charlatans.  In very much the same style of another Sufi “reformer”, the fifteenth 
century Moroccan, Aḥmad Zarrūq (d. 899/1493), they enumerate the qualities 
and attributes of “the shaykh”, listing god-fearingness (taqwa) and strict 
observance of the sharī‘a as essential to the selection of a proper guide on the 
spiritual path.  This underscores the general mentality and cosmology of the 
eighteenth century Muslim, namely that religion remained the essential source 
for making sense of one’s existence as well as living one’s life.   
This paradigm was not to be seriously challenged until the advent of the 
sweeping institutional and educational reforms enacted by Muḥammad Ali 
Pasha (d. 1265/1849), the Albanian self-declared ruler of Egypt under nominal 
Ottoman suzerainty after the Napoleonic invasion of 1798-1801.  Perhaps the 
most devastating reform to this existing paradigm was the systematic 
marginalisation of the ‘ulamā’ by usurping their pious and religious endowments 
and thereby effectively ending their independence of the state.  Ironically, it was 
                                             
97 Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī, Al-'Ara'is Al-Qudsiyya (Cairo: Dar al-Karaz, 2008), 94-95. 
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the ‘ulamā’ themselves who clamoured for Ali’s ascendancy after the expulsion 
of the last French troops from Egypt.99 
Additionally, the ‘ulamā’ were the sole vanguard against despotism and 
tyranny, whether incurred by the Ottoman authorities or the Mamlūk emirs.  
They were the only segment of society that regularly interacted with both the 
ruling elites as well as the general laity.  They also commanded esteem and 
respect from both.   Thus they were the stabilising force that the ruling elites 
counted on to maintain order, and the laity counted on to intercede to the ruling 
elites on their behalf.  Napoleon Bonaparte clearly realised this when he sought 
to curry the ‘ulamā’s’ favour by forming an executive dīwān that consisted of 
some of the most respected Azhar ‘ulamā’.  Amongst them was Abd Allah al-
Sharqāwī (d. 1227/1812), the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar at the time and fellow 
Sufi of the Khalwatī order of al-Dardīr.100  
 As trusted interpreters of the sharī‘a, the upholding of justice and the 
securitisation of individual and societal rights was viewed as falling squarely 
within the responsibilities of the ‘ulamā’, effectively providing an essential 
counterbalance to a political system where absolute executive authority rested 
with the ruler, with no other form of oversight in place to curb its tyranny.  Of 
course, there was a formal process by which to address grievances via the 
court system, but as only Turks were appointed as judges, it appears as there 
was a general reluctance on the part of the Egyptians to approach judges for 
crimes of usurpation of the ruling class.  This was most likely due to the fact that 
the Turkish judges were viewed as either complicit or at the very least 
ineffectual.  In either case, they were not accorded the same esteem as that 
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that was reserved for the Egyptian ‘ulamā’, who were seen as “of the people”, 
but also as guardians of justice.101 
The prevalence of less than strict practice of Islamic etiquettes, 
especially as regards to those associated with the Sufi orders, provoked the ire 
of several reformers in the Muslim world of the eighteenth century.  Lane 
recounts in detail the particularly curious practices of the Rifā’ī order, such as 
the eating of glass and the swallowing of whole swords, and an offshoot of the 
Aḥmadiyya plucking the hair off a donkey at the mausoleum of Aḥmad al-
Badawī in Ṭanṭa.102  The pressures of a vastly weakened central government, 
the usurpation of the Mamlūk beys, an expanding uneducated urban class, and 
impending European superiority all contributed to an environment in Egypt and 
beyond that was ripe for renewalist and reformist projects.  
Cultural and Intellectual Climate at the time of al-Dardīr 
 
Only recently has there been a challenge103 to the prevailing narrative of 
the decline and stagnation of a glorious Arab-Islamic civilisation that began in 
earnest after the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols, and with it, the Abbasid 
caliphate in 1258.  The long, hard fall culminated in the ascendancy of the 
belligerent Ottoman sultanate, having captured Islam’s political and intellectual 
centre, Egypt, in 1517, from the Mamlūks, Saladin’s inheritors and last 
upholders of Arab-Islamic culture and intellectualism.  This narrative has been 
prescribed by both Western and Arab intellectuals alike, though they disagree 
somewhat on the cause and effect.  Arab intellectuals such as Georgi Zaydan 
and even the Azhar chronicler Abd al-Mun’im Khafājī attribute the decline to 
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“Turkish occupation” and suppression of the Arab-Islamic intellectual legacy.  
Khafājī goes so far as to imply that the Ottomans sought to supplant the Arabic 
language with Turkish, an assertion for which there is no historical evidence.104 
 Zaydan and Khafājī wrote in a time when the Muslim world was still 
reeling from the last vestiges of European colonialism and rising Arab 
nationalism, both of which viewed the Ottoman Empire as an unfortunate 
misstep that has been traversed and a true Arab renaissance could begin in 
earnest.  Such is the narrative that propels criticism of the culture of al-Azhar, 
Egyptian Sufism, and the ‘ulamā’ class.  It is also the same narrative adopted by 
Islamic reform movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as 
the Wahhābī and Salafī reductionists, as well as some of the political Islamist 
movements, such as the Muslim brotherhood.105 
 Western scholars have also adopted a similar narrative – though for 
different reasons and dissimilar pretences.  Traditional Orientalists, such as 
Lewis and Coulson, posit that the “golden era” of Islam breathed its last at the 
end of the fourteenth century, precipitated and hastened by the fall of Baghdad, 
the then greatest city in Islam, to the Mongols, in 1258.106  Like their Arab 
counterparts, they associate the Muslim world’s intellectual fortunes with their 
political ones, a stance which remains the bane of many historians, especially 
those of the “exotic” Orient.  While a contrast in the focus and material of 
Islamic writings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be readily 
discerned, whether or not such a contrast represents a decline or stagnation 
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remains an open question.  These works should be evaluated on their individual 
merits, rather than holding them up to imagined criteria of a bygone era that 
vastly differed in terms of their political and cultural aspects. 
 Scholars have tended to focus on three main themes in seventeenth and 
eighteenth century intellectual life in the Muslim world: the renewal of ḥadīth 
studies, “neo-Sufism”, and “reductionist reformism”.107  Certain figures feature 
prominently in this discourse, such as Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, Ibrāhīm al-
Kūrānī (d. 1101/1689), Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī (d. 1205/1791), Shah Walī Allah al-
Dihlawī (d. 1176/1762), and Muḥammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1206/1792).  
Voll traces the origins of the three themes to a common source – the intellectual 
salons of the Hejaz during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
where Indian and Arab Islamic scholarship participated in an exchange of ideas 
forming a “scholarly community” that ostensibly placed more emphasis on 
ḥadīth studies than on madhhab jurisprudence, and sought to reorient Sufism to 
more closely align with orthodox practices.108   
Dallal has challenged the assertion of Voll that the reformist eighteenth 
century intellectual trends can be traced to a common origin.  He argues that to 
categorise diverse approaches, such as that of al-Dihlawī, who advocated 
Sufism, and that of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, who completely rejected it as a 
heretical practice, under a single rubric, is misleading.109  This point is driven 
home in his comparison of the Indian and Najdi scholars, where he states that: 
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“It is perhaps safe to state up front that Walī Allah would have disagreed with 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb on every single issue he addressed.”110   
A more plausible conclusion that does not reject Voll’s single origin 
thesis, or Dallal’s repudiation of it, is that the Muslim world (specifically the Arab 
Ottoman provinces of Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Hejaz) during the 
eighteenth century was subject to a common set of political and social dynamics 
that undoubtedly influenced its intellectual dynamics as well.  Politically, 
decentralisation of power and acceding of it to local authorities by the Ottomans 
was a common trend across all Arab provinces.  Local leaders in Egypt and 
Syria in the latter half of the eighteenth century even felt emboldened enough to 
challenge the charade of Ottoman suzerainty and claim outright sovereignty.111  
The leading ‘ulamā’ of all three centres traced their intellectual 
genealogies (sanad) back to common Mamlūk era scholars, such as Zakariyyā 
al-Anṣarī, Jalal al-Dīn al-Suyūtī (d. 911/1505) and Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalānī.  This 
is especially significant in the ḥadīth sciences, as the Indian ḥadīth scholar, al-
Dihlawī, claimed that after examining the ḥadīth chains of transmission available 
to him, he found them to be interrupted except for those of the Egyptian ‘ulamā’, 
the likes of whom previously mentioned above.112  These common links 
between scholars of Egypt, Syria, the Hejaz, and to some extent Yemen, North 
Africa, and the Subcontinent, formed a fellowship and network of Islamic 
learning that by and large preserved the authority of Islam without the need for 
a centralised clerical system to validate doctrine and doctors.  These scholarly 
circles exhibited remarkable consistency on matters of creed, jurisprudence, 
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and methodology, though dissenting views were “tolerated” in as much as they 
adhered to the broad based creedal and juristic methodologies of classical 
Sunni Islam.  Ash‘arism in the Islamic heartlands and Maturidism in the Indian 
subcontinent were the accepted creedal articulations amongst Sunni ‘ulamā’.  
The three main schools of law, the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, and Shāfi’ī, constituted the 
main legal traditions to which every scholar of any repute adhered to at least 
one of, with the Ḥanbalī school finding only few adherents in central Arabia and 
small enclaves in Syria and Iraq.   
Though Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb in Arabia was not the first to challenge this 
normative understanding, his impact and influence were perhaps the most 
significant.  It was he who expressed the notion that Ash’arism was a non-Sunni 
creed that did not expressly follow the dictates of the Qur’ān and the ḥadīth – as 
did Ibn Taymiyya before him. More importantly, however, for Ibn Abd al-
Wahhāb were the heterodox practices of the Muslim laity, which included saint 
veneration, membership in Sufi orders, invoking the Prophet or Muslim saints as 
intercessors in supplication (tawassul), and belief in saintly miracles (karāmāt).  
The creedal text authored by Ibn Abd al-Wahhāb was used as a guiding text by 
which to evaluate the laity’s conformance with Wahhabism and later served as 
a foundational text for the nascent Saudi state.113 
 Examining the scholarly works produced during the lifetime of al-Dardīr, it 
is a fair statement that many of the works were either commentaries (shurūḥ) or 
supra-commentaries (ḥawāshī) on works produced during the Mamlūk period or 
earlier.  This phenomenon was not limited to books of law, but rather extended 
to works on grammar, morphology, rhetoric (balāgha), theology, and even 
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Qur’ānic exegesis.114  Interestingly enough, the lion’s share of original writings 
can be found in the discipline of taṣawwuf, where al-Dardīr and his 
contemporaries authored a number of works dealing with both ṭarīqa Sufism, as 
well as the more esoteric topics of the discipline.  Al-Dardīr’s immediate 
predecessors, Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī, and al-Nābulusī, authored between them some 
four hundred works on taṣawwuf.  Also finding original authorship were small 
legal treatises covering such topics as the legality of tobacco and the renovation 
of churches.115  Nevertheless the genre of the era was the many commentaries 
and glosses on legal and creedal works, Arabic grammar, morphology, and 
rhetoric, and logic.  Many of these works were didactic and did not aim to offer 
ground-breaking insights heretofore unknown.  In fact, many ‘ulamā’ chose not 
to write but rather spend the majority of their days and nights teaching and 
disseminating that which they had taken sometimes decades to acquire.  Thus, 
any examination of the intellectual legacy of this period must primarily focus 
upon the many commentaries and glosses on earlier works.  They were 
effectively the dominant genre of the era; in much the same way ḥadīth 
compendiums were the genre for much of the formative period of Islam.  
Therefore a critical evaluation should be predicated on the contents of these 
works in the context of their historical time period, rather than dismissing them 
out of hand as dull imitations. 
 
Primary Sources 
 
The primary sources that form the subject of this study consist of extant 
manuscripts of al-Dardīr’s works as well as works available in published form.  
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Additionally, several manuscripts provided hagiographic material essential to 
the understanding of al-Dardīr’s background.  These include biographies of al-
Dardīr’s main teacher, Muḥammad Sālim al-Ḥifnī, and of his main student, 
Aḥmad al-Ṣāwī.  Additionally, the works of Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī proved essential in 
extrapolating the salient points of al-Dardīr’s views on knowledge, gnosis, and 
enlightenment, as it was the school of Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī to which he prescribed 
regarding these points.  Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī’s master, Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, 
popularised the thought of the great Andalusian master, Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī 
(d. 638/1240), and provided intellectual arguments for Ibn ‘Arabī’s complex and 
sometimes controversial statements, greatly impacting Sufism in general, and 
the “school” of al-Nābulusī / al-Bakrī / al-Ḥifnī / al-Dardīr specifically.  Al-
Nābulusī also chronicled his visit to Egypt in the late seventeenth century in his 
work al-Ḥaqīqa wa’l-Majāz fī al-Riḥla ilā Bilād al-Shām wa Miṣr wa’l-Ḥijāz, which 
proved highly beneficial in providing background information on the cultural, 
social, and intellectual climate in Egypt during the late Ottoman period. 
 The annals of al-Jabartī still remain the premier source for Ottoman 
Egyptian history.  His work is of additional significance in that he himself was a 
Khalwatī and disciple of al-Dardīr’s shaykh, Muḥammad Sālim al-Ḥifnī; he 
extols the virtues of the Khalwatī order and outlines their methods of initiation 
and operation.  A less cited work by academics, most likely due to scathing 
criticism by Edward Said in Orientalism, is Edward William Lane’s (d. 1876) An 
Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, was also 
referenced for this study. 
The sum of al-Dardīr’s oeuvre complete the primary sources, particularly 
his three works in kalām theology: al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya, his gloss on Umm al-
Barāhīn, and his commentary entitled Fawā’id al-Farā’iḍ.  In jurisprudence, his 
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main works for the study are his commentary on Mukhtaṣar Khalīl, and his own 
treatise, Aqrab al-Masālik.  In taṣawwuf, Tuḥfat al-Ikhwān and the relevant 
sections in his theology and jurisprudential works constitute the primary sources 
for this study.   Al-Dardīr’s political stances and ideas about the political 
discourse of his day are gleaned from al-Jabartī’s chronicles and al-Dardīr’s 
own works, where he often offers social and political commentary in the context 
of his scholarly expositions.  
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Al-Dardīr’s Writings116 
 
Al-Dardīr was a prolific writer, by the standards of his time, producing some 
nineteen works.117  He wrote more than either of his two main teachers, ‘Alī al-
Ṣa‘īdī and Muḥammad Sālim al-Ḥifnī, who were arguably the most prominent 
scholars of al-Azhar of their generation.  Al-Dardīr’s works span several 
different religious disciplines, including jurisprudence, theology, taṣawwuf, 
Prophetic biography, rhetoric, Qur’ānic exegesis, and dialectic.  However, most 
of his works, as well as his teaching during his lifetime, focused on the three 
core disciplines of jurisprudence, theology, and taṣawwuf.   
His major works may be listed as follows: 
1) Manḥ al-Qadīr fī Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar Khalīl: A commentary of the epistle of 
Khalīl ibn Isḥāq al-Jundī (d. 767/1366) in Mālikī jurisprudence.  This 
particular commentary has become the standard manual for training 
Mālikī jurisprudents from Mauritania to Eastern Arabia.  Completed in 
1197/1783. 
 
2) ‘Aqrab al-Masālik ‘ilā Madhhab al-Imām Mālik: A treatise based upon the 
mukhtaṣar of Khalīl that suffices with the mention of only the dominant 
positions within the Mālikī legal school as determined by al-Dardīr.  Most 
likely completed after the commentary on Khalīl in 1197/1783, which 
would make it one of the last works completed by al-Dardīr. 
 
3) Al-Tawajuh al-Asnā bi Naẓm al-Asmā’ al-Ḥusnā: A sixty-eight-line poem 
of supplications using the ninety-nine names of Allah. Aḥmad al-Ṣawī (d. 
1241/1826), a student of al-Dardīr and commentator on the poem 
mentioned that al-Dardīr composed it in one night and that it was 
amongst the last of his works.118 
 
4) Tuḥfat al-Qārī lī Kitāb al-Bārī fī al-Mutashābih: A treatise presumably 
dealing with the verses in the Qur’ān that seem anthropomorphic in 
nature.119 
 
                                             
116 Al-Dardīr’s works receive a more formal in-depth treatment in the respective chapters 
detailing his role as theologian, jurisprudent, and Sufi guide. 
117I qualify his prolificacy as scholars a few generations before al-Dardīr such as al-Nābulusī 
and Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī each wrote over two hundred works.  Except for Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī (who 
was atypical to the Egyptian milieu of scholarship), I am yet to find anyone of al-Dardīr’s 
generation or of those immediately succeeding him who wrote more. 
118 Aḥmad al-Ṣawī, Al-Ṣalawāt Al-Dardīriyya Wa Yalīhī Sharḥ Manẓumat 'Asmā‘ Allāhi Al-Ḥusnā 
(Cairo: Maktabat al-Qāhira, 2001). 
119 Extant manuscript in Dar al-Kutub MS 18818.  
 59 
5) Tuḥfat al-Ikhwān fī ‘Ilm al-Bayān: A treatise on linguistic metaphor and 
simile.  Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī mentions in his biographical entry on al-Dardīr 
that he wrote it upon his recommendation.120 
 
6) Sharḥ al-Dardīr ‘alā al-Ādāb al-‘Aḍudiyya: A commentary on the treatise 
of ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) in the discipline of waḍ‘ (original usage 
of language), a Sunni Persian scholar and judge of the Shāfi‘ī school.121 
 
7) Manẓūmat al-Munfarija122 
 
8) Risalat al-‘Iqd al-Waḥīd fī ʼĪḍāḥ al-Su’āl ‘an al-Tawḥīd: A small treatise in 
Ash‘arī theology.123 
 
9) Al-Mawrid al-Bāriq ‘alā ‘Ashraf al-Khalā’iq: A litany of Prophetic 
formulas.124 
 
10) Fatḥ al-Qadīr fi Aḥadīth al-Bashīr: A narration of the first ḥadīth from 
each of the major works of ḥadīth.125 
 
11) Minhāj al-Ṣadiqīn wa Tibyān al-Sālikīn: An incomplete treatise on the 
essential aspects of taṣawwuf following the Ghazalian model with an 
introductory section on Ash‘arī theology.126 
 
12) Tuḥfat al-Ikhwān fī Ādāb Ahl al-‘Irfān: A treatise on taṣawwuf and the 
various etiquettes of the Sufi path and states of the soul.127 
 
13) Asanīd al-Kutub al-Sitta wa Asanīd al-A’imma al-‘Arba‘a: The thabat, or 
list of al-Dardīr’s scholarly licenses in the major ḥadīth works and works 
of the four imams.128 
 
14) Al-Tahqīqat al-Aḥmadiyya Sharḥ al-Dardīr ‘alā Manẓumatihi al-
Musamma al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya: Al-Dardīr’s commentary on his own 
text in theology.  Written in 1177/1763.129 
 
15) Mawlid al-Nabī: A retelling of the Prophet Muhammad’s life in verse.130 
                                             
120 al-Zabīdī, Al-Mu‘jam Al-Mukhtaṣ, 123-24. 
121 Two extant manuscripts in the Azhar library, MS 42822 and 45558. 
122 Extant manuscript in Azhar library MS 92568 (haven’t see it yet) 
123 Two extant manuscripts in Azhar library MS 42126 and MS 46036 and one in Dar al-Kutub 
MS 30526 
124 MS 134583 and MS 67060 in Azhar library 
125 MS 50065 in Azhar library 
126 MS 39679 in Dar al-Kutub 
127 MS 5297 in Dar al-Kutub, MS 1372 in Azhar library.  This work of al-Dardīr is also known by 
a number of other titles that are extant in Dar al-Kutub and the Azhar library.  After comparing 
the manuscripts, I found that the works titled Tuḥfat al-Murīd (MS 37616 Dar al-Kutub and MS 
97489 Azhar), Tuḥfat al-Sayr w-al-Sulūk ʼilā Mālik al-Mulūk (MS 22062 Dar al-Kutub), and 
Risāla fī al-Sayr ʼilā Allāh (MS 25601) are indeed identical to the work known as Tuḥfat al-
Ikhwān fī Ādāb ahl al-‘Irfān. 
128 MS 131022 in Azhar library 
129 There are well over 30 extant copies in al-Azhar library; which is a testament to the 
widespread acceptance of the work and use as a didactic text by the Azhar ‘ulamā’.  
130 Published in Cairo as well as several extant copies in Azhar library. 
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16) Ḥāshiyat al-Dardīr ‘alā Sharḥ al-Hudhudī ‘alā al-Sanūsiyya: A gloss on 
the commentary of ‘Alī al-Ṣa‘īdī on the lesser treatise of the Algerian 
theologian, Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490), also known 
as Umm al-Barāhīn.  The text of al-Sanūsī found widespread appeal in 
North Africa and later in the Arab East, including Cairo and Damascus.  
As al-Dardīr relates himself, he wrote this gloss at the behest of his 
master, Muḥammad ibn Sālim al-Ḥifnī, who thought that an easier 
explication was needed as the commentary of al-Ṣa‘īdī was deemed too 
difficult for novices.131 
 
17)  Sharḥ al-Dardīr ‘alā Fawā’id al-Farā’iḍ fī Ḍābiṭ al-‘Aqā’id: A commentary 
on the treatise in theology of Muḥammad ibn Muṣṭafā Kamāl al-Dīn al-
Bakrī (d. 1196/1782), one which al-Bakrī wrote while held prisoner 
presumably by the Russians.132 
 
18) Sharḥ al-Dardīr ‘alā Aqrab al-Masālik: Al-Dardīr’s commentary on his 
own treatise in Mālikī jurisprudence, and the most widely studied work on 
the subject in Egypt even in contemporary times. 
 
19) Ḥāshiyat ‘alā Qiṣat al-M’irāj: Al-Dardīr’s gloss on the Ascension narrative 
of the Prophet written by Najm al-Dīn al-Ghayṭī (d. 981/1573).133 
 
 
Of these, his commentaries in Mālikī jurisprudence and kalām theology are the 
most important in accessing al-Dardīr’s legacy.   
  
                                             
131 MS 39656 in Dar al-Kutub and MS 92570, MS 10011, MS 132541, MS 40996 in Azhar 
library 
132 MS 492 Dar al-Kutub 
133 Aḥmad al-Dardīr, Ḥāshiyat ‘Alā Qiṣat Al-M’irāj (Cairo: Muṣṭafa al-Bābī al-Halabī, 1948). 
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Overview of Al-Dardīr’s Biography 
 
 Biographical information on al-Dardīr outside of al-Jabartī’s annals is 
quite limited, as most of the ṭabaqāt literature copies verbatim from al-Jabartī’s 
entry.  Little is known about his life prior to his entrance into the scholarly elite of 
al-Azhar, as al-Jabartī offers strong praise for al-Dardīr for both his scholarly 
pursuits as well as his social activism and championing of the cause of the 
common man.  What follows is a brief summary of al-Jabartī’s entry. 
Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abū Ḥāmid al-‘Adawī al-Dardīr 
was born in 1127/1715 in the Upper Egyptian village of Banī ‘Adī, on the 
outskirts of present day Asyut.  The village of Banī ‘Adī was named after the 
tribe that first settled there, originally from the Arabian Peninsula and 
descendants of the second caliph of Islam, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 22/644).   
This particular tribe was renowned for its proclivity in producing Islamic scholars 
and theologians.  These include al-Dardīr’s master in jurisprudence, ‘Alī al-
Ṣa‘īdī as well as many of his students and those he presided over as 
administrator of the Azhar dormitory for Upper Egyptian students.  Several of 
the scholars hailing from this village later became renowned for their willingness 
to intercede on the behalf of the Cairo townspeople in addressing their 
grievances with the ruling elite.  Al-Ṣa‘īdī in particular confronted several of the 
Mamlūk emirs and it is said that when he approached they would extinguish 
their water pipes, as he detested smoking and would not fail to rebuke those 
who partook in it, even in a public forum.  Al-Dardīr was clearly influenced by 
the likes of al-Ṣa‘īdī in this regard, as he too on more than one occasion 
confronted the emirs in order to obtain concessions for the hapless 
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townspeople, particularly the residents of the impoverished Ḥusayniyya quarter, 
just north of al-Azhar.134   
Al-Dardīr received instruction in the elementary aspects of reading and 
writing, in addition to memorising the Qur’ān, under the tutelage of his father.  
Al-Dardīr’s father, Muḥammad, a local Qur’ān teacher, was held in high esteem 
and considered saintly as al-Dardīr ascribes to him several saintly miracles.  Al-
Dardīr relates that his father never accepted remuneration for his teaching 
duties, and that he would on occasion provide for his poorer students.  He also 
relates that his mother would find light from what appeared to be lighted 
candles emanating from his father’s room at night when darkness had set in.  
When queried about it, he would reply that it was from the light of offering 
prayers upon the Prophet.  Lastly, al-Dardīr recounts that in times of austerity 
when little food was available, his father would recite the Qur’ānic chapter of 
Quraysh and subsequently the plate would feed a great number of people.  
Later on, al-Dardīr would recite the same chapter and open locked doors 
without a key until he became renowned for such exploits.135 
 It is thus apparent that al-Dardīr from an early age was instilled with the 
teachings of Sufism.  This was not unusual for men of his background and 
upbringing, as Sufism was a central part of life in both the Egyptian countryside 
as well as the capital.  This early Sufi upbringing was to shape his worldview 
and approach to knowledge as well as its acquisition.  Nearly all of al-Dardīr’s 
works devote at least one section to Sufism, though the genre of the work is 
other than Sufism, such as in his works on kalām and fiqh.  As al-Dardīr hailed 
from Upper Egypt, there is no doubt he was instructed according to the Mālikī 
school of law, as it is the only madhhab practised in Upper Egypt.  No historians 
                                             
134 See Muḥammad Makhlūf ʻAdawī, Tarīkh Banī ‘Adī (Cairo: s.n., 1990), microform. 
135 al-Dardīr and al-Ṣawī, Aqrab Al-Masālik 'Alā Al-Sharḥ Al-Ṣaghīr, 1:8. 
 63 
have offered an explanation for this, as after Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was able to 
rehabilitate Sunnism in Egypt after the demise of the last Fatimid caliph, he 
primarily supported his own Shāfi’ī school, though he patronised madrasas 
teaching the Ḥanafī and Mālikī schools in Cairo as well.  A plausible explanation 
for the pre-eminence of the Mālikī School in Upper Egypt may be due to its 
isolation from Cairo and resultant lack of attention from successive Fatimid and 
Ayyubid rulers.  This sense of neglect in the Upper Egyptian psyche still 
resonates today, as the region historically has served as a sanctuary for fleeing 
emirs and as points of departure for the launching of rebellions.  In the pre-
modern context, it is likely al-Dardīr and his cohorts from the countryside felt a 
small sense of loyalty to the “state”136, as it were, in as much as their true 
loyalties could be more accurately understood via the prism of an Islamic ethos 
– one that showed concern for the umma in its entirety, albeit with more focused 
concern for those in one’s sphere of influence.  This is a recurring theme with 
al-Dardīr, where in both his pedagogical approaches and his social activism the 
welfare of the common Muslim was paramount.   
 After completing his primary education in Banī ‘Adī, al-Dardīr travelled to 
Cairo to study at the prestigious al-Azhar.  Little is recorded about this period in 
his life, but it can be assumed that he studied the Islamic canon of the day, 
which included the Arabic disciplines and the core disciplines of theology, 
jurisprudence, and taṣawwuf.137  Al-Azhar at this point in its history had secured 
its place as the pre-eminent institution of Sunni scholarship in Egypt, if not the 
greater Muslim world. The construction of al-Azhar as a mosque was 
                                             
136 “State” as understood in the term dawla, where the observance of public and private morals 
is in large part dependent upon the ability of the “state” to properly govern.  The khabar of ‘Umar 
ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, narrated in the Mudawwana: “Limā yaz‘a Allāh b’il-sulṭān a‘ẓam mimmā yaz‘a 
b’il-Qur’ān” “That which God enforces via political authority is greater than that which he 
enforces with the Qur’ān.” 
137 Al-Dardīr’s education is covered more extensively in the forthcoming chapter. 
 64 
commissioned by the Fatimid caliph al-Mu‘izz li Dīn Allāh in 359/970 and was 
completed two years later under the supervision of the Fatimid general, Jawhar 
al-Ṣiqillī (d.).138  After the ascension of the Ayyubids, al-Azhar was neglected 
and closed for Friday congregational prayers, seen as a symbol of the former 
Fatimid caliphate.  It was not until the time of the Mamlūk sultan, Ẓahir Baybars, 
that al-Azhar was rededicated to Sunni Islam.  Nevertheless, it remained an 
institution amongst many educational institutions in Egypt until the Ottoman 
conquest.  It was Mamlūk Bey patronage under Ottoman rule that came to 
define al-Azhar and elevate it to the status of pre-eminence, as well as neglect 
of Mamlūk era madrasas by Ottoman authorities.139   
It was during this time that al-Dardīr embarked on his most formative 
relationships, namely with his two main teachers, Muḥammad al-Ḥifnī and ‘Alī 
al-Ṣa’īdī.  Al-Ḥifnī served as Al-Dardīr’s main teacher in ḥadīth, as his scholarly 
ijāza indicates as much.  Al-Ḥifnī also became al-Dardīr’s spiritual guide, by 
whom which he was initiated into the Khalwatī order.  Al-Ṣa‘īdī was the 
foremost Mālikī jurisprudent of his generation, and al-Dardīr was his greatest 
pupil.  Both al-Ḥifnī and al-Ṣa‘īdī were renowned for their influence over the 
Mamlūk emirs, and their lack of hesitation in even rebuking them if the situation 
so warranted.  Al-Jabartī mentions that he was especially critical of smoking of 
the water pipe and would publicly rebuke an emir if he saw it in his 
possession.140  
                                             
138 Bayard Dodge, Al-Azhar: A Millennium of Muslim Learning (Middle East Institute: 
Washington DC, 1961), 5. 
139 Ibid., 60. Western sources on the development of al-Azhar in the pre-modern era remain 
sparse.  Arabic secondary sources include: ʻAlī ʻAbd al-ʻAẓīm, Mashyakhat Al-Azhar Mundhu 
Inshāʼihā Ḥattá Al-Ān. (al-Qāhirah: al-Hayʼah al-ʻĀmmah li-Shuʼūn al-Maṭābiʻ al-Amīrīyah, 1978); 
Muhammad ʿAbd al-Munʿim Khafaji and ‘Alī ‘Alī Ṣubḥ, Al-Azhar Fī Alf ʿām. (Cairo: Al-Maktaba 
al-Azhariyya l-il-Turāth, 2012); Abdulwahhāb al-Saʼidī, Al-Jāmʼal-Azhar Wa Shuyūkhuhu Fi Al-
ʼaṣr Al-Ưthmānī (Cairo: Maṭbaʼt al-Amāna, 1994); Muhammad ʿAbd Allah ʿInan, Tārīkh Al-Jāmiʿ 
Al-Azhar (Cairo: Muʾassasat al-Khanji, 1958). 
140 See al-Jabartī’s biography of al-Ṣa’īdī in: al-Jabartī, 'Ajā'ib Al-Āthār Fi Al-Tarājim W'al-
Akhbār, 1:647-50. 
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 After ‘Alī al-Ṣa‘īdī died in 1189/1775, al-Dardīr assumed his two official 
positions within al-Azhar, namely the position of mufti of the Mālikī school, and 
rector of the Upper Egypt riwāq (residence hall/college).  In addition, he 
continued to teach the disciplines of jurisprudence, theology, ḥadīth, tafsīr, and 
Arabic grammar and rhetoric in the Azhar mosque.  Though he was not 
appointed the position of “Shaykh al-Azhar”, al-Jabartī concedes that al-Dardīr 
was seen as the “Shaykh of all of Egypt”; the Shaykh al-Azhar position was for 
several generations firmly in the grip of the Shāfi‘īs, thus explaining the reason 
for overlooking al-Dardīr and al-Ṣa‘īdī.  Another plausible explanation is that 
scholars haling from Upper Egypt may not have been viewed as loyal enough to 
the Ottoman Pasha and Mamlūk emirs to be accorded the powerful position.  
Whatever the case may be, there is no doubt that Cairo denizens viewed al-
Dardīr as the main religious authority after the deaths of al-Ṣa‘īdī and al-Ḥifnī. 
 Al-Dardīr was perhaps the greatest disciple of al-Ḥifnī in the Khalwatī 
order, with only Maḥmūd al-Kurdī as a possible rival, who in turn was the 
greatest disciple of the Syrian shaykh who introduced the Syrian branch of the 
Khalwatī order in Egypt, Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī.  This underscores the importance of 
al-Dardīr in eighteenth century Sufism, in his role as a renewer within the order, 
as well as his role in the propagation of the order.141  Al-Dardīr eventually 
established his own sub-order and zāwiya, though after his death, his sub-
order, the Dardiriyya-Khalwatiyya was absorbed into the Sibā’iyya sub-order, 
named after his student and disciple, Ṣāliḥ al-Sibā‘ī (d. 1221/1806).142  The 
zāwiya itself was built using funds provided by the sultan of Morocco, 
Muḥammad III (d. 1204/1790).143  Al-Jabartī recounts a story where the son of 
                                             
141 This is covered more extensively in the fifth chapter. 
142 J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 76-78. 
143 Perhaps he is most renowned for being the first world leader to recognise the newly 
independent United States of America in 1777. 
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the sultan was in Egypt and had exhausted all of his funds, leaving him 
destitute in a foreign land.  As Sultan Muḥammad was in the habit of patronising 
several of the Cairo ‘ulamā’, they were asked to surrender some of their tributes 
to support his young son.  They all refused save for al-Dardīr, who reasoned 
that it was the sultan’s money to begin with, and as such, his son is more 
entitled to its use.  When word reached the sultan of al-Dardīr’s magnanimity, 
the sultan increased his patronage the following year ten-fold. This allowed al-
Dardīr to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and build the zāwiya.144  Al-Jabartī 
uses this story to demonstrate al-Dardīr’s integrity and his standing amongst all 
aspects of society, including the ruling elite, the scholarly elite, and the common 
people.  Al-Dardīr died in 1786, the same year that the Ottoman sultan sent his 
top admiral to restore Ottoman suzerainty in the light of local Mamlūk 
usurpation.  His funeral prayer was held at the Azhar mosque where a large 
crowd attended.  His body was then interred just a few hundred metres away 
the zāwiya he had established a few years earlier, where he remains until the 
current day. 
 The only other hagiographical entry for al-Dardīr written by a 
contemporary of his is that of the Indian polymath Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī (d. 
1205/1791), who was a close friend and student of al-Dardīr.  He includes him 
in his hagiography of over six hundred of his teachers and contacts he 
accumulated over the course of his travels between India, Yemen, the Hejaz, 
and Egypt.  His entry on al-Dardīr is nearly identical to that of al-Jabartī, but as 
al-Zabīdī was a generation older, the more reasonable conclusion is that al-
Jabartī relied on al-Zabīdī’s entry rather than the reverse.  Indeed, al-Zabīdī 
includes personal reflections on his companion and teacher, where he states:145 
                                             
144 al-Jabartī, 'Ajā'ib Al-Āthār Fi Al-Tarājim W'al-Akhbār, 2:224-25. 
145 al-Zabīdī, Al-Mu’jam Al-Mukhtaṣ, 123. 
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I accompanied him (al-Dardīr) often, and he loved me for the sake of God.  I 
accompanied him on his visits to the awlīyā on several occasions, and benefitted from 
him [certain] things.  And I may have attended some of his lessons in kalām theology 
and logic. 
 
Al-Zabīdī also describes al-Dardīr as “unparalleled in his time in the rational and 
transmitted disciplines.”  He further mentions that one of al-Dardīr’s works on 
language – specifically rhetoric – was written on advice from him while they 
were in each other’s company at the shrine of Aḥmad al-Badawī in Tanta.146  
In addition, the Sufi chronicler, Yūsuf al-Nabhānī (d. 1350/1932) commits an 
entry in his compendium of saintly miracles, Jāmi‘ Karāmāt al-Awlīyā’, to al-
Dardīr, describing him as “the sun of gnostic knowledge, the [greatest] gnostic 
of his era, and the object of consensus of all Muslims of all the different schools 
of thoughts and understanding as to his high rank, sainthood (wilāya), spiritual 
guidance, and overall benefit in all Muslim lands.”147  The entry then mentions 
an incident involving a son of one of al-Dardīr’s students had where he had 
applied the doctrine of tawassul (intercession) using al-Dardīr during a difficult 
situation with the authorities in Egypt and then the spirit of al-Dardīr appeared in 
his dream and led him to safety.  After he awoke, he was given complete victory 
in his ordeal.148  Finally, a biographical entry was included for al-Dardīr in the 
Ṭabaqāt al-Mālikiyya of Muḥammad Makhlūf.149 Al-Dardīr is the first entry in the 
twenty-fifth ṭabaqa, indicating twenty-five generations after the eponymous 
imam of the school, Mālik ibn Anas.  The entry quotes al-Jabartī’s entry 
verbatim, though Makhlūf offers a more thorough treatment of al-Dardīr’s 
oeuvre.150  
                                             
146 Ibid., 122-24. 
147 Yūsuf al-Nabhānī, Jāmi‘ Karāmāt Al-Awlīya'. (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-‘Aṣriyya, 2001), 564. 
148 Ibid., 565. 
149 Not to be confused with Ḥasanayn Muḥammad Makhlūf (d. 1990) the former Grand Mufti of 
Egypt, his son. 
150 Makhlūf, Shajarat Al-Nūr Al-Zakiyya, 516-17. 
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Conclusion 
 
Al-Dardīr is an example of the intellectual elite that was entrusted with the 
interpretation and transmission of the Islamic tradition. The approach of al-
Dardīr to the tradition was a critical and interpretive one, rather than a simple 
rehashing of past scholarly work.  This approach was predicated on the 
absolute veracity and integrity of the Qur’ān and the corpus of ḥadīth as a 
starting point; the tradition, however, is inclusive of the interpretive methods, 
linguistic hermeneutics, and syllogistic logic of the intellect that formed the 
overall interpretive method of the inherited Islamic tradition.  Chapter 2 
examines the education paradigm established from Islam’s very beginnings in 
the Prophetic era to the time of al-Dardīr in the late twelfth/eighteenth century. 
The Islamic disciplines formed based upon a consistent commitment to 
maintaining the veracity of the primary texts of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth, and the 
continuous process of unlocking their meanings for practical application.  
Chapter 3 discusses al-Dardīr’s understanding of the basic epistemological 
issues of the tradition, their relationship to rationality and theology, and the role 
of supra-rationalism in informing the overall Islamic understanding of 
knowledge.  Chapter 4 examines al-Dardīr’s relationship with Islam’s legal 
tradition, analysing its development since the Prophetic era, and later on the 
specific Mālikī tradition, in order to contextualise al-Dardīr’s approach to 
maintaining and transmitting the legal tradition.  Chapter 5 completes the study 
by analysing al-Dardīr’s societal roles, and placing him within the context of a 
greater tradition of the Islamic intellectual elites’ influence on the formation and 
development of Muslim societies.  The primary research questions this study 
endeavours to address are: 
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1) How did al-Dardīr interact with the Islamic tradition, and what degree of 
influence did the interpretive tradition have in informing this interaction? 
2) How did al-Dardīr’s approach to the transmission of knowledge reflect 
the educational paradigm established by the discursive Islamic tradition, 
and in what were the means he sought to faithfully and successfully 
transmit it? 
3)  How did al-Dardīr epitomise the core Islamic disciplines of creedal 
theology, jurisprudence, and taṣawwuf? 
4) To what degree did the societal roles exercised by al-Dardīr reflect a 
tradition of engagement, collusion, or cooperation with the political elites? 
 
Chapter Two:  Al-Dardīr and the Foundations of the Islamic 
Educational Paradigm 
Introduction 
 The illustration of the paradigm of the transmission of the Islamic tradition 
is perhaps no more apparent than in the trajectory that Islamic education 
pursued over the course of its pre-modern history.  Al-Dardīr represents the 
culmination of this tradition, as the Islamic disciplines had matured to a degree 
in which the terminology and conceptual frameworks were solidified, and 
adhered to nearly conventional standards.  The disciplines of theology, 
jurisprudence, and taṣawwuf in particular followed these guidelines.  This was a 
process that took a millennium to reach its apogee in the lifetime of al-Dardīr, 
and evolving educational paradigms underlie the framework for conceptualising 
these developments.  This chapter analyses these developments in order to 
assess the process of cumulation and culmination as they pertain to the 
intellectual contributions of al-Dardīr to the Islamic tradition. It has been our 
contention that the significance of the ‘ulamā’ and their writings cannot be 
properly understood outside of the conceptual framework of the transmitted 
tradition; therefore, the conceptual underpinnings that informed the 
methodology of al-Dardīr in his writings and articulation of the Islamic tradition 
are scrutinised in the following sections.   
These primarily include the hierarchical classification of the Islamic 
disciplines (taqsīm al-‘ulūm), the authoritativeness of the sanad (intellectual 
genealogy), and the linguistic hermeneutics that came to define the 
methodology of interpreting the Qur’ān and ḥadīth – the primary sources of 
Islam.  These frameworks came to define the authoritative Sunni tradition, as 
authority was never delegated to a formal clergy or an infallible Imam.  Shils 
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posits that any tradition requires a systematic approach to defining its 
boundaries – what it is and what it is not, though he admits there is some 
arbitrariness regarding the whole process:1 
There is a certain arbitrariness in the definition of the boundaries of the tradition of 
religious knowledge and in the decision as to what lies outside of them.  This problem would not 
exist if traditions were, as some of their detractors allege, entirely constant and incapable of any 
change other than complete rejection.  The selection and training of the adepts of tradition and 
their incorporation into institutions which have the responsibility of maintaining the tradition help 
to keep the interpretation of the tradition within the boundaries which define it and which 
distinguish it from what it is not. 
 
Al-Azmeh also posits that the delineation of authority, and in turn, 
orthodoxy, was subject to historical and political imperatives, and that the 
Islamic disciplines “are historical entities whose boundaries were established 
and changed by historical circumstances.”2    
The on-going enterprise of maintaining the tradition is defined by the 
maintaining of the methodology of interpreting the tradition, as well as 
maintaining the integrity of the sources of said tradition i.e. in the case of Islam, 
the Qur’ān and ḥadīth.  As a result of this on-going enterprise, a normativeness 
or orthodoxy3 was instituted by which spurious and exceptional interpretations 
could be identified.  Underpinning this normativeness are the methodological 
tools of classification hierarchy, linguistic hermeneutics, and isnād – tools which 
developed over the course of the history of the Islamic tradition and which 
                                             
1 Shils, Tradition, 91. 
2 Aziz al-Azmeh, Arabic Thought and Islamic Societies, Routledge Library Editions Politics of 
Islam Volume 1 (London: Routledge, 2013), ix, 295 pages, 199. 
3 The concept of “orthodoxy” in religion is a problematic one; every sect or denomination makes 
a claim of orthodoxy, so the inherent problem is who and by what means is orthodoxy or 
normativeness determined?  For the purposes of this study which is restricted to Sunni Islam, 
the boundaries of orthodoxy are determined by the consensus of the Sunni ‘ulamā’; these 
boundaries have tended to be rather vast, but it is the tools of the tradition – the hermeneutical 
methods as well as the ijāza-sanad paradigm that came to define the parameters of the 
intellectual tradition in Sunni Islam.  The ‘ulamā’ did not determine orthodoxy, but rather 
revealed it, based upon their application of the hermeneutical tools of the tradition, and the 
verification of the interpreters based upon the ijāza-sanad paradigm. Thus, it is our contention 
that orthodoxy is definable, though it is characterised more by its approach to the interpretation 
of the primary texts, and their valid use by the interpreters, rather than a regime of 
delegitimisation or anathemisation of perceived heterodox belief or praxis.  The boundaries of 
orthodoxy no doubt were subject to historical precedent, as al-Dardīr defined his understanding 
of orthodoxy as direct functions of the core disciplines of creed, jurisprudence, and Sufism. This 
is analysed later in this chapter. 
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inform al-Dardīr’s methodology.  Al-Dardīr’s contribution to this enterprise is 
best understood via the historical inputs that influenced his approach in his 
writings; this study demonstrates that the concepts of tabsīṭ (simplification), 
tarjīḥ (judicial preference), and taḥqīq (intellectual actualisation) define his 
methodology, yet these concepts themselves were also products of the 
cumulative discursive tradition, as is demonstrated throughout this study. 
The emphasis on the seeking of knowledge by the ‘ulamā’ as the primary 
objective of the Islamic tradition cannot be overstated.  The first word revealed 
to the Prophet Muhammad was “Read!”  Though the people of Mecca were a 
largely unlettered group, the exhortations to learn, read, recite, and pursue 
intellectual endeavours were emblematic of the new society that initially formed 
in the Arabian Peninsula and then expanded into lands that possessed their 
own mature literate traditions, such as Byzantium and Persia.  As a result, 
Islamic education was not monolithic and underwent significant changes in 
style, content, and pedagogy with respect to varying locales and historical 
times.   
The literature reflects some of these developments,4 but there has been 
no comprehensive analysis of Islamic education that extends beyond a 
sociological approach; the actual underpinnings of the pre-modern educational 
system have not been thoroughly explored, as in the manner for Western 
education such as in the works of Durkheim.5  While such a broad analysis is 
outside of the bounds of this chapter, and dissertation, the chapter nevertheless 
attempts to answer the question: what was the nature of al-Dardīr’s education, 
                                             
4 See for example: Makdisi and American Council of Learned Societies., The Rise of the 
Colleges : Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West; Tibawi, Islamic Education: Its 
Traditions and Modernization into the Arab National Systems; Jonathan Porter Berkey, The 
Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo : A Social History of Islamic Education, Princeton 
Studies on the near East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
5 Emile Durkheim, Selected Writings on Education. Volume 2, the Evolution of Educational 
Thought (London: Routledge, 2006). 
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as typical of the early modern era, and how did the cumulative discursive 
tradition affect and inform the nature of that education? What was his own 
approach in his writings as he made the transition from student to teacher, and 
what contribution, if any, did he make to the discourse or conversation that was 
taking place over the course of the whole of Islamic learning?   
The early modern era of the late eighteenth century presents a particular 
challenge for Islamic studies, as it witnessed paradigm shifting intellectual 
currents in Europe that sought to marginalise and undermine the influence of 
tradition.  Speaking of the post-Enlightenment period, Shils states:6  
Rationality and scientific knowledge on the one side and traditionality and ignorance on 
the other were set against each other as antitheses. The party of progress, which believed that 
mankind must move forward towards emancipation from arbitrary and oppressive authority and 
towards the conduct of human affairs by scientifically illuminated reason, abominated the 
condition of superstition and ignorance in which most human beings lived.  It associated that 
condition with ecclesiastically imposed dogma…Tradition acquired the bad name which had 
become attached to dogma. 
 
 Muslims in general never conceived inherited teachings as arbitrary and 
oppressive, except after their confrontation with the West in the early nineteenth 
century in the form of colonialism, with its concomitant cultural and intellectual 
dominion.  Before this, tradition, as well as its preservation, transmission, and 
articulation, was deemed as essential for all knowledge pursuits.7  
Islamic education has exhibited a notable resiliency in the face of 
changing circumstances that were reflective of economic, social, and political 
realities.  Though the suggestion that Islamic culture was at the mercy of its 
political fortunes is a pervasive one, it is not a particularly fair suggestion, 
especially in the much-maligned period of al-Dardīr.  Muslim societies, 
beginning with the period of Umayyad rule, developed a distinct “civil” 
infrastructure that operated semi-independently from the political authority.  The 
                                             
6 Shils, Tradition, 5. 
7 See, for example, the writings of reformist Arab intellectuals in: Albert H. Hourani, Arabic 
Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1983). 
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waqf (endowment) system provided a means by which civil infrastructure could 
operate independently (or at least semi-independently) from state supervision.8  
This development was concomitant with the rise of a professional scholarly 
elite, who were needed as judges, court reporters, and other functionaries of 
the state. Though the various rulers, emirs, sultans, etc. were usually the 
endowers of these waqf based charitable enterprises that supported mosques 
and institutions of learning, it is important to bear in mind that governments in 
pre-modern Islam operated markedly differently than the post-Enlightenment 
nation-state with its strict separation between private enterprise and public 
welfare.  “State” wealth, as it were, was considered the province of the ruler, to 
dispense with in a manner that was pleasing to God.9  There was no inherent 
system of checks and balances on state appropriations and imbursements, 
save for the judiciary, usually headed by a chief justice (qāḍī al-quḍāt), but as 
he was state appointed, it was rare for a justice to accuse the ruling elite of 
financial impropriety.  Nevertheless, the relationship between the ruling elite 
and the intellectual elite (the ‘ulamā’) was complex, and is given further 
consideration in the last chapter. 
 The intellectual independence of the ‘ulamā’ allowed them to instruct in a 
manner that they saw fit, largely unfettered by state or institutional oversight, at 
least from a pedagogical perspective.  The ijāza – isnād system provided the 
main qualification for instruction appointments at the various pillars of the Azhar 
mosque, with popularity, familial, tribal, and madhhab based connections and 
affinities playing a secondary role in determining teaching appointments.10  
Waqf designations also played a role, as often the endower (wāqif) would 
                                             
8 See Makdisi and American Council of Learned Societies., The Rise of the Colleges : 
Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West, 35-74. 
9 See Berkey, The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo : A Social History of Islamic 
Education, 66-75, 95-107. 
10 See ibid., 119-27. 
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stipulate a specific legal school, or regional affiliation as the beneficiary of the 
endowment.   
The case of al-Azhar was unique, as it was the beneficiary of numerous 
endowments, especially during the period of Ottoman rule, where it eclipsed all 
other institutions of learning in Cairo as the premier institution.  Ottoman 
chauvinism was probably the principal factor behind al-Azhar’s rise to 
prominence, with many of the Mamlūk era awqāf suffering indifferent neglect 
and losing their lifelines.  Al-Azhar, conversely, predated the Mamlūks, and the 
Ayyubids, and enjoyed a renaissance under the Ottomans, though most of the 
infrastructure improvements to the mosque and adjacent arwiqa (dormitories) 
were financed by the Mamlūk emirs, the de-facto rulers in the later Ottoman 
period of al-Dardīr, when the sublime Porte was distracted by its wars in 
Eastern Europe.11  Additionally, al-Azhar was not easily categorised – neither 
solely a mosque – nor a madrasa – but rather something distinctive – a shrine.  
‘Alī Mubarak reports in his Khiṭaṭ that since its inception in the Fatimid era, al-
Azhar had always attracted the mujāwirīn (pilgrim-travellers), from both within 
Cairo and outside of it from as far as the lands of the Maghreb, and 
characterises it as the holiest mosque, after the three holy mosques of Mecca, 
Medina, and Jerusalem.12   
       As mentioned above, al-Dardīr received an education that was typical of 
many of his contemporaries.  His early education in the kuttāb taught the basics 
of reading and writing as well as memorisation of the Qur’ān.  Showing early 
signs of promise, he then travelled from his village to Cairo to study in al-Azhar.  
In this, he followed a model that had remained virtually unchanged since the 
                                             
11 Bayard Dodge, Al-Azhar: A Millennium of Muslim Learning (Middle East Institute: Washington 
DC, 1961), 94-97. 
12 ʻAlī Mubārak,, Al-Khiṭaṭ Al-TawfīQīYah Al-Jadīdah Li-Miṣr Al-Qāhirah Wa-Mudunihā Wa-
Bilādihā Al-Qadīmah Wa-Al-Shahīrah (al-Qāhirah: Maṭbaʻat Dār al-Kutub, 1980), 4:33. 
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times of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (d. 589/1193) after his rededication of the Azhar 
college-mosque to Sunni Islam, with the Fatimids having initially established al-
Azhar centuries earlier.  This model was founded primarily on the master-
apprentice paradigm that had also characterised education in mediaeval, and to 
a lesser extent, Enlightenment Europe as well.13  Students were expected to 
master a broad-based ancillary curriculum consisting of grammar, morphology, 
rhetoric, and to some extent logic before moving on to study the essential 
disciplines of jurisprudence, theology, ḥadīth, and taṣawwuf.14  
 This chapter explores the nature of eighteenth century Islamic education, 
via the prism of al-Dardīr’s own experience, including issues of “curriculum”, 
transmission of knowledge and pedagogical methods, as well as its relation and 
progression as compared to earlier and later eras in the history of Islamic 
education.  The accumulation of knowledge until the time of al-Dardīr had a 
direct effect on the aforementioned issues, as this chapter demonstrates.  The 
questions of innovation and stagnation in the educational field are better 
addressed via the framework of the cumulative discursive tradition, which in the 
Islamic context, places a premium on continuity and accessibility to the core 
tenets and traditions, rather than dedication to pursuit of a programme 
predicated on innovation and originality.   
Al-Azmeh states: “…as truth is one and invariant, the genealogy of 
philosophical knowledge is not a process of development or improvement, but is 
the transmission of an invariant in which the past is simply a prior occurrence of 
the present.” 15   Hence, there was no “development” of knowledge in the sense 
of changing truths for changing times; the tradition restated and rearticulated 
                                             
13 See Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn, 398-402. 
14 Dodge, Al-Azhar: A Millennium of Muslim Learning, 197; Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to 
the History of Education in Modern Egypt, 41-65. 
15 al-Azmeh, Arabic Thought and Islamic Societies, 160. 
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axiomatic and apodictic truths based upon a unifying hermeneutical approach to 
the Qur’ān and ḥadīth. Furthermore, the ancillary methods and mechanisms by 
which these truths are articulated for changing times and circumstances 
constituted what later came to be referred to as the turāth – a neologism for 
sure, but nonetheless came to refer to the corpus of scholarly literature that 
made the tradition accessible to successive generations of students and 
erstwhile ‘ulamā’. This, essentially, was the role of the ‘ulamā’ – the restatement 
and re-articulation of universal truths in a manner commensurate with evolving 
circumstances. Their ability to do so via the tools of the tradition constituted 
their authoritativeness.  
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Intellectual Genealogies, Hermeneutics and Sunni Authoritativeness 
 
 After the death of the Prophet Muḥammad, the issue of authority proved 
to be a contentious one, and affected the course of the nascent Muslim polity’s 
spiritual and political fortunes until the present day.  Within the person of the 
Prophet, both spiritual authority – the understanding of God’s message to man, 
and political authority – the practical application of the divine message, were 
contained.  However, after his death, the development of political factions over 
the issue of succession preceded and precipitated the emergence of theological 
factions.  Different criteria emerged over the issue of political authority, i.e. 
should the khalīfa be from the tribe of Quraysh, or is he limited to the direct 
descendants of al-Ḥusayn, or can he be any qualified male?16 
 The Sunnis emerged as the dominant group, though they were not 
immune from theological splintering within their own ranks.  Nevertheless, the 
idea of authority in spiritual and theological matters came to be understood as 
independent from the political authority after the miḥna that arose over the 
createdness of the Qur’ān during the tenure of the Abbasid Empire.  Spiritual 
authority then came to be inferred from the authoritativeness of the interpreter 
of the sacred texts – the ‘ālim – as it were.  The ‘ālim’s authority to speak on 
matters of religion in the Sunni world was predicated on the soundness of his 
training, and his ability to conform to issues of broad consensus understood by 
his predecessors.  Hence, spiritual authority vested in individual ‘ulamā’ was a 
direct function of their placement within a continuous diachronic tradition.  The 
placement within this tradition, by way of his scholarly chain of transmission, 
and by why of his own individual interpretation of the sacred texts that does not 
                                             
16 Corresponding to the Sunni, Shī‘ī, and Khawārij positions, respectively.  
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diverge from broad issues of consensus, underpinned the authoritativeness of 
the Sunni tradition.17   
  As has been observed by the likes of Makdisi18, Berkey19, and 
Chamberlain20 the issue of authoritativeness in pre-modern Sunni Islam 
remains a contentious issue.  Makdisi argues for a formal system that arose in 
Baghdad in the tenth and eleventh centuries that became a forerunner for the 
university system and conference of formal degrees in Western Europe.  The 
ijāzat al-tadrīs wa’l-iftā’ (the licence to teach and issue religious edicts) was a 
written document issued by one’s teacher after a number of years of study at a 
madrasa.21  Without such a licence, one presumably would not be able to find 
work at a madrasa or in a judicial court.  Berkey and Chamberlain challenge this 
notion, though their focus of study is Cairo and Damascus respectively.  They 
contend that the Sunni system for transfer of scholarly pedigree was less formal 
than Makdisi’s characterisation of a pedagogical system that was the principal 
influence for the European university system.22 Notwithstanding, their focus 
remains confined to social and anthropological analysis, and neither fully 
considers the hermeneutical or pedagogical aspects of the transmission and 
articulation of the tradition as a means to confer and preserve authoritativeness, 
and normativeness. The means of transmission of the Islamic tradition played a 
major role in the development of the traditions, especially in the early formative 
                                             
17 See also Graham’s discussion of the “isnād paradigm” in: Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: 
An Essay in Interpretation,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 23 (1993): 501-7. 
18 In his seminal work: Makdisi, The Rise of the Colleges : Institutions of Learning in Islam and 
the West.  
19 See Berkey, The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo : A Social History of Islamic 
Education. 
20 See Michael Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190-1350 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
21 Makdisi, The Rise of the Colleges : Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West, 147-48. 
22 Berkey, The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo : A Social History of Islamic 
Education, 44-45; Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190-
1350, 69-90. 
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period, when oral transmission was the almost exclusive means by which 
knowledge was transferred. 
The oral tradition, retaining its primacy from the pre-Islamic era, was 
considered essential by Muslim religious scholars well into the third century.23  It 
was not until the ḥadīth and fiqh compendium of Mālik ibn Anas (d. 97/179) that 
the written tradition began to take shape.24  Nonetheless, the ‘ulamā’ continued 
to insist on the “master-apprentice” mode of transmission of knowledge.  Aḥmad 
Zarrūq, the fifteenth century Moroccan scholar, records the internal dispute 
between the Sufis of al-Andalus.  Some recognised the legitimacy of self-
didactic scholarship, on the assumption that one could discern the mawārid 
(reliable sources) of knowledge, while others felt that knowledge of esoteric 
realities required a shaykh, notwithstanding the intelligence and piety of the 
student/disciple.25  Zarrūq further states that the transmission of knowledge – in 
a general sense, and not just “Sufi” knowledge – is more complete when 
transmitted from a teacher, rather than a book alone. He cites the verse: 
“…They are clear signs in the breasts of those who have been given 
knowledge” to buttress his argument.26  
The aural transmission was just as significant as the oral transmission, 
as scholars emphasised the embodiment of the Prophetic teachings, the 
inculcation of the Ādāb, as vital to the realisation of transference of knowledge. 
The ḥadīth often cited in this vein, “naḍḍara Allāh imri’ sami‘a maqālati fa 
ḥafiẓaha wa addāha fa rub ḥāmil fiqh ilā mā huwa afqah minh” (May God 
enlighten one who hears my speech, memorises it, and then transmits it, for 
                                             
23 Prior to the earliest surviving authored book, the Muwaṭṭa’ of Mālik, written in the latter half of 
the second/eighth century, ḥadīth narration was almost most certainly oral in its transmission. 
See Jonathan Brown, Hadith : Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World, 
Foundations of Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), 44-47. 
24 Schoeler, The Genesis of Literature in Islam : From the Aural to the Read, 68-81. 
25 Aḥmad Zarrūq, Qawā’id Al-Taṣawwuf (Damascus: Dar al-Bayrūtī, 2004), 96-97. 
26 Qur’ān (29:49) 
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perhaps a transmitter of knowledge carries it to one more knowledgeable than 
himself.”27 It indicates that transmission of knowledge is not equivalent to its 
embodiment.  For knowledge to be valid for transmission to others, its bearer 
must embody its meanings, thereby ensuring that the aural transmission 
accompanies both the oral and written transmission.  The Ottoman scholar, 
Tāsh Kubrī Zādā, citing a chain of transmission that includes Aristotle, Plato, 
and Socrates, mentions ten conditions for the successful transmission of 
knowledge.  Amongst them are spiritual purification of the heart, complete 
sincerity and avoidance of ostentation, reduction of worldly distractions, 
forsaking of laziness, resolve to acquire knowledge until death, and the 
selection of only pious teachers.28  Similar conditions are mentioned for the 
teacher or transmitter.29  Consequently, great significance was attached to the 
mode and method of transmission, in addition to its content. 
Though the formalism that was adopted later by Islamic institutions – that 
in Makdisi’s opinion was the forerunner for the Western college system – is 
pivotal in understanding the transference of religious authority, a failure to 
understand the underpinnings of this formalism would neglect an essential 
aspect of Sunni authoritativeness.  The hermeneutics of understanding the 
primary texts of Islam – the Qur’ān and ḥadīth – has been progressively defined 
and circumscribed by the Sunni ‘ulamā’ since the death of the Prophet 
Muḥammad.  Though Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī has been acknowledged 
as the pioneering force that established the Islamic hermeneutic30 method, a 
                                             
27 Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-ʿArabī and Muḥammad ibn ʿĪsá Tirmidhī, ‘Ariḍat Al-Aḥwadhī 
Bi-Sharḥ Saḥīḥ Al-Tirmidhī. (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, N.D.), 10:123-24. 
28 Ṭāsh Kubrī Zāda, Miftāh Al-Sa‘Āda Wa Miṣbāh Al-Sīyāda. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 
1985), 1:17-37. 
29 Ibid., 1:39-51. 
30 The Islamic discipline referred to in al-Shāf‘ī’s work al-Risāla – uṣūl al-fiqh – is commonly 
translated by Western scholarship as “Islamic legal theory” or the more literal “Fundamentals of 
jurisprudence”; however, in my view a more appropriate term would be Islamic hermeneutics.  
As the foundation of the Western conceptualisation of the discipline of hermeneutics refers to 
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more useful characterisation is that he “articulated” the Islamic hermeneutic 
method. It was his own premise, as well as those of his predecessors and 
contemporaries, that the other eponymous imams such as Abū Ḥanīfa and 
Mālik also employed a hermeneutical system.  Their students later articulated 
their respective systems after al-Shāfi‘ī had shifted the paradigm with his 
ground-breaking epistle. Much in the same way that Arabic grammar, 
morphology and rhetoric did not have formalised realities in the early days of 
Islam, but whose tenets were nonetheless observed by the Arabs, the 
hermeneutics of Islam were practiced, though not formally articulated, in many 
instances. 31 
 After the canon compilations of the Prophetic ḥadīth in the Muslim third 
century, by al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) and Muslim (d. 261/875), the narration of 
ḥadīth still maintained an important role, but in a hitherto different aspect.  
Ḥadīth narration before this was focused on establishing the primacy and 
veracity of the ḥadīth itself, where the reliability of the narrators, studied in the 
discipline of ‘ilm al-rijāl, was a means to that end.  After the formal written 
compilations obviated the need for establishing the veracity of the corpus of 
Prophetic ḥadīth, focus shifted to the rijāl (narrators), as a mechanism of 
establishing scholarly credential.  The concept of isnād (literally “the act of 
support by way of another”) as the premier credential of scholarly pedigree was 
                                                                                                                                    
the exegesis and interpretation of the Bible, the parallels are unmistakable.  Though uṣūl al-fiqh 
is defined by Muslim scholars as “the knowledge of the general proofs (adilla) for the body of 
legal rulings, these “proofs” preponderantly return to the interpretation of the text of the Qur’ān 
and ḥadīth, aided by the ancillary proof sources of qiyās and ijma‘ both of which are predicated 
on hermeneutic interpretation. See Ghazzālī, Al-Mustaṣfá Min ʿIlm Al-Uṣūl. (Bayrūt: Muʼassasat 
al-Risālah, 1997), 1:35-43. 
31 For a thorough analysis of hermeneutics in the formative period and how it remained an 
unwritten and informal tradition, and thus a substantial challenge to the notion that al-Shāfi’ī 
alone formulated Islamic legal theory, see Umar F. Abd-Allah Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and 
Medina : Islamic Reasoning in the Formative Period (Leiden: Brill ; Biggleswade : Extenza 
Turpin [distributor], 2013), 8-22. 
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established.32  Beginning in the Mamlūk era, the notion of a written certificate 
establishing a scholar’s teachers and the books that they studied began to take 
form.  This differed from the ijāza, which was a license to teach or narrate; the 
new document came to be known as the thabat (literally “record”) in the Muslim 
East, and fihris (literally “index”) in Morocco and North Africa east of Egypt.33   
This system of scholarly pedigrees was a “quality control” mechanism 
that ensured only rigorously qualified individuals could “sit” to teach.  This level 
of informality remained in place until the institutional reforms of Muḥammad ‘Ali 
Pasha in the nineteenth century.  The ijāza system continued to persist, mainly 
in the form of ceremonial ḥadīth licenses, and the more substantial and less 
ceremonial Qur’ān licenses.34  Scholarship has tended to focus on the issue of 
whether this informal pedagogy was a forerunner of the Western university 
system.  However, the role of this informal pedagogy in shaping Muslim 
scholars and their societies has received less attention.  A scholar like al-Dardīr, 
who hailed from the countryside and made his mark in Cairo by virtue of his 
scholarship and affiliations, underwent a particular sort of training that allowed 
him to digest the Islamic tradition, as understood until that point, and then 
transmit it to the next generation of scholars.  This warrants greater attention, in 
our view, than the former argument, as it sheds light on the development of the 
Islamic tradition, especially in such a critical period as the early modern era.  
To properly gauge the level of adaptation of a scholar such as al-Dardīr, 
a review of the underlying Islamic approach to the sacred texts – the objects of 
continuity and renewal – is essential.  As aforementioned, the oral nature of the 
transmission of Islamic learning was essential and emblematic of the earliest 
                                             
32 Brown, Hadith : Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World, 137-42. 
33 Brinkley Morris Messick, The Calligraphic State Textual Domination and History in a Muslim 
Society (Berkeley: University of California Press,, 1993), 115-16. 
34 Ijāzas in Qur’ān remain substantially significant. Correct pronunciation via direct audition 
remains the principal objective. 
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periods.  Many of the earliest texts, such as the Muwaṭṭa’ of Mālik and the 
Musnad of Ibn Ḥanbal, were almost exclusively comprised of ḥadīth narrations 
and anecdotes that were designed to be read audibly in the majlis setting of the 
shaykh, with his explication substituting for the parsimonious level of textual 
commentary that accompanied these early transmission texts.  One of the first 
authors to depart from the narration style genre was the acclaimed mystic, al-
Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857)35.  His theosophical approach to understanding 
the Islamic tradition was almost scandalous for his day, especially considering 
the socio-political climate of state enforced polemical stands, in large part due 
to the miḥna led by the Mu‘tazilites.  He also managed to provoke the ire of his 
famous contemporary, Ibn Ḥanbal, for the former’s predilection for articulating 
the spiritual states of the heart in a self-appraising manner, contrary to hitherto 
normative practice.   
The early ascetic texts of scholars like al-Muḥāsibī were pedestrian when 
compared to the later texts of Ibn al-‘Arabī, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. 318/936)36, 
or even the more widely accepted al-Ghazālī.  Similar trends can be observed 
in the other Islamic disciplines, most notably theology and Arabic literature.  The 
maturation of the Islamic disciplines was inevitable, as the austere cultural 
landscape of Arabia gave way to the sundry panoramas of Byzantine Europe 
and Persia, and all their attendant philosophies and obfuscated mythologies.  
The most formidable of these intellectual systems was the Greek philosophical 
system, one that enamoured the likes of Avicenna, al-Fārābī, and Averroes to 
the extent that they sought to reconcile this ancient system, which they 
                                             
35 See al-Kattāni, Fihras Al-Fahāris Wa Al-Athbāt. 
36 See Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Bernd Radtke, and John O'Kane, The Concept of 
Sainthood in Early Islamic Mysticism : Two Works by Al-Ḥakīm Al-Tirmidhī, Curzon Sufi Series 
(Richmond: Curzon Press, 1996); Bernd Radtke, Al-Ḥakīm at-Tirmiḏī : Ein Islamischer 
Theosoph Des 3./9. [I.E. 8./9.] Jahrhunderts (Freiburg: K. Schwarz, 1980); ʿAbd al-Muḥsin 
Ḥusaynī, Al-Maʿrifah ʿInda Al-Ḥakīm Al-Tirmidhī (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Kātib al-ʿArabī, 1968). 
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nominated as ḥikma, a term borrowed from the Qur’ānic lexicon, with the 
revealed knowledge of the Qur’ān.  This project was challenged by al-Ghazālī, 
in his Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-Falāsifa).  Averroes 
apologetic response, the Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahāfut al-Tahāfut) 
challenged al-Ghazālī’s contentions, and the Greek philosophical stream 
persevered, albeit in a renovated form, and found its place in the works of the 
Ash‘arī theologians, who made ample use of syllogistic logic and categorical 
propositions to counter balance the arguments of the Mu‘tazilites.37  
Al-Ghazālī’s legacy largely lies in three main accomplishments: the 
issuance of his challenge of the Arabic Neo-Platonic philosophy project, the 
reconciliation of Sufism with mainstream Islamic thought, and providing the 
impetus for a logic based pedagogical approach to transmitting the Islamic 
disciplines.  It is the last accomplishment that is most informing here.  As 
aforementioned, the logic based approach (ṭarīqat al-mutakallimīn) found in its 
way into virtually all the disciplines, including Arabic grammar, legal theory, 
rhetoric, and theology.  The faith neutral project of reconciling reason with 
revelation found a comfortable surrogate in the post-Ghazalian iteration of the 
transmission of the Islamic tradition.  It was here that Islamic hermeneutics 
reached its most mature form, as most Muslim scholars from the twelfth through 
the fifteenth centuries accepted the logic-based pedagogy as an essential 
element of the Islamic curriculum.38  A few dissenters appeared, the most 
famous of them the prominent Damascene theologian and jurisconsult, Taqī al-
Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328)39.  However, despite his objections to 
                                             
37 See Frank Giffel, Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford university press, 
2009), 97-110. 
38 See John Walbridge, God and Logic in Islam : The Caliphate of Reason (Cambridge ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 107-20. 
39 See Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, Ibn Taymīyah : Ḥayātuhu Wa-ʿAṣruh - Ārāʼuhu Wa-Fiqhuh 
(Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1952); Ovamir Anjum, Politics, Law and Community in Islamic 
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rational discourse and the presence of metaphorical device in language, he 
nonetheless conformed to the pedagogical style of his day in his writings, 
deploying logical constructs to buttress his arguments.40   The fact that he often 
appeared to contradict himself by using rational constructs in his own 
arguments was not lost on his detractors, such as Sa‘d al-Dīn Mas‘ūd al-
Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390)41, the polymath whose commentaries became the 
standard reference in the disciplines of theology, Arabic rhetoric, and Ḥanafī 
jurisprudence.  Al-Taftāzānī refuted the perceived monism of Ibn al-‘Arabī, 
utilising a theological approach propelling Ash‘arī epistemology to counter Ibn 
‘Arabī’s theosophical supra-rational discourse.42  Notwithstanding the tension 
between strict scholasticism based upon a rational reading of the revelation, 
and more theosophical readings of the same, ultimately the scholastic approach 
came to characterise the mode of transmission of the Islamic disciplines, though 
more mystical and theosophical readings remained upon the boundaries of 
orthodoxy. 
After al-Ghazālī, and the subsequent fall of the Abbasid caliphate in 
Baghdad over a century later, the pendulum of Islamic intellectualism shifted 
west, primarily to Cairo, and secondarily to Damascus and the North African 
centres of Fes and Kairouan.  The discursive style of writing favoured by the 
intellects of the Muslim East gave way to a more streamlined and concise style 
based upon didactic texts (mukhtaṣar), commentaries (sharḥ), and later on, 
glosses and supra-commentaries (ḥāshiya).    The first mukhtaṣars appeared 
around the thirteenth century, a period coinciding with the establishment of the 
                                                                                                                                    
Thought : The Taymiyyan Moment, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
40 For an example, see: Taqi al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Īmān (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1996). 
41 Despite his prolific body of work, no Western study of al-Taftāzānī has been undertaken.  See 
brief biography in: Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ Al-Maqāṣid. (Beirut: ‘Ālam al-kutub, 1989). 
42 See Risāla Fī Waḥdat Al-Wujūd (CairoN.D.). 
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first Islamic seminaries (madrasa) in Cairo by its new Sultan, Ṣalāh al-Dīn al-
Ayyūbī.43   
The discursive style employed in the seminaries of Baghdad, 
characterised by courses in dialectic (al-jadal) and disputation (al-khilāf), was 
not adopted in the same form in Cairo.  The main objective of Ṣalāh al-Dīn’s 
madrasa project was to re-establish Sunni authoritativeness in the wake of over 
a century of active propagation of Isma‘īlī doctrine.  He also seemed to be 
concerned with the disposition of the general populace, and not just the 
scholarly elite.  Hence, the creedal mukhtaṣar, pronounced from the city’s 
minarets, was used to re-establish Sunni doctrine.44  The result was a new 
pedagogy inaugurated during the Ayyubid period, and reached maturation in 
the Mamlūk era.  It was characterised by a dedicated focus on an Islamic 
hermeneutic based upon linguistic semiotics, authoritative transmission, 
discipline mastery via memorisation of concise, didactic texts, and the modified 
scholastic method that was borrowed from the seminaries of Baghdad and its 
environs.   These are all examined in the following sections. 
                                             
43 Fadel, "The Social Logic of Taqlīd and the Rise of the Mukhtaṣar." 
44 For an analysis regarding Ṣalāh al-Dīn’s motivations behind his “anti-Fatimid” measures and 
patronage of Sunnism, see: Nathan Hofer, The Popularisation of Sufism in Ayyubid and Mamluk 
Egypt, 1173-1325, Edinburgh Studies in Classical Islamic History and Culture (Edinburgh: 
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Arabic Hermeneutics 
 
 One of the most oft-cited verses of the Qur’ān extolling the virtues of the 
Arabic language is: Indeed, We have revealed an Arabic Qur’ān so that you 
may understand (innā anzalnāhu qur’ānan ‘arabiyyan la‘allakum t‘aqilūn).45  
Before the advent of Islam, the Arabic language was primarily a spoken 
tradition, as there is no evidence to suggest the Arabs of Arabia had engaged in 
any literary endeavours worth mention.  The sole genre they engaged in of 
literary merit was the ode (qaṣīda); poems of varying lengths but generally not 
exceeding a hundred verses.  The majority of the classic theologians, such as 
Mālik, al-Shāfi‘ī, and al-Ash‘arī considered the Arabic language to be both 
sacred in its wording as well as its meanings.  Only the scholars of the Ḥanafī 
School permitted the ritual prayers to be recited in a language other than 
Arabic.46   
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ al-Rāzī (d. 370/980), the renowned Ḥanafī jurisprudent and 
exegete, argued that knowledge of the semantic meanings of the individual 
Arabic words of the Qur’ān was sufficient, as only the Arabs of the seventh 
century would be privy to precise meanings of resulting from metaphor, idiom, 
or simile.47  On the latter point the majority agreed, and thus the disciplines of 
Arabic language, including grammar, morphology, rhetoric, prosody etc. were 
studied in earnest as a means to “freeze” the seventh century language, 
considered the period in which the language was in its most pristine form.  
 Language formed the basis of Islamic thought; words were not merely 
the effects of social constructs and conventions, but are rather divine in origin.  
                                             
45 Qur’ān (12:2) 
46 ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Al-Jazīrī, Al-Fiqh ‘Alā Al-Madhāhib Al-Arba‘a (Cairo: Dār Ibn al-Haytham, 
N.D.), 134. 
47 ‘Abd Allah Ibn Bayyah, Amālī Al-Dalālāt Wa Majālī Al-Ikhtilāfāt (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2007), 
62. 
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The tenth/fifteenth century scholar, al-Suyūtī, reports the near consensus 
position that language is tawqīfī (divine in origin) rather than tawfīqī (effect of 
convention), though language developed from its divine primordial state when 
revealed to the primordial man, Adam, to later adapt and accept new words by 
way of convention.48  The underlying principle of Arabic hermeneutics was one 
based on the premise that meaning – specifically in the sacred texts of the 
Qur’ān and Prophetic ḥadīth – reflects intent, and since it was revealed to man, 
is ultimately accessible and knowable by him, via the preserved usages of the 
words.  Hence, the ‘ulamā’ took great pains in preserving the language of the 
Qur’ān.  This was specifically referred to as ‘aṣr al-iḥtijāj (period of “proof’), 
when the Arabic language continued to retain its pristine form, before expansion 
led to the introduction of foreign words at around 150/767, thus losing its ability 
to provide the “proof” for systematic rules of grammar, morphology, and 
lexicography.49   
Hence, the interpretation of the Islamic tradition has always been 
predicated on its Arabic underpinnings and the necessity of a hermeneutic that 
forms part of the tradition in and of itself.  Some Muslim theologians have even 
asserted that one of the root causes of disbelief and apostasy amongst Muslims 
is an inadequate understanding of the Arabic language, and this point in 
particular is often cited regarding the aberrant theology of splinter sects, such 
as the Kharijites.50  The Arabic language was of primal interest during the early 
theological debates with the Mu’tazilites.  Specifically, the inimitability of the 
Qur’ān, provoked debate, with some Mu’tazilites adopting the position that its 
                                             
48 Suyūṭī, Al-Muzhir Fī ʿUlūm Al-Lughah Wa-Anwāʿihā. (al-Qāhirah: ʿĪsá al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 
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50 See Sanūsī’s roots of disbelief in: Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf Sanūsī, Sharḥ Al-Muqaddimāt,,ed. 
Nizār Ḥamādī (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Ma‘ārif, 2009), 123-26. 
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inimitability was to due to the divine hand incapacitating anyone who would 
attempt to counter the Qur’ān.   Conversely, Ash‘arī theologians such as al-
Bāqillānī, argued that the Qur’ān was inherently inimitable, as it reflected the 
divine attribute of God’s speech.51  
The tradition of preservation of Arabic hermeneutics was practiced 
throughout all of the disciplines, most notably in the ancillary Arabic disciplines, 
such as grammar, morphology, and rhetoric, as well as uṣūl al-fiqh (juristic 
methodology).52 In the latter period of al-Dardīr, the emphasis on Arabic 
hermeneutics found its way in the commentaries and glosses of seemingly 
unrelated disciplines such as fiqh.  However, an argument can be made that the 
impetus behind the inclusion of grammar, morphology, and rhetoric in the 
commentaries on fiqh manuals was an attempt at training students in applying 
the Arabic hermeneutic to understand the texts, rather than the oft-repeated 
accusation that such inclusions were useless filler.  
One of al-Dardīr’s contemporaries, al-Amīr, devoted a commentary to the 
subject, entitled “Ghāyat al-Iḥkām fī Ādāb al-Fahm wa al-Ifhām.”53  As the title 
suggests, the book explains the etiquettes of understanding the text and 
commentary, as well as the etiquettes regarding text and commentary 
production.   This, no doubt, reflected the pervasiveness of the text-commentary 
genre that dominated the pedagogical landscape in the era of al-Dardīr.   Al-
Dardīr likewise took a keen interest in preserving the traditional Arabic 
hermeneutic, as evidenced in his commentaries in theology and jurisprudence, 
as well as dedicated works to the subject. 
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 Al-Dardīr thus contributed to the on-going scholarly struggle to preserve 
the language of the Qur’ān in a work entitled Tuḥfat al-Ikhwān fi ‘Ilm al-Bayān, a 
small didactic treatise on the Arabic discipline of bayān (rhetoric), specifically 
the literary devices of majāz (figurative expression), tashbīh (simile), and kināya 
(metaphor).  Al-Dardīr in a similar pedagogical style to his other works, authors 
both the matn (text) and sharh (commentary) for this particular work.  He also 
chooses the same title, Tuḥfat al-Ikhwān (the Treasure of the Brethren) as he 
did for his seminal work on taṣawwuf (Sufism).54  Al-Zabīdī, who describes 
himself as a close confidant of al-Dardīr, mentions that he wrote this particular 
work in bayān at his behest.55  It is likely, then, that al-Dardīr may have been 
disposed to contributing to the larger project at hand at al-Azhar in the late 
eighteenth century of making the Islamic disciplines more accessible to newer 
generations of students, and secondly, of standardising and canonising the 
rules of interpretation of the Islamic tradition for these newer generations.   
The latter project was exemplified in al-Zabīdī’s encyclopaedic work in 
language, Tāj al-‘Arūs, as well as al-Dardīr’s Tuḥfat in bayān and to some 
degree in his manual of taṣawwuf of the same title.  The attention to the rules of 
Arabic grammar, morphology, and rhetoric, was emblematic of the 
commentaries and glosses that exemplified this era.  Al-Dardīr was not alone in 
this, as fiqh works of all schools as well as other works in kalām often spend 
considerable space in deciphering the linguistic purports and connotations of 
the basic didactic text.  For example, in al-Dardīr’s own commentary on the 
Kharīda, he states in his commentary on the following line:56 
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Aqsām ḥukm al-‘aql lā maḥāla haya al-wujūb thumma al-istiḥāla 
(The divisions of the rational ruling indisputably 
    Are: obligation then impossibility) 
[This is] a subject with its predicate omitted – [namely] three, as the flowing line indicates; and 
the sentence “are: obligation..” is a jumla isti’nāfiyya (new sentence) that clarifies “divisions”, as 
it is [equally] correct that [the phrase beginning with] “are” is the predicate. Aqsām (divisions) is 
the plural form of qism (division) with a kasra and sukūn (diacritical marks of “i” and 
“unvoweled”), and it refers to that which it and something else falls under a whole or universal.  
A whole is that which consists of two or more substances, [whereas] the universal is that which 
is common to many instances.  That which falls under the whole is known as a part, and that 
which falls under the universal is known as a particular… 
 
Notwithstanding the cryptic nature of the commentary, it is clear that al-Dardīr in 
this particular passage incorporates multiple disciplines - grammar, morphology, 
and Aristotelian logic - to demonstrate a particular point.  He does this 
throughout this commentary on the Kharīda, as well as his other commentaries 
in fiqh, taṣawwuf, and rhetoric.  This particular interdisciplinary style of 
commentary came to be emblematic of the sharh - ḥāshiya (commentary – 
supra-commentary) genre favoured by Muslim scholars of the Mamlūk and 
post-Mamlūk period.   
The maturity of the pedagogical model reached its fruition in the late 
Ottoman period of al-Dardīr, and invariably all works produced were done so for 
the express purpose of pedagogical use in the many circles of learning in al-
Azhar and greater Cairo.  The linguistic aspect of the texts was given special 
consideration, and it would appear that there was a renewed interest in the 
documentation of the Arabic language, not unlike the period in early Islam when 
the formal disciplines of the language were first being formulated.  This 
coincided in the eleventh/seventeenth century with a renewed interest in the 
discipline of manṭiq (Aristotelian logic), specifically in North Africa, as has been 
suggested by El-Rouayheb.57  A predecessor of al-Dardīr and al-Zabīdī, ‘Abd 
al-Qādir al-Baghdādī (d. 1093/ 1682) authored an encyclopaedic work on 
Arabic literature, which he appropriately called Khizānat al-Adab (the Treasury 
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of Literature).58  In this masterful work, he ostensibly offers commentary on the 
one thousand citations used by the thirteenth century polymath, Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 
646/1249) in his twin works on grammar and morphology, the Kāfiyya and 
Shāfiyya, respectively.  Though there is little in the literature about Ibn al-Ḥājib 
or his works, there is little doubt that the Kāfiyya and Shāfiyya were highly 
influential, especially in the period before the emergence of Ibn Mālik’s 
thousand line didactic poem, al-Alfiyya.  This later work became the standard 
pedagogical text for Arabic grammar and morphology in the Arab speaking 
lands of North Africa and Egypt, though the Kāfiyya and Shāfiyya retained their 
pre-eminence in the non-Arab lands of Anatolia and Persia.59  
 Al-Dardīr’s contribution to this renewed interest in the Arabic disciplines, 
as aforementioned, came in the form of his work in bayān (Arabic rhetoric).  In 
his introduction, al-Dardīr states that this small treatise is dedicated to three 
main subjects: 1) majāz (figurative expression), 2) tashbīh (simile) and 3) kināya 
(metaphor).60  The common theme of the three subjects is their juxtaposition to 
literal meaning; this is significant, as al-Sanūsī states that one of the root 
causes of heterodox theology is a failure to interpret meanings of the Qur’ān 
and ḥadīth outside the confines of literal meaning.  The contrast between literal 
meaning and figurative meaning is predicated on the concept of waḍ‘ (original 
usage)61, where the delineator of original usage is God himself, as already 
mentioned regarding the tawqīfī theory of language.  This is a further testament 
to the intertwining of language and theology, and hence the attention of the 
‘ulamā’, such as al-Dardīr, who was primarily a theologian and jurist.  He 
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summarises the incidence of majāz (figurative language) in 1) singular words, 2) 
between subject and predicate, and 3) compounded between singular words 
and subject-predicate relationship (the two varieties being tashbīh and 
kināya).62  Al-Dardīr’s use of theological constructs to illustrate the Arabic 
hermeneutic comes into sharp relief when he enumerates the causes for an 
expression to be interpreted figurative rather than literally, what he refers to as 
qarīna ṣārifa ‘an al-ma‘na al-ḥaqīqī (indicator that precludes the intended 
meaning to be taken literally).  In this, al-Dardīr reiterates the near-consensus 
position that the default interpretation of any text returns to the divinely 
designated waḍ‘ (original usage) meaning, unless there is a clear indicator that 
the literal meaning is not intended.  In this aspect, he concurs with the theory of 
hermeneutics posited by Hirsh, namely that the “verbal meaning” (correlating to 
waḍ‘) of a text does not change, whereas its “significance” (roughly correlating 
to the figurative devices of majāz, tashbīh, and kināya) can vary based upon 
“evidence” predicated on rules of logic.63  For al-Dardīr, this “evidence” or 
indicators take into consideration the status of the utterer of the expression as 
they do the feasibility of a literal understanding of the expression.  As far as 
feasibility of the literal meaning of the expression, the indicator can be rational, 
legal, or empirical.  For example, the expression: “His day is fasting and his 
night is praying”, the literal meaning is clearly not intended as on the basis of 
rationality as the day cannot literally fast nor can the night pray.  An example of 
a legal indicator would be the believer’s utterance “ The season of spring 
brought about the sprouting of the crops”, as God is the sole cause of all 
occurrences.  The expression “The ruler built the city” would not be understood 
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literally, as empirical evidence indicates that a single person cannot build an 
entire city but rather would be the one to issue the order.64   
 The subset of Arabic hermeneutics outlined above form part of a larger 
set of hermeneutical theory that defines authoritativeness in Sunni Islam, which 
also includes the other epistemic sources of the rational intellect and empirical 
observation.  Thus, the hermeneutic rules underlying the interpretation of 
scripture incorporate aspects of the logical intellect as well as empiricism, in as 
much as that language, after its initial primordial divinely prescribed state, is 
subject to usage by generations of native speakers that define and inform the 
meanings associated with its semantic expressions.  The method by which one 
avails of these established usages is predominately empirical, as it consists of 
careful and recorded observation of the incidences of these usages.  Hence, 
the Arabic disciplines of grammar, morphology, rhetoric, lexigraphy, etc. are all 
empirically based.  This is significant, as the perennial debate of reason versus 
revelation in the Islamic paradigm rings hollow when one considers the 
methodology by which revelation is interpreted, which incorporates fundamental 
aspects of reason, as has been demonstrated above.   
Al-Dardīr sees language as the basis by which the primary sources are 
interpreted, as well as a pre-requisite to accessing the Islamic scholarly tradition 
in the form of its varied and discursive disciplines.  Furthermore, mastery of the 
Arabic language is an essential element for claiming intellectual authority, as it 
forms part of the overall methodology of interpretation by which authority is 
conferred. Furthermore, the gap between the spoken language and the written 
language in the time of al-Dardīr most likely necessitated the perhaps over-
emphasis on issues of language, even in the works of theology and 
                                             
64 al-Ṣāwī and al-Dardīr, Hāshiyat Al-Shaykh Aḥmad Al-Ṣāwī ‘Alā Sharḥ Sayyidī Aḥmad Al-
Dardīr Lī Risālatahi Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān Fī ‘Ilm Al-Bayān, 10-14. 
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jurisprudence, as a means of practical application of the principles learnt in the 
principle Arabic genres of naḥw, ṣarf, balāgha, and adab.65  Al-Dardīr, in the 
muḥaqqiq tradition, summarises the work of his predecessors to produce for the 
aspiring ‘ālim the keys to a tradition that would have been otherwise 
unnavigable.  For al-Dardīr to arrive at a position of being able to summarise the 
tradition, he would have necessarily been fully acquainted with it in a profound 
way.  The following section outlines his education, as gleaned from his thabat, 
or scholarly pedigree.  
 
The Thabat of al-Dardīr and his Education 
 
The thabat66 of al-Dardīr enumerates the books he has studied with their 
appropriate genealogies that extend back to the original authors, or in the case 
of ḥadīth, to the Prophet Muḥammad himself.  The thabat obtained from the 
Egyptian National Archives in Cairo appears not to be exhaustive, as it does not 
mention any of the works of theology (‘ilm al-kalām), jurisprudence (fiqh), or 
Sufism, that al-Dardīr studied with his teachers.  A contemporary of al-Dardīr, 
who appeared to have studied in the same circles and with the same teachers 
despite being nearly thirty years younger than al-Dardīr, Muḥammad al-Amīr (d. 
1232/1817), wrote an extensive thabat that included such diverse disciplines as 
astronomy, geometry, as well as the traditional disciplines of theology, 
jurisprudence, Qur’ānic exegesis, and ḥadīth.67   
                                             
65 See al-Dardīr’s introduction to his treatise in Arabic rhetoric (balāgha): Aḥmad al-Ṣāwī and 
Aḥmad al-Dardīr, Hāshiyat al-Shaykh Aḥmad al-Ṣāwī ‘alā Sharḥ Sayyidī Aḥmad al-Dardīr lī 
Risālatahi Tuḥfat al-Ikhwān fī ‘Ilm al-Bayān (Cairo: Muṣṭafā Bāb al-Ḥalabī, 1935), 3. 
66 “Al-thabt bi sukūn al-muwaḥḥada al-thābit al-qalb w’al-lisān…wa ammā b’il-fatḥ famā yuthbit 
fīhi al-muḥaddith masmū‘ahu ma‘ asmā’ al-mushārikīn lahū fīhi lannahu k’al-ḥujja ‘ind al-
shakhṣ…” Abd al-Ḥayy al-Kattāni, Fihras Al-Fahāris Wa Al-Athbāt. (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-
Islāmī, 1982), 1:68. 
67 Aḥmad; al-Ṣawī al-Dardīr, Aḥmad, Ḥāshiyat Al-Ṣāwī ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya (Cairo: 
Maṭba‘at Ḥijāzī, N.D.), 29. 
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The discrepancy between the two credentials can likely be attributed to a 
difference in purpose.  Whereas al-Dardīr mentions in the first few lines of his 
thabat that he wrote it in response to his students’ requests, al-Amīr makes no 
such remark, but appears to have attached a title to his thabat, thereby making 
it a scholarly work, as he does include some anecdotal comments in reference 
to his teachers.68  Therefore, his work seems to been have meant more for 
posterity than to assuage a request of a group of students, as in the case of al-
Dardīr.  Whatever the case may be, al-Dardīr begins his thabat69 by declaring 
that the knowledge of isnād is a fundamental aspect of religion, and is the 
mainstay of Islamic scholars from amongst the earliest generations as well as 
the latter ones.  In this he follows nearly the exact wording of his main teacher, 
al-Ḥifnī, leaving little room for doubt that he was in possession of his thabat and 
took it as an exemplar.  His thabat confirms his biographical entries of al-Jabartī 
and al-Zabīdī, in that his main teachers were ‘Alī al-Ṣa‘īdī and Muḥammad al-
Ḥifnī, the rector of al-Azhar.  Most of al-Dardīr’s genealogies in the discipline of 
ḥadīth are from al-Ḥifnī, though on some occasions he mentions genealogies 
going through both al-Ṣa‘īdī and al-Ḥifnī.  Not mentioned in the thabat is the fact 
that al-Ṣa‘īdī was al-Dardīr’s main teacher in Mālikī jurisprudence; they both 
hailed from the same tribe and region in Upper Egypt, Banī Adī.  Al-Ṣa‘īdī is 
also the first teacher mentioned by al-Amīr in his thabat, bolstering the idea that 
while al-Dardīr and al-Amīr were contemporaneous and may have attended 
similar circles, they might have had a frosty relationship.  This would be 
insignificant except for the fact that tribal affiliations may have had influence on 
the hierarchy amongst the scholarly elite at al-Azhar, for it was al-Dardīr who 
                                             
68 Such as when he mentions that Muḥammad al-Ḥifnī died while teaching a book on Prophetic 
characteristics. See Muḥammad al-Amīr, Sadd Al-Arab Min ‘Ulūm Al-Isnād Wa 'L-Adab (Cairo: 
Maṭba‘at al-Hijāzī, N.D.), 34. 
69 al-Dardīr, "Thabat Al-Dardīr." 
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assumed al-Ṣa‘īdī’s mantle after his death, assuming the positions of both 
Mālikī mufti and head of the Upper Egypt student body, and not al-Amīr.   
After the small prologue, al-Dardīr begins with the books he read or 
studied in the discipline of Qur’ānic exegesis (tafsīr).   He most likely begins with 
this rather than ḥadīth, even though in his own words it is what is “specifically 
intended with the disciple of intellectual genealogies (‘ilm al-asānīd)” due to the 
greater rank assigned to the Qur’ān, the word of God, as opposed to the ḥadīth, 
the words of the Prophet.  He mentions four specific works, namely Ma‘ālim al-
Tanzīl by al-Ḥusayn al-Baghawī (d. 516/1122)70, the Tafsīr of Fakhr al-Dīn al-
Rāzī (d. 606/1210)71, the Kashshāf of the Mu’tazilite theologian Maḥmūd al-
Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144)72, and the Anwār al-Tanzīl and Asrār al-Ta’wīl of 
Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286)73.  All four of the tafsīr works were 
theological commentaries on the Qur’ān, sometimes even polemical, as the 
purpose of the work of al-Bayḍāwī, a renowned Ash‘arī theologian, was to 
present the best of al-Zamakhsharī’s exegesis, specifically by excising the 
Mu‘tazilite polemics contained therein.  Nevertheless, al-Zamakhsharī’s tafsīr is 
primarily a rhetorical one, which seeks to highlight the Qur’ān’s use of the 
various Arabic literary devices.  One would be hard-pressed to find a tafsīr 
written after al-Zamakhsharī’s Kashshāf that did not borrow in some form or 
fashion from his pioneering work.  The fact that it is still studied today in Islamic 
seminaries and institutions of learning despite its purported sectarian leanings 
is a testament to its genius.   
                                             
70 See al-Ḥusayn ibn Masʿūd Baghawī, Tafsīr Al-Baghawī Al-Musammā Maʿālim Al-Tanzīl,. 
(Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1993). 
71 See Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar Rāzī, Tafsīr Al-Fakhr Al-Rāzī Al-Mushtahir Bi-Al-
Tafsīr Al-Kabīr Wa-Mafātīḥ Al-Ghayb. (Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr, 1985). 
72 See Maḥmūd ibn ʿUmar Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf ʿan Ḥaqāʼiq Ghawāmiḍ Al-Tanzīl Wa-
ʿuyūn Al-Aqāwīl Fī Wujūh Al-Taʼwīl,,ed.ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd, and ʿAlī Muḥammad 
Muʿawwaḍ (al-Riyāḍ: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 1998). 
73 See ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar Bayḍāwī, , Anwār Al-Tanzīl Wa-Asrār Al-Taʼwīl, Al-Maʿrūf Bi-Tafsīr 
Al-Bayḍāwī. ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Marʿashlī (Bayrūt: Dār Iḥyāʼ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī : 
Muʼassasat al-Tārīkh al-ʿArabī, 1998). 
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The common theme between the four works, namely language and 
theology, emphasised the application of Arabic hermeneutics to unravel the 
multi-layered meanings of the Qur’ān.  In contrast, the “report-based” exegeses 
such as those of Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) and al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), trained 
traditionists who approached the discipline of tafsīr with a focus on Prophetic 
traditions to extrapolate meanings of the verses.  Additionally, these four tafsīrs 
are steeped in methodological issues, specifically in Arabic hermeneutics and 
interpretive theology.  Al-Zamakhsharī, who also authored the lexicon Asās al-
Balāgha74, was a master of the Arabic disciplines trained in the Khwārazm 
tradition of the ‘ulūm al-‘aqliyya that emphasised grammar and logic.  Though 
he was supporter of the Mu‘tazilite doctrine, Sunni scholars accepted his tafsīr 
as authoritative despite its Mu’tazilite leanings.75 
Terse texts that emphasised linguistic and theological aspects were 
emblematic of the late tafsīr genre.  It is not coincidental that the four tafsīr 
works included in al-Dardīr’s thabat were works of Persianate scholars. 
Theological polemics flourished in the Persian intellectual centres of Ray, 
Shiraz, Tabriz, and Samarkand in the high mediaeval period.  The Ash‘arī – 
Mu‘tazilite polemics produced a vibrant discourse that re-formed the way the 
Islamic tradition was transmitted.  In subjects as diverse as Arabic grammar and 
rhetoric, hermeneutics, and of course, theology, the method of the kalām 
theologians (ṭarīqat al-mutakallimīn) became the standard discourse for 
presenting the Islamic tradition.  This scholastic method was marked by a 
systematic approach that was characterised by “exhaustive investigation and 
disjunction” (al-sabr wa’l-taqsīm), an approach championed by the likes of al-
                                             
74 This work may be one of a kind in that it cites the literal meaning(s) of the word entries 
followed by the figurative usages with illustrative examples. See Maḥmūd ibn ʿUmar 
Zamakhsharī, Asās Al-Balāghah (Bayrūt: Dār Ṣādir : Dār Bayrūt, 1385). 
75 See Andrew J. Lane, A Traditional Muʿtazilite Qurʼān Commentary : The Kashshāf of Jār 
Allāh Al-Zamakhsharī (D.538/1144) (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
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Ghazālī and al-Rāzī, who established this thoroughgoing approach in response 
to Mu‘tazilite polemics.76   
This method appears to have borrowed heavily from Aristotelian 
syllogistic logic, but also referenced Avicennan philosophical constructs to 
establish a more or less unified approach to the classification and study of the 
Islamic disciplines.  This methodology came to be characterised in the form of 
the “ten foundational principles” (al-mabādi’ al-‘ashra), which defined for each 
Islamic discipline their starting ten principles.  They are summarised in the 
following table, including al-Dardīr’s designations from the Kharīda:77 
Principle Example – ‘Ilm al-‘Aqā’id (Creedal 
Theology) 
Definition (al-ḥadd): of a discipline: the 
essential attributes or objectives of the 
subject of inquiry 
The discipline by which one is enabled 
to affirm religious beliefs by way 
unassailable proofs 
Subject (al-mawḍū‘) The divine essence and attributes 
Name (al-ism) ‘Ilm al-Tawḥīd, ‘Ilm al-‘Aqā’id 
Benefit (al-thamara) Knowing God and eternal bliss 
Relationship to other disciplines (al-
nisba) 
Foundation of all other disciplines and 
a prerequisite 
Merit (al-faḍl) The most noble of all Islamic 
disciplines 
Originator (al-wāḍi‘) God or the Prophet originally, and al-
Ash‘arī in terms of formal discipline  
Sources (al-istimdād) The Qur’ān, ḥadīth, and scholarly 
consensus 
Issues (al-masā’il) The necessary beliefs regarding God, 
the Prophets, and the realm of the 
unseen 
Legal ruling (al-ḥukm) Personal obligation, with detailed 
apologetics a communal obligation 
 
Al-Dardīr next enumerates the ḥadīth works he “took” (akhadha), 
beginning with the first narrated report (al-ḥadīth al-musalsal bi al-awwaliyya): 
“Those who exhibit mercy are shown mercy by the Merciful, show mercy to 
                                             
76 See Ghazzālī,, Al-Mustaṣfá Min ʿilm Al-Uṣūl; Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar Rāzī, , Al-
Maḥṣūl Fī ʿilm Al-Uṣūl, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā (Bayrūt: Manshūrāt Muḥammad ʿAlī 
Bayḍūn, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1999). 
77 Aḥmad; al-Sibā‘ī al-Dardīr, Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, Ḥāshiyat Al-Shaykh Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Al-Sibā‘ī 
‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya (Cairo: al-sharika al-dawliyya li ṭibā‘, 1423), 137-44. 
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those on earth, and you will be shown mercy from He in the heavens.”78  The 
tradition of the first narrated report appears to extend as far back as to the time 
of Sufyān ibn ‘Uyayna (d. 196/811)79, an early ḥadīth scholar who was a 
contemporary of al-Shāfi‘ī.  The condition is that the report must have been the 
first ḥadīth heard from the particular transmitter, throughout all of the 
transmitters of in the chain of transmission (sanad).80  Al-Dardīr claims to have 
heard this as the first ḥadīth from both of his teachers, al-Ḥifnī and al-Ṣa‘īdī.  
Though neither al-Bukhārī nor Muslim include this particular ḥadīth in their 
collections, it is nevertheless considered a sound and authentic tradition, due to 
the unbroken chain of direct transmission.  Also referred to as the “ḥadīth of 
mercy”, the tradition of initiating erstwhile ḥadīth scholars with an admonition 
reminding them of God’s mercy, as well as the importance of showing mercy to 
others, appears to be the impetus for the selection of this particular ḥadīth as 
the first to be heard.   
The tradition of this style of narration is extensive, with over two hundred 
musalsal ḥadīth narrated in a similar fashion.81  The common thread between all 
of them is the accompaniment of a particular act upon narration of the ḥadīth.  
Of these, al-Dardīr also includes in his thabat the tradition of the reciting of the 
sixty-first chapter of the Qur’ān (al-Ṣaff), mentioned in the ḥadīth stating the 
Prophet Muḥammad was asked by a group of his companions about the most 
pious deeds one can undertake; the aforementioned chapter was then revealed 
with the opening verse: O ye who believe! Those in the heavens and the earth 
                                             
78 Narrated in the ḥadīth collections of al-Tirmidhī and Abū Dawūd. 
79 See Aḥmad Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī and, Taqrīb Al-Tahdhīb, ed. Khalīl Ma'mūm Shīhā (Bayrūt: 
Dār al-Ma‘rifa, 1997), 1:303. 
80 This tradition is still alive today, as this researcher was once part of a gathering with the 
prominent Syrian ḥadīth narrator, Ḥasan Hītu, where he refused the ijāza because he had 
already mentioned another ḥadīth in the conversation prior to us soliciting the ijāza (Kuwait, 
2006). 
81 See Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Bāqī Ayyūbī, Al-Manāhil Al-Salsalah Fī Al-Aḥādīth Al-Musalsalah 
(Dimashq: Dār Iḥyā' ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, 1976). al-Amīr, Sadd Al-Arab Min ‘Ulūm Al-Isnād Wa 'L-Adab, 
13. 
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exalt God and He is the Most Wise, the Eminent.  O ye who believe!  Why do 
you speak of that which you do not practice?82  Al-Dardīr includes only one 
other of these traditions, which he chooses to conclude his thabat, known as 
the tradition of the “handshake” (ḥadīth al-muṣāfaḥa), which, as the name 
suggests is narrated with the accompaniment of a handshake, in an unbroken 
chain of transmission extending back to the Prophet himself.  These inclusions 
appear more indicative than exhaustive.  The fact that he would preface and 
conclude his intellectual genealogy with these types of traditions indicates that 
ḥadīth studies in the later Islamic tradition were more ritualistic and ceremonial 
than didactic.  This is sometimes referred to in the Islamic literature as tabarruk 
– seeking blessings via ritualistic practices – and a mainstay of Sufi oriented 
Muslim societies throughout the pre-modern and early modern periods.  The 
ḥadīth collection of al-Bukhārī was read publicly in times of strife as a means of 
tabarruk and warding off suffering and tribulation.83   
Al-Dardīr lists all of the major ḥadīth compendiums, including those of al-
Bukhārī, Muslim, Ibn Mājah, Abū Dawūd, and the Muwaṭṭa’ of Mālik.  The 
manner by which he “received” these collections varies from one to the next.  
For the collection of al-Bukhārī, he uses the term “narrated with authoritative 
chain” (arwīhi b’il-sanad); the term riwāya in the terminology of the ḥadīth 
specialists is a general term that can refer to any number of eight different 
methods of accepting ḥadīth narration (taḥammul).84  Al-Dardīr also uses the 
term “narrated with authorization” (arwīhi b’il-ijāza) when listing the collections of 
Abū Dawūd and al-Nasā’ī.  For the other ḥadīth collections, such as the 
Muwaṭṭa of Mālik and the Musnad of al-Shāfi‘ī, he uses no particular term and 
                                             
82 Qur’ān (61:1).   
83 Still practiced to this day in al-Azhar and Medina. 
84 See al-Qāḍī ‘Iyāḍ, Al-Ilmā‘ Ilā Ma‘rifat Uṣūl Al-Riwāya Wa Taqyīd Al-Samā‘ (Cairo: Dar al-
Turāth, 1970). 
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merely refers to the chain of transmission.  An argument can thus be made that 
ḥadīth studies in the early modern period were largely ceremonial; the works 
listed by ijāza would imply that they were not necessarily received by audition, 
and that the license to narrate was given on account of the piety and 
scholarship of the receiver, and not necessarily via a direct audition.  Though 
this mode of transmission was known in the earlier periods, it was considered a 
weaker and less reliable form of transmitting sacred texts, though a legitimate 
one nonetheless.  The subject of ḥadīth studies in the late eighteenth century 
has received some attention from Western scholarship, with the particular 
assertion that there was some sort of revival, which began outside of Egypt, 
most notably in the Hejaz and interior India.   
The figure of Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī (d. 1791/1205), a polymath Indian 
scholar, and contemporary and self-described friend of al-Dardīr, has been 
characterised as a leading figure in this regard.85  He initiated majālis in the 
narration of ḥadīth, often attended by al-Azhar’s leading scholars.  Al-Jabartī, a 
contemporary and admirer of al-Zabīdī, attributes the latter’s popularity to style 
more than content.  Al-Zabīdī wore his turban and kaftan in a style 
uncharacteristic of the Azhar ‘ulamā’.  He also adopted an antiquated style in 
his narration of the Prophetic reports, focusing on the narrators themselves and 
the more arcane aspects, as well as utilising a reader for reports, in a throwback 
style reminiscent of earlier periods that al-Jabartī was able to identify from its 
description in older books.86  When al-Zabīdī progressed from merely narrating 
the reports to offering commentary on them, the Azhar ‘ulamā’ discontinued 
attending his majlis.  Al-Jabartī does not explicitly state why this happened, but 
                                             
85 Reichmuth, The World of Murtada  Al-Zabidi (1732-91): Life, Networks, and Writings, 11-16; 
Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760–1840, 54-56. 
86 Reichmuth, "Murtadā Az-Zabīdī (D. 1791) in Biographical and Autobiographical Accounts. 
Glimpses of Islamic Scholarship in the 18th Century," 79-80. 
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it can be inferred that such commentary was not novel, and well established 
within al-Azhar, and therefore of little value to them.  The majlis culture that al-
Zabīdī initiated continued to be quite popular, and the Azhar ‘ulamā’ remained 
supportive, though they only attended thereafter on special occasions, such as 
the completion of al-Zabīdī’s lexicon, Tāj al-‘Arūs, his magnum opus. 
It is difficult to determine if there was a revival of ḥadīth in the 
twelfth/eighteenth century, as there is a dearth of studies regarding the previous 
centuries.87 However, judging by al-Dardīr’s thabat, consistent attention to the 
reading and narrating of ḥadīth was maintained as far back as the Mamlūk era, 
specifically with the commentator of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī (d. 
852/1449) and his most famous pupil, Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1520).  A 
sampling of various intellectual genealogies of scholars of the eighteenth 
century in Egypt reveals that nearly all of them trace their scholarly lineages to 
these two scholars.88   
Al-Dardīr also mentions some of the aḥzāb (pl. of ḥizb) he was 
authorised to recite.  The ḥizb was generally a litany of formulas and 
invocations that were to be recited by the spiritual aspirant daily.  These were 
often associated with specific Sufi orders, but not necessarily so.  One of these 
non-specific litanies was that of the ḥizb of al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277), the famous 
Shāfi‘ī jurisprudent.  Al-Dardīr includes a sanad for this particular litany, and it 
appears to have held special significance for the Khalwatī order of al-Dardīr, 
though al-Nawawī was not known to have been an adherent of this particular 
order.  Muṣṭafā Bakrī al-Ṣiddīqī, the Syrian master who reintroduced the 
                                             
87 John Obert Voll, "Abdallah Ibn Salim Al-Basri and 18th Century Hadith Scholarship," Die Welt 
des Islams 42, no. 3 (2002): 357. 
88 See, for example: al-Amīr, Sadd Al-Arab Min ‘Ulūm Al-Isnād Wa'l-Adab; Aḥmad al-Dardīr, 
"Thabat Al-Dardīr," ed. Maktabat Jāmi‘at al-Riyāḍ (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1284 A.H.). 
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Khalwatī order in Egypt, penned a commentary on the litany of al-Nawawī and 
included it in the daily recitations of his disciples.89   
Additionally, al-Dardīr includes his authorisation to recite the litanies of 
the Shādhilī order, included the famous collection of Prophetic panegyrics by 
the Moroccan Berber mystic Muḥammad al-Jazūlī (d. 870/1465).  It was not 
uncommon during this later period after the maturation of the Sufi orders for an 
established master, such as al-Dardīr, to be initiated into multiple orders, though 
generally speaking the memberships in these orders were more ceremonial, in 
order to acquire the blessing of the sanad connection to the order and/or its 
original master.  Al-Dardīr was a staunch supporter of the Wafā’iyya order, an 
Egyptian offshoot of the Shādhilī order; he penned a commentary on one of 
Muḥammad Wafā’s formulaic invocations, using the opportunity to expound 
upon his integrated understanding of Sufism and its salient points as relates to 
non-ṭarīqa specific universals.90  Al-Dardīr received this particular ijāza from his 
Khalwatī master, al-Ḥifnī, rather than from a Shādhilī master.  
As aforementioned, the totality of al-Dardīr’s education, including all of 
the works he studied, cannot be gleaned in its entirety from his thabat.  
However, its analysis supports the thesis of Sunni authoritativeness bound to a 
transmitted tradition, as the books studied confers the notion of consensus 
bound interpretative methods, and the teachers mentioned with their isnād 
confers the notion of appropriate training from certified teachers..  Though many 
of the post-Ayyubid Egyptian scholars studied in al-Azhar, their teachers 
conferred authoritativeness in the transmission and explication of the tradition.  
The Azhar served as the physical institution by which authority was conferred.  
                                             
89 Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī al-Ṣiddīqī,, Al-Maṭlab Al-Tām Al-Sawi Sharḥ Hizb Al-Imām Al-Nawawī,, ed. 
Muḥammad Abd al-Qādir Naṣṣār (Cairo: Dār al-Karaz, 2008). 
90 al-Jabartī, 'Ajā'ib Al-Āthār Fi Al-Tarājim W'al-Akhbār, 3:308. See also: Aḥmad al-Dardīr, 
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The pedagogy of transmission of texts via audition was paramount to the ijāza 
system.  Autodidactism was largely illegitimate in the eyes of the ‘ulamā’, as the 
paradigm of isnād served to close the loop not only in terms of the veracity of 
the texts, but just as importantly the integrity of the interpretive method and set 
of apodictic principles, that, as a whole, ensured the soundness of the tradition.   
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Al-Dardīr and the Tradition of Taḥqīq  
 
 Taḥqīq (verification or realisation) has a number of different usages in the 
Islamic tradition.  One usage that has gained traction amongst the Sufis is the 
meaning of realisation and witnessing of the divine will and presence in all 
things.  Al-Sha‘rānī refers to this meaning in a number of his Sufi manuals, 
referring to the manner by in which one can worship God.  One may worship 
Him by way of taslīm (acquiescence), or by the higher form of taḥqīq 
(realisation) and kashf (unveiling), a more immediate and potent form, where 
the worshipper gains access to the unarticulated divine wisdoms.91  While al-
Dardīr also makes reference to this usage, particularly in his Sufi discourse, his 
contribution to the significant corpus of literature in the Islamic disciplines lies in 
another usage of the taḥqīq term, namely that denoting verification.  El-
Rouayheb refers to its usage in this manner, albeit in the context of the 
Persianate-Islamic tradition of taḥqīq amongst their ‘ulamā’, where texts are not 
merely the subject of commentary, but rather challenged and critiqued using the 
intellectual and rational sciences.92  Wisnovsky refers to a “spectrum of taḥqīq”, 
ranging from philological analysis, which examines a text for authorial 
authenticity, to the more advanced philosophical analysis, subjecting the 
author’s arguments to a more critical analysis.93  He further delineates this 
spectrum, postulating that there are seven types that can be gleaned from a 
reading of the post-classical philosophical commentaries, such as al-Rāzī’s 
Jawābāt on the Ishārāt of Avicenna. 
                                             
91 Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha‘rānī, Al-Qawā’id Al-Kashfiyya (Cairo: Maktabat Umm al-Qura, 2008). 
92 El-Rouayheb, "Opening the Gate of Verification: The Forgotten Arab-Islamic Florescence of 
the 17th Century." 
93 Robert Wisnovsky, "Avicennism and Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on the 
Ishārāt," Oriens 41 (2013): 354. 
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 Asad Ahmad, in the same issue of Oriens, states that:94  
..taḥqīq appears to be much more than independent verification.  In the course of tracing the 
arguments presented in the body of texts, we have seen that, even when an author claims to be 
doing taḥqīq, he is doctrinally accepting positions of past scholars.  Indeed he calls such 
adoption of ideas as doing philosophy “by way of taḥqīq.”  This is especially and paradoxically 
true in cases where the mas’ala is controversial i.e. where one would expect an entirely 
independent proof to be forthcoming.  However, the demonstration in such cases is not entirely 
based on doctrinal commitments either; only certain key and controversial premises are granted 
as taḥqīq.  This gives the impression that taḥqīq straddles tradition and scholarly factionalism, 
on the one hand, and independent reasoning and verification, one the other, in a complex 
fashion. 
 Thus, the positions of El-Rouayheb, Wisnovsky, and Asad on the issue 
of taḥqīq can be summarised as follows: 
1) Taḥqīq is the use of the rational sciences (logic) to evaluate and criticise 
the inherited tradition (El-Rouayheb). 
2) Taḥqīq is the commentator’s use of a form of textual criticism that 
examines the cogency of the original author’s arguments, and then either 
reconciles them with the author’s earlier work(s), repairing them if they 
are faulty, or presenting new arguments in opposition if the author’s 
arguments are untenable (Wisnovsky). 
3) Taḥqīq is the use of both independent verification, and eclectic selection 
of one’s particular factional doctrines to buttress and solidify 
philosophical arguments (Asad). 
 
Al-Dardīr’s practice of taḥqīq does not appear to fit conveniently into any of the 
aforementioned definitions.  Rather, what al-Dardīr, and other ‘ulamā’ like him in 
the Sunni tradition appear to do is use the various epistemological tools at their 
                                             
94 Asad Q. Ahmed, "Post-Classical Phliosophical Commentaries/Glosses: Innovation in the 
Margins," ibid.: 346. 
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disposal to arrive at a singular “truth” on any particular issue.  In other words, al-
Dardīr is not so doctrinally committed to the Ash‘arī school, for example, to 
preclude him from declaring a position in the Māturīdī school, or in the Sufi-
theology of Ibn al-‘Arabī to be the “muḥaqqaq” position.  Furthermore, al-
Dardīr’s practice of taḥqīq is not solely concerned with the identification of the 
“truth” on any given issue, though this is a priority, but also includes issues of 
doctrinal precision and clarity, which address pedagogical concerns more than 
epistemological ones.  These epistemological tools include identification of the 
stronger riwāya and of the more cogent logical arguments, as well as 
reconciliation of seemingly opposing viewpoints across different disciplines.  For 
al-Dardīr, this is most apparent in his treatment of kalām and Sufism, and to a 
lesser degree his treatment of fiqh and manṭiq.   
From another perspective, al-Dardīr’s taḥqīq resembles Shil’s notion of 
“critical intelligence”, where he states:95 
In each generation a further step forward from the point previously reached is possible; it is a 
step which could not be taken without the prior steps having been taken…Thus, within a setting 
of determined devotion to the tradition and with the desire to uphold it and without any intent to 
be original or to refute anyone, except perhaps some minor commentator, an alert critical 
intelligence will first sense that all is not as it should be with the tradition which it possesses.  
Although the tradition seen as a whole may be regarded as self-evidently correct and capable of 
demonstration should the need arise, the critical intelligence will attempt to improve the tradition 
by refining it.  This refinement consists in making ostensibly minor reformulations, clarifying 
definitions, differentiating categories, or grouping them under more general categories, 
resolving apparent contradictions, and restoring the unity of the body of belief, which had been 
diminished by critical analysis. 
  
Thus, a figure like al-Dardīr, considered a muḥaqqiq, or the “critical intelligence” 
that refines the tradition, neither reformulates it or challenges its structural 
underpinnings, but redefines and rearticulates core meanings and principles to 
facilitate transmission of said meanings and principles to a newer generation.  
This, in essence, is what defines the process of tajdīd (renewal) from the 
perspective within the tradition rather than without.    
                                             
95 Shils, Tradition, 215. 
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Al-Dardīr’s paradigm of taḥqīq is best understood in his approach to the 
disciplines of ‘aqīda and taṣawwuf as the two disciplines share a common 
objective – to know reality, defined as the manner by which things truly exist 
unencumbered by the conceptual frameworks that while necessary, are also a 
barrier.  Thus, the conceptualisation of God via His attributes is a necessary 
framework, but for the Sufi seeking a “truer” knowledge of God, the 
methodology of taṣawwuf is the only avenue by which merely rational 
conceptualisations can be transcended, as in the Islamic epistemology the 
rational intellect (‘aql) is by nature apophatic, whereas the active intellect (qalb) 
is cataphatic.  The vicissitude of the apophatic and cataphatic approaches 
comes into its sharpest relief in the positive divine attributes and the doctrine of 
qadr (destiny).  The maturation of the two approaches did not reach their zenith 
until the post Akbarian period, coupled with the revivification of Ash‘arī creed in 
Egypt and North Africa in the post Fatimid period. 
The salient features of the taḥqīq of al-Dardīr in the rational disciplines 
(creedal theology and logic) and the spiritual discipline of taṣawwuf can be 
summarised via the following: 
1) Definitions 
2) Tarjīḥ (weighted preference) of opinions within the Ash‘arī school 
3) Exposition of differences between Ash‘arī and Māturīdī theologies 
4) Al-Dardīr’s definition of orthodoxy 
5) Relationship of rational affirmations and spiritual realisations 
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Definitions 
 
 The Islamic tradition, after its encounter with the classical philosophers of 
Greece, most notably Aristotle, has been concerned with ḥudūd (definitions). Al-
Ghazālī spends considerable time on this in his logic introduction in his book on 
juristic methodology, al-Mustafṣā min ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl.  In it, he states that the main 
method by which taṣawurrāt (conceptualisations) are evaluated is via the 
preciseness of their definitions.96 Specifically, the manner by which essential 
concepts in the disciplines are defined in order to arrive at what is characterised 
by the “perfect” definition of having the twin attributes of being both jāmi‘ (all 
inclusive of relevant particulars) and māni‘ (all exclusive of irrelevant 
particulars).  Thus, the classic definition of man as the “rational animal”, and 
later slightly modified by the Muslim scholars as al-ḥayawān al-nāṭiq (the 
articulate animal), is inclusive of all human beings while excluding all other 
creatures.  It was in this vein that al-Dardīr did not suffice himself with the 
definitions of his predecessors, but rather sought to improve upon them by 
coming closer to the ideal of al-jāmi‘ al-māni‘.   
 Al-Dardīr appears to emphasise the importance of precise definitions, 
most significantly in his works on theology, including creedal theology and 
taṣawwuf. For example, he defines ‘aql (intellect) as “a secret of the spirit by 
which the soul can understand immediate (a priori) and demonstrative 
knowledge.”97 His predecessors defined intellect without reference to the spirit 
(rūḥ), as either a ‘araḍ (accident), such as al-Ash‘arī who defined it as 
knowledge of some of immediate knowledge, whereas others, such as the 
Arabic philosophers, defined it as a jawhar (substance) devoid of materiality in 
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its essence, but concomitant with it in its active aspect.  A third group avoided 
the question of definition altogether, as it is of the realm of the unseen, and a 
proper definition consisting of a genus and differentia is unattainable.98  Thus, 
al-Dardīr appears to reconcile between the three approaches, by 
acknowledging the unknowable aspect of the intellect, but affirming its purpose, 
in understanding a priori and demonstrative realities.   
In his definition of taklīf (moral responsibility), al-Dardīr prefers the 
meaning of ilzām mā fīhi kulfa (morally compulsive) to ṭalab mā fīhi kulfa (moral 
demanded), as the former does not include the legal categories of mandūb 
(recommended) and makrūh (reprehensible), both of which are not compulsory 
under the sharī’a.  This definition is more accurate as it excludes taklīf for pre-
pubescent children, as though the precepts of the sharī’a are applicable in their 
case, but in a non-compulsory fashion.99   
In another instance, al-Dardīr defines the three categories of the ḥukm 
al-‘aqlī (rationality), wujūb (rational necessity) as “that which does not accept 
negation as a matter of its essence”, and istiḥāla (rational impossibility) as “that 
which does not accept affirmation as a matter of its essence” and jawāz 
(rational possibility) as “anything that accepts either negation or affirmation.”100   
Al-Dardīr states that these definitions are “more concise, clear, and 
correct” than the more popular and standard definitions of “that which the 
intellect cannot conceive of its existence”, and “that which the intellect cannot 
conceive of its negation” for the meanings of impossibility, and necessity, 
respectively.101  Though al-Dardīr does not explicitly state the reason for this 
position, al-Sibā‘ī states in the gloss that the popular definitions neglect the 
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necessity of non-existence for certain things, such as a partner to God.  
Additionally, they exclude the attributes of aḥwāl (positive attributes such as 
God being omniscient, omnipotent, etc.)102, as they do not truly exist, but rather 
are affirmed by necessity of the existence of the attributes of ma‘ānī (positive 
attribute such as God’ omniscience and omnipotence), and therefore are 
rationally necessary, despite not existing extra-mentally.103 
Tarjīḥ (weighted preference) of opinions within the Ash‘arī school 
 
 The Ash‘arī school, like any methodology based school within Islam, is 
defined by its diversity of opinions as it is defined by its issues of consensus.104 
Al-Dardīr, in the tradition of taḥqīq, seeks to include, in his view, only the 
soundest of opinions, especially as they relate to the nature of reality and the 
world, and as a result, several instances of his exercise of tarjīḥ are discernable 
in his works.105  For example, he affirms the validity of the īmān (faith) of the 
muqallid (imitator), defined as one who accepts the words of another regarding 
matters of faith without definitive proof, though his i‘tiqād (conviction) is 
unwavering.106  In connection with this issue, al-Dardīr stipulates that naẓar 
(intellectual consideration) is obligatory for those who have the mental faculties. 
However, one’s faith is not affected by one’s exertion of one’s intellect to arrive 
at ma‘rifa (knowledge of God), as it is sound in either case i.e. whether one 
merely imitates, or believes, based upon personal conviction via exertion of 
intellect.107  This latter issue was a point of contention between the Ash‘arīs, 
with al-Ghazālī stating that naẓar is not obligatory, but merely sharṭ kamāl 
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(condition for completeness).108  The position adopted by al-Dardīr is supported 
by his preference regarding the issue of the primary obligation, which he cites 
as ma‘rifa (knowledge of God), specifically knowledge of that which is rationally 
necessary, possible, and impossible for God.  This reflects the position of al-
Ash‘arī himself.  Nonetheless, others within the Ash‘arī school stated that naẓar 
is the primary obligation upon which all others rest.109  Hence, in this instance, 
al-Dardīr preferred to return to the roots of the school by favouring the opinion 
of its eponymous founder. 
 Furthermore, on the issue of the anthropomorphic attributes of God, such 
as yad (hand), or sāq (shin), a highly contentious issue amongst the Ash‘arī 
theologians and the Ḥanbalī/Wahhābī counterparts, al-Dardīr explicates the 
position of al-Ash‘arī, negating the contention that he understood the references 
in the Qur’an to yad and sāq as anthropomorphic.  He explains a verse from the 
didactic poem of his predecessor, al-Laqqānī: wa kull naṣ awham tashbīhan fa 
awwilhu aw fawwiḍ wa rum tanzīhan (and every text that would appear to imply 
similitude: interpret it or consign, and affirm transcendence).  He asserts that 
both positions i.e. those of the salaf (predecessors) and the khalaf (later 
successors) consist of interpretation and reject the literal meaning.  In the case 
of the former, the interpretation beyond negation of the literal meaning is ijmālī 
(general and unspecific), whereas the interpretation of the latter is tafṣīlī 
(specific), such as yad denoting divine power, and wajh denoting the divine 
essence.110  In this case, al-Dardīr does not express a preferred opinion, but 
elects instead to clarify the commonalities between the two positions, in an 
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effort to contrast them with whom he refers to as al-mujassima 
(anthropomorphists), who insist on a literal interpretation.111  
Exposition of Differences between Ash‘arī and Māturīdī Theologies 
 
Al-Dardīr considered the Ash‘arī and Māturīdī schools of theology the 
sole representatives of Sunni Islam.112 While the Ash‘arī and Māturīdī 
theological schools are similar in their general approach to the divine attributes, 
there are several differences in matters that are deemed less than absolute 
from an epistemological perspective, and hence, not required for basic belief, 
and thus subject to interpretation and diversity of opinion.  While al-Dardīr is an 
avowed Ash‘arī (whom he refers to as “our imam”113), his knowledge of the 
Māturīdī school is apparent and more than cursory, which bolsters his 
credentials as a muḥaqqiq of the Islamic disciplines.   
The sharpest difference between the Ash‘arī and Māturīdī theologies is 
the issue of the pre-eternalness of the divine attributes of creation, life giving, 
and sustenance. Al-Māturīdī posits that they are pre-eternal (qadīm), whereas 
al-Ash‘arī posits that they are cosmic connections (ta‘alluqāt) of the divine 
attribute of omnipotence (qudra), and attributes of action (ṣifāt al-af‘āl), and 
therefore ḥādith (temporal).  Al-Dardīr presents the argument for the Māturīdī 
position, asserting that the divine attribute of omnipotence merely signifies the 
validity of bringing the non-existent into existence or vice versa, not the actual 
execution of creation, which requires another attribute which the Māturīdīs refer 
to as takwīn (formation).  Al-Dardīr then states that the muḥaqqiqūn of the 
Ash‘arīs posited that there is no evidence for a third attribute in addition to the 
divine will and power.  Hence, the omnipotence of God denotes the validity of 
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rendering the existence or non-existence of entities (as the Māturīdī position 
asserts); the divine will is the mukhaṣṣiṣ (specifier) of whether existence or non-
existence will be the disposition of potential entities. 
Al-Dardīr’s Understanding of Orthodoxy and Orthopraxy 
 
 The idea of orthodoxy is one that has stoked considerable discussion in 
the literature.  The term itself is a borrowed one from Christian polemics, 
presenting significant challenges for an apposite rendering in Islam.  
Nevertheless, the notion of sound and legitimate religious belief and/or practice 
is one that is recognised by all three Abrahamic religions.  Calder attempted to 
arrive at a notion of the outer limits of “right belief” for either the Sunni of Shia 
traditions, without judging if one of the two traditions is orthodox and the other 
not.114  Essentially, he arrives at the conclusion that Sunni orthodoxy can be 
gleaned from the discursive genre traditions of qiṣāṣ al-anbiyā’, ṣirāṭ al-nabī, the 
Qur’ān, ḥadīth, kalām, fiqh, tafsīr, and sharḥ.   
 One of the most significant works in prescribing correct belief is al-
Ghazālī’s Fayṣal al-Tafriqa, a treatise he penned as a rejoinder to the various 
theological schools, including the Ash’arīs, for their propensity to prescribe 
unbelief to any school that opposes them.  He achieves this by asserting that 
īmān is to hold as true all that the Prophet Muḥammad conveyed, and more 
specifically, to assert that all he conveyed exists.  He then postulates five forms 
of existence: ontological (dhātī), sensory (ḥissī), conceptual (khayālī), noetic 
(‘aqlī), and analogous (shabahī).  Thus, anyone ascribing any of the five forms 
of existence to anything conveyed as true by the Prophet Muḥammad cannot 
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be considered an unbeliever.115  Thus, he ascribes the differences amongst the 
various Islamic schools of theology, including the Mu‘tazilites, as predicated on 
different understandings of existence, and hence, not fundamental differences 
in perceptions of reality that would render any of the schools outside of the fold 
of Islam. 
  Al-Dardīr adopts a different approach than al-Ghazālī, narrowing the 
definition of proper Islam. Though there is no exact and precise term for 
orthodoxy in the Islamic tradition, al-Dardīr nevertheless references two broad 
concepts to epitomise correct belief: (orthodoxy) and correct practice 
(orthopraxy).  As regards the former, where he defines imān, he invokes the 
concept of taṣdīq mā ‘ulima min al-dīn bi’l-ḍarūrā (affirming that which is known 
from Islam necessarily).116  While this is not an original concept of al-Dardīr, it is 
worthy to note that the definition rests upon epistemological grounds.  
Necessary knowledge here does not refer to the kalām perspective of a priori 
necessity, but rather necessity from the perspective that even an untrained 
Muslim who has not studied the Islamic disciplines should be expected to have 
such knowledge as a minimum requirement to identify as a Muslim.  This 
assumes no knowledge of kalām or fiqh terms, but basic elements of tawḥīd, 
such as the oneness of God, the truthfulness of His messenger, and the legal 
obligation to pray five times a day and avoid alcoholic beverages, all form part 
of minimum necessary knowledge for the believer. 
Conversely, al-Dardīr defines orthopraxy in the context of the three core 
disciplines of practical legal rulings (fiqh), the explication of creed (‘aqīda), and 
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spiritual wayfaring (sulūk, taṣawwuf), corresponding to ‘ilm, ‘itiqād, and ‘amal.117  
He notes that the objective is to follow the way of the salaf al-ṣāliḥ (the 
righteous predecessors), and this can only be achieved by following the 
scholarly conclusions of the jurists, the kalām theologians, and those who 
applied their conclusions in “busying themselves with righteous deeds and 
spiritual struggle/purification”, such as al-Junayd, and those who follow his way.  
He delimits the valid applications of fiqh to the four madhhabs of Abū Ḥanīfa, 
Mālik, al-Shāfi‘ī and Ibn Ḥanbal, stating that other schools are potentially valid, 
but none has enjoyed the stability of the four schools.  As regards to creed, he 
delimits valid application to the schools of al-Ash‘arī and al-Māturīdī, and those 
who follow them.   
Al-Dardīr mentions the theological school of the Ḥanbalīs in disparaging 
terms, as he equates them with the mujassima (anthropomorphists), specifically 
in their belief that God’s speech is an accident of sound and letter.118  As 
regards the last discipline, taṣawwuf, al-Dardīr stipulates that one must master 
the first two disciplines as a prerequisite, after which one should seek the way 
of al-Junayd (d. 297/910)119, and those who follow him.  He then enumerates 
those whom he considers have fulfilled this criteria: Aḥmad al-Rifā‘ī (d. 
578/1182)120, ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 561/1166), Aḥmad al-Badawī (d. 
675/1276)121, Ibrāhīm al-Dasūqī (d. 696/1296)122, Abū Ḥasan al-Shādhilī 
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(d.656/1258)123, Muḥammad al-Khalwatī (d. 751/1350)124, and ‘Abd Allāh al-
Naqshabandī (d. 792/1389).125  Al-Dardīr emphasises the importance of 
aligning with a reputable shaykh of one of the aforementioned ṭarīqas, and one 
who has traversed the path of spiritual wayfaring and mujāhada, otherwise such 
a person should be avoided.  Though he does not anathemise those who do not 
follow one of the four legal schools or two theological schools, he describes 
them as people of ḍalāl (misguidance).126 
 Al-Dardīr appears to address students of knowledge and those seeking 
spiritual training rather than issuing a fatwa to the general populace.  His narrow 
definition of acceptability betrays his commitment to traditional methods and his 
rejection of tampering with the core disciplines of ‘aqīda, fiqh, and taṣawwuf.  
One can also theorise that al-Dardīr, like other theologians of his era, such as 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, constricted theological acceptability in favour of theological 
integrity, as a reaction to perceived unorthodox practices.  In the case of al-
Dardīr, unqualified imams were the main culprit behind these practices, where 
as for Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb in Arabia uncritical acceptance of community 
practices and traditions marred by reprehensible innovations (bid‘a) and 
polytheistic tendencies (shirk) were the main impetuses. 
                                                                                                                                    
122 See Helena Hallenberg, Ibrahim Al-Dasuqi (1255-1296) : A Saint Invented, Suomalaisen 
Tiedeakatemian Toimituksia Humaniora, (Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, 
2005). 
123 See Muḥammad ibn Abī al-Qāsim Ibn al-Ṣabbāgh, Elmer H. Douglas, and Ibrahim M. Abū-
Rabiʿ, The Mystical Teachings of Al-Shādhilī : Including His Life, Prayers, Letters, and Followers 
: A Translation from the Arabic of Ibn Al-Sabbagh's Durrat Al-Asrar Wa Tuhfat Al-Abrar, Suny 
Series in Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993). 
124 Sometimes referred to as Muḥammad Nūr al-Khalwatī, acknowledged in the silsila of the 
Khalwatī ṭarīqa as its founder, though little is now about him as later scholars articulated the 
principles of the ṭarīqa. See: Earle H. Waugh, Visionaries of Silence : The Reformist Sufi Order 
of the Demirdashiya Al-Khalwatiya in Cairo (Cairo ; New York: American University in Cairo 
Press, 2008), 26.  
125 Al-Dardīr is most likely referring to Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshaband, the eponymous founder of the 
Naqshabandī ṭarīqa. See: Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, 62-64. 
126 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyat ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 655-56. See also 
Trimingham’s treatment of the origin of the Sufi ṭarīqas in: Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in 
Islam, 31-66. 
 120 
For al-Dardīr, the manner of remedy included a sharper definition of 
legitimacy in terms of belief and practice, but also included facilitated access to 
the legitimate tradition. This forms part of a broader theme of al-Dardīr’s 
motivations, namely tabsīṭ (simplification and accessibility) and tarjīḥ (juristic 
preference), where he facilitates access to the Islamic tradition by choosing the 
soundest paths to said tradition, and by avoiding the enumeration of all possible 
paths in the wider Islamic tradition.  The synthesis between the rational and 
mystical traditions also features prominently in al-Dardīr’s approach the Islamic 
disciplines, as is analysed below.  
Relationship of Rational Affirmations and Spiritual Realisations 
 
Perhaps al-Dardīr’s most significant contribution to the taḥqīq tradition is 
his synthesis of multiple disciplines to arrive at a coherent unified theology.  
While the synthesis of metaphysical Sufi and Ash‘arī doctrines are more 
thoroughly analysed in the following chapter, it bears to note here that such a 
synthesis can be attributed to al-Dardīr’s pursuit of taḥqīq.  More specifically, 
the conclusions reached by the rational intellect as regards the nature of reality 
tend to uncover that reality to a certain depth.  However, in the final summation, 
it is the kashf (unveiling) of reality via taḥqīq (spiritual actualisation) that offers 
the truest and most faithful manifestation of taḥqīq (in the sense of ascertaining 
the truth via the most veritable means).   
El-Rouayheb refers to these different “connotations” of taḥqīq i.e. 
“verification” as in “critical engagement with received scholarly views, often by 
applying the rules of logic or dialectic” and in the context of Sufism, “verification 
typically denoted the mystical-experiential authentication of the truths”127.  El-
Rouayheb alludes to the tension between the two methods of “verification”, 
                                             
127 El-Rouayheb, "Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century : Scholarly Currents in 
the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb," 235. 
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referring to the “exoteric theologians” as amongst the “ordinary believers” in 
their assenting to the mystical verification of the Sufis, though they may never 
directly experience it.128   
Al-Dardīr, in the tradition of al-Sha’rānī and al-Nābulusī before him, 
believed that both the rational and mystical ways of knowing were 
complementary, and as a result asserts the equal significance of both, in order 
to realise the meaning of taḥqīq in all of its connotations.  He states that those 
who err in the exoteric rational aspects of theology will remain hopelessly 
deprived of experiencing taḥqīq in its mystical form, such as the Mu‘tazilites and 
other non-Sunni sects.129  He further elaborates, synthesising the exoteric and 
esoteric routes, regarding the issue of the acts of creation, stating: “and the 
command [of God] to the slave [of God] of “do!” or “do not!” is only upon the 
casting of the veil (sad al-ḥijāb) and their belief that they are the [true] authors 
[of their acts], for the veil of the Mu’tazilite is dense, whereas the Sunni 
contemplates and knows the Truth by way of proof (dalīl), and the walī (gnostic) 
witnesses (shāhada) when he ascends to the [station of] ‘ayn al-yaqīn (the eye 
of certainty).”130   
Al-Dardīr’s overture to dalīl is most certainly of the rational kind, 
presumably via the usual manner of logical syllogisms, whereas witnessing 
refers to spiritual realisation, a concept often expressed via other terms, such as 
kashf (unveiling) and dhawq (tasting).  For al-Dardīr, the two are inextricably 
linked and form part of a unified metaphysics that asserts the multi-layered 
nature of the world, whose reality is one, though approached and understood 
from multiple knowledge sources.  These ideas are not new, and have been 
articulated by al-Ghazālī and Ibn ‘Arabī before him, albeit with slight differences.  
                                             
128 Ibid. 
129 al-Dardīr, "Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān Fī Bayān Ṭarīq Ahl Al-‘Irfān," 10. 
130 Ibid. 
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Al-Ghazālī, like al-Dardīr, is committed to Ash‘arism, but al-Dardīr’s taḥqīq is 
expressed in his ability to summarise and clarify in a manner that was brought 
forth in a didactic text, whereas his predecessors works were often inaccessible 
except to the most erudite of scholars and theologians.   
Al-Dardīr’s style in exposition, integrating traditional topics of taṣawwuf 
into his manuals on creed, such as the Kharīda, and his manuals in fiqh, such 
as in Aqrab al-Masālik, represented a departure from his predecessors.  They 
were hesitant to refer to matters of an esoteric nature, as is the case with many 
issues in taṣawwuf, with issues that were generally exoteric, such as matters of 
creed and jurisprudence.  Their reluctance to do so could be attributed to the 
epistemological ramifications of doing so, as the exoteric theologians were loath 
to include matters in theological treatises that rested on less assured 
epistemological foundations, as is the perception with esoteric Sufism.  
Consider this following passage from his commentary on the Kharīda:131 
…and this represents the beginning of the matter regarding taṣawwuf, the life of the 
hearts; he arranged it [the subject of taṣawwuf] topically after the knowledge of the creed of 
īmān as it is not possible to travel to God except after knowing it. 
 
Hence, from an epistemological perspective, the rational foundations of 
creedal theology are a prerequisite for knowledge gleaned from direct mystical 
experience – both are equally legitimate, yet mystical knowledge is restricted to 
those who perfect the rational foundations, in addition to knowledge gleaned 
from authority based reports of the unseen from revelatory scripture (the Qur’ān 
and ḥadīth).  Thus, whereas the dominant paradigm before al-Dardīr treated the 
discipline of exoteric theology and of esoteric taṣawwuf as discrete and not 
comingled with one another, al-Dardīr reasserts the essential unity of the 
Islamic disciplines by affirming their common epistemology and terminology.  
Furthermore, he elects a style of lucidity that makes no assumptions of the 
                                             
131 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyat ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 599-600. 
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reader, seeking to offer the “zubda” (quintessence) of the disciplines, especially 
creedal theology, taṣawwuf, and jurisprudence.   
The next chapter demonstrates the manner by which al-Dardīr 
approached the rational and mystical disciplines under a unified theory of 
knowledge, as an effort to rearticulate the Islamic tradition to assure its 
continued transmission. 
Chapter Three: Al-Dardīr’s Sufi-Theology: Synthesis of Kalām 
and Taṣawwuf Epistemologies  
Introduction 
 This chapter analyses al-Dardīr’s theology, specifically in his synthesis of 
kalām and Sufi approaches to knowledge.  As noted by many, there is a history 
of tension between the rational exoteric approach to knowledge, and the Sufi 
esoteric approach in the Islamic tradition.1  This may be due to the dissonance 
between the very personal approach of Sufism, and the impersonal, cerebral 
approach of kalām.  When reading al-Dardīr’s works in theology, or those 
specifically committed to Sufism, one is left with the impression that there is no 
tension or dissonance between the two approaches. One may even conclude 
that they are complementary, and could not reasonably exist independent of 
each other. 
 This apparent “synthesis” may appear at first glance an apologetic effort 
justifying Sufism using the logical constructs of kalām theology.  This occurred 
in an earlier era; some Sufis wrote manuals of creed to allay suspicions about 
Sufism after the trial and execution of al-Ḥallāj.2  However, it is our contention 
that al-Dardīr reoriented kalām theology to address the discourse of his day.  
The Islamic discipline of ascertaining reality, specifically in terms of God and His 
attributes, has used various terms throughout the history of the Islamic tradition, 
including kalām, uṣūl al-dīn, al-fiqh al-akbar, and ‘aqīda.  These terms represent 
historical and contextualised discourses.  For example, at the height of 
                                             
1 See Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis : The Defense, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the 
Modern World, ix; Ayman Shihadeh, Sufism and Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007), 1-7; Alexander D. Knysh, Ibn ‘Arabi in the Later Islamic Tradition : The Making of 
a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). 
2 Ayman Shihadeh, "The Mystic and the Sceptic in Fakhr Al-Dīn Al-Rāzī," in Sufism and 
Theology, ed. Ayman Shihadeh (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 2. 
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polemical discourse in the fifth/eleventh century, theology was referred to as 
kalām, and jadal wa munāẓara (disputation and debate).3 
 This chapter demonstrates that al-Dardīr’s synthesis of the Sufi and 
kalām streams was not apologetic, but rather symbiotic.  Al-Dardīr was 
influenced by Ibn al-‘Arabī’s metaphysics, and this is reflected in his treatment 
of creedal theology. Al-Dardīr considered sound creed an essential prerequisite 
to realising deeper understandings of God and reality.  Sufism is the cognitive 
discipline by which these deeper meanings can be unlocked.  Consequently, al-
Dardīr reoriented the theological discourse by focusing less on disputative 
polemical issues, and more on the understanding of the divine attributes, in 
order to reach a ma‘rifa (spiritual knowledge) of God.  In his main work devoted 
to creedal theology, al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya, al-Dardīr prefaces his treatment of 
the divine attributes with his understanding of epistemology.  This chapter 
analyses his understating of the sources of knowledge and its relationship to his 
Sufi-kalām synthesis.   
 We then analyse the development of the Ash‘arī tradition, and explore 
the historical and contextual factors that influenced al-Dardīr’s discourse as an 
Ash‘arī theologian.  Al-Dardīr’s understanding of God and His attributes is 
analysed in the following section, as the basis for his Sufi-kalām synthesis.  
Finally, al-Dardīr’s understanding of the ḥaqīqa (ultimate reality) and the nature 
of divine existence from the ḥaqīqa perspective are addressed, in order to 
comprehend the influence of the Akbarian tradition on al-Dardīr’s theological 
methodology.  
                                             
3 See the titles of the works of al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), and al-Shirāzī (d. 476/1083), for 
example: ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbd Allāh Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī,, Al-Kāfīyah Fī al-Jadal, 
ed. Khalīl Manṣūr (Bayrūt, Lubnān: Manshūrāt Muḥammad ʿAlī Bayḍūn ; Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmīyah, 1999); Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī ibn Yūsuf Fīrūzābādī al-Shīrāzī and, Kitāb Al-
Maʿūnah Fī al-Jadal, ed. ʿAbd al-Majīd Turkī (Bayrūt: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1988). 
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Al-Dardīr’s Sources of Knowledge 
 
 Al-Dardīr’s epistemology can be gleaned from his works on kalām and 
taṣawwuf.  Though Sufi shaykhs before him posited spiritual cognition as a valid 
source of knowledge, such inferences were rarely integrated into the works of 
‘aqīda (creedal theology).  Al-Dardīr endeavours to integrate the two knowledge 
streams into a single cohesive epistemology.4  Al-Dardīr states plainly in his 
commentary on his main theological text, al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya that the purpose 
of the text is to furnish the believer with unequivocal proofs for the authenticity 
of Islam, and to guide him from the “yoke of [unmindful] imitation” to the “light of 
verification.”5  
  Taqlīd, in this sense, is diametrically opposed to taḥqīq, and should not 
be confused with the taqlīd / ijtihād binary in jurisprudence.  Taḥqīq in the realm 
of theology refers to the verification of one’s personal convictions of the divine 
reality, independent of authoritative transmission, unlike the case in the taqlīd / 
ijtihād binary of jurisprudence.  The manner by which these independent 
convictions can be obtained are by way of the ‘aql (rational intellect), or dhawq 
(spiritual cognition).6  For al-Dardīr, the rational intellect represents the key by 
which higher spiritual cognition can be realised. 
 Al-Dardīr, like all Ash‘arī theologians before him, adhered to Aristotle’s 
tripartite ontology, in which all conceptualisations are either necessary, merely 
possible, or impossible.  Furthermore, he relies heavily upon syllogistic logic 
when offering rational proofs for the existence of God, utilising the syllogism’s 
                                             
4 Whether they are indeed, two knowledge streams, remains an issue for debate.  Some have 
posited that the Sufi, or esoteric approach to reality, developed in parallel with the exoteric 
approach, characterised by reliance on the ostensible purport of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth, and the 
deductions of the rational intellect, the mainstay of the kalām theologians.  See various 
contributions in: Shihadeh, Sufism and Theology; al-Azmeh, Arabic Thought and Islamic 
Societies, 178-79. 
5 Min rabaqat al-taqlīd ilā nūr al-taḥqīq see al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyat ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-
Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 131. 
6 See William C. Chittick, Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul : The Pertinence of 
Islamic Cosmology in the Modern World (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007), 45-47. 
 127 
conclusion to deduce unequivocal certainties regarding God and His attributes.  
To buttress his arguments, al-Dardīr builds upon the Aristotelian notion of 
activities of the mind, namely conceptualisations (al-taṣawwur) and judgements 
(al-taṣdīq).  Ultimately, īmān is defined as acceptance and declaration as “real” 
all that the Prophet Muḥammad conveyed in his message as an emissary from 
God.  The rational mind, thus, is held responsible for recognition of the ultimate 
reality, as long as it maintains its sanity.  Unlike the Mu‘tazilites, and to some 
degree the Māturīdīs, al-Dardīr does not consider one morally responsible 
(mukallaf) unless, in addition to sanity, a clear conveyance of Islam’s message 
has been communicated.7 
The Ontology of the Intellect 
 
 Al-Dardīr considers the three sources of knowledge, at least from a 
theological perspective, as the (1) ‘aql (rational intellect), (2) (‘āda) experience 
gleaned by repetition, and (3)  (shar‘) divine revelation.  He appears to conflate 
the ontological and epistemological aspects of intellect in his definition of it, 
stating that the ‘aql is “a sirr rūḥānī (spiritual enigma) by which the soul can 
perceive knowledge via both self-evidentiary and demonstrative means, with its 
place in the heart, and its light in the mind.”8   Thus, in a single line he 
addresses the issues of mind-body duality, logical reasoning, and cognition of 
the heart and/or mind.  It would appear that he attempted to straddle the line 
between the unknowability of the human soul and intellect, in as much as a 
proper definition consisting of genus (jins) and specific differentia (faṣl) is 
untenable.  However, he attempts a definition nonetheless, characterising the 
                                             
7 For the Mu’tazilite position on the issue, addressed as the ability of the rational intellect to 
perceive al-ḥusn w’al-qubḥ (good and evil), see Sophia Vasalou, Moral Agents and Their 
Deserts : The Character of Mu'tazilite Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 6-8. 
For the Māturīdī position, see Muḥammad Ibn Abī Sharīf al-Maqdasī and Kamāl Ibn  Humām, 
Al-Musāmara Sharḥ Al-Musāyara (Beirut: Al-Maktaba al-‘Aṣriyya, 2004), 162-63. 
8 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 172-79. 
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‘aql as a secret of the spirit, and hence of the world of malakūt, imperceptible 
and unknowable, and negating the assertion of earlier theologians and 
philosophers that it is either a jawhar or ‘araḍ, both of which constitute ‘ālam al-
shahāda (the perceptible realm). . 
Other theologians, not known for particular Sufi leanings, and from the 
Persianate intellectual school, such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shirāzī (d. 476/1083) and 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), defined the intellect as a ‘araḍ (accident) 
that performs the function of idrāk (discernment).9  Al-Dardīr quotes Abū Bakr 
al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), who defined the intellect as “some of necessary 
knowledge.”10  The “some” here refers to an acknowledgement of a minimum 
level of discernment that would render one morally responsible.  This includes, 
for example, the knowledge that objects occupy space, and that objects must 
either be moving, or at rest.  Under this definition, intellect and knowledge are 
mutually interdependent; one cannot claim to have intellect without this basic 
necessary knowledge, and similarly, one cannot lay claim to knowledge without 
this basic definition of intellect.  It is in this sense that the intellect is deemed an 
accident, in need of the body to contain it, rather than a substance, as 
knowledge is an accident and cannot be considered a substance.  Hence, al-
Dardīr prefers the position of Sufi-theologians like al-Ghazālī to the position of 
Ash‘arī theologians who offered more rationalistic explanations. 
Al-Dardīr also adopts another position of al-Ghazālī, positing that the 
terms ‘aql (intellect) rūḥ (spirit), nafs (soul), and qalb (heart) are essentially 
synonymous when understood from their purely metaphysical meanings, though 
each term indicates a different and unique aspect of the human reality.11  To al-
Dardīr, the intellect (‘aql) serves as the instrument of the soul (nafs) by which it 
                                             
9 See: Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad Rāzī, Ma‘ālim ‘Uṣūl Al-Dīn (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyā', 2012), 145. 
10 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 181. 
11 al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā' ‘Ulūm Al-Dīn, 3:4-6. 
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can recognise necessary and demonstrative forms of knowledge.   It is then, 
that the nafs is the essence of the human condition.  The nafs condemned in 
the Sufi literature is of a different connotation, the sum of lower and carnal 
desires.  The heart, then, in al-Dardīr’s view, is the place of the intellect.   
Another commentator on al-Dardīr’s Kharīda, Muḥammad Bakhīt al-
Muṭī‘ī, one of the Grand Muftis of Egypt (d. 1354/1935), states that “al-Ghazālī, 
al-Rāzī, and al-Rāghib, as well as many Muslims, as well as that preferred by all 
the hukamā’  (philosophers), and the Sufis, is that it (the intellect) is an 
independent, absolute essence neither confined to space nor physically 
tangible.”12 The implication is that the intellect does not occupy a particular 
place in the physical body, where the “heart” in al-Dardīr’s definition is a 
metaphysical heart, not the bodily organ in the chest.  Nevertheless, al-Dardīr’s 
student, al-Ṣawī, states that the heart in al-Dardīr’s definition refers to the 
physical organ.13  The two opinions can be reconciled by adopting the 
Ghazalian position that the metaphysical heart is connected to the physical 
heart in some fashion, but not in way knowable via the rational intellect.    
Based upon the previous discussion, it appears that al-Dardīr’s definition 
of the intellect is not based solely on rational argument as exposited in kalām 
theology, underscored by his attempt at a definition from an ontological 
perspective. Indeed, it would appear that elements of Sufi metaphysics inform 
his selections and influence his stance on other theological issues as well, as is 
demonstrated more thoroughly below.  
 
 
                                             
12 Muḥammad Bakhīt al-Muṭī‘ī, Ḥashiyat Al-Muṭī‘ī ‘Alā Kharīda Al-Tawḥīd (Cairo: Maṭb‘at al-
islām, 1314 a.h.), 17. 
13 al-Dardīr, Ḥāshiyat Al-Ṣāwī ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 32. 
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The Epistemology of the Intellect 
 
Al-Dardīr further elaborates on the rational intellect from an 
epistemological perspective, stating that both necessary knowledge (al-‘ilm al-
ḍarūrī) and demonstrative knowledge (al-‘ilm al-naẓarī) are the means by which 
the intellect acquires its knowledge.   Necessary knowledge is defined as that 
which is irrefutable and requires no evidence or proof.  Essentially, the proof lies 
within itself with no external verification outside of the constructs of the intellect 
required.  Al-Dardīr exemplifies this by citing the necessity of knowing the 
corollaries: (1) that all effects require a cause, (2) the impossibility of the 
coexistence of non-binary contraries (al-ḍidayn), and (3) the impossibility of the 
absence of both binary contraries in a single object of identical time and place 
(al-naqīdayn).14  These necessary truths form the underpinning for establishing 
the existence of God and His attributes.  Thus, the proof of God’s existence and 
His attributes using demonstrative knowledge is based upon logical arguments 
that return to necessary self-evident “truths.”  Hence, knowledge of the 
existence of God is necessary, but not self-evident, at least by way of rational 
inquiry..  For al-Dardīr, the existence of God via self-evident knowledge can 
only be realised via Sufi cognition.  
Hence, al-Dardīr, while fully acknowledging the irrefutability of the Ash‘arī 
rational arguments, also acknowledges and fully endorses the veracity of 
spiritual realisations.  They are, to him, no less reliable than rational necessary 
and demonstrative forms of knowledge.  Indeed, knowledge informed by 
spiritual realisations is considered a form of necessary knowledge, as they have 
                                             
14 According to Aristotle, there are two types of contraries: 1) those with no intermediates, such 
as odd and even (a number must be one or the other); and 2) those with intermediates, such as 
blackness and whiteness (an object may be one or the other, or an intermediate between 
blackness and whiteness) with intermediates such as grey or yellow.  For simplicity, we refer to 
contraries without intermediates as binary contraries (al-naqīdān) and those with intermediates 
as non-binary contraries (al-ḍidān).  See Adler et al., Great Books of the Western World, 7: 16-
17. 
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no proofs but themselves, and are irrefutable to the one who experiences them.  
The crucial distinction between the two sources of knowledge is that rationally 
derived truths are apparent and irrefutable to anyone of sound rational intellect, 
whereas spiritually informed knowledge is only apparent and irrefutable to its 
bearer.  Nevertheless, both routes form the cornerstones of al-Dardīr’s 
epistemological system.  He posits that certainty in God and the Islamic view of 
reality is attainable, either by burhān (rational proof), or mushāhada 
(witnessing), or both.15   
Al-Dardīr includes empirical knowledge as a valid source, and defines it 
as the affirmation or negation of a proposition via observed repetition, i.e. fire 
burns, and food satiates.16  However, al-Dardīr negates the premise that this 
observed correlation is indicative of ontological causation (ta’thīr).17  Rather, 
observed empirical phenomena by way of repetition merely indicate an 
association (rabṭ) between the two sequential occurrences.  The ontological (or 
efficient) cause cannot be informed by empirical observation, as its reality is 
within the realm of metaphysics.  In this regard, al-Dardīr does not deviate from 
the standard Ash‘arī position, yet he does not categorically negate the “nature” 
of things, rather only their efficacious ontological causality.   
This correlation between observed (i.e. only perceptible in the sensory 
realm) cause and effect is a function of the ḥukm al-‘ādī (empirical judgement), 
though God is constantly intervening to effect all acts in creation, remaining the 
sole ontological cause (mu’aththir). 
                                             
15 See al-Dardīr’s definition of taṣawwuf in: al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī,, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-
Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 602-03. 
16 Ibid., 168. 
17 Our translation of al-Dardīr’s term: ta’thīr, as “ontological cause” attempts to draw a distinction 
between another term he uses for causation: tasabbub (observable causation).  The former is 
used to indicate causation as regards the divine, ultimate reality, which is imperceptible to man, 
and unfathomable by way of rational inquiry.  The latter term refers to the observed realm of 
experience, whilst not “unreal”, but nevertheless conceals the divine, ultimate reality that cannot 
be realised by either rational inquiry or sense perception.  This is more thoroughly discussed in 
the sections on waḥdāniyya and causation. 
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A third source of knowledge, and perhaps the most obvious when 
discussing matters of faith, cited by al-Dardīr, as well as countless other Muslim 
scholars before him, is revelation (waḥy).  Revelation includes both the literal 
word of God as revealed in the Qur‘ān, and the Prophetic ḥadīth.  In his treatise, 
al-Kharīda, al-Dardīr defines knowledge acquired via revelation as “the speech 
of God that addresses the actions of the morally responsible, via either a 
command, or [mere] permissibility, or a [divine] designation for either of them (a 
command or permissibility).”18  Al-Dardīr cites the definition used most often by 
jurisconsults, demonstrating his command of multiple disciplines, most notably 
jurisprudence and theology.   
Revelatory texts are classified according to the categories of qaṭ‘ī 
(conclusive) and ẓannī (presumptively authoritative).  The verses of the Qur’ān 
and the Prophetic ḥadīth fall into one of the two categories.  The thubūt 
(veracity) of a text is the level of confidence in its utterance by the Prophet 
Muḥammad.  The dalāla (denotation) is the possibility of a text to have more 
than one valid interpretation.  Most verses of the Qur’ān and most of the ḥadīth 
texts are categorised as ẓannī al-dalāla (presumptively denoted).  Thus, the 
logical possibilities regarding the dual aspects of thubūt and dalāla are four: 1) 
qaṭ‘ī al-thubūt wa al-dalāla; 2) qaṭ‘ī al-thubūt wa ẓannī al-dalāla; 3) ẓannī al-
thubūt wa qaṭ‘ī al-dalāla; 4) ẓannī al-thubūt wa ẓannī al-dalāla.   
In matters of essential creed,19 only proofs from mutawātir sources are 
accepted.  Creed, however, is not limited to only essential aspects, as most of 
                                             
18 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 154-61. 
19 I draw the distinction between “essential creed”, sometimes referred to by theologians as ma 
‘ulima min al-dīn bil-ḍarūra and between “auxiliary creed.”  If one refutes anything of the former, 
then their belief system is said to be incompatible with that of Sunni Islam.  Refutation of the 
latter, while sinful, does not render one outside the pale of Islam.  Auxiliary creed is based upon 
sound solitary ḥadīth.  Hence, the belief of the punishment of the grave, based upon solitary 
ḥadīth, while is considered obligatory to believe in, its denial does not exclude one from Islam.  
The Mu‘tazilites refuted this particular belief, but nevertheless most Ash‘arī theologians found 
this to be heterodox (fisq), but not heretical (kufr).  
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the transmitted revelatory reports that describe the day of judgement and the 
afterlife come from the solitary ḥadīth, and not from the mutawātir Qur’ān or 
ḥadīth.  Thus, in matters regarding the order of events on the day of judgement 
and the physical descriptions of eschatological phenomena, there is a 
considerable level of disagreement, on a level commensurate with that of 
jurisprudential dissent.20 
Al-Dardīr, in the section on sam‘īyāt (eschatology), cites the different 
opinions regarding the exact nature and sequence of the events of the afterlife.  
For example, concerning the nature of the ṣirāṭ (bridge crossing over Hell), he 
mentions the disagreement over its width, with some alleging the impossibility of 
it being narrower than a hair, and sharper than a sword.21  Al-Dardīr asserts that 
the aẓhar (more apparent meaning) is that the ṣirāṭ’s width and ease of 
traversal is commensurate with the degree of one’s deeds.  Thus, the ṣirāṭ for 
the worst sinners will be narrowest and sharpest.22  Others, cited by al-Dardīr, 
as disagreeing with this notion, include the Ash‘arī theologians, Shihāb al-Dīn 
al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) and al-‘Izz ibn ‘Abd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), likely 
dissenting due to the impossibility of a physical structure having such 
dimensions.  However, al-Dardīr follows the methodology of Sufi-theologians, 
like al-Ghazālī, who posits that empirical propositions are not applicable at the 
intersection of the physical and metaphysical realms.23  Al-Dardīr applies this 
methodology consistently, such as in the issue of the Prophet Muḥammad’s 
                                             
20 See for example the various opinions concerning the ṣirāṭ in al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya 
‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 477-82. 
21 Ibid., 480-81. 
22 Ibid., 481. 
23 See al-Ghazālī’s discussion on the punishment of the soul in the grave in: al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā' 
‘Ulūm Al-Dīn, 5:246-58. 
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body and soul ascending to heaven, and his vision of God during the Mi‘rāj 
(night ascension).24   
The theological foundations by which al-Dardīr draws his proclamations 
is deeply rooted in the Ash‘arī tradition – a tradition that arose as a result of a 
rationalist strand within Islam that began with their most formidable opponents, 
the Mu‘tazilites, but ultimately informed the course of theological debate for 
centuries after the initial confrontations.  The following section analyses the 
development of the later Ash‘arī school, with the objective of contextualising the 
contributions of al-Dardīr to the tradition in light of the foundational history that 
preceded him. 
 
                                             
24 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 414-15. 
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The Ash‘arī Tradition in the Later Period 
 
 Al-Dardīr was a dedicated Ash‘arī theologian, characterising himself as 
al-mutaḥaqqiq b’il-‘aqā’id al-ash‘ariyya (verifier of the Ash‘arī creed).25  He 
follows the methodology of many of his predecessors, such as the Egyptians 
Zakariyyā al-Anṣarī (d. 926/1520), Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī (d. 852/1449), and 
Ibrāhīm al-Laqqānī, as well as others considered the main proponents of 
Ash‘arī theology, such as al-Ghazālī, and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210).26  
The eponymous “founder” of the school, Abū Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī (d. 324/936)27, 
was an Iraqi scholar dedicated to the Mu‘tazilite school early in his career, but 
later abandoned it for a creed that closely resembled that of a Samarkand 
contemporary of his, Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944).28  Though there are 
no reports that the two men ever met or corresponded, they shared similar 
positions on matters of creed, specifically in the areas of divine attributes, the 
divine will, and ontology.   Due to their similarities, as well as their numbers of 
adherents, the Ash‘arī and Māturīdī theologies have been accepted as the 
normative theologies of Sunni Islam, as reported by al-Dardīr.29 
                                             
25 Aḥmad al-Dardīr, "Minhāj Al-Ṣādiqīn Wa Tibyān Al-Salikīn," in 'Ilm al-kalām (Cairo: Dar al-
Kutub, 1920), 2. 
26 For biographical information, see: Yasin Ceylan,,Theology and Tafsīr in the Major Works of 
Fakhr Al-Dīn Al-Rāzī (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 
1996); Ayman Shihadeh, "Fakhr Al-Dīn Al-Rāzī on Ethics and Virtue" (D Phil, University of 
Oxford, 2002); Ayman Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr Al-Dīn Al-Rāzī, Islamic 
Philosophy, Theology and Science : Texts and Studies, (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
27 See Daniel Gimaret, La Doctrine D'al-Ashʿarī, Patrimoines (Editions Du Cerf) Islam, (Paris: 
Cerf, 1990). 
28 See Mustafa Cerić, Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam : A Study of the Theology of Abū 
Manṣūr Al-Māturīdī (D. 333/944) (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and 
Civilization, 1995); Ulrich Rudolph and Rodrigo Adem, Al-Māturīdī and the Development of 
Sunnī Theology in Samarqand, Islamic History and Civilization (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 
29 A third school, known as “Atharī” or “traditionalist” is based upon the early theology of Aḥmad 
ibn Ḥanbal, characterised by the rejection of the use of rational arguments to affirm God’s 
attributes. 
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The Ash‘arī school was reintroduced into Egypt by Ṣalāh al-Dīn al-
Ayyūbī (d. 589/1193)30, upon the demise of the last Fatimid ruler, Al-‘Aḍid li Dīn 
Illāh in 567/1171.  The creed of al-Naysabūri, an Ash‘arī theologian the new 
Sultan had studied under in his childhood, was promoted as the standard creed 
of the new sultanate under the auspices of the Abbasid caliphate.31  Other 
sources have pointed to the creed of Ibn Tumart (d. 524/1130), the founder of 
the Almohad dynasty in the Maghreb, as the one adopted by Ṣalāh al-Dīn and 
ordered read from the minarets.32  That the impetus for the establishment of the 
Ash‘arī creed amongst the masses should come from North Africa does not 
come as a great surprise, as the political environment following the period of 
Fatimid rule was conducive to such an intellectual trend.  The vassals of the 
Fatimid caliph, the Zirids, effectively ended Fatimid rule in North Africa before 
Ṣalāh al-Dīn’s appearance, having pledged allegiance to the Abbasid caliph, 
and announcing their return to Sunnism in 1048.  As in Egypt, Isma‘īlī 
propaganda proved largely ineffective and won few followers.  Nevertheless, in 
the wake of the Fatimid departure, a concerted programme of indoctrination to 
Sunni Ash‘arism was pursued by succeeding dynasties in North Africa and 
Egypt.  The Almohads, Zirids, and Hafsids (vassals of the Almohads) instituted 
projects to promote Sunni pietism, serving as the catalyst for a similar 
programme in Ayyubid Egypt.33   
                                             
30 Known in the West as Saladin, the Muslim conqueror of Jerusalem.  An important aspect of 
his legacy is his establishment of Sunni theology in Egypt after the reign of the Fatimids, who 
adhered to an Isma‘īlī Bātinī theology of Islam. 
31 Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī Maqrīzī, Al-Mawā’iẓ W 'Al-I‘tibār Fī Dhikr Al-Khiṭaṭ W'al-Athār.(London: Furqan 
Islamic Heritage Foundation, 2003), 4: 440. 
32 Muḥammad ibn Tumart, otherwise known as the “Mahdi” of the Almohad dynasty in Morocco. 
See Wilyam Sharīf, The Dearest Quest : A Biography of Ibn Tumart (Tranent: Jerusalem 
Academic, 2010). 
33 Nathan Hofer, The Popularisation of Sufism in Ayyubid and Mamluk Egypt, 1173-1325, 
Edinburgh Studies in Classical Islamic History and Culture (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2015), 38-41. 
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The Muslim East was in a state of disarray due to the continuing Mongol 
threat and the vacuum left in the wake of the dissolved Baghdad caliphate.  As 
a result, intellectual trends, after the fall of the Fatimids in Egypt, generally 
travelled from West to East.  This can be legitimately demonstrated with the 
adoption of Ash‘arī texts of North African origin, such as the creed of al-Sanūsī, 
and the logic text of al-Akhḍarī in the Egyptian syllabus.34   This phenomenon is 
also reasonably demonstrated through the spread of Sufi orders in Egypt that 
were of North African origin, such as the Shādhilī order, which found wide 
acceptance and adoption in Egypt.35 
Consequently, the ‘ulamā’ in the post-Fatimid period were 
overwhelmingly Ash‘arī.  A perusal of the Egyptian scholars in the hagiographic 
literature reveals that virtually all of them from the time of Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī, 
the premier scholar of the late Mamlūk and early Ottoman eras, followed the 
Ash‘arī school.36  The uniform dedication to Ash‘arī theology at the exclusion of 
all others can be explained by the strong Sunni rejection of Isma‘īlī propaganda 
carried out by the Fatimid state in North Africa and Egypt.  As the vassal states 
of North Africa declared their independence from Fatimid rule decades before 
the unseating of it by the Ayyubids in Egypt, the dissemination of standard 
creeds explicating the Ash‘arī positions appeared in North Africa before they did 
in Egypt.37 
                                             
34 For a more detailed study of Moroccan logic texts and their entry into Egypt, see: Khaled El-
Rouayheb, "Sunni Muslim Scholars on the Status of Logic, 1500-1800," Islamic Law and 
Society 11, no. 2 (2004). 
35 See Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, 272, 78; Hofer, The Popularisation of Sufism in 
Ayyubid and Mamluk Egypt, 1173-1325, 105-73. 
36 See for example, the Shāfi‘ī and Mālikī hagiographies: Tāj al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn ʿAlī 
Subkī, Ṭabaqāt Al-Shāfiʿīyah Al-Kubrā, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Ṭanāḥī and ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ 
Muḥammad Ḥulw, (al-Qāhirah: Maṭbaʿat ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1964); Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī Ibn 
Farḥūn, , Al-Dībāj Al-Mudhahhab Fī Ma‘rifat ‘Ayān ‘Ulamā' Al-Madhhab, ed. Muḥammad al-
Aḥmadī Abū al-Nūr (al-Qāhira: Dār al-Turāth lil-Ṭab‘ wa'l-Nashr, 1975). 
37 The most well known of these creeds are those of al-Sanūsī. See Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf 
Sanūsī, Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar ibn Ibrāhīm Tilimsānī, Umm Al-Barāhīn / Li-Abi Abd Allah 
Muḥammad Ibn Yūsuf Al-Sanūsī Al-Tilimsānī. Wa-Yalīhā, Sharḥ Umm Al-Barāhīn Li-Muḥammad 
Ibn ʿumar Ibn Ibrāhīm Al-Mallālī Al-Tilimsānī, ed. Khālid Zahrī (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 
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The most famous Ash‘arī creed, a text still widely studied today, is that of 
the North African scholar Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490).  He 
penned a minor, a major, and a redacted minor creed (al-Sughrā, al-Kubrā, and 
Sughrā al-Sughrā).  The Sughrā al-Sughrā found widespread acceptance in 
North and West Africa, popularly known as Umm al-Barāhīn (The Quintessence 
of All Proofs).  This succinct text is primarily responsible for the spread of the 
Ash‘arī creed in North and West Africa in the wake of the dissolution of the 
Fatimid caliphate in Egypt.38  The Umm al-Barāhīn also found its way to the 
Malay Archipelago, more popularly known as al-Durra, often translated into 
Malay and Javanese, with accompanying commentaries.39 
The creeds of al-Sanūsī, as well as that of the Egyptian scholar, Ibrāhīm 
al-Laqqānī, Jawharat al-Tawḥīd, represent a departure from earlier theological 
works penned in the Muslim East.  The standard works of Ash‘arism before 
these later works included the commentaries of the Samarkandian theologian 
Sa’d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390) on the ‘Aqā’id al-Nasafiyya and the 
Maqāsid of al-Ījī (d. 755/1355).  These are polemical works in the tradition of the 
kalām dialectic, exploring theological issues and refuting counterclaims.  This is 
in stark contrast to the North African treatises of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, which dispensed with the majority of the polemics, and focused 
almost entirely on delineating the basic creed of Sunni Islam.   
The fourteenth century Egyptian scholar and “shaykh of Islam”, 
Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī, in his work on the classification of the sciences, Khizānat 
al-‘Ulūm, makes a distinction between ‘ilm al-kalām and ‘ilm al-‘aqā’id.  Small 
                                                                                                                                    
1423); Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf Sanūsī and Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī Bannānī, Sharḥ Sughrā Al-Sughrā Fī 
ʿIlm Al-Tawḥīd, (Miṣr: Maktabat Muṣtafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1373). 
38 El-Rouayheb, "Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century : Scholarly Currents in 
the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb," 188-93. 
39 Sanūsī and Tilimsānī, Umm Al-Barāhīn / Li-Abi Abd Allah Muḥammad Ibn Yūsuf Al-Sanūsī Al-
Tilimsānī. Wa-Yalīhā, Sharḥ Umm Al-Barāhīn Li-Muḥammad Ibn ʿumar Ibn Ibrāhīm Al-Mallālī Al-
Tilimsānī, 6. 
 139 
treatises such as that of al-Sanūsī represent the latter, whereas the longer 
works of al-Taftāzānī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 
403/1013) represent the former.40  The sixteenth century Tunisian scholar and 
judge, Muḥammad ibn Abī Faḍl al-Kūmī (d. 916/ 1510), in his commentary on 
the preeminent creedal text of his era, ‘Aqīdat Ibn al-Ḥājib, stated that works of 
‘ilm al-kalām delve into the subject from a general viewpoint, concerning 
knowledge in and of itself (al-ma‘lūm min ḥayth huwa ma‘lūm), i.e. 
epistemological issues; whereas ‘ilm al-‘aqā’id explores the subject from the 
specific standpoint of required beliefs.41   
It would seem that al-Dardīr, in the mukhtaṣar tradition, merely lists the 
required beliefs.  However, a closer examination of his commentaries, most 
notably his commentary on the Kharīda, reveals that he expounded upon 
complex epistemological issues.  He addressed the basic tripartite Islamic 
sources of knowledge: the intellect, experiential observation, and revelation.  A 
cursory look at the fatwa literature of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
appears to show that many urban and agrarian Muslims in Egypt asked 
questions of an epistemological nature, such as the existence of the jinn and 
angels, the claim of immortality for al-Khiḍr, and the veracity of saintly 
miracles.42   
The simplification sought by al-Dardīr in the explication of essential creed 
appears to be partially due to the relative ignorance of the masses regarding 
such matters.  For example, he includes amongst the obligatory articles of faith 
                                             
40 Zakariyya al-Anṣārī, Khizānat Al-‘Ulūm Fī Taṣnīf Al-Funūn Al-Islāmiyya Wa Maṣādiruhā, ed. 
‘Abd Allāh Nadhīr Aḥmad (Bayrūt: Dār al-Bashā'ir al-Islāmiyya, 1998). 
41 Muḥammad al-Kūmī, Taḥrīr Al-Maṭālib (Beirut: Mu'assat al-ma‘ārif, 2008), 37. 
42 See Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ʿIllaysh and Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī Ibn Farḥūn, Fatḥ Al-ʿalī Al-Mālik Fī 
Al-Fatwā ʿalá Madhhab Al-Imām Mālik, (Miṣr: Sharikat Maktabat wa-Maṭbaʿat Muṣṭafá al-Bābī 
al-Ḥalabī wa-Awlādih, 1378). 
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belief in the jinn, the awlīyā’ (saints), and their karāmāt (saintly miracles).43 His 
other work in ‘aqīda, sometimes referred to as ‘aqīdat al-‘awām (The Creed of 
the Masses), addresses this phenomenon directly.44  Al-Dardīr was not alone in 
this regard, as other scholars of the post-classical period also penned simple 
creeds for the masses.45 
The polemical kalām tradition, as it flourished in the classical Muslim 
East, especially amongst Persianate scholars adhering to the Shāfī‘ī school of 
jurisprudence, was one that never found major currency in North Africa or 
Egypt.  This can perhaps be explained by the dominance of the Mālikī school of 
jurisprudence at the exclusion of all others in North Africa and Upper Egypt.  It 
is often boasted in Mālikī hagiographical literature that no Mālikī scholars were 
known to have diverged from the Sunni creed except for what has been 
attributed to Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), otherwise known as Averroes.46   
Before al-Sanūsī, Mālikī jurists in North Africa favoured the creed of Ibn 
Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (d. 386/996).  This creed was hardly Ash‘arī in its 
composition and methodology; instead, it paraphrased verses from the Qur’ān 
without enumerating the specific attributes of God, as do the Ash‘arī texts.  The 
originally intended audience were Qur’ān schoolboys, but it quickly became a 
standard text for studying basic theology.47  This was likely because it formed 
the introduction to a larger text on Mālikī jurisprudence, al-Risāla, which 
remains a standard text studied by Muslim jurists until this day.  Its style and 
                                             
43 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī,, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 507-08,36-42. 
44 Aḥmad al-Dardīr and Muṣṭafā al-‘Uqbāwī, Ḥashiyat ‘Alā Sharḥ ‘Aqīdat Al-Dardīr (Cairo: 
Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1939). 
45 Such as Aḥmad Marzūkī, Manẓūmat ‘Aqīdat Al-‘Awwām (Indonesia: Ma‘had Nūr al-
Ḥaramayn, 1416); Aḥmad Maqqarī, Iḍā'at Al-Dujna Fī ‘Itiqād Ahl Al-Sunna (Cairo: Maktabat al-
Qāhira, 1996); Sanūsī and Bannānī, Sharḥ Sughrā Al-Sughrā Fī ʿilm Al-Tawḥīd. 
46 The implication that Ibn Rushd (Averroes) adopted aspects of Neo-Platonist philosophical 
tenets at odds with Ash‘arism. See Majid Fakhry, Averroës (Ibn Rushd) : His Life, Works and 
Influence (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001), 12-30. 
47 See editor’s introduction in: Muḥammad Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, Al-Risāla Al-Fiqhiyya 
(Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1986), 38-56. 
 141 
presentation were similar to the creeds favoured by Ḥanbalī scholars in Iraq, 
avoiding any use of rational argument or specialist terminology.  Additionally, 
the Ayyubid post-classical intellectual tradition in Egypt was less concerned with 
refuting the now defunct Mu‘tazilites than with re-establishing Sunnism, 
specifically amongst the masses, after a long period of Fatimid rule. 
Though al-Sanūsī appeared to have Sufi leanings, and occasionally 
employed Sufi terminology, his creeds are largely devoid of any underlying Sufi 
methodologies.48  The order in which he enumerates the divine attributes 
follows that of most of the Ash‘arī theologians before him, such as al-Juwaynī 
(d. 478/1085), al-Rāzī, and al-Ghazālī, where God’s omnipotence (al-qudra) is 
discussed first, thereby alluding to its primary significance in relation to the rest 
of the divine attributes.49  Contrastingly, al-Dardīr begins with God’s divine life 
(al-ḥayāt), then knowledge (al-‘ilm), then Will (al-irāda), and then omnipotence 
(al-qudra).50  Though al-Dardīr uses a slightly different order in his al-Kharīda, 
beginning with the divine attribute of knowledge, and then the divine Life, it 
remains unmistakable that his departure from previous theological texts by 
enumerating omnipotence behind Life and Knowledge cannot be explained as 
merely incidental.  A further perusal of his other works reveals a conscious and 
purposeful approach to his enumeration of the divine attributes predicated on a 
Sufi understanding of the relation of the attributes to the maqām (spiritual 
station) of the Sufi aspirant.  The significance of this order preferred by al-Dardīr 
is noted by Reichmuch in his study of al-Zabīdī, who also preferred to list divine 
knowledge before divine power and will, even attributing this preference to al-
                                             
48 Based upon a close reading of his main work in creed, Sanūsī and Tilimsānī, Umm Al-
Barāhīn / Li-Abi Abd Allah Muḥammad Ibn Yūsuf Al-Sanūsī Al-Tilimsānī. Wa-Yalīhā, Sharḥ 
Umm Al-Barāhīn Li-Muḥammad Ibn ʿumar Ibn Ibrāhīm Al-Mallālī Al-Tilimsānī. 
49 Rāzī, Ma‘ālim ‘Uṣūl Al-Dīn, 62-65; al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā' ‘Ulūm Al-Dīn, 1:126; Ibrāhīm Bājūrī, 
Ḥāshiyat Al-Bājūrī ‘Alā Matan Al-Sanūsiyya (Damascus: Dār al-Bayrūtī, 1994), 62. 
50 Aḥmad  al-Dasūkī and Muḥammad al-Sanūsī, Ḥashiyat ‘Alā Umm Al-Barāhīn (Cairo: Muṣṭafā 
al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1939). 
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Dardīr’s influence on al-Zabīdī, his contemporary and friend.51  This may return 
to the Sufi notion that divine knowledge is the origin of the universe, as the 
universe “existed” in the knowledge of God before He willed and caused it to 
exist in the external realm.52  This point is explicated further in the section 
below.53 
The first Egyptian successor to al-Sanūsī in Ash‘arī creed authorship was 
Ibrāhīm al-Laqqānī (d. 1041/1632).  Like al-Sanūsī, he was a Mālikī jurist and 
Sufi practitioner.  He is most well known for his creed in verse Jawharat al-
Tawḥīd (The Jewel of Oneness).  It is a one hundred and forty four line poem 
succinctly delineating the Ash‘arī creed in much the same manner as al-
Sanūsī’s Umm al-Barāhīn.  Al-Laqqānī’s text enjoyed wide appeal, especially in 
Egypt, and is still studied in al-Azhar’s secondary schools, along with al-Dardīr’s 
Kharīda.  Unlike Umm al-Barāhīn, the Jawhara includes the traditional third 
chapter of kalām theology, transmitted revelatory knowledge of the unseen (al-
sam‘īyāt).  Additionally, some polemical issues are included, such as the belief 
of the imitator (īmān al-muqallid), the capacity of belief to increase and 
decrease, and the first legal obligation (awwal wājib). 
Al-Dardīr’s main text in creedal theology, the Kharīda, represents the 
culmination and epitome of the discipline.  No other text after the Kharīda 
achieved its renown and ubiquity, attested to by its use in the circles of al-Azhar 
as the pre-eminent didactic text in theology.  It was al-Dardīr’s engagement with 
the long history of kalām, as well as his incorporation of Sufi principles, that 
distinguished his work from that of his predecessors.  This methodology’s 
salient features are brought into sharp relief by al-Dardīr’s treatment of the 
                                             
51 See: Stefan Reichmuth, The World of Murtada  Al-Zabidi (1732-91): Life, Networks, and 
Writings, 315. 
52 See: William C. Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God : Principles of Ibn Al-ʿarabī's Cosmology 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 20-22. 
53 In the section entitled “Al-Dardīr’s synthesis of kalām theology and “mystical” knowledge.” 
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divine attributes.  The divine attributes for the Sufi-theologians were not merely 
an abstraction by which the enigma of divinity could be appreciated, but 
additionally represented the highest form of tawḥīd, and the essential unity of 
reality.  The following section analyses al-Dardīr’s understanding of the divine 
attributes, and specifically the influence of Sufi metaphysics on that 
understanding.   
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Al-Dardīr’s Understanding of God and His Divine Attributes 
 
Al-Dardīr states early on in his principal creed, al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya, 
that the obligation to know God is an individual one, and, more importantly, the 
primary one.  Hence, al-Dardīr makes clear that God cannot actually be known, 
in the sense that a full conception of the divine mind is unknowable by man, 
lacking the faculty of perceiving God as he really is (fi nafs al-amr).  Instead, 
man’s intellect is the faculty by which divine signs are to be understood and 
interpreted as proofs of God’s existence.  God, therefore, makes Himself known 
via His signs, but only to the extent that He decrees is humanly possible.  
Therefore any conception of God’s essence is deficient, and in fact 
conceptualising His essence is patently discouraged.  Creation, and the 
manifest effects of the divine names upon creation, then serves as the means 
by which illumination of the intellect and the soul can take place by reflection 
upon these signs. 
The essential “unknowability” of God’s essence is a central theme 
amongst the Sufi-theologians. Al-Sha‘rānī, quoting Ibn ‘Arabī, states:54  
Know that all of creation [is a product] of a cause (ma‘lūla), and that the modality of God’s 
essence is unknowable.  Moreover, it is necessary that the proof (dalīl) and the proven (madlūl) 
share a common aspect in issues of rationality. As the Truth (God) is unknowable by proof, it 
follows that there is no way of knowing His essence. 
 
In this, they do not depart from the position of the more traditional theologians, 
such as al-Rāzī, but the issue of “knowing God” becomes a function of 
recognising the essential unity and manifestation of the divine attributes in 
creation.  The āthār (effects) are the means by which their causes, the 
manifestations of the divine attributes, can be discerned, and hence, God 
“known.”  The “reading” of these effects as signs of the divine is a central theme 
in al-Dardīr’s theology. 
                                             
54 al-Sha‘rānī, Al-Qawā’id Al-Kashfiyya, 55. 
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Al-Dardīr devises a tripartite rendering of the realm of signs: the celestial 
world, the terrestrial world, and the human anatomy.  In this, he forwards the 
teleological argument (or argument by design) for the existence of God, which 
more or less corresponds to the arguments mentioned in the Qur’ān.55  He 
offers a lengthy exposition of the teleological argument in his commentary on 
the Kharīda: 
…And you may prove [the temporality of the universe] as it consists of divergent 
species and different types, as is indicated by the Qur’ān.  Wherein some [of creation] is 
celestial, some is terrestrial, some is illuminated, some is dark, some is hot, some is cold, some 
is moving, some is still, some is ethereal, some is material, some whose existence has been 
witnessed after its nonexistence, and some whose nonexistence has been witnessed after its 
existence…and all of these different types consists of categories, individuations, and attributes 
that are innumerable, and thus indicate that [all] is contingent upon a Wise Creator (mukhaṣṣiṣ 
ḥakīm).56 
 
After this exposition, al-Dardīr is careful to point out that the 
wondrousness of the universe does not mean its contemporaneousness with 
God, but its existence and creation ex nihilo.  This point is significant, for it is by 
which al-Dardīr, taking al-Ghazālī as his example, anathematises the Falāsifa, 
no doubt referring to some of the Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā 
(Avicenna) (d. 427/1037) and al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), affirmers of the co-
eternality of the universe with God.  He does not mention them by name, but 
does report that the bearer of such a belief is a kāfir by consensus of the 
Muslims.   
Al-Dardīr then deals with the negative divine attributes first; stating the 
concept of takhliya (voiding) precedes taḥliya (sweetening).57  His invocation of 
the takhliya/taḥliya binary, a concept borrowed from Sufi ethics, betrays his 
motivation for learning creedal theology.  The understanding of God by what He 
is not aligns with the Sufi ethic of voidance of vices as prerequisite to 
embodying of virtues (taḥliya).  As he emphasised in his Sufi works, sound 
                                             
55 See for example, Qur’ān (88:17-20) 
56 al-Dardīr  and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 236-37. 
57 Ibid., 328-29. 
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creed is an essential aspect and necessary requirement for sulūk (spiritual 
wayfaring).  
The importance of the negative or apophatic theology as a precedent to 
its positive counterpart lies in its nature.  Negative theology is ultimately more 
absolute than its counterpart of positive or cataphatic theology.  As the logical 
maxim states, a negative proposition always distributes its predicate, so stating 
that God is one in essence is akin to stating that there is none but He, an 
absolute statement.  Not coincidentally, the first formula to be given by the 
master to his disciple is the first part of the testification of faith, an absolute 
negation.58  Al-Dardīr’s utilisation of Sufi terminology when speaking of the 
divine attributes, specifically as concepts of sulūk (spiritual wayfaring), further 
reveals his methodology in his works of creedal theology.   
Unlike his predecessors who penned longer commentaries, such as al-
Taftāzānī, al-Dardīr’s primary objective is to explicate essential creed as a 
prerequisite to spiritual purification, and not to specifically dispel the perceived 
misconceptions of the Mu’tazilites, Falāsifa, Jabriyya, or Qadariyya.  Hence, the 
issues al-Taftāzānī discusses in great detail in his commentary on al-Ījī’s 
Maqāsid, such as the difference between māhiyya and wujūd,59, or the 
particulars of the Mu‘tazilite argument for their rejection of the positive 
attributes,60 are referenced by al-Dardīr as concluded arguments, without 
revisiting in detail the deliberations by early Ash‘arīs.   
The negative attributes of beginninglessness (qidam) and eternalness 
(baqā’) are mentioned in tandem, as God existed before He created time and 
space, and will continue to exist after time and space.  These are considered 
negative attributes as all beings other than God have a definite beginning 
                                             
58 This concept is explored further in the chapter dealing with al-Dardīr’s role as Sufi guide. 
59 Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ Al-Maqāṣid, (Beirut: ‘Ālam al-Kutub, 1989), 1:310-16. 
60 See Ibid., 4:72-87. 
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(ḥudūth) and will meet a definite end (fanā’).  Thus, qidam and baqā’ are the 
opposites of ḥudūth and fanā’.  As God’s attributes are unique to Him, no other 
being can have a share of beginninglessness or eternalness.  The human soul, 
though posited to exist before and after bodily death, is granted immortality 
either as a favour of divine grace (for the dwellers of Paradise), or as a 
punishment meted out by divine justice (for the denizens of Hell).  
Al-Dardīr then exposits the negative divine attribute of aseity or self-
sufficiency (al-qiyām bi al-nafs), which he defines as the absolute lack of need 
for an essence within which His essence can reside, and hence exist (al-
maḥall), or an essence which is the direct cause for His essence (al-
mukhaṣṣiṣ).  Hence, God is not an attribute, which would require an essence to 
reside in, nor does any agent cause Him, as He is uncaused.  The use of the 
term mukhaṣṣiṣ, whose verbal form literally means “to specify” or “to 
particularise”, is used here in the context of specification or particularisation of 
that which is only logically possible, thereby excluding the specification or 
particularisation of the existence of an essence logically necessary.  Out of an 
infinite number of logical possibilities, the mukhaṣṣiṣ determines that is which to 
actually exist.61  Hence, as God’s existence is logically necessary and 
uncaused, the determinant (al-mukhaṣṣiṣ) is inapplicable when referencing the 
divine essence.  Thus, the negative attribute of aseity negates the notion that 
God can be an attribute, or that His existence is only logically possible and is 
subject to an external cause.62    
                                             
61 For a discussion of the development of the takhṣīṣ (particularisation) argument for the 
existence of God, specifically in the thought of al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, see: Herbert 
Davidson, "Arguments from the Concept of Particularization in Arabic Philosophy," Philosophy 
East and West 18, no. 4 (1968). 
62 The Ash‘arī argument for takhṣīṣ (particularisation) as articulated by al-Dardīr, likely 
originated with al-Juwaynī, who modified the argument from earlier Ash‘arism to dispense with 
atomist physics. See Shihadeh, "The Existence of God," 211.  
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The fourth negative attribute mentioned by al-Dardīr is dissimilitude to 
temporal beings.  Though it can be surmised that, as a rule, all of the divine 
attributes are dissimilar to the attributes of temporal beings, the context here is 
specific to the three types of temporal beings: bodies (ajsām), substances 
(jawāhir), and accidents/attributes (‘arāḍ).  Bodies can either be physical, which 
are then defined by height, width, and depth; or logical, such as the taxonomic 
categories that are defined by genus and species.  Thus, God cannot in any 
way be defined or limited by physical height, width, and depth; or by logical 
categorisations such as genus and species.  Similarly, substances are defined 
by in their indivisibility on an atomic level, and as parts that make up a whole of 
an essence.  Thus, God cannot be a substance since His essence does not 
make up a part of a whole, nor can His essence be deemed indivisible, as even 
an indivisible object is subject to the constraints of time and space, both of 
which are inapplicable to the divine existence.  Accidents are either times, 
places, directions, or dimensions.  Al-Dardīr states this explicitly: 63  
[God] Most high is neither a substance, nor a body, nor an accident, nor moving, nor 
still, nor described as large or small, nor above, nor beneath, nor residing in space, nor united 
[with temporal objects], nor immanent, nor transcendent, nor right, nor left, nor behind, nor in 
front, nor any other attribute specific to temporal beings, for if He was similar to them, then that 
which is necessary for them would be necessary for Him such as being created and needing a 
creator; and all of this is logically impossible. 
  
Ibn al-‘Arabī essentially affirms the position of the Ash‘arī theologians on 
a basic, exoteric level, but on an esoteric level, he upends the paradigm.  God’s 
attributes in the Akbarian cosmology are all literal (ḥaqīqī), whilst all human 
attributes, deficient and contingent, could only be interpreted as figurative 
(majāzī).  True power, will, knowledge, sight, hearing, etc. are for God alone; 
human beings only possess a faint shadow of reality, as God is the Reality, and 
all other realities are contingent upon His grace.  He states in his treatise on the 
                                             
63 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 280-82. 
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mutashābihāt: Radd al-Mutashābi ilā al-Muḥkam (Returning the Ambiguous to 
the Authoritative):64 
There is no actor in existence except for God, and all human action – according to the 
people of the Sunna – is attributed to God in terms of both existence and conception, without 
partner or aid, and it is literally (‘alā al-ḥaqīqa) His action. 
 
In this assertion, Ibn al-‘Arabī does not diverge from the standard 
position of the Ash‘arī theologians, as the doctrine of kasb (acquisition) asserts 
that God is the creator of all actions and that human beings merely acquire the 
created act, and it is that acquisition by which they are held accountable (manāṭ 
al-taklīf).65  Ibn al-‘Arabī goes on to speak of the dual manifestation (tajallī) of 
the divine attributes: a terrestrial experiential manifestation (maẓhar ‘ādī suflī), 
and a higher celestial real manifestation (maẓhar ḥaqīqī ‘ulwī).  The former is 
attributed to human action, via forms and bodily movements, while the latter is 
attributed to God.  The “attribution” of human acts to human beings themselves 
is a means by which they can comprehend the incomprehensible, and to 
“assuage their hearts”, but the real actor and creator in both attributions is God 
alone.   
Ibn al-‘Arabī cites the Qur’ānic verse: (Fight them and God will punish 
them by your hands)66 to illustrate his point.  In this regard, Ibn al-‘Arabī 
summons the well established outward-inward (ẓāhir – bāṭin) doctrine that 
attributes ostensible and observed phenomena to a terrestrial realm.  Though 
this may be incontrovertible in its occurrence and perception by man, it is 
nonetheless a superficial realm that does not indicate the true reality, which is 
ultimately unobservable, and only intelligible via rational construct, submission 
to revelation, or intuitive cognition (dhawq).   
                                             
64 Muhyī al-Dīn Ibn al-‘Arabī, Radd Al-Mutashābih Ilā Al-Muḥkam (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-
Azhariyya, 2007), 81. 
65 See for example: al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 297-99. 
66 Qur’ān (9:14). 
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Ibn al-‘Arabī’s cosmology allows for the notion of “multiple depths” to the 
same reality, though the overarching and only true reality is the unobservable 
realm of the divine, which, nevertheless, manifests itself via the divine names 
and attributes and the resulting realm of creation.  This duality has Qur’ānic 
roots, in the concept of ‘ālam al-shahāda (the witnessed realm) and ‘ālam al-
ghayb (the unseen realm).  The tripartite cosmology of al-Ghazālī, as well as 
that of Ibn al-‘Arabī, are similar, with the lowest realm, ‘ālam al-mulk (the 
corporeal realm), the middle realm, ‘ālam al-malakūt (the angelic realm), and 
the highest realm, ‘ālam al-jabarūt (the divine realm).67  The corporal realm is 
accessible to all rational beings; the angelic realm is closed to all but the 
prophets and saints; and the divine realm is accessible to none, even the 
prophets and saints.   
One can then reasonably infer that the innermost reality is ultimately 
unknowable by man, and that there are divine secrets that are not divulged 
even to the greatest of the prophets and saints.  This forms the underlying 
premise of the highly developed theology characteristic of the post-classical 
period synthesised with Sufi epistemology, where it is admitted that God is 
ultimately unknowable, and that kalām theology can at best offer limited 
approximations.   
This theme is found in some aspects of al-Dardīr’s theology, most 
conspicuously in his explanation of the Ash‘arī doctrine of acquisition (kasb), 
discussed further below.  Thus, the superior form of knowing, accessible only to 
God’s chosen servants, is the way of intuitive cognition (dhawq), but such a 
path requires the basic key of sound creed followed by sincere devotions.  It is 
not fortuitous that al-Dardīr prefaces nearly all of his works on Sufism with 
                                             
67 Binyamin Abrahamov, Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism : The Teachings of Al-Ghazâlî and Al-
Dabbâgh, Routledge Sufi Series (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 108; Richard McGregor, 
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introductory sections on basic creed, outlining the negative and positive divine 
attributes according to the standard Ash‘arī doctrine.  His possible reasons for 
doing so are discussed below, but one plausible explanation is that he too was 
part of the larger reform movement that the late eighteenth century witnessed, 
where heterodox excesses and general civil malaise precipitated a greater 
attentiveness on the part of the ‘ulamā’ to creedal issues. 
The Waḥdāniyya (Oneness) of God 
 
The final negative attribute cited by al-Dardīr is God’s absolute oneness 
(al-waḥdāniyya).  Al-Dardīr explicates the doctrine of oneness by asserting that 
God is one and without partner in essence, in attributes, and in actions.  His 
oneness in essence proscribes His consisting of parts, or multiple essences.  
His oneness in attributes proscribes multiple incidences of the same attribute 
i.e. God can have only one attribute called knowledge, one called life, etc.  This 
particular doctrine is the Ash‘arī response to the Mu‘tazilite insistence on 
refutation of all positive divine attributes, as in their view that would amount to a 
form of polytheism, where multiple pre-eternal (qadīm) attributes are akin to 
multiple deities.   
Al-Dardīr responds to this concern by distinguishing between multiple 
deities and multiple attributes that are neither equivalent to the divine essence 
(lays ayn al-dhāt), nor are they other than the divine essence (tughāyir al-dhāt).  
He then concludes that the Mu‘tazilites would have to admit that their view of 
the divine essence consists of attributes residing in the divine essence, and not 
divisible from it; thence the divine essence is indistinguishable from its 
attributes.68  If this is the case, then each positive attribute, in as far as the 
definition of a positive attribute is that which has a reality “outside of the mind”, 
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and an essence, must then have its own set of attributes recursively, to ad 
infinitum.  Thus, God’s positive attribute of knowledge must have a will, power, 
life, and intent69 all of its own, and then those attributes must also have the 
same essential attributes of their own, and so forth.70   
Of course, al-Dardīr here utilises the “coercion” (ilzām) argument, the 
mainstay of polemical theological argument.  Whether the Mu‘tazilites would 
accept his definition of essence (dhāt), and all of the ramifications that 
accompany it, is unclear, but nonetheless al-Dardīr does not fail to make a 
cogent argument.  In addition to the standard double preventative (al-tamānu‘) 
argument, which states that if there were multiple gods, they could either agree, 
or disagree, both possibilities are posited as inconceivable.  If they agree then 
they are incapable of affecting the other, and hence no longer an omnipotent 
god, and if they were to disagree, the created world would cease to exist.  Yet, 
he also takes care to refute the possibility of multiple positive attributes, as well 
as multiple efficient actors.  He utilizes in this regard the Aristotelian category of 
quantity (al-kamm), in both variants: connected (al-muttaṣil) and unconnected 
(al-munfaṣil).  The connected quantity refers to God’s indivisibility i.e. He is not 
made up of parts, whereas the unconnected quantity refers to His oneness in 
essence i.e. he has no partners or others like Him.  These two categories also 
extend to his attributes and actions, thereby adding to six in total.   
The measured use of Aristotelian logic to this degree appears unique to 
al-Dardīr, when compared to other theological works of the early modern era, as 
commentaries on the Umm al-Barāhīn of al-Sanūsī, and the Jawhara of al-
                                             
69 The other positive attributes of hearing, seeing, and speech are not included in the argument 
because their proofs are by way of transmitted tradition (naqlī), rather than rational construct 
(‘aqlī), and thus would not be requisite for the definition of a positive attribute that is 
indistinguishable from the definition of an essence. 
70 al-Dardīr, "Sharḥ Fawāyid Al-Farāyid Fī Ḍābiṭ Al-‘Aqāyid," 28. 
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Laqqānī do not specifically utilise, a fact that al-Dardīr implicitly notes.71  This 
strengthens the thesis that logic enjoyed a sort of revival in eighteenth century 
Egypt, despite the ambivalent stance taken by Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī, a cohort of al-
Dardīr.  Al-Dardīr’s primary master, ‘Alī al-Ṣa‘īdī, penned a commentary on the 
Shamsiyya, a primary text in logic. The brother of his other master, Muḥammad 
al-Ḥifnī, was of the opinion that logic was a communal obligation (farḍ kifāya).72   
However, whether there was a “revival” of logical studies in the 
eighteenth century remains to be seen.  A decline in logical studies prior to the 
eighteenth century is a questionable thesis, especially in light of the fact that al-
Dardīr’s own intellectual genealogy (thabat), indicates theological studies 
imbued with logic (kalām) go back to at least the time of Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī, a 
scholar of the tenth century.73 
 The treatment of God’s oneness in essence, attributes, and actions, 
inevitably leads into a discussion of the Ash‘arī doctrine of acquisition (kasb).  
Perhaps no other particular doctrine has generated as much discussion, as 
issues of theodicy are inextricably linked.  Occasionalism is a term generally 
prescribed for the Ash‘arī doctrine that proscribes any causation apart from 
God, for He is both the primary cause, and only cause.  Recent scholarship has 
offered different perspectives regarding the position of the primary articulator of 
this doctrine.  Reading al-Ghazālī, especially in his treatment of the subject in 
the Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-Falāsifa), it appears that the 
position of the Ash‘arī theologians is that all acts in the universe are direct and 
                                             
71 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 283-84. 
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73 See previous chapter. 
 154 
continuous creations of God, and that any apparent cause and effect 
relationship outside of this paradigm is merely occasional.74   
Causation and Divine Omnipotence 
 
Al-Dardīr lays a careful argument when discussing the topic of 
ontological causation (al-ta’thīr), stating emphatically that God alone causes, in 
the sense of origination (al-ikhtirā‘) and creation ex nihilo (al-ījād).  While he 
does acknowledge the existence of human power (qudra), he negates any 
possibility that human action is the mu‘aththir (ontological cause) of any human 
voluntary act.75  He then poses the inevitable question: how, then, can humans 
be held accountable for their actions if they are not the originators of their own 
actions?  Al-Dardīr then invokes the standard acquisition (kasb) defence; 
namely that God alone creates; humans and all other created beings “acquire” 
the created act.  To answer the anticipated question of human accountability, 
he invokes the concept of ta‘alluqāt (cosmic connections)76. He defines the 
ta‘alluq as the extension of the attribute to a matter in addition to its essential 
connection to its possessor.77  In the case of the ta‘alluq of divine omnipotence, 
it is defined as that which manifested (abrazat) all things in accordance with the 
divine will.  Human acquisition (kasb) is defined as the ta‘alluq of human power 
affecting human voluntary acts. The manifestation of voluntary human acts is 
then a product of two connections: the divine and the human.  
In positing the qudra of created beings, al-Dardīr acknowledges the 
legitimacy of sense perception as a legitimate epistemological source, but also 
demonstrates its limitation in ascertaining the ontological reality i.e. the way 
                                             
74 Edward Omar Moad, "Al-Ghazali on Power, Causation, and 'Acquisition'," Philosophy East 
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75 The implication being that human involuntary acts, such as the function of the internal organs, 
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76 I translate ta‘alluq as “cosmic” connection as it is defined by al-Dardīr as the connection or 
effect of the divine attribute on the created world, i.e. the cosmos.  
77 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 354. 
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things really are – the ḥaqīqa.  Indeed, al-Dardīr asserts that created beings are 
subject to coercion ontologically (majbūr fi’l-bāṭin), whilst appearing as voluntary 
actors according to mere sensory perception   (mukhtār fi’l-ẓāhir).78  The 
ontological reality then, is unequivocal in that God is the creator and author of 
all acts, whether voluntary or involuntary.  He presents this position as the 
authoritative Sunni position, though admitting that it was reached after a long 
and difficult period of polemical argumentation. Al-Dardīr appears to concede 
that the issue cannot be fully understood via the toolbox of the kalām 
theologian, but must, nevertheless, be acquiesced to as a matter of orthodox 
creed.  The question of reconciling human accountability with the ontological 
reality, however, remains.  Al-Dardīr attempts to mollify this persistent issue 
from epistemological and mystical perspectives rather than from a purely 
rational one.   
He addresses the epistemological perspective by invoking the concept of 
cosmic connection (ta’alluq), as previously mentioned.  Though from an 
ontological perspective, God’s omnipotence (qudra) is cosmically connected to 
all that occurs in the universe (that is of course within the realm of the logically 
possible), the power (qudra) of created beings is cosmically connected to their 
own voluntary acts.  This human power, exerted in conjunction with human will, 
is what is known as acquisition (kasb).  Hence, the created human act has two 
cosmic connections (ta’alluqāt):  the creating and originating pre-eternal divine 
cosmic connection, and the temporal (ḥādith) acquisitive cosmic connection.   
The latter has no efficacious power, being the sole province the former; 
yet, the latter remains the basis for human accountability.  Al-Dardīr then 
mentions that involuntary or coerced acts are outside the bounds of 
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accountability, as any rational person would attest to.   It is here that he posits 
the main distinction between the Ash‘arī position on the matter, and the 
positions of the heterodox Jabriyya and Qadariyya.  Al-Dardīr claims that the 
Jabriyya deny the created power (qudra) of human action, and hence, humans 
are subject to divine coercion, (majbūr) from both ontological (bāṭin) and sense 
perception (ẓāhir) perspectives.  It is because of this stance that al-Dardīr 
declares their sect unequivocally heretical (kuffār), in addition to being 
heterodox, as he reports that their theology categorically denies accountability 
(taklīf), and thus, is tantamount to denial of the Prophetic message.   
Regarding the Qadariyya, however, he reports a difference of opinion, 
though he cites their inclusion as believers as the sounder opinion.  The 
reasoning for this softer stance is that the Qadariyya merely posit the efficacy of 
created human acts and wills.  Though they have admitted a partner with God, 
the fact that they also admit human power and will are creations of God, and 
hence, admit implicitly that the human act is also a creation of God, albeit in an 
indirect manner.79  This position is similar to that largely associated with the 
Mu‘tazilites, who theorise human efficacy via an invested power (al-quwwa al-
mūda’a) by God in the created being.  Thus, the human act is a function of an 
efficacious intrinsic power without a direct dependence on the divine efficacy.  
Again, al-Dardīr finds this stance heterodox (bid‘ī), but short of heretical.  It 
appears that the Mu‘tazilite position is functionally identical to that of the 
Qadariyya, the difference in wording only.  The Qadariyya dispense with the 
formality of an invested power, and postulate the efficacy of human will and 
power without referencing the source of that power, though one can conclude it 
is divine in origin.   
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Al-Laqqānī, in his treatise on creed, the Jawhara, confirms the functional 
concurrence of the two positions, as he assigns the position of self-created acts 
to the Mu‘tazilites, with no mention of the Qadariyya.80  Al-Dardīr also 
acknowledges the similarity of the two positions in a subsequent section in the 
Kharīda.81 He also addresses the question of whether some of the Sunni 
theologians adopted a similar position vis à vis the efficacy of the invested 
power.  He mentions specifically al-Ghazālī and al-Subkī adopting this position, 
as does Frank regarding al-Ghazālī in his work al-‘Iqtiṣād fi’l-‘Itiqād, stating that 
“the thesis that God “creates” a particular event – is uniquely the cause of its 
existence – does not formally dent the efficacy of secondary causes”.82 Though 
al-Dardīr denies the efficacy of secondary causes, he addresses the contention 
here by Frank by differentiating between the Mu’tazilite position and the Ash‘arī 
position by clarifying the difference between ta’thīr (efficacy) and sabab 
(secondary cause).   
He states “the position of efficacy by way of [secondary] power with 
some of our imams is that God has sole efficacy and is the sole actor by way of 
this [secondary] power that He created in these things.  Hence, efficacy is for 
God alone, though by way of an intermediary.  As for the Qadariyya, they 
attribute efficacy to these intermediate causes by way of these secondary 
causes.”83 
It is on this occasion that al-Dardīr addresses the issue of natural 
dispositions and their efficacy, or lack thereof.  While he negates any efficacy 
associated with natural dispositions (al-ṭabī‘a), and assigns sole efficacy to God, 
it is not apparent that he would refute the existence of natural dispositions 
                                             
80 al-Laqqānī, Itḥāf Al-Murīd Bi Jawharat Al-Tawḥīd, 152. 
81 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 306. 
82 Richard M. Frank, Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arite School, Duke Monographs in Medieval and 
Renaissance Studies (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), 37. 
83 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 309. 
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altogether.  Such a stance is attributed to al-Ghazālī, by virtue of the fact that 
Occasionalism, as an Islamic doctrine, denies any form of causal power in all 
creatures, and hence, by definition denies any intrinsic natures in said 
creatures.84  The crux of this argument is that in the absence of logical 
necessity i.e. causal efficacy for other than God, the only conclusion one can 
deduce would be the illegitimacy of intrinsic or dispositional natures in created 
beings.  Such a conclusion would be understandable, considering al-Ghazālī’s 
use of the word sabab (cause) in different contexts that could be easily 
conflated with other sub-contexts.   
Nevertheless, an essential distinction should be made between the 
ontologically based ta‘thīr (ontological cause) and the sense perception based 
sabab (observable cause).  The term ta‘thīr appears in al-Laqqānī’s Jawhara: 
wa ‘indana kasb li-al-‘abd kullifa bihi wa lam yakun mu’aththiran (and in our 
[school] the slave [of God] has an acquisition that he has been made 
accountable [though] he possesses no ontological cause).85  Earlier works in 
Ash‘arī theology centre the discussion around the issue of the “creation of acts” 
(khalq al-af‘āl) and dispense with the terms sabab and ta’thīr.  Al-Bāqillānī 
presents in the dialectical style of his intellectual age and region (tenth century 
Iraq) and does not use the terms sabab and ta’thīr, but rather refutes the 
Mu‘tazilite / Qadariyya argument of the self-creation of human acts by 
referencing a series of Qur’ānic verses and pointing out the “fallacies” of the 
Mu‘tazilite thesis in each verse.86   
Al-Bayḍāwī reports that al-Bāqillānī took the unique position amongst 
Ash‘arī theologians in defining acquisition (kasb) or the human act itself as the 
                                             
84 Edward Omar Moad, "Al-Ghazali's Occasionalism and the Natures of Creatures," 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 58, no. 2 (2005). 
85 al-Laqqānī, Itḥāf Al-Murīd Bi Jawharat Al-Tawḥīd, 152. 
86 Abū Bakr al-Bāqillāni, Tamhīd Al-Awā'il Wa Talkhīṣ Al-Dalā'il (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-kutub al-
thiqāfiyya, 1987). 
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determining factor in its classification as either an act of obedience or 
disobedience This is in contrast to the earlier position of al-Ash‘arī, who stated 
that all human acts are caused solely by God’s efficient power, and completely 
devoid of any other factor.87 Interestingly, both Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 
685/1286) and Sa’d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, who each wrote in the compendium 
style of their era88, cite the opinion of the Shāfi‘ī judge Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī 
(d. 412/1021), stating that human acts are cosmically connected (ta‘allaqa) to 
both divine and human power.89 A third opinion is attributed to the teacher of al-
Ghazālī, “Imām al-Ḥaramayn” (the imam of the two sacred mosques) ‘Abd al-
Malik ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), stating that human acts are a product 
of a power that God creates within them.90  Al-Dardīr introduces the concept of 
ta’thīr as ikhtirā‘ and ījād (creation ex nihilo), specifically as the ta’alluq of divine 
power with human beings’ voluntary acts.  Human power is also “connected” 
(ta’allaqa) with their voluntary acts, but by way of kasb (acquisition), rather than 
ta‘thīr.  Hence, human voluntary acts have two ta‘alluqāt: one divine and pre-
eternal, referred to as ta‘thīr, and another human and temporal, referred to as 
kasb.  This argument of al-Dardīr resembles that of al-Isfarāyīnī, who also 
posited the dual ta‘alluq doctrine.  Thus, taklīf (moral responsibility) is conferred 
by way of kasb, not self-creation of human acts.  
Kalām works of the eleventh to fourteenth centuries were more polemical 
than the later texts of al-Sanūsī and al-Dardīr, and included in their text a range 
of dissenting opinions, from both within the Ash‘arī tradition, as well as without.  
It therefore not surprising that some eight to nine positions are recorded within 
the Sunni tradition for this issue alone.  Al-Dardīr, in the muḥaqqiq tradition, 
                                             
87 Nāṣir al-dīn al-Bayḍāwī, Ṭawāli‘ Al-Anwār Min Maṭāli‘ Al-Anẓār (Beirut: Dar al-jīl, 1991), 197. 
88 See previous chapter. 
89 al-Bayḍāwī, Ṭawāli‘ Al-Anwār Min Maṭāli‘ Al-Anẓār,301-305; al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ Al-Maqāṣid, 
4:263-4. 
90 Nāṣir al-dīn al-Bayḍāwī, Ṭawāli‘ Al-Anwār Min Maṭāli‘ Al-Anẓār (Beirut: Dar al-jīl, 1991), 197. 
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takes an eclectic approach to arrive at the position that best suits his 
weltanschauung, one particularly informed by Sufism, and especially Akbarian 
cosmology.  Hence, his position that creatures are coerced inwardly – another 
manner of saying in the ultimate reality or ontologically, and yet, voluntarily 
choose outwardly, is consistent with Sufi metaphysics and the Sufi sharī’a - 
ḥaqīqa paradigm. 
Divine Essence and Divine Existence 
 
The essence versus existence argument is an old one, first mentioned by 
Aristotle, and subsequently discussed by Mu’tazilite and Ash‘arī theologians.91 
Though at first glance the existence/essence issue appears to be a kalām issue 
regarding divine simplicity, it has a substantive basis in the controversial Sufi 
doctrine of waḥdat a-wujūd (unity of existence), attributed to Ibn al-‘Arabī and 
his followers.  Most notably, Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī attempted to reconcile al-
Ash‘arī’s view affirming the coincidence of essence and existence with the 
putative view of Ibn al-‘Arabī regarding the unity of existence.92 It has been 
already pointed out that al-Dardīr, like al-Ḥifnī, al-Bakrī, and al-Nābulusī before 
him, was one such follower.  Yet, he was also a dedicated Ash‘arī theologian 
and a recogniser of the scholarship of al-Taftāzānī, an opponent of Ibn al-
Arabī’s doctrine of the unity of existence.  
Al-Dardīr takes the side of al-‘Ash’arī, declaring that the divine essence 
and existence are one in the same and indistinguishable. On this point he 
contravenes later Ash‘arī theologians, such as al-Taftāzānī, whom al-Dardīr 
quotes often, who devoted a large section of his commentary on the Maqāsid of 
                                             
91 For a discussion of Avicenna’s treatment of the subject, and its Aristotelian and kalām origins 
see: Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context (London: Duckworth, 2003), 145-60. 
92 Khaled El-Rouayheb, "Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century : Scholarly 
Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,, 
2015), 325-26. 
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his teacher, al-Ījī, refuting the attributed opinion of al-Ash‘arī that claims God’s 
essence (māhiyya) is indistinguishable from His existence (wujūd).  Al-Dardīr 
states in the Kharīda:  
...And the veritable truth (al-ḥaqq) is that there is no intermediate state [of existence] 
(ḥāl)93, and thus [God’s] existence is identical to [His] essence and is not a distinguishable 
attribute separate from it. 
 
Al-Dardīr’s justification for postulating the identicalness of divine essence 
and existence is his rejection of the “intermediate state.”  The doctrine of the 
“intermediate state” (ḥāl) is a highly contentious one that was accepted and 
rejected by various Ash‘arī theologians.  It is a noetic construct that was utilised 
to account for divine attributes that could not be characterised as existing 
outside the mind, hence a state between existence (wujūd) and non-existence 
(‘adam).  In the traditional theology, these included the positive attributes (al-
ṣifāt al-ma‘nawiyya)– the notion that God is wilful, omniscient, omnipotent, 
seeing, hearing, speaking and alive.  These “attributes” are considered 
secondary to the positive attributes (ṣifāt al-ma‘ānī), which are merely their 
nounal forms.  Post-Ash’arī theologians who sought to counter the Mu’tazilite 
assertion that God is characterised via His positive attributes postulated these 
attributes, but they are circumscribed to His essence, as positing them distinct 
from His essence would amount to positing multiple deities.  Hence, seven 
additional attributes were theorised by Ash‘arī theologians; but to counter 
claims of double attributes, since God can only have one attribute of 
omnipotence, omniscience, etc., the notion of “intermediate state” was born.  
These secondary positive attributes do not have a distinct existence from their 
primary counterparts, and hence are in an “intermediate state” between 
                                             
93 The “intermediate state” is postulated on the premise that objects can be neither existing nor 
non-existing, at least in the conceptualisation of the mind.  This is indirectly related to Ibn al-
‘Arabī’s concept of thubūt, which posits that objects in the realm of divine knowledge before 
they are brought into actual existence neither exist nor not exist, but instead are referred to as 
“fixed” (thābit).  This doctrine is explored to greater detail in the following section on monism. 
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existence and non-existence.  Al-Dardīr rejects the doctrine of the ḥāl, and thus 
dispenses with the secondary attributes altogether in most of theological 
works.94 
Al-Dardīr considers the attribute of divine existence to be in the same 
category as the ṣifāt al-ma‘ānī; they are non-existent outside the constructs of 
the intellect.  He uses the term thubūt (mental confirmation) to denote this 
category, distinguishing it from wujūd, which denotes extra-mental reality. Since 
the notion of a distinct existence from the divine essence is a mental construct 
that cannot be materially conceptualised, it then follows that rejection of the 
intermediate state necessitates the rejection of a distinct divine existence not 
identical to the divine essence.  Hence, al-Dardīr claims this as the preferred 
opinion, as this is reflected in his counting the divine attributes as thirteen, and 
not the more widely held twenty. Furthermore, the enumeration of wujūd (divine 
existence) amongst the thirteen is attributed to tasāmuḥ (concession), as the 
ṣifa nafsiyya (ontological attribute) is not an attribute at all, but rather a purely 
mental construct that has thubūt (mental confirmation) without an existential 
reality, unlike the ṣifāt al-ma‘ānī (positive attributes), which have a true wujūd.95   
Returning to the issue of the efficacy of human acts, al-Dardīr’s 
reconciliation from an ontological perspective is reserved for his advanced 
works in theology.  The notion of inward coercion and outward volition is not 
mentioned in his Kharīda, an intermediate text designed for primary students of 
the Azhar mosque-college.  Indeed, he moderates the divisive doctrine: 96 
…and they are the voluntary acts, those that we have volition and intent without 
origination and creation; and this cosmic connection that conforms to our volition is called 
acquisition (kasb or iktisāb).  Thus, the cosmic connection of God’s power in conformity with our 
volition is one of origination (ījād), whilst the cosmic connection of our power in conformity with 
our volition is one of acquisition, not origination.  Hence, our voluntary acts are cosmically 
                                             
94 The exception the works where he offers commentaries on texts that include them, such as 
al-Dardīr, "Sharḥ Fawāyid Al-Farāyid Fī Ḍābiṭ Al-‘Aqāyid." 
95 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 244-45. 
96 Ibid., 244. 
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connected to both powers: the pre-eternal power, and the temporal [human] power. The latter 
has no efficacy (ta’thīr)…and thus, the servant [of God] is volitional; and in the case that God 
creates the act in the servant without an accompanying power of his own, than he is coerced 
and compelled, and God has showed His favour upon us in this case by removing 
accountability. 
 
Al-Dardīr carefully words the explanation here, avoiding using the 
phraseology he used in Tuḥfat al-Ikhwān, a work primarily on Sufism, where he 
characterises the divine omnipotence as coercing and compelling in both 
voluntary and involuntary human acts.  Such a stance is more indicative of the 
ḥaqīqa aspect of the tradition, which can only be fully reconciled via a Sufi 
perspective, as admittedly, the rational intellect can fail to fully comprehend the 
metaphysical implications of the divine will and omniscience.   
Al-Dardīr can hence be characterised as addressing two distinct 
audiences on the issue of divine will and omniscience: mainstream students of 
Islamic creed, where arguments largely remain within the realm of the rational; 
and a more elite audience of advanced students and spiritual aspirants who 
recognise the limitations of their own intellectual perceptions.  This 
individualised approach allowed someone like al-Dardīr to navigate between 
various intellectual circles that, to the outside observer, may be seen at odds 
with each other.   
The Azhar vanguard of the elite ‘ulamā’, while proponents of Sufism in a 
general sense, was not necessarily supportive of a discourse promoting overt 
Sufi terminologies and mystical cognition.  Notwithstanding, al-Dardīr’s 
reputation as a preeminent jurisprudent and theologian, as well as social critic, 
assured him certain latitude from his peers regarding some of his more 
particular stances on issues of theology and Sufism.  
 Nevertheless, al-Dardīr also utilises the doctrine of ṣifāt al-af‘āl (divine 
attributes of action) to buttress his argument for the efficacy of the divine will 
and omnipotence at the exclusion of human will and power. This doctrine is one 
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of the few where the Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs diverge, where the latter postulate 
a single, pre-eternal attribute known as formation (takwīn).  This attribute in the 
Māturīdī scheme is closely associated with omnipotence and will, and theorised 
as the attribute that executes the specific instances of the divine will and 
omnipotence, in as much as that will and omnipotence are the ability and 
potential of the divine efficacy.  Takwīn (formation) is the execution of that ability 
and potential, in creating existence from non-existence. Formation is a pre-
eternal attribute, as are will and omnipotence, and the Māturīdī theology does 
not recognise manifestations of the divine will and omnipotence as attributes, 
such as giving life, death, sustenance, eternal felicity or misery, etc. as 
temporal, but rather as pre-eternal.97  The muḥaqqiqūn (verifiers)98 amongst the 
Ash‘arīs, conversely, do not posit a divine, pre-eternal attribute of formation, but 
rather consider all of the above manifestations of the pre-eternal divine will and 
omnipotence, as temporal.   
Ta‘alluqāt (Cosmic Connections) and ‘Ilal (existential causes)99 
 
The doctrine of the ta’alluqāt in the Ash‘arī scheme appear to serve as 
an answer to the Falāsifa’s assertion that God is an ‘illa (existential cause) for 
the existence of the universe, as noted by Ibn al-‘Arabī.100  Al-Dardīr, following 
his predecessors, negates the notion that God creates by ‘illa (existential cause) 
as such an assertion establishes a necessary relationship between the ‘illa and 
the ma‘lūl (caused), so that the existence of the ‘illa – God in this case – is 
existentially connected to the ma‘lūl  - the universe in this case.  According to al-
Dardīr such a doctrine constitutes kufr (heresy), as it renders the divine will 
                                             
97 See Ibn Abī Sharīf al-Maqdasī and Humām, Al-Musāmara Sharḥ Al-Musāyara, 103-06; al-
Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 391-94. 
98 Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 394. 
99 We have chosen the term “cosmic connections” as the translation for ta‘alluqāt, as the divine 
attributes, according to al-Dardīr and other Ash‘arī theologians, are understood to have their 
manifestations in the universe, or the “cosmos” via these connections. 
100 Muhyī al-Dīn Ibn al-‘Arabī, Al-Futuḥat Al-Makkiyya, (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1997), 1:315-16. 
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ineffectual.101  It also the follows that if God is necessary for the existence of the 
universe, then the universe is also necessary for Him, and hence is co-eternal 
with God - a doctrine of the Falāsifa.  However, the negation of creation via ‘illa 
introduces the problem of the relationship of the pre-eternal Creator to the 
temporal creation, with the Ash‘arī rejection of essential natures and assertion 
of Occasionalism, and the rejection of God being an existential cause for the 
universe. 
Additionally, the early rationalist theologians were divided regarding the 
relationship of the divine essence to the divine attributes, with some eliminating 
the attributes altogether, such as the Mu‘tazilites, and others, such as the 
Karrāmiyya, asserting some and eliminating others.102 
The Ash‘arīs solve this issue with the concept of the ta‘alluq. It is not 
clear when this was introduced, but al-Ghazālī mentions it in his Iqtiṣād in a 
general sense, not a technical one, when discussing the attribute of divine 
omnipotence (qudra), specifically the issue of the relationship between human 
power and divine power.  As is the style of the Iqtiṣād, he posits the question of 
an adversary, who asks: if human power is to have any meaning, then how can 
the Ash‘arīs state that only God has the power to create, and human power is 
ineffectual?  Here al-Ghazālī responds by asserting that God is the Originator 
and Creator of single acts, as well as the power within humans to effect those 
acts, and hence, human power can only be understood as subservient to divine 
power.  A further objection may then be raised, namely, how is God the Creator 
before the appearance of creation, If the divine attributes are co-eternal with the 
divine essence, and considering the Ash‘arī claim that God’s attributes are co-
eternal with His essence?   
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Al-Ghazālī responds to this objection by invoking the concept of ta‘alluq, 
namely that the attribute of divine power has two ta‘alluqāt, one by which 
creating beings come to be in-time, and another, no less significant, that he 
states as the “waiting” (intiẓār) for the ta‘alluq, since the “actual” ta‘alluq, i.e. at 
the moment of in-time creation (ḥudūth), has yet to take place.  Al-Ghazālī does 
not assign a particular term for this “different” type of ta‘alluq other than to say it 
is a ta‘alluq in-waiting.103  Al-Rāzī, a century after al-Ghazālī, refers to the two 
ta‘alluqāt as al-qudra al-qadīma and al-qudra al-ḥadītha, without specifically 
referencing the term ta‘alluq.104 
The doctrine of the ta‘alluq in a more formalised manner appears to be a 
later addition of Ash‘arī theologians in North Africa and Egypt, as the earlier 
works of al-Bāqillānī, al-Rāzī, and al-Ghazālī make no explicit reference to it as 
a technical term.  However, al-Sanūsī, who popularised short creeds in the later 
tradition, appears to be the first Ash‘arī theologian to mention the term in a 
technical sense:105  
It is necessary for God seven attributes, known as the positive attributes, and they are 
power and will, mut‘alliqān (both cosmically connected) to all logical possibilities, and 
knowledge, cosmically connected to all logical necessities, possibilities, and impossibilities, and 
life, not cosmically connected to anything… 
 
Al-Laqqānī, the Mālikī jurist and Ash‘arī theologian who penned the 
popular Jawharat al-Tawḥīd, also mentions the ta‘alluq, in the same manner as 
al-Sanūsī.106  Al-Dardīr, however, extends the doctrine of ta‘alluq by specifically 
defining it – something his predecessors appeared not to do – and also further 
categorising the ta‘alluq into distinct categories, as is discussed below. 
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Al-Dardīr defines the ta‘alluq as: iqtiḍā’ al-ṣifa amran zā’idan ‘alā 
qiyāmihā b’il-dhāt k’aqtiḍā’ al-‘ilm ma‘lūman yankashif bihi (the requirement of 
the attribute a matter above and beyond its connection with the essence, such 
as the requirement of divine knowledge the object of its discovery).107  The 
ta‘alluqāt are not attributes, but rather mental constructs postulated in order to 
understand the manifestations of the divine positive attributes.  For example, 
the attribute of irāda (divine will), coupled with God’s omnipotence, enacts the 
external manifestation of the logically possible (takhṣīṣ al-mumkin), and, hence 
precludes the need for the attribute of formation (takwīn).   
Al-Dardīr, however, does assign specific terms to the variants of ta‘alluq: 
validity/actualisation (ṣulūḥiyya/tanjīziyya) and temporality/pre-eternalness 
(ḥudūth / qidam).  Consequently, the cosmic connections to the divine attributes 
in al-Dardīr’s scheme are of four types and are summarised in the following 
table: 
Cosmic Connection Attribute(s) 
No cosmic connection save for 
connection to the divine essence 
Life 
All that is logically possible, 
impossible, and necessary 
Knowledge, Speech 
Only to what is logically possible, at 
the exclusion of the impossible and 
necessary 
Will, Omnipotence 
All that is existent Hearing, Seeing 
 
The cosmic connections are then further categorised into three distinct 
categories according to validity/actualisation (ṣulūḥiyya/tanjīziyya) and 
temporality/pre-eternalness (ḥudūth / qidam).  The logical possibilities are thus 
four; the corresponding attributes are summarised in the following table: 
  
Valid or Actualised Temporal or Pre- Corresponding 
                                             
107 Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 354. 
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eternal Attributes 
Valid Temporal None 
Valid Pre-eternal Will, Omnipotence, 
Speech, Hearing, Seeing 
Actualised Temporal Omnipotence, Speech, 
Hearing, Seeing, 
Attributes of action 
Actualised Pre-eternal Will, Speech, 
Omniscience, Hearing, 
Seeing 
 
Divine speech is the only attribute to fall into the three categories.  It has a 
potential, pre-eternal connection from the aspect of its potential to address man 
before his existence, and is pre-eternal as the Ash‘arīs hold divine speech as 
uncreated.  Additionally, it has an actualised, pre-eternal connection from the 
aspect of its indication of the logical categories (possibility, impossibility, and 
necessity), and an actualised, temporal connection from the aspect of its 
address to man after his creation.  The actualised, temporal connection is also 
equally applicable to the attributes of action i.e. giving of life, death, sustenance, 
etc., and forms one aspect of the divine omnipotence, as in temporal realisation 
of the pre-eternal divine decree (will) and the potential divine omnipotence.   
 The divine omnipotence does not have an actualised pre-eternal 
connection, as it would necessitate the pre-eternalness of the universe (qidam 
al-‘ālam), a notion championed by the Arabic philosophers, and patently 
rejected by the kalām theologians.  The potential pre-eternal aspect of 
omnipotence circumvents this doctrine somewhat elegantly, as it leaves the 
absolute possibility of God to enact what He wills, though not all that He is 
capable of will come to be. 
 Al-Dardīr’s student, al-Sibā‘ī, answers the expected question as to how 
the divine may interface with a temporal attribute under this scheme by equating 
the cosmic connection of the divine omnipotence with the temporal attributes of 
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action, and not the divine attribute itself.  Hence, God can be Creator, Giver of 
Life, Providence, etc. as cosmic connections to the divine omnipotence, but not 
the divine omnipotence itself.108   
 This distinction also has ramifications in al-Dardīr’s mystical degrees of 
oneness (marātib al-tawḥīd), where the spiritual aspirant’s perception of the 
oneness of the divine attributes is a higher degree than the perception of the 
oneness of the divine names (or attributes of action).109  Al-Dardīr also posits 
the divine order of the cosmic connections, beginning with divine omniscience, 
then will, and then omnipotence.  It thus becomes clear why al-Dardīr broke 
from tradition and cited knowledge before will and power, as divine knowledge 
not only uncovers the reality of all things, but it also determines it.  Hence, 
nothing can exist without a cosmic connection to divine knowledge.   
 Having only one cosmic connection, the actualised pre-eternal, unlike 
hearing and seeing, which have three, brings to bear the important distinction of 
God’s omniscience in that it is a principal cause of all reality, in a way more 
primal than will and omnipotence.  One can infer that the principle reason 
behind this is al-Dardīr’s synthesis of Sufi metaphysics with kalām rationality, 
where in the former, knowledge, and more specifically, knowledge of the divine 
is the fundamental goal of Sufi based spirituality.  Kalām rationality, on the other 
hand, as exemplified in the works of the early Ash‘arī theologians such as al-
Bāqillānī, al-Juwaynī and al-Rāzī, was primarily concerned with establishing 
Sunni orthodoxy by refuting the putative heterodox postulations of the 
Mu‘tazilites and the Falāsifa.   
 While al-Dardīr does not neglect the refutation of the Mu‘tazilite nemesis 
– though its ideology no longer posed a significant threat at least five centuries 
                                             
108 Ibid., 298-300. 
109 This concept is further elucidated below in the relevant section. 
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before – his explication of the Ash‘arī creed is directed towards the spiritual 
aspirant (murīd) searching for the keys to knowledge of the divine (ma‘rifa).  
This argument is bolstered by the fact that al-Dardīr prefaces his dedicated 
works to Sufism with sections on basic creed.110  Conversely, he also 
summates his dedicated works on creed with sections on Sufism.111  His 
teacher’s teacher, Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī posits this stance outright: 112 
 Knowing the Lord is of three types: for the laity, the elite, and the elite of the elite.  The 
laity’s knowledge consists of knowing what is logically necessary, permissible, and impossible 
for God as well as His prophets…The knowledge of the elite consists of knowing the effects of 
the divine names and attributes…The knowledge of the elite of the elite consists of knowing the 
treasures of the secrets of the divine essence. 
 
 Hence, al-Bakrī repositions essential creed as the first step towards 
unlocking the secrets of more esoteric knowledge.  The synthesis of 
epistemologies is unmistakable; knowing the treasures of the secrets of the 
divine names cannot be construed as a rational exercise, as such “secrets” are 
firmly planted in the realm of the esoteric mystical tradition.  The common 
knowledge of the laity however, follows the standard epistemology of rational 
construct.   
 A similar theme is struck by Ibn al-‘Arabī in the introduction to his 
Futūḥāt, which he prefaces with the “creed of the laity”, which according to al-
Bakrī, is standard Ash‘arī creed.113  This synthesis of Sufism with creed would 
have most likely dismayed the likes of al-Taftāzānī, while a supporter of Sufism, 
was a purist who did not like to mix his rational epistemologies with their 
mystical counterparts.  Yet, al-Taftāzānī represented an Islamic ethos that was 
still finding itself and contending with diverse streams of Islamic thought.  The 
                                             
110 See for example: al-Dardīr, "Minhāj Al-Ṣādiqīn Wa Tibyān Al-Salikīn."; "Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān Fī 
Bayān Ṭarīq Ahl Al-‘Irfān." 
111 Such as in: al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya; al-Dardīr, 
"Sharḥ Fawāyid Al-Farāyid Fī Ḍābiṭ Al-‘Aqāyid." 
112 Muṣṭafā Bakrī, Al-Suyūf Al-Ḥidād Fī ‘Anāq Ahl Al-Zandaqa Wa 'L-Ilḥād (Cairo: Dār al-Āfāq al-
‘Arabiyya, 2007), 37-38. 
113 Muhyī al-Dīn Ibn al-‘Arabī, Al-Futuḥat Al-Makkiyya, (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Miṣriyya, 1985), 
1:161-73. 
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maturation that would define the later Islamic tradition of al-Dardīr had not yet 
taken hold.   
 After the stunning victories the Egyptians attained on the battlefield 
against both the Mongol and Crusader armies, a certain steadiness in 
intellectual pursuits, if not in political ones, was achieved, and defined the 
Mamlūk years, and extended after the Ottoman conquest in 1517.  Just as the 
early ascetic Sufism of Abū Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857)114 and Bishr al-Ḥāfī 
(d. 227/850)115 at the beginning of the Abbasid era was a response to perceived 
palace excesses, the recalibration of Sufism, and final reconciliation with Sunni 
orthodoxy – specifically the integration of Akbarian Sufism - was precipitated by 
active Ottoman acceptance of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s ideas.   
 Winter argues, that, unlike in the Arabic speaking lands, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s 
viewpoint was adopted and protected by the Ottoman authorities. Their impetus 
for taking such a stance might have been to install a Sunni oriented Sufism to 
counter the Alid esotericism threat from the Safavid Empire.116  Nevertheless, 
opposing viewpoints in the Ottoman capital were not absent, but few scholars, 
who had hopes for securing the Sultan’s patronage, were willing to launch 
public polemical campaigns against the newly appointed patron-saint of the 
Ottoman Empire.117  It is probable that the support of Ottoman officialdom, at 
least from a sociological perspective, accounted for the acceptance of Akbarian 
cosmologies amongst the ‘ulamā’ class, specifically the Khalwatī disciples of 
Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī, such as al-Ḥifnī, Maḥmūd al-Kurdī (d. 1194/1780)118,  ‘Abd al-
                                             
114 See Gavin N. Picken, Spiritual Purification in Islam : The Life and Works of Al-Muḥasibī 
(London: Routledge, 2011). 
115 See Michael Cooperson, Classical Arabic Biography: The Heirs of the Prophets in the Age of 
Al-Ma'mun (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 154-87. 
116 Bruce Alan Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918 : A Social and Cultural 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 115-18. 
117 Sirriyeh, Sufi Visionary of Ottoman Damascus : ʿAbd Al-Ghanī Al-Nābulusī, 1641-1731, 126. 
118 See F. de Jong, Ṭuruq and Ṭuruq-Linked Institutions in Nineteenth Century Egypt : A 
Historical Study in Organizational Dimensions of Islamic Mysticism (Leiden: Brill, 1978). 
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Raḥmān al-Jabartī (d. 1241/1825) the chronicler, and disciple of al-Kurdī, and 
al-Dardīr.   
 The larger intellectual project of reconciling Akbarian Sufism with Sunni 
orthodoxy, however, fell on those who were respected as jurists and 
theologians.  The Mālikī mufti and Azhar doctor, al-Dardīr, was part of a larger 
trend amongst the students of al-Bakrī who sought to recapture Sufism from its 
perceived demagogues and charlatans.  His shaykh, al-Ḥifnī, rector of al-Azhar, 
also fulfilled the role, but his literary production was too pauce to leave a lasting 
impression.  They were preceded in this by one of their master’s most 
celebrated teachers, ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, who infused his works of 
creedal theology with Sufi metaphysics, such as in his commentary on the 
creed of al-Sanūsī, where he states:119  
Believers are of three types: (1) Believers of a belief based upon taqlīd muṭābiq wa idh‘ān 
(precise imitation and acquiescence)…and they are sinful for forsaking that which is obligatory – 
al-ma‘rifa (knowledge of God). (2) Believers of a belief of rational argument and proof; there is 
no difference of opinion regarding the validity of their belief, but the question is: are they 
knowers of God or not?  The preferred opinion is that they are people of intellect, contemplation, 
and acquiescence, and not of knowledge and inspiration. (3) Believers of a belief based upon 
valid unveiling and witnessing, and there is no difference of opinion regarding the validity of 
neither their belief nor their knowledge of the divine. 
  
 Furthermore, he cites the over-reliance of the various sects, such as the 
Mu‘tazilites, Naturalists, Qadariyya, and Jabriyya on the ‘aql (rational intellect), 
as well as their abandonment of tawakkul (reliance) upon God in understanding 
the divine, as inhibitors to taḥqīq, and adherence to the Muḥammadan 
Sunna.120 Deviation from normative theological positions prevents higher 
spiritual realisations, as the rational intellect, if corrupted, will not redeem what 
appear to be sound conclusions, but nonetheless faulty, due to caprice.   
 The theme al-Nābulusī invokes is one shared by al-Dardīr, where he 
mentions the ḥijāb (spiritual veil) of the Mu’tazilites as opaque, due to their 
                                             
119 Nābulusī, Al-Anwār Al-Ilāhiyya Sharḥ ‘Aqidat Al-Sanūsiyya, 63. 
120 Ibid., 65. 
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perceived deviance in matters of creed, specifically the doctrine of the creation 
of human acts.121  This recalls the famous anecdote recorded by Ibn al-‘Arabī 
when he warns Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī of the perils of relying on naẓar (rational 
inquiry) alone, without the certainty that can only be accorded by the path of 
spiritual discipline.122 
 Arguably, the most contentious aspect of Islamic theology has been the 
various understandings regarding the very nature of God, His essence.  
Negative theology in both its Islamic and Catholic variants was largely 
successful in prescribing what God is not, but the tools at the disposal of the 
theologians seemed ill equipped to prescribe what He is.  Competing with the 
theologians in this aspect were the ascetics – the Sufis, who often suffered the 
onslaught of accusations of antinomianism and heresy because of their 
unfiltered proclamations of divine love and union.  Chief to this dilemma 
between the theologians and the Sufis was the doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd (the 
unity of existence) – an issue often the principal dividing line between the 
rationalist (Ash‘arī or Māturīdī), and Sufi theologians.   
 Yet, there appeared to be a marked shift in the tradition when 
theologians of repute attempted reconciliations between the exoteric 
demarcations between the divine and the corporeal on one hand, and the 
esoteric immanence of the divine in all things corporeal, of the Akbarian Sufis 
on the other.  This is what Ibn al-‘Arabī referred to as tanzīh (incomparability) 
and tashbīh (similarity).123 The tension between the seemingly diametrically 
                                             
121 al-Dardīr, "Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān Fī Bayān Ṭarīq Ahl Al-‘Irfān," 9. 
122 Shihadeh, "The Mystic and the Sceptic in Fakhr Al-Dīn Al-Rāzī," 102. 
123 I prefer Chittick’s translation to transcendence and immanence, as it is more faithful to the 
etymology of the Arabic terms tanzīh and tashbīh, and avoids the perhaps problematic 
connotations from Christian theology. See William C. Chittick et al., In Search of the Lost Heart 
Explorations in Islamic Thought, (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2011). 
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opposed terms defines the exoteric / esoteric basis for understanding the 
existence of God.   
 Al-Dardīr perhaps represented a synthesis of the two bases, as he was 
an Ash‘arī theologian in the muḥaqqiq tradition, as well as a proponent of Ibn 
‘Arabī’s Sufi metaphysics, via his line of teachers that extended back to al-
Nābulusī. The following section analyses the manner by which al-Dardīr was 
able to make this reconciliation, as well as the degree of success, if any, he had 
in doing so.  
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Al-Dardīr’s Synthesis and the Sharī‘a-Ṭarīqa-Ḥaqīqa Paradigm 
 
 While early Western scholarship on Sufism has shown a propensity to 
characterise it as a fringe movement within Islam, to the extent of having foreign 
origins, more recent scholarship, beginning with Massignon’s magisterial study 
of al-Ḥallāj, has thoroughly refuted this thesis.124  Nevertheless, certain 
dichotomies remain ubiquitous, and have come to characterise scholarship in 
the field, such as the binary frameworks of sober vs. intoxicated variants of 
Sufism, and stoic, existential monism vs. dynamic, testimonial monism.125 
Nevertheless, the Sufi/Anti-Sufi cognitive frame, where orthodox Islam is 
fundamentally at odds with Sufi readings of Islam, or, at the very least, with 
certain Sufi readings, remains persistent.126   
The most virulent of the Anti-Sufi criticisms can be traced to the 
interpretations of Ibn al-‘Arabī, and to “intoxicated” manifestations of Sufism, 
such as that of al-Ḥallāj127 (d. 309/922), and Ibn Sab‘īn128 (d. 669/1269).  Most 
notably, in the later Islamic period, the doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd has been the 
object of the most violent of these criticisms, though Ibn al-‘Arabī is not 
recorded to have ever used the term.  
 
                                             
124 Louis Massignon and Herbert Mason, The Passion of Al-Hallāj : Martyr and Mystic of Islam, 
Bollingen Series (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982). 
125 Chittick et al., In Search of the Lost Heart Explorations in Islamic Thought. 88. The latter 
binary refers to Massignon’s attribution of waḥdat al-wujūd vs. waḥdat al-shuhūd. 
126 See for example: Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis : The Defense, Rethinking and Rejection of 
Sufism in the Modern World; Andrew Newman, "Sufism and Anti-Sufism in Safavid Iran," 
Bristish Institute of Persian Studies: Iran 37 (1999). 
127 Abū Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj was one of the most controversial figures in Islamic history.  His 
ecstatic utterance: “I am the Truth (God)”, as well as palace intrigue, earned him a death 
sentence.  See Massignon’s seminal work: G. Makdisi, "Ashʿarī and the Ash'arites in Islamic 
Religious History I," Studia Islamica 17 (1962): 38. 
128 See Govert Westerveld, Ibn Sab‘in of the Ricote Valley (Murcia: Academia de Estudios 
Humanisticos de Blanca, 2014); Vincent J. Cornell, "The All-Comprehensive Circle (Al-Iḥāṭa): 
Soul, Intellect, and the Oneness of Existence in the Doctrine of Ibn Sab‘Īn," in Sufism and 
Theology, ed. Ayman Shihadeh (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
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Waḥdat al-Wujūd 
 
The central question that pertains to the doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd is 
whether or not the realisation of the unity of existence by the Sufi is a religious 
experience where all other existent beings pale next to the utmost reality of the 
divine existence, or whether, in addition to the aforementioned, an ontological 
reality.  If the former, then few would find trouble with such a definition, as it is 
non-controversial in that it tacitly acknowledges the division between man and 
God, and hence, accusations of pantheism or monism ring emptily.   
Chittick posits that some used the term waḥdat al-shuhūd as an alternate 
to waḥdat al-wujūd as a means to offset criticism of the doctrine by rendering it 
a purely subjective experience rather than an ontological reality.129 Al-Taftāzānī, 
in his polemical response to waḥdat al-wujūd, affirms as much, and is careful to 
avoid a general anti-Sufi position, but rather directs his criticism towards his 
perception of the thoroughly heterodox assertion that fails to distinguish 
between man and his Creator.  He acknowledges the mystical state of fanā‘ 
(annihilation), reached by the ‘ārifūn (knowers of God), and also described by 
al-Taftāzānī as al-waḥda al-muṭlaqa (absolute unity), where the mystic arrives 
to a final state of shuhūd (witnessing) that the ultimate reality is God.   
He contrasts this orthodox view, in his estimation, to that of the 
“wujūdiyya”130 who equate even the lowliest creatures with God, and negate 
any concrete existence to created beings as merely illusory.131  Thus, al-
Taftāzānī, one of the foremost kalām theologians of his era, rejects the notion of 
                                             
129 Chittick et al., In Search of the Lost Heart Explorations in Islamic Thought. 87. 
130 Apparently his manner of referencing the proponents of waḥdat al-wujūd. 
131 al-Taftāzānī, Risāla Fī Waḥdat Al-Wujūd. Aladdin disputes the authorship of the Risāla to al-
Taftāzānī, citing al-‘Alā al-Bukhārī (841/1438). Knysh makes no mention of the disputed 
authorship.  Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that al-Taftāzānī rejected the doctrine of 
waḥdat al-wujūd regardless of his authorship of the Risāla, as he rejected the unity of divine 
essence and existence in his kalām works. See: Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, Al-Wujūd Al-Ḥaqq 
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unity of existence as an ontological reality.  It does bear to note, however, that 
his critique is entirely directed at the Fuṣūṣ, with little direct reference to the 
work.  No mention is made of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s other works, the most notably 
absent reference the Futūḥāt, emulating previous polemical critiques, such as 
the works of Ibn Taymiyya and al-‘Izz ibn Abd al-Salām (d. 660/1261).132  One 
can only speculate as to why the Futūḥāt was ignored with such regularity in the 
Mamlūk era especially, or as to why the emphasis was on the Fuṣūṣ, but one 
possible explanation points to the polemics of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s apologists and 
interpreters, and not to the greatest master himself.   
Amongst the most well known of the interpreters of al-Fuṣūṣ was the 
Anatolian theologian, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnāwī. It has been theorised that al-
Qūnāwī’s reading of Ibn al-‘Arabī, which was heavily influenced by Avicennan 
cosmology, largely shaped his legacy, and left him open for criticism from more 
accomplished theologians such as al-Taftāzānī, whose impression of Ibn al-
‘Arabī was largely informed by his interpreters, specifically of his Fuṣūṣ, more 
than the words of the greatest master himself.133  This mixed attitude towards 
him seemed to last well into the late Mamlūk and early Ottoman periods, until 
the Ottoman conquest of Damascus in 1516, when patronage of the master’s 
tomb marked the beginning of a renewed dedication to his thought and 
legacy.134 
Scholars, such as al-Sha‘rānī, interpreted Ibn ‘Arabī with an emphasis on 
the Futūḥāt, and an almost complete disregard for the Fuṣūṣ, the earlier work 
                                             
132 See Knysh, Ibn ‘Arabi in the Later Islamic Tradition : The Making of a Polemical Image in 
Medieval Islam, 49-113. 
133 See "Ibrāhīm Al-Kūrānī (D.1101 / 1690), an Apologist for Waḥdat Al-Wujūd," Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society 5, no. 1 (1995). 
134 See Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918 : A Social and Cultural History, 
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that caused so much indignation.135 The one work he published in defence of 
Ibn al-‘Arabī focuses entirely on refuting the concepts of ittiḥad, ḥulūl, and the 
pre-eternalness of the universe from his doctrine.136  In Damascus, where Ibn 
al-‘Arabī was buried and received a patron-saint status after the Ottoman 
conquest, it was Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī who became his most celebrated 
interpreter after al-Sha’rānī. He dedicated a singular work to the defence of 
doctrine of the unity of existence, al-Wujūd al-Ḥaqq wa’l-Khiṭāb al-Ṣidq.137 
In this polemical work, it is obvious that al-Nābulusī is tackling a 
contentious subject that was at the forefront of the religious issues of his day.138  
The tone is aggressively apologetic, with al-Nābulusī referencing various 
Qur’ānic verses, Prophetic ḥadīth, and scholarly quotes, culminating in support 
of his wujūd al-ḥaqq thesis.   He takes a particularly critical stance of al-
Taftāzānī, oftentimes pointing out logical inconsistencies in his arguments, a 
rather bold move, considering al-Taftāzānī’s reputation as a theologian and 
master of polemical argumentation.  Nevertheless, al-Nābulusī advances his 
argument with confidence, painstakingly establishing an orthodox position for 
understanding the unity of existence.   
On a basic level, the thrust of al-Nābulusī’s argument is to draw a 
distinction between wujūd (existence) and al-mawjūdāt (things that exist).   
Existence can only be one, as God is existence.  In other words, the broad 
concept of true existence (al-wujūd al-ḥaqq) can only belong to God, as He is 
the Originator of all things, and as all things owe their existence to Him, their 
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“existence” is understood metaphorically (al-wujūd al-iḍāfī).  Hence, a plethora 
of existent beings is obvious and undeniable, but their “existence” does not 
equate “The Existence”, who can only be God.  “The Existence” is uncreated, 
indivisible, unique, and singular.  Al-Nābulusī resurrects the early Ash‘arī 
position of the imam himself, in that existence is not an ontological attribute of 
God, but rather is identical to the essence of God.  Any reference to it as an 
attribute is understood metaphorically, or as in al-Dardīr’s vocabulary “an 
indulgence.”139 
 In answering the critics – primarily al-Taftāzānī – al-Nābulusī alleges that 
the deniers of the doctrine of the unity of existence worship a form (ṣūra) that 
they imagine to be God, though this “form” remains nondescript and 
unknowable, but a form nonetheless.  By acknowledging a separate essence to 
a unique existence, it is implied that God is existent (mawjūd), and hence, an 
existence that has a form.  Al-Nābulusī directly quotes al-Taftāzānī where he 
admits that the notion of absolute non-existence (al-‘adam al-muṭlaq) has no 
conceivable form, as it is identical to the logically impossible.  However, in order 
to subscribe to the parallel notion, namely “absolute existence” (al-wujūd al-
muṭlaq), then the same most hold true, i.e. no form can be conceptualised.  This 
can only be realised with the necessary existence (al-wujūd al-wājib), which is 
unique to God.  Thus, God has no form, neither within the mind nor outside of it.  
A third category, then, “absolute possibility” (al-imkān al-muṭlaq), is the realm of 
all possible existents (mawjūdāt), and hence, cannot apply to God for the 
aforementioned reasons.140 
 God can then be “known” via theophanies (tajalliyāt), divine 
manifestations, while multiple in number, only point to the one, true, undivided 
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140 al-Nābulusī, Al-Wujūd Al-Ḥaqq Wa'l-Khiṭāb Al-Ṣidq, 75-78. 
 180 
existence of the One (al-wujūd al-ḥaqq).141  Thus, all existents (mawjūdāt) are 
forms (ṣuwar) that are actually divine manifestations (tajalliyāt) of the one true 
Existence.  The ability to recognize these forms as pointers to this central reality 
is the essence of ma‘rifa (“knowing God”), and only the spiritual aspirant can 
arrive to such stations.   
This thesis of the doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd offered by al-Nābulusī, one 
predicated on drawing a clear distinction between existence (wujūd) and 
existents (mawjūdāt) is not merely a question of the Sufi aspirant reaching the 
station of fanā’ (annihilation).  It is a given that the realisation of this spiritual 
station is key in realising the reality of the unity of existence, yet it is not 
confined to a realisation of the triviality of creation in light of the Creator.  Al-
Nābulusī’s premise is that it is also an ontological reality.  However, if such a 
reality cannot be fathomed by the rational intellect, can it truly be real in the 
conventional sense?   
Such is the overarching question that not only informs this issue, but the 
larger question of spiritual gnosis and its epistemological implications.  Not only 
al-Nābulusī, but also al-Ghazālī, and countless others before him, and even al-
Taftāzānī, would acknowledge the potency of spiritual training as a means to 
acquiring knowledge of the non-empirical world.  The discourse on such issues 
represented a dividing line between the kalām theologians and the Akbarian 
Sufis.  Al-Dardīr, with impeccable credentials as kalām theologian as well as a 
Bakrī-Khalwatī Sufi, represented a synthesis and reconciliation between the two 
streams.  This is best demonstrated in his writings and approach to actualising 
tawḥīd.   
                                             
141 The translation of tajilliyāt as theophany may provoke some consternation, as a theophany 
has different connotations in other faith traditions.  Nevertheless, the notion of God revealing 
himself via various manifestations is consistent with both the Arabic term tajallī and the original 
Greek etymology. 
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Where al-Dardīr stands on this issue, namely the wujūdī/shuhūdī debate 
is not expressly stated in the works, but it can be inferred that he does not stray 
from the position adopted by al-Nābulusī before him.  However, al-Dardīr more 
explicitly reconciles the position of al-Ash‘arī, noting that divine existence is not 
an attribute, but rather equivalent to the divine essence.  This then is an 
ontological reality, rather than a mere “witnessing” based upon spiritual 
cognition (dhawq).  However, this ontological reality – the oneness of true 
existence, where all other existences are contingent upon the divine existence, 
and therefore not “true” existences, cannot be fully realised by rational means.  
Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī states in his treatise on waḥdat al-wujūd: “Some of these 
(adhwāq) spiritual realisations cannot be realised except by spiritual striving and 
industriousness in the matter that is known, and not by way of mere rational 
knowledge, as spiritual cognition is several levels higher than rational 
knowledge.”142  
Al-Dardīr follows al-Bakrī in this fashion, but also reconciles the Ash‘arī 
doctrine of the oneness of divine acts, names and attributes, and essence, by 
relating it to spiritual cognition of the reality of these “levels of tawḥīd.”  The 
highest level, tawḥīd al-dhāt, corresponds to the maqām (spiritual station) of 
waḥdat al-wujūd, the epitome of ma‘rifa (spiritual gnosis).143  This is explained 
further in the following section. 
Hierarchical Approaches to Tawḥīd 
 
Unlike al-Nābulusī and Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī, al-Ḥifnī and al-Dardīr were 
members of the Cairo and Azhar elite – the “establishment ‘ulamā’”.  They were 
accomplished theologians, jurisprudents, and champions of the urban poor and 
                                             
142 Muṣṭafa Bakrī, "Risālat Al-Mawrid Al-‘Adhb Lidhī Al-Wurūd Fī Kashf Ma‘Na Waḥdat Al-
Wujūd," in Aḥmad Ḥilmī, ed. Cairo National Archives (CairoN.D.), 10. 
143 Aḥmad al-Dardīr, "Mishkāt Al-Asrār Lī ‘Ārif Al-Waqt  Abī Al-Anwār," in Taymūr, ed. Dar al-
Kutub (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub, 1921), 4-6. 
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disenfranchised.  Appreciating the dissimilarity between the khawāṣ and the 
‘awām, expounding upon such doctrines such as the unity of existence did not 
comprise their public discourse.  Nevertheless, in the private circles of their 
disciples and gatherings of spiritual audition, elucidating the finer points of the 
spiritual stations and the realisation of divine unity would not have been out of 
place.   
In his own treatises, al-Dardīr does not offer detailed refutations of 
polemical attacks against Ibn al-‘Arabī or his doctrines.  Rather, he refers to the 
unity of existence when expounding upon the highest rank of tawḥīd – tawḥīd 
al-dhāt (the oneness of the divine essence).  The true nature of acts affiliated to 
creation is revealed to be merely metaphorical, God the one true Actor.  All acts 
in the universe are merely shadows of the one true Actor, without whom they 
would have no existence whatsoever; thus, there is no existence except for the 
One.144   
Al-Dardīr treads carefully in his kalām manuals, avoiding the issue of 
unity and existence altogether except when discussing the divine attribute of the 
same name (wujūd), known as the ontological attribute (al-ṣifa al-nafsiyya).  He 
confirms his preference for al-Ash‘arī’s opinion of God’s existence (wujūd) as 
indistinguishable from His essence (dhāt). Taken with the concept of God’s 
necessary existence, al-Dardīr forwards an argument for an ontological unity of 
existence. If God’s existence is necessary, and the existence of all others is 
contingent on the necessary existence, then ontologically, their existence 
resembles God’s existence in name only.   
Hence, the ḥaqīqī existence is the sole province of God, in the same 
manner that the positive divine attributes are ḥaqīqī, whilst their human 
                                             
144 al-Dardīr, "Mishkāt Al-Asrār Lī ‘Ārif Al-Waqt  Abī Al-Anwār," 4. 
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counterparts are majāzī, as posited by Ibn al-‘Arabī.145 Earlier Ash‘arī 
theologians, such as al-Rāzī, would take issue with this.  However, as they 
predicated the validity of speaking of both the wujūd of God and wujūd of 
created beings upon the notion that it represents a true dichotomy – either 
something exists, or it does not, and hence the same term can be used to 
address both divine and created existences.146   
Further to this, wujūd is understood by al-Rāzī to be other than the 
māhiyya (quiddity) of a thing; with the example that one is able to claim: “the 
universe exists” or “the universe does not exist” whereas it would be 
unintelligible to say “existence exists” or “existence does not exist.”147  Al-Dardīr 
counters this by arguing that differentiating between the existence and the 
quiddity of God occurs in the mind but need not occur externally, as one can 
conceptualise the quiddity of a thing without conceptualising its existence, and 
vice versa.148 Al-Bājūrī (d.1276/1860)149 disagrees with this interpretation, 
stating that al-Ash‘arī’s original statement of equating divine existence to 
quiddity is understood figuratively, as it is sufficient than an attribute is 
differentially conceptualised from its possessor.  In this scheme, it is irrelevant if 
the attribute and possessor are differentiated externally outside of the mind.150  
He mentions other opinions, such as that of al-Dardīr, but summates the issue 
by declaring that knowing whether or not God’s existence is equivalent to His 
essence is from amongst the perplexities of kalām theology, and it is sufficient 
                                             
145 See discussion regarding anthropomorphic divine attributes and theomorphic human 
attributes in: Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God : Principles of Ibn Al-ʿarabī's Cosmology, xviii. 
146 See, for example, al-Rāzī’s argument in: Rāzī, Ma‘ālim ‘Uṣūl Al-Dīn, 32. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Al-Dardīr quotes al-Taftāzānī to buttress his argument.  See al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, 
Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 261. 
149 See PhD study: Aaron Spevack, "The Archetypal Sunni Scholar: Law, Theology, and 
Mysticism in the Synthesis of Al-Bajuri" (Bston University, 2008). 
150 Ibrāhīm Bājūrī, Ḥāshiyat Ibrāhīm Al-Bayjūrī Al-Musammā Bi-Tuḥfat Al-Murīd ‘Alā Jawharat 
Al-Tawḥīd (Cairo: Al-Maṭba‘a al-Azhariyya, 1924), 33. 
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for one to know that God merely exists, without contemplating the relationship 
of His essence to that existence.151 
Ṭarīqa and Ḥaqīqa 
 
The influence of Sufi metaphysics on al-Dardīr is also discernable 
regarding his position on “seeing” God.  All Ash‘arīs affirm the beatific vision – 
seeing God in the afterlife – albeit via a non-physical manner commensurate 
with His majesty. Conversely, the Mu‘tazilites reject this position on the premise 
that vision is limited by its physical constraints, and hence impossible in terms 
of the divine. However, al-Dardīr also allows the possibility of seeing God in this 
life in the form of dreams.152   
He also prefers the opinion that Muḥammad saw God in an awakened 
state the night of Ascension.  He qualifies the vision of God in dreams by stating 
that it is a vision of the heart, not of the eyes, and by defining the ru’yā as “a 
type of idrāk (realisation) created by God in any place he wishes”, and thus not 
limited to physical sighting of the eyes.153   
Al-Dardīr elaborates on the meaning of ma‘iyya (being “with” God) in 
some of the verses of the Qur’ān,154 where he affirms the possibility of God 
being “with” creation in essence, and not merely by the attribute of his all-
encompassing omniscience.  He mentions that there are those from amongst 
the people of ‘ilm who anathemise anyone who upheld such a contention.  
Indeed, the Ash‘arī understanding of ma‘iyya is necessarily figurative and 
metaphorical, as the Arabic preposition ma‘ (with) coupled with the essence of 
God is rationally inconceivable.155 Al-Dardīr raises this objection and counters 
                                             
151 Ibid. 
152 al-Dardīr and al-Sibā‘ī, Ḥāshiyya ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 399-415. 
153 Ibid., 402. 
154 Such as Qur’ān (9:40), (20:46) and (57:4) 
155 See for example al-Rāzī’s tafsīr of verse (57:4) in: Rāzī, Tafsīr Al-Fakhr Al-Rāzī Al-Mushtahir 
Bi-Al-Tafsīr Al-Kabīr Wa-Mafātīḥ Al-Ghayb. 
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the Ash‘arī insistence on ta‘wīl of the verse by offering a rational argument of his 
own, as follows156:  
It can be said to them: do you not admit that God is the Master of creation with His Will and 
Power, and that he maintains the heavens and the Earth? To which they must acquiesce, and 
then said to them: is the Will, Power, and Knowledge by which God maintains the universe 
disconnected from His essence?  To this, they must also acquiesce, and then said to them: then 
He is with us by His essence, and without ittiḥād (unification) or ḥulūl (incarnation). 
 
The attempt at a rational explanation for a mystic concept may not be 
very convincing, but it does display al-Dardīr’s commitment to Ash‘arī 
rationalism, and his commitment to spiritual cognition, both as a means to 
understanding God and the universe, and his attempt at reconciliation between 
the two.  He further pursues this line of inquiry in his explanation of the 
mutashābihāt verses and the ḥadīth “Verily God has created Adam in his ṣūra 
(form).”157  Image here is understood by al-Dardīr in metaphysical terms, in as 
much as humans are endowed by their creator with will, power, knowledge, etc. 
all essentially divine attributes in their true realisation, but the reciprocation of 
these attributes in human form is the means by which humans are held 
accountable by God.  He reiterates the lack of efficacy for anything but the 
divine attributes, as the ẓāhir (outward) semblance of acquisition of divine 
creation is the manāṭ al-taklīf (basis of accountability).158 
In his apologetic treatise on the formula of ‘Alī Wafā (d. 807/1405)159, My 
Lord! The One! My Lord! The Everlasting! The Most High! The Wise! (yā 
mawlāya yā wāḥid yā mawlāya dā’im yā ‘alīyy yā ḥakīm), al-Dardīr does not 
hesitate to exposit on the finer points of Sufi metaphysics, specifically the 
spiritual stations corresponding to levels of beholding of God’s oneness, and 
                                             
156 al-Dardīr, "Minhāj Al-Ṣādiqīn Wa Tibyān Al-Salikīn," 6-7. 
157 Ibid., 8. 
158 Ibid. 
159 See "Mishkāt Al-Asrār Lī ‘Ārif Al-Waqt  Abī Al-Anwār," 8. 
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the ultimate beholding (shuhūd) of the unity of existence.160  The link between 
Ash‘arī cosmology, and the ranks and levels of God’s self-disclosure to the 
spiritual aspirant is unmistakable, and hardly a coincidence.  Kalām for al-Dardīr 
was not merely a polemical tool by which to vanquish the Mu‘tazilite nemesis, 
but was in fact the ingress to greater spiritual realisation and beholding of God 
and the true Reality.   
The tripartite taxonomy of tawḥīd: unity of action, unity of divine names 
and attributes, and unity of the divine essence forms the basis of the aspirant’s 
uncovering of the multi-layered reality. The Ghazalian cosmology of the divine 
names as a sub-genus of the divine attributes finds its way here, though little 
attention has been given to the subject of the divine names in most Ash‘arī 
manuals, including al-Dardīr’s Kharīda.  Nonetheless, many of the Ash‘arī 
theologians offered dedicated works to the issue of the divine names, including 
al-Rāzī, al-Ghazālī, Zarrūq, and al-Dardīr.161  The apparent appropriation of the 
divine names as a matter for Sufi metaphysicians rather than kalām theologians 
is likely due to the primacy of the Prophetic tradition that mentions their 
enumeration as a means of salvation, and the spiritual implications of iḥṣā’, the 
word used by the Prophet to describe the significance of the names – wa man 
aḥṣāhā dakhala al-janna.162  The word aḥṣāhā has been alternatively translated 
as “preserved”, “memorised”, “realised”, and so forth, but none seem to capture 
the meaning comprehensively.  The ambiguous nature of the word, even in its 
                                             
160 For a more thorough analysis of the Wafā’iyya order and its founders, see: McGregor, 
Sanctity and Mysticism in Medieval Egypt. 
161 See al-Ṣawī, Al-Ṣalawāt Al-Dardīriyya Wa Yalīhī Sharḥ Manẓumat 'Asmā‘ Allāhi Al-Ḥusnā; 
Aḥmad Zarrūq, Al-Maqṣad Al-Asmā Fī Sharḥ Asmā' Allāh Al-Ḥusnā (Damascus: Dār al-Bayrūtī, 
2004); Ghazzālī, Al-Maqṣad Al-Asnā Fī Sharḥ Maʿānī Asmāʼ Allāh Al-Ḥusnā, Recherches 
Publiées Sous La Direction De L'institut De Lettres Orientales De Beyrouth Nouv Sér a, Langue 
Arabe Et Pensée Islamique (Bayrūt: Dār al-Mashriq, 1971); Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar 
Rāzī, Sharḥ Asmāʼ Allāh Al-Ḥusná Lil-Rāzī : Wa-Huwa Al-Kitāb Al-Musammá Lawāmiʿ Al-
Bayyināt Sharḥ Asmāʼ Allāh Taʿālá Wa-Al-Ṣifāt, ed. Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raʼūf Saʿd (al-Qāhirah: 
Maktabat al-Kullīyāt al-Azharīyah, 1396). 
162 Muslim ibn Ḥajjāj al-Nishapurī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, (Cairo: Dār al-Sha‘b, N.D.). 
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original Arabic, has prompted many of the commentators to offer their own 
understanding of what, indeed, is needed in terms of the believer’s relationship 
with the Names in order to be granted the highest spiritual reward of eternal 
felicity.   
Al-Dardīr characterises the station of tawḥīd al-asmā’ wa’l-ṣifāt as the 
second station after that of tawḥīd al-af‘āl.  In this second station, the aspirant 
realises by way of dhawq (spiritual cognition) that the divine names are 
exclusive to God, to the degree that he does not perceive anyone but God to be 
the bearer of benefit or cause of harm.163  Similarly, the divine attributes are 
realised as exclusive to God, to the degree that the human attributes of power 
and perception (such as hearing and seeing), though they share a name with 
the divine attributes, are iḍāfī (auxiliary) and thus devoid of any real efficacy.   
Hence, if the aspirant realises his true contingency by disavowing any 
efficacy except for God by way of dhawq and shuhūd, then his heart becomes 
purified and receptive to the tajallī waḥdānī ṣifātī (theophany of oneness of 
attributes), by which he is able to encompass the true meaning of all power and 
perception.164  It as this point he realises that any power or perception that was 
attributed to him in his state of ḥijāb (veiling) was auxiliary; the ontological 
reality is that the attribution is to the essence of this tajallī (theophany), from the 
aspect of its manifestation in the lowest of stations (the realm of acts).  From 
this maqām, the aspirant can reach the final and highest station, that of tawḥīd 
al-dhāt (the oneness of the Essence).  In this station, the aspirant witnesses 
none except God by excluding any essences save the divine essence.  It is 
devoid of multiplicities, and that the perceived multiplicities are existent and 
sustained by the existence of God, and not by their own self-sufficiency.  Thus, 
                                             
163 al-Dardīr, "Mishkāt Al-Asrār Lī ‘Ārif Al-Waqt Abī Al-Anwār," 7. 
164 Ibid. 
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they are mere shadows that would have no existence without the Being that 
casts the shadows; this contingent existence is not existence at all, and the true 
existence is the sole province of God.   
From this perspective, that of the divine, there is only one existence, 
waḥdat al-wujūd (unity of existence).165  Thus, al-Dardīr sees the concept of 
waḥdat al-wujūd as the culmination and final stage in the spiritual realisation of 
the ‘ārif (gnostic), essentially a waḥdat al-shuhūd (unity of disclosure), but also 
an ontological reality, if understood from the perspective of the divine.  This is 
predicated on the Ash‘arī concept of ta’thīr (causality), where exclusive causality 
and sole efficacy for God are tantamount to ontological unity of the divine 
essence.  This combines the dual epistemic sources of rationality and spiritual 
cognition, where sole efficacy is realised by the former, and ontological unity is 
realised by way of the latter.   
The three levels of tawḥīd in al-Dardīr’s Sufi discourse correspond to 
those in his kalām discourse: the oneness of acts (tawḥīd al-af‘āl), the oneness 
of the divine Names and Attributes (tawḥīd al-asmā’ wa’l-ṣifāt), and the oneness 
of the divine Essence (tawḥīd al-dhāt), in ascending order.166  The first level is 
attained when the aspirant ceases to attribute any act to anyone other than 
God.  Thus, all acts are created, which the traditional kalām theology posits, but 
al-Dardīr differentiates between the demonstrative proof (dalīl), and saintly or 
intuitive cognition (dhawq).  The spiritual realisation of oneness of acts cannot 
be attained by demonstration, but only via dhawq.  It is the first stage of 
enlightenment (fatḥ), and thus is not accessible by purely rational means.   
Al-Dardīr is careful to point out that such a state could lead to heresy 
(ilḥād), declarations of physical unity with God (ittiḥād), or failure to make a 
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distinction between the lawful and the prohibited (al-ḥalāl wa al-ḥarām).  
Therefore, such a path should not be attempted except under the guidance of 
an experienced and well-qualified guide (shaykh).  Al-Dardīr implicitly makes 
allowances for ecstatic utterances (shaṭaḥāt), which are not to be understood in 
a literal sense when uttered by the truly “intoxicated” aspirant.  Spiritual 
openings elicit powerful responses and the one overcome by them is akin to the 
temporarily insane, and therefore not legally responsible for their utterances or 
their actions.   
In this regard, al-Dardīr also differentiates between the recondite 
symbolism employed by the likes of Ibn al-‘Arabī and his supporters, and the 
indiscriminate ecstatic utterance of the aspirant.  The former is abstruse by 
design, for two primary reasons.  The first is that the nature of ascribing divine 
realisations to words is by nature an exercise of shadows and approximations; 
the words can never do justice.  This has more to do with the nature of 
language than it has to do with the nature of the spiritual experience.  For pre-
modern Islamic scholars like al-Dardīr, the experience is a window into the 
ultimate reality; such a reality cannot be circumscribed by language, as though 
language may be divine in origin167, it nevertheless contains connotative and 
conventionalist aspects that are decidedly non-divine, and thus remains forever 
limited in its ability to express higher meanings.168   
Consequently, the Sufis devised a complex terminology that would 
provoke condemnations of heresy and corruption of the faith, if understood 
ostensibly.  Following this line, all non-divine forms and attributes are 
metaphoric, and ultimately unreal.  This follows from the concept of waḥdat al-
                                             
167 A view espoused by many Muslim scholars, most notably Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūtī (d. 911/ 
1505).  See Suyūṭī, Al-Muzhir Fī ʿUlūm Al-Lughah Wa-Anwāʿihā, 1:20-31. 
168 See discussion in: Ibrāhīm Kurānī, Al-Maslak Al-Jalī Fī Ḥukm Shaṭḥ Al-Walī, ed. Muḥammad 
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wujūd as essence and existence are the sole province of God, and thus all 
other perceived essences and existences are “less real” due to their 
contingency, as opposed to those of God, which are aseitic.  Hence, the divine 
attributes are literal – even from a linguistic perspective – and real, though a 
reality not realisable by rational or transmitted avenues of knowledge.  The 
ḥaqīqa can then be only expressed in words insofar as language is also “less 
real”, and thus insufficient to articulate such matters, and hence occasionally 
produces seemingly heretical or incomprehensible utterances by its bearer. 
The second reason is to prevent the erstwhile but uninitiated novice and 
dilettante from claiming states described symbolically in the text, for himself.  
The notion of an elite form of knowledge not appropriate for public consumption 
is promoted by Ibn ‘Arabī and mentioned in the ḥadīth of Abū Hurayra, 
commonly referred to as the ḥadīth of the “two vessels.”169  Exoteric 
commentaries on the ḥadīth in question claim that the knowledge that would 
have put Abū Hurayra in danger was of the prophecies concerning the 
tribulations of the Umayyads.  However, Ibn al-‘Arabī, as well as al-Dardīr,170 
cite it as proof of an elite esoteric knowledge of the Prophet Muḥammad that 
was disseminated to some and not to others.  Ibn Ḥajar criticises this 
interpretation as specific to the Bātiniyya (Isma‘īlī) sect171, accused of 
dismissing the exoteric meanings of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth whilst positing 
esoteric meanings that only they could understand.172   
Al-Dardīr, like many theologians before him, appears to reconcile this 
issue by affirming the duality of exoteric and esoteric meanings, and by 
                                             
169 “I preserved two vessels from the Messenger of God, one that I disseminated, and the other, 
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‘Ārif Al-Waqt  Abī Al-Anwār," 10. 
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negating any mutual exclusion between them.  He further posits that the ahl al-
ma‘rifa (folk of gnosis) know the secrets of the unseen world, such as the 
modality of the descent of the angels.  He refers to this theophanic knowledge 
as asrār al-‘ālam (secrets of the universe) and asrār al-Qur’ān (secrets of the 
Qur’ān).  Borrowing a concept from creedal theology, al-Dardīr states that just 
as the Arabic letters of the Qur’ān reflect the meanings of the pre-eternal 
attribute of God’s speech, the sum of creation reflects the pre-eternal divine 
attributes of will, knowledge, and power.173  Despite the ability of the gnostic to 
unveil some of the divine secrets, it is but a drop in the ocean compared to the 
knowledge that is the exclusive province of God.  This includes the reality of the 
divine essence, attributes, and the reality of divine tawḥīd, referred to as al-
ta‘ayyun al-awwal (the primary entification).174   
Therefore, the ḥaqīqa that is accessible to the gnostic consists of two 
major parts: 1) the knowledge of the unseen realms made accessible by God, 
and 2) the knowledge that the true ḥaqīqa of all things is only known by God, 
just as true essence, existence, knowledge, power, will, etc. are also the sole 
province of God.  Hence, for al-Dardīr the sharī‘a - ṭarīqa - ḥaqīqa paradigm, 
while firmly rooted in Sufi metaphysics, is the crowning epitome of the Islamic 
tradition as a whole, as all roads eventually lead to actualizing the ḥaqīqa as 
explained above.  “The sharī‘a is the sum of the legal rulings and obligations, 
the ṭarīq is the embodiment of the Muḥammadan virtues, and the ḥaqīqa is 
drinking from the glasses of pure monotheism.”175 
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Al-Dardīr’s understanding of this paradigm extended into the realm of 
jurisprudence – representative of the sharī‘a – an essential prerequisite for 
embodying the ṭarīqa and realising the ḥaqīqa. Just as he leveraged the 
tradition to inform his understanding of creedal theology and taṣawwuf, the 
tradition of jurisprudence before him played a pivotal role in the methodology of 
taḥqīq he applied to the discipline.  The following chapter analyses this 
methodology in light of the greater question of al-Dardīr’s utilisation of the tools 
developed and preserved by the tradition itself to maintain its vibrancy and 
relevance for changing times and circumstances.
Chapter Four: Tarjīḥ and al-Dardīr’s Methodology Regarding 
the Fiqh Tradition 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter addresses the scholarly contribution of al-Dardīr to the 
discipline of fiqh (jurisprudence) and his efforts towards maintaining the fiqh 
tradition.   His methodology of taḥqīq, as mentioned in the previous chapter 
regarding the synthesis of sharī‘a, ṭarīqa, and ḥaqīqa, follows a similar pattern in 
the tradition of jurisprudence, representing the practical aspect of sharī‘a and 
ṭarīqa. However, the fiqh tradition is not fraught with issues of an ontological 
nature, in contrast with the disciplines of theology and taṣawwuf.   Instead, it is 
more concerned with issues of epistemology and hermeneutics, specifically the 
relationship of the primary texts of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth to legal rulings, and 
the manner of interpretation of the texts to derive those legal rulings that inform 
all aspects of a Muslim’s life.   
The fiqh tradition developed discursively over a millennium, and 
underwent periods of shifting focus.  The early modern era of al-Dardīr 
represented the final iteration of this discursive tradition, representing both a 
culmination and cumulation of all that had transpired before it.  This chapter 
analyses the methodology of al-Dardīr towards interpreting this inherited 
tradition, as well as towards its transmission. 
This chapter also challenges a long standing assumption in the literature 
that the post-classical period (roughly after the sixth/twelfth century) produced 
little in the way of creativity and merely rehashed previous works, typically in the 
form of the sharḥ and ḥāshiya (commentary and gloss).  This questions relates 
to the overall thesis of this study – the exploration of early modern Islamic 
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intellectual history as exemplified in al-Dardīr – by evaluating his two main 
works in Mālikī fiqh: his commentary on the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl, informally 
referred to as al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr (the major commentary), and his own 
mukhtaṣar entitled Aqrab al-Masālik ilā Madhhab al-Imām Mālik, as well as the 
commentary he wrote upon this mukhtaṣar, informally referred to as al-Sharḥ al-
Ṣaghīr (the minor commentary).  To properly evaluate and understand the 
significance of these two works it is necessary to put them in their proper 
context as regards the discursive tradition.  The cumulative nature of this time 
period’s intellectual activities dictates that a paradigm of fiqh works, specifically 
in the Mālikī tradition, is established in order to properly evaluate the 
contributions by al-Dardīr.   
This chapter begins with a brief analysis of the background knowledge 
regarding the transmission and discipline of jurisprudence, and specifically as 
they relate to the Mālikī school.  The early development of the Mālikī school is 
then discussed with specific reference to its unique formation and its 
implications for how the Mālikī tradition was subsequently understood and 
transmitted in later years.  The synopsis-commentary-gloss genre in the Mālikī 
tradition, a development that initially took place in the seventh/thirteenth 
century, and affected the approach that al-Dardīr in his writings, is analysed in 
light of the predominate view that this particular genre offered little, and was a 
mere rehash of earlier and more creative works.  The chapter then moves on 
with an analysis of al-Dardīr’s commentary on the synopsis of Khalīl, and al-
Dardīr’s synopsis, Aqrab al-Masālik, in an effort to place them within the 
discursive tradition, and offer a fresh look at the significance of the late stage 
development of fiqh jurisprudence and its transmission.  The chapter concludes 
with an analysis of the most distinctive and overarching characteristic of the 
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Mālikī tradition in its later stages, the elimination or minimisation of plurality of 
legal opinions, primarily via the jurisprudential concept of tarjīḥ (juristic weighing 
narrations and evidence), and its relation to the social and intellectual 
conditions of the early modern era.  
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Jurisprudence and Madhhabism 
 
.  After the death of the Prophet Muḥammad, a formative period for the 
canonisation of Islam’s laws and precepts began in earnest.  Before that, 
Islam’s faithful had depended entirely upon their Prophet for understanding 
God’s commands and prohibitions, whether via the revelation of the Qur‘ān or 
the Prophet’s pronouncements and exemplary actions.  The death of the 
Prophet presented a significant challenge to the integrity of Islam’s 
authoritativeness.  What had been nearly absolute and unequivocal during the 
Prophet’s lifetime now became a negotiation of the sacred texts, subject to 
varying hermeneutics based upon on reason, cultural practices, and to some 
extent, Arab sensibilities.  Whether regional schools arose within the early 
Abbasid era, the Iraqi cities of Kufa and Basra becoming the intellectual centres 
of the new empire, in addition to the Hejaz, and then transforming into the 
“personal schools” of Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik, or whether the level of internal 
dissent within these “regional schools” would preclude their existence, remains 
an open question.1  
Notwithstanding, the internal dissent within regional centres such as 
Medina and Kufa cannot be characterised to be as polemical as which typified 
the theological debates regarding doctrine and ontology.  While the political and 
theological schism that gripped Islam is discussed elsewhere, it is well worth 
remarking that jurisprudence – the set of laws, precepts, principles and 
corollaries that inform all aspects of human action – was less acrimonious than 
the discourse between kalām theologians.  Al-Shāfi‘ī was reported to have 
discouraged his followers from engaging in kalām, whilst encouraging them to 
                                             
1 Wael B. Hallaq, "From Regional to Personal Schools of Law? A Reevaluation," Islamic Law 
and Society 8, no. 1 (2001); Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina : Islamic Reasoning in the 
Formative Period, 21.  
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concentrate on fiqh, stating: “It is better to be said you have erred rather than 
you have disbelieved (kafart).”2 The issues were fundamentally different – 
doctrinal theologians such as al-Ash‘arī and al-Māturīdī were concerned with 
ascribing and negating attributes to God based upon rational arguments, 
whereas the jurisprudents were endeavouring to articulate God’s law for their 
particular times and circumstances based upon close reading of Islam’s primary 
texts of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth.   
Dissent regarding jurisprudential matters was entirely acceptable, 
perhaps even mundane.  Non-polemical comparative works that include Shī‘ī 
(Ja‘farī), Ẓahirī, and Ibāḍī jurisprudence, in addition to the Sunni four, while not 
common, nonetheless exist.3  Conversely, non-polemical works in kalām 
theology are nearly non-existent, as the subject of the ascertainment of the 
universe’s reality leaves little room for polite discussion.  Though the 
jurisprudential schools were not immune from polemical rhetoric, nevertheless 
they have largely adopted the attitude articulated by al-Shāfi‘ī: “I consider my 
opinion to be correct and yours to be incorrect, though the opposite holds out as 
a legitimate possibility.”4  Hence, there never was any anathematisation in the 
realm of jurisprudential works, though panegyrics and apologies for specific 
madhhabs were not uncommon.5 
 The ”formative period” of jurisprudence has been the primary focus of 
Western scholarship.6  The dominant paradigm in most of these studies 
                                             
2 ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn Aḥmad al-Shaʿrānī, Al-Yawāqīt Wa-Al-Jawāhir Fī Bayān ʿAqāʼid Al-Akābir, 
(Bayrūt: Dār Ṣādir, 2003), 30. 
3 Such as: Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa-Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid, (Bayrūt: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 
1995). 
4 Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, Al-Shāfiʻī : Ḥayātuhu Wa-ʻaṣruhu - Ārāʼuhu Wa-Fiqhuh, (al-Qāhirah: 
Dār al-Fikr al-ʻArabī, 1996), 37. 
5 Such as Muḥammad Andalusī Al-Rā‘ī, Intiṣār Al-Faqīr Al-Sālik (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 
1981). 
6 See, for example: Norman Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993); Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964); 
Crone and Cook, Hagarism : The Making of the Islamic World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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postulates that the formation of “Islamic law”7 began in earnest at least a 
century after the Prophet’s death, making the search of an authentic Prophetic 
Sunna at the outset of the formative period elusive. In the realm of 
jurisprudence, much has been made of the notion of the “closing of the gates of 
ijtihād.”  More recent scholarship has thoroughly challenged this notion8, but the 
overall narrative of decline remains ubiquitous.  Moreover, the period of al-
Dardīr, characterised by the synopsis-commentary-gloss genre, has been 
routinely dismissed by most Western (and quite a few Arab) scholars as tedious 
and consisting of nothing more than a rehash of previous creative works9, or as 
“a patchwork of excerpts from earlier sources” rendering it a “rather 
unrewarding literature to discuss at length.”10 
Using the transmission of tradition paradigm, it will be demonstrated that 
a more justified assessment of al-Dardīr’s specific contributions to Islamic 
jurisprudence can be obtained.  The Islamic tradition, when specifically referring 
to jurisprudence, is fundamentally concerned with the divine intent as regards 
rulings that inform all human action.  The five basic rulings of obligation, 
reprehensibility, permissibility, meritoriousness, and prohibition constitute the 
essential framework for interpreting the divine commandments and prohibitions.  
Thus, the occupation of the jurist has always been characterised by interaction 
with the tradition in an effort to apply juristic methodologies to acquire new 
                                                                                                                                    
University Press, 1977); Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-
10th Centuries C.E (Leiden ; New York: Brill, 1997); Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic 
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). 
7 I use the quotation marks for reasons that will become apparent below. 
8 See, for example: Wael B. Hallaq, Sharī‘a : Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge, UK 
; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
9 See various entries in: Roger Allen and D. S. Richards, Arabic Literature in the Post-Classical 
Period / Edited by Roger Allen and D.S. Richards,The Cambridge History of Arabic Literature 
(Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
10 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 374. 
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rulings for unprecedented circumstances.11  While this formative effort was the 
bulk of the work carried out by the mujtahid imams such Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik, 
the work of the later jurisprudents of their respective schools involved sifting 
through a multiplicity of opinions and fatwas.  These narrations had 
accumulated during previous years, and the fuqahā’ identified the soundest of 
these opinions, declaring them as such, sometimes referred to as the mu‘tamad 
(the most reliable opinion), or the mashhūr (most noted), or rājiḥ (most 
preponderant).  It will be demonstrated that al-Dardīr, in his capacity as a 
master of the Mālikī madhhab, and educationalist with his own specific ideas, 
was able to take the understanding and practice of the fiqh of Mālik to a hitherto 
unknown level of clarity and accessibility.   
The synopsis-commentary-gloss genre enjoyed its greatest prominence 
in the period after the dissolution of Fatimid rule in Egypt. The emergence of 
Egyptian Islamic scholarship as the preeminent standard bearer in scholarly 
production began in the twelfth century.  To properly evaluate the scholarly 
worth of works produced during the early modern ear of al-Dardīr, a paradigm of 
Islamic intellectual development and history, specifically in the field of 
jurisprudence must be established.  Similarly to chapter three, an analysis of 
earlier periods of fiqh works, specifically those corresponding to the Mālikī 
madhhab is presented.  Though the four major schools of jurisprudence 
developed concomitantly, it is our contention that they did so in relative 
isolation, especially in the formative period.  This is especially relevant for the 
                                             
11 See, for example, al-Ghazālī’s introduction on juristic methodology in: Muḥammad Abū Ḥāmid 
al-Ghazālī, Al-Mustafṣā Min ‘Ilm Al-Uṣūl, (Damascus: al-Risāla al-‘Ālamiyya, 2012), 1:31-44. 
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Mālikī school, in particular, as it was the sole and virtually unopposed school in 
North Africa and Upper Egypt for much of its development.12   
Madhhab jurisprudence had been established and become the normative 
practice of Sunni Islam at least five centuries before al-Dardīr’s birth.13  This 
coincided, and perhaps was even precipitated by the appointment of the four 
state judges in Egypt representing the four Sunni schools of law by Baybars in 
660/1262, initially the Mālikī, Ḥanafī, and Ḥanbalī as deputy judgeships to the 
preeminent Shāfi‘ī judge, and then later promoted to chief judgeships in 
663/1265.14  Additionally, the establishment of numerous religious seminaries 
dedicated to disseminating Sunni madhhab jurisprudence during the Ayyubid 
and Mamlūk regimes solidified the normality of madhhab affiliation.  No scholar 
of repute could afford to affiliate with anything other than the four schools as far 
as jurisprudence was concerned.  This trend continued well into the eighteenth 
century, until challenged by the reformist movement of Ibn Abd al-Wahhāb in 
Arabia, as well as the reformist movements of the twentieth century that took 
him as their inspiration. 
 The madhhab paradigm that defined al-Dardīr’s scholarship in 
jurisprudence was not significantly challenged in Egypt during his lifetime.   
However, the state of Islamic scholarship in general was an issue on many of 
the ‘ulamā’s minds.  The traditional syllabus now included thousands of lines of 
terse prose and verse, and lengthy expositional commentaries were needed to 
                                             
12 See Muḥammad al-Mukhtār Muḥammad Māmī, Al-Madhhab Al-Mālikī : Madārisuhu Wa-
Muʼallafātuh, Khaṣāʼiṣuhu Wa-Simātuh, (al-ʿAyn: Markaz Zāyid lil-Turāth wa-al-Tārīkh, 2002), 
62-78. 
13 By “established and normative”, I refer to the practice of Muslim scholars’ affiliation with one 
of the four jurisprudential schools of law, which, for Egyptian scholars, coincided with the 
dissolution of the Fatimid caliphate and its replacement with the Sunni Ayyubid sultanate, which 
pursued an ambitious programme of Sunni institution building and a rededication to madhhab 
jurisprudence. See Maqrīzī, Al-Mawā’iẓ W'al-I‘Tibār Fī Dhikr Al-Khiṭaṭ W'al-Athār, 4:362-97. 
14 Sherman A. Jackson, "The Primacy of Domestic Politics: Ibn Bint Al-Aʿazz and the 
Establishment of Four Chief Judgeships in Mamlûk Egypt," Journal of the American Oriental 
Society 115, no. 1 (1995). 
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“decipher the code” (fakk al-rumūz).  Jurisprudence in particular became a 
highly specialised discipline and was easily the most demanding of all the 
subjects in the Islamic curriculum.  The Mālikī curriculum in particular, which 
was aimed towards mastering the capstone text of Mukhtaṣar Khalīl, a 
fourteenth century manual on Mālikī jurisprudence, written by the Egyptian 
scholar Khalīl ibn Isḥāq al-Jundī (d. 767/1365).  This text was eventually 
accepted as the authoritative text in the Mālikī School, virtually at the exclusion 
of all others.  Numerous commentaries were penned to elucidate the terse yet 
verbose text.  The commentaries themselves often added a layer of complexity 
that also rendered the original Mukhtaṣar still inaccessible except to the 
brightest of students.  Ibn Khaldūn laments the pedagogy of the synopsis-
commentary genre, stating that: 15 
This has a corrupting influence upon the process of instruction and is detrimental to the 
attainment of scholarship.  For it confuses the beginner by presenting the final results of a 
discipline to him before he is prepared for them.  This is a bad method of instruction.  It also 
involves a great deal of work for the student.  He must carefully study the words of the 
abridgement, which are complicated to understand because they are crowded with ideas, and 
try to find out from them what the problems of the given discipline are.   
 
It is difficult to conclusively determine if Ibn Khaldūn had the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl 
in mind when making his critique, but it must have already been circulating 
amongst the students of al-Azhar by the time Ibn Khaldūn arrived in Cairo in 
1382, nearly twenty years after Khalīl’s death.  It is also possible that Ibn 
Khaldūn was referring to Ibn al-Ḥājib’s mukhtaṣar, which was the first major 
synopsis of the Mudawwana and other early works written in the pre-synopsis 
nawāzil style.  The nature of abridgement and synopsis required new technical 
terms and shorthand symbols to refer back to the primary works.   
This added level of required proficiency may have been the source of Ibn 
Khaldūn’s ire, where he might have felt the burden of learning specific terms 
and symbols added an unnecessary level of abstraction.  Whatever the case 
                                             
15  Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn, 489. 
 202 
may be, there is little doubt that studying madhhab jurisprudence in mediaeval 
and early modern Islam was a serious endeavour that required exceptional 
dedication in order to be qualified to issues fatwas according to one’s particular 
madhhab.  
Al-Dardīr, like his predecessors, participated in the pedagogy of the 
synopsis-commentary tradition, but unlike his predecessors, eliminated the 
specialist technical terms, simplified the synopsis language to make it more 
readable, and integrated his own commentary with the synopsis so that it read 
as one contiguous text, likely mitigating the inherent difficulties of the genre 
criticised by Ibn Khaldūn.  This is demonstrated further in the following sections. 
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The Synopsis-Commentary-Gloss genre (mukhtaṣar-sharḥ-ḥāshiya) 
in the Mālikī Tradition 
 
 The Mālikī tradition underwent several iterations before arriving at its final 
form in the form of the synopsis-commentary-gloss genre.  This phenomenon 
was no means unique to the Mālikī tradition, as the other three schools of Sunni 
jurisprudence were subject to similar developments.16  
The Mālikī jurists, for the most part, did not follow their counterparts in 
the Ḥanafī and Shāfi‘ī schools in producing works that outlined the principles 
and methodological tools upon which the madhhab is understood.  For the 
Shāfi‘ī school, this approach began with the eponymous imam himself, whose 
two major works, the Risāla and the Umm, both expound on his methodological 
principles, and specifically how he diverged from the schools of both Mālik and 
Abū Ḥanīfa.  Notwithstanding the fact that he studied with Mālik directly, and 
with Abū Ḥanīfa indirectly, via al-Shaybānī, one of his two main companions.   
As for the Ḥanafī school, the intellectual climate in Iraq where it 
developed, and found a stronghold via Abbasid patronage, was highly 
polemical. The works of al-Shaybānī, such as Kitāb al-Hujja ‘alā Ahl al-Madīna 
(The Book of Proofs Against the [Scholarly] Folk of Medina] is polemical in 
nature, often using rational methodologies to buttress an argument.  Some have 
                                             
16 Most studies for the other schools have focused on the specifics of the use of interpretive 
reasoning to establish legal authority throughout the life of the madhhab.  I am unaware of any 
specific published study in Western academia that examines the progression of the 
transmission of the madhhab’s rulings over the course of its development. For an example of 
the former for the Ḥanafī and Shāfi‘ī traditions respectively, see: Brannon M. Wheeler, Applying 
the Canon in Islam : The Authorization and Maintenance of Interpretive Reasoning in Ḥanafī 
Scholarship, Suny Series, toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996); Halim, Legal Authority in Premodern Islam : Yaḥyā B. 
Sharaf Al-Nawawī in the Shāfi'ī School of Law. 
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mentioned that the early works of the Mālikiyya in Iraq were similar in nature, 
having obviously been affected by the context of their intellectual milieu.17  
 Instead, the Mālikī jurists focused on ascertaining, and transmitting 
Mālik’s authoritative legal opinions. The final stage of this focus came in the 
form of the mukhtaṣar; a pedagogical genre adopted by the other madhhabs at 
least a century earlier. The pedagogical shift to the mukhtaṣar, however, was 
not without its detractors, within the Islamic tradition and without.  Ibn Khaldūn 
has been mentioned as an early critic of the mukhtaṣar tradition in general; 
through he praised the compendium of Ibn al-Ḥājib specifically, calling it the 
index (barnāmij) of the Mālikī madhhab18. However, there were others, some 
even who had authored their own short treatises, such as Ibn Abī Zayd al-
Qayrawānī who reportedly ordered the burning of a copy of al-Barādhi‘ī’s 
Tahdhīb when it was presented before him.19  A recent scholar, the Moroccan 
jurist and historian, Muḥammad al-Ḥijawī (d. 1376/1957), offers a scathing 
critique:20 
When they immersed themselves in synopses, the wording of the text became unintelligible and 
only understood with the aid of a commentary, or a commentary and a gloss [and] as a result 
the [original] purpose was lost by which synopses were [first] written, which was to summarise 
many volumes into one, to facilitate [learning], to ease burdens, to reduce time spent, and to 
increase knowledge.  [Yet], the opposite was achieved, as the time was spent to unlock the 
impassable, and time was lost with no [perceivable] recompense. 
 
The compendium of Ibn al-Ḥājib also won praise from scholars from 
other schools, such as Ibn Daqīq al-‘Īd (d. 702/1302) and Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 
756/1355), amongst others.21  Such a strong reaction, whether positive or 
                                             
17 Māmī, Al-Madhhab Al-Mālikī : Madārisuhu Wa-Muʼallafātuh, Khaṣāʼiṣuhu Wa-Simātuh, 67-68. 
18 Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn, 417. 
19 It should be noted that Ibn Abī Zayd’s Risala was originally intended as a child’s primary 
manual, though it became part of the standard curriculum for the transmission of the Mālikī 
tradition.  The purported burning of the Tahdhīb is somewhat disputed, as other reports claim 
that he praised the book.  See: Abū Sa‘īd al-Barādhi‘ī, Al-Tahdhīb Fī Ikhtiṣār Al-Mudawwana, 
(Dubai: Dār al-Buḥūth lī al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya wa Iḥyā' al-Turāth, 1999), 1:146-8. 
20 Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥijawī, Al-Fikr Al-Sāmī Fī Tāriīkh Al-Fiqh Al-Islāmī, (Beirut: Dār 
al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1995), 2:459. 
21 Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Salām al-Umawī and ‘Alī  al-Jazā'irī, Tanbīh Al-Ṭālib Li-Fahm Lughāt 
Ibn Al-Ḥājib (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyā', 2011), 6. 
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negative, indicates that the compendium of Ibn Ḥājib presented a fundamental 
shift in the manner that the Mālikī school was perceived, as well as transmitted 
from both within and without. 
The success of the Mudawwana as the premier Mālikī manual did not 
preclude the arrival of the mukhtaṣar (synopsis or abridgement) genre amongst 
the Mālikī scholars, but perhaps delayed it to some degree.  Unlike the 
trajectory of the development of the other schools, the Mudawwana, – 
essentially a second hand report of Mālik’s legal opinions – as well as its 
associated commentaries and glosses, remained the main pedagogical text in 
the Mālikī tradition until the appearance of the mukhtaṣar of Ibn Shās, and to a 
greater degree the appearance of the mukhtaṣar of Ibn Ḥājib.  
Al-Ghazālī, renown for his exploits in kalām, was also one of the premier 
jurists of the Shāfi‘ī school.  He authored the most authoritative works in the 
Shāfi‘ī madhhab at the time: the encyclopaedic al-Basīṭ, its synopsis:  al-Wasīṭ, 
and its synopsis: al-Wajīz.  The Basīṭ was a commentary on al-Juwaynī’s 
Nihāyat al-Maṭlab, which in turn was a synopsis of al-Shāfi‘ī’s original work, al-
Umm.22 The Mālikī school took a decidedly different direction and did not 
produce the first mukhtaṣar23 until the twelfth century, a century after al-
Ghazālī.  Ibn Shās, who was inspired by al-Ghazālī’s Wajīz, wrote the first 
Mālikī mukhtaṣar in the style of the Shāfi’ī jurists, as evidenced by the author’s 
own admission in his introduction:24 
I was inspired to write this book as a compilation of the madhhab of the savant of Medina Mālik 
ibn Anas…Because of what I have found in regards to many of those affiliated to the [Mālikī 
                                             
22 See Ghazzālī, , Al-Wajīz Fī Fiqh Al-Imām Al-Shāfiʿī, ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd, and ʿAlī 
Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ (Bayrūt: Dār al-Arqam, 1997), 1:65-69. 
23  In the sense of a synopsis of larger earlier works arranged according to jurisprudential 
subject.  The “mukhtaṣars” of the student of Mālik, Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam were of an entirely 
different nature and cannot be considered synopses in the same sense as they were still 
arranged in the nawāzil style, and thus are mode properly understood as selections rather than 
comprehensive synopses or compendiums. 
24 ‘Abd Allāh ibn Najm Khallāl,‘Iqd Al-Jawāhir Al-Thamīnah Fī Madhhab ‘Ālim Al-Madīna,.Sharīf 
Mursī, (Cairo: Dār al-Āfāq al-‘Arabiyya, 2011), 1:27-28. 
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madhhab] in our time abandoning occupation with it, and turning towards others. [They have 
done so] to the point that it has become emblematic of many who consider themselves jurists, 
or are considered distinguished.  I have not heard from any of them, nor has it reached me that 
they have turned away except for its repetition, and lack of order.  Some of them have posited 
that it is nearly impossible to order, or to be organised according to select criteria…and their 
abandoning of the [madhhab] has been caused by the neglect shown by the imams of the 
madhhab in organising it in a manner that highlights precise meanings and derives practical 
principles… 
 
Thus, it would appear that Ibn Shās sensed the inherent difficulty in 
learning, teaching, and transmitting the legal rulings of the Mālikī madhhab as 
compared to other schools, such as that of the Shāfi‘ī school, as evidenced by 
the highly structured Wajīz of al-Ghazālī.  This difficulty was due to the out-
dated style of the Mudawwana – a text that reflected the work of several 
different scholars, and did not enjoy the structure and organisation of the later 
Shāfi‘ī works.  Indeed, it is quite remarkable that nearly half a millennium after 
its appearance the Mudawwana and its commentaries remained the dominant 
legal and pedagogical texts for the Mālikī madhhab.   
Some have suggested this was due to the unchallenged dominion the 
Mālikī madhhab held over North Africa and Andalucía, aided by the 
endorsement of state authority.25  The Umayyad caliphate from its early days in 
the eighth century officially sanctioned the Mālikī legal rulings in their courts, 
particularly those reflected in narrations of Ibn al-Qāsim in the Mudawwana.26  
Brockopp alleges that the charismatic nature of the eponymous imams, 
specifically Mālik, conferred upon them a divine like quality.  However, as 
Wymann-Landgraf points out, it was the legal school of Medina, as represented 
by Mālik, that carried the greater sway as regards the authoritativeness of his 
legal opinions, especially in the early formative days of the intellectual learning 
centre of Kairouan.27  Whether the madhhab of Mālik, as understood by his 
                                             
25 ‘Alī, Iṣṭilāḥ Al-Madhhab ‘Ind Al-Mālikiyya, 191-92. 
26 Oussama Arabi, David Stephan Powers, and Susan A. Spectorsky, Islamic Legal Thought : A 
Compendium of Muslim Jurists, Studies in Islamic Law and Society, (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 221. 
27 Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina : Islamic Reasoning in the Formative Period, 80-81. 
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students and successors was understood to be more of a function of a specific 
Medinese school of law where Mālik was its most famous proponent, or if it was 
indeed a function of Mālik’s personal school, is a matter of scholarly debate.   
While this is perhaps a fruitful argument regarding the formative years of 
the madhhab, it is clear that by the time of consolidation of the madhhab’s 
regional schools in the era of Ibn al-Ḥājib, this is a moot point.  In this period, 
the fiqh of Mālik is specifically referenced, as well as some of the main jurist-
consults of the school, without particular regard for an Iraqi, Egyptian, or 
Andalusian derivative of a larger Medinese methodology. The method adopted 
by Ibn al-Ḥājib, in his mukhtaṣar, also later adopted to some degree by Khalīl, 
was the extensive use of epistemic designations,28 rather than specifically citing 
the names of the scholars who held those opinions.   
Ibn Farḥūn, the Mālikī hagiographer and contemporary of Khalīl, 
analyses these epistemic designations in descending order of veracity.29 The 
following table summarises Ibn Farḥūn’s sixteen designations: 
# Epistemic 
Designation 
Meaning Alternate 
terms  
Contrasting 
Designation 
Meaning 
1 Mashhūr (1) The 
strongest 
evidence or 
(2) The 
largest 
number of 
reporters  
Ma‘rūf, 
aṣaḥḥ, 
ṣaḥīḥ, 
Shādh, 
Munkar, 
Takhrīj 
Exceptional, 
rejected, and 
alternate 
(weaker) 
opinions 
2 Ashhar The more 
reliable 
opinion of two 
or more 
mashhūr 
opinions 
Mashhūr, 
aṣaḥḥ, 
ma‘rūf 
Mashhūr The less 
reliable of two 
or more 
mashhūr 
opinions 
                                             
28 “Epistemic designations” is our term for the referencing of terms such as rājiḥ, mashhūr, 
ṣaḥīḥ, etc. that attach an epistemic value to certain legal opinions based upon their human 
source. 
29 Ibn Farḥūn, Abū Fāris, and Sharīf, Kashf Al-Niqāb Al-Ḥājib Min Muṣṭalaḥ Ibn Al-Hājib. 
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3 Aṣaḥḥ The more 
sound of two 
or more ṣaḥīḥ 
opinions 
 Ṣaḥīḥ, takhrīj The less 
sound of two 
or more ṣaḥīḥ 
opinions 
4 Ṣaḥīḥ The “sound” 
opinion as 
opposed to an 
“unsound” 
opinion 
 Fāsid, 
shādh, 
mashhūr 
Unsound 
opinion 
(based on 
juristic 
evidence), 
larger number 
of reporters 
(but less 
sound 
according to 
one or more 
jurisconsults) 
5 Ẓāhir (1) That which 
is apparent 
without 
reference to a 
specific proof-
text (naṣṣ) or 
(2) apparent 
from juristic 
evidence 
 None  
6 Wāḍiḥ The same as 
ẓāhir 
 None  
7 Aẓhar (1) The more 
apparent of 
two or more 
apparent 
opinions or (2) 
two or more 
proof-texts 
 Ẓahir The less 
apparent of 
two or more 
apparent 
opinions or 
proof-texts 
8 Manṣūṣ (1) The 
documented 
opinion (to 
Mālik or one 
of the earlier 
scholars) as 
opposed to an 
opinion 
derived used 
juristic 
reasoning 
 Takhrīj, 
manṣūṣ (of a 
scholar other 
than Mālik) 
An opinion 
not 
specifically 
attributable to 
Mālik or his 
companions 
but deduced 
by later 
scholars from 
earlier 
opinions 
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(takhrīj) or (2) 
a opinion of a 
later scholar 
in the 
absence of a 
documented 
opinion from 
an earlier one 
9 Ma‘rūf The well-
known opinion 
of Mālik or 
one his direct 
students, as 
opposed to 
one falsely 
attributed 
(munkar) to 
them 
 Munkar, 
takhrīj 
A falsely 
attributed 
opinion to 
Mālik or his 
direct 
students 
(though the 
opinion may 
be legitimate 
nonetheless), 
or an opinion 
of a later 
scholar where 
Mālik has no 
documented 
opinion 
10 Ijma‘ The 
consensus of 
all (1) 
jurisconsults 
or (2) all 
Mālikī 
jurisconsults 
 Khilāf A dissenting 
opinion (as 
regards to (2) 
only as 
regards to (1) 
is 
inconceivable 
11 Ittifāq Same as Ijma‘  Khilāf A dissenting 
opinion (as 
regards to (2) 
only as 
regards to (1) 
is 
inconceivable 
12 Madhhab (1) The same 
as mashhūr or 
(2) the 
authoritative 
opinion of the 
school despite 
weak juristic 
 Shādh, 
khilāf, takhrīj 
Exceptional, 
dissenting, or 
un-
attributable 
opinion to 
Mālik 
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evidence or 
(3) the 
authoritative 
opinion of the 
school from 
amongst 
several takhrīj 
opinions 
13 Jumhūr The majority 
opinion of 
those who 
directly 
narrated from 
Mālik 
 Shādh Exceptional 
opinion 
14 Akthar The majority 
opinion of 
narrators from 
Mālik 
(whether 
direct or 
indirect) 
 Aqall Minority 
opinion of 
fewer 
narrators 
15 Aḥsan, Awlā That which 
has been 
found 
praiseworthy 
by Mālik 
 None  
16 Mukhtār Opinion 
favoured by 
some 
jurisconsults, 
despite it 
being in 
variance with 
the mashhūr 
 Mashhūr Dominant or 
majority 
opinion 
  
As evidenced by the table above, the epistemic designations are not 
used uniformly or consistently by Ibn al-Ḥājib, as some of the designations are 
used interchangeably, underscoring the need for a manual like that of Ibn 
Farḥūn, to decipher the “code.”  Additionally, Ibn al-Ḥājib uses a shorthand for 
expressing two, three, or up to four different opinions on a single legal issue.  If 
an issue concerns a ruling of permissibility or lack thereof then he omits an 
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explicit reference to the two obvious opinions i.e. prohibition or permissibility, 
whilst making an explicit reference to a third opinion that usually indicates 
prohibition under some circumstances and permissibility under others.30   
For example, when reporting the ruling on the permissibility of wages for 
a prayer leader in a mosque (imam), he states “and the third [opinion] is that if is 
solely for [leading the prayer] it is impermissible, but if the [role] includes the call 
to prayer (adhān) or maintenance of the mosque, it is permissible.”31  The use 
of pronouns also figures in this shorthand, such as fī-hā (in it) where the 
reference is to the Mudawwana.32  For example, regarding the same issue, Ibn 
al-Ḥājib states: “And in it [the Mudawwana]: and it is permissible to receive 
wages for the adhān, as well as for the adhān and prayer together.”33   
Such complex shorthand renders Ibn al-Ḥājib’s compendium all but 
inaccessible except for trained specialists.  The widespread use of this text, as 
reported by many Mālikī jurists34, posed a monumental shift in the pedagogical 
method by which the school’s legal opinions were transmitted.  Before the 
compendium of Ibn al-Ḥājib, students studied the Mudawwana or one of the 
abridgements of it, which still fell in several volumes.35  While the Mudawwana 
was explicit in its language and did not use specialised terms, it was 
nonetheless a difficult work to master, as it was essentially the work of several 
authors, and required some commentary.  Mālikī jurists authored several 
commentaries, but most of those would be classified as ta‘līqāt (annotations), 
                                             
30 For an example, see below in the discussion regarding Khalīl’s commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājib’s 
compendium and the issue of natural and processed salt as regards the purifying state of water. 
31 Ibn Farḥūn, Kashf Al-Niqāb Al-Ḥājib Min Muṣṭalaḥ Ibn Al-Hājib, ed. Abū Fāris, and Sharīf 
(Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1990),149. 
32 Ibid., 154. 
33 ʿUthmān ibn ʿUmar Ibn al-Ḥājib, , Jāmiʿ Al-Ummahāt, ed. Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Akhḍar 
Akhḍarī (Dimashq: al-Yamāmah, 1998), 436. 
34 Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn, 417. 
35 The Mudawwana, published by Dār Ṣādir, is in seven volumes, whilst the abridgement of the 
Mudawwana of al-Barādhi’ī and published in Dubai, comprises four volumes. 
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rather than the full commentaries that came to characterise those penned on 
the later compendiums and synopses.   
As early as the fifth/eleventh century, jurists in North Africa were 
contemplating abridging and reorganising the Mudawwana in some fashion, as 
the chief abridger of the Mudawwana, al-Barādhi‘ī (d. 438/1047) states his 
impetus for abridging the Mudawwana in his introduction:36 
I intended this book as an abridgment of the subject matter of the Mudawwana and the 
Mukhtaliṭa37 at the exclusion of all others, as it is the noblest book to have been written from 
amongst the compilations. I have relied in it on brevity and synopsis over long-windedness and 
expansiveness to be more appealing to aspirations of the student, more easily understandable, 
and as aid to memorisation. 
 
As a result, Ibn al-Ḥājib’s treatise cannot be seen as an accessible 
reference for determining the school’s dominant opinion – that by which the 
fatwa is to be issued – in the entirety of its jurisprudential issues. His work is 
more of a compendium for accessing the legal opinions reflected in the 
Mudawwana as well as the other ummahāt of the Mālikī tradition.  It was the 
work of the teachers and jurisconsults who taught the Jāmi‘ al-Ummahāt as a 
pedagogical text to explicate its meanings and designate the dominant 
opinions.   
One such jurisconsult was Khalīl ibn Isḥāq al-Jundī, who penned one of 
the more authoritative commentaries on Jāmi‘ al-Ummahāt, titled: al-Tawḍīḥ fi 
Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar al-Far‘ī l-ibn al-Ḥājib.  Despite the objections of those who 
favoured the elongated style (al-mabsuṭāt) of the Mudawwana over the 
mukhtaṣar genre as a whole, such as Ibn Khaldūn, Ibn al-Ḥājib’s compendium 
found wide scale acceptance and attracted the attention of Mālikī scholars in 
North Africa and Egypt.  Najīb, the critical editor of al-Tawḍīḥ, counts thirty-nine 
                                             
36 al-Barādhi‘ī, Al-Tahdhīb Fī Ikhtiṣār Al-Mudawwana, 1:167. 
37 The Mudawwana and the Mukhtaliṭa are both references to the Mudawwana due to its multi-
authorship as it resembles an edifice with many add-ons, rather than a single coherent work. 
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known commentaries on Ibn al-Ḥājib’s compendium written between the 
eighth/fourteenth and eleventh/seventeenth centuries.38   
Like al-Dardīr, Khalīl penned a commentary on the premier pedagogical 
text of his time, the compendium of Ibn al-Ḥājib, and then wrote his own 
mukhtaṣar.  Though al-Dardīr’s mukhtaṣar did not find the widespread appeal of 
that of Khalīl, nevertheless, the “project” of reforming the Mālikī school to 
enhance its accessibility, and bring it in line with the standard established by the 
other jurisprudential schools began with Ibn Shās and Ibn al-Ḥājib, and ended 
with al-Dardīr in the early modern era.  The focus of Khalīl’s commentary was to 
unlock Ibn al-Ḥājib’s text, as the abbreviation of names and references to 
epistemic designations by terms and pronouns necessitated explication.   
For example, when commenting on the ruling regarding the usability of 
water contaminated by dirt blown by the wind for ritual ablution, Khalīl mentions 
the “rules” (qawā‘id) of Ibn al-Ḥājib’s terminology, in a manner similar to Ibn 
Farḥūn as demonstrated in the table above.  Khalīl does not preface his 
commentary with any sort of introduction that explains the methodology of his 
commentary, and in this he has not departed from the style of most of his 
predecessors.39  One is left to piece it together by reading through the entire 
commentary.  Nonetheless, it is apparent that Khalīl did indeed have a 
particular methodology in his commentary, and one that reflected the 
intellectual paradigm of his era and local circumstances. 
 For instance, he cites opinions of other schools regularly throughout his 
commentary.  When in agreement with the Mālikī opinion, such as the issue of 
performing the devotional acts of fasting, and the pilgrimage to Mecca on behalf 
                                             
38 al-Jundī Khalīl ibn Isḥāq , Al-Tawḍīḥ Fī Sharḥ Al-Mukhtaṣar Al-Farʻī Li-Ibn Al-Ḥājib, ed. 
Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Karīm Najīb (al-Qāhirah: Markaz Najībawayh lil-Makhṭūṭāt wa-Khidmat al-
Turāth, 2008). 
39 As is mentioned later regarding the commentary of al-Dardīr on Khalīl’s Mukhtaṣar, he breaks 
from tradition and does provide a useful introduction. 
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of the dead, of which both the Shāfi‘ī school and Mālikī school deem invalid. 
Additionally, he cites the issue of the intention for prayer preceding the opening 
invocation, upon which the Ḥanafī and Shāfi‘ī schools agree.40  Additionally, 
Khalīl makes judicious use of citation of relevant verses from the Qur’ān as well 
as Prophetic reports to buttress some of the legal rulings of the compendium.  
For example, he cites the verses of divorce [2:228-234] regarding the waiting 
period of divorced women, and such as the ḥadīth regarding the permissibility of 
elongating of a woman’s garment despite its propensity to gather filth.41   
However, it is difficult to support the claim of Najīb that Khalīl’s 
methodology in his commentary is based upon providing supporting dalīl (juristic 
evidence) for the rulings of Ibn al-Ḥājib’s compendium.  Indeed, this represents 
a sore spot for students and practitioners of the Mālikī madhhab, as unlike their 
Shāfi‘ī and Ḥanafī counterparts, most works of the madhhab do not make 
mention of dalīl, preferring instead to present legal rulings attributable to Mālik 
or other jurisconsults of the Mālikī tradition – and most glaringly the mukhtaṣars 
of Ibn al-Ḥājib, Khalīl, and al-Dardīr.  Najīb offers the Tawḍīḥ as a testament to 
the inaccuracy of this premise, stating that Khalīl’s commentary is an 
“encyclopaedia of positive jurisprudence, juristic foundational principles, and 
ḥadīth, the likes of which can hardly be found in other juristic schools.”42  
Nonetheless, his claim remains unsubstantiated, as Khalīl’s use of 
supportive references are mostly in the form of attribution to the Mālikī 
jurisconsults; his citation of primary references are for illustrative purposes only, 
the overwhelming majority of rulings in Ibn al-Ḥājib’s compendium are explained 
without reference to the Qur’ān or ḥadīth. 
                                             
40 Khalīl ibn Isḥāq, Al-Tawḍīḥ Fī Sharḥ Al-Mukhtaṣar Al-Farʻī Li-Ibn Al-Ḥājib, 70. 
41 Ibid., 70-71. 
42 Ibid., 69. 
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Khalīl’s commentary, however, is not without value, and was a necessary 
step before Khalīl could pen his famous mukhtaṣar.  The preoccupation with 
dalīl in jurisprudential works is a modern phenomenon, as even Ibn Khaldūn’s 
criticism of the mukhtaṣar genre does include any reference to the idea of lack 
of juristic proofs in the Mālikī literature.  The modern Muslim however, heavily 
influenced by the reformist discourse, specifically the introduction of what were 
traditionally issues of scholarly concern into the public discourse, has rendered 
the layman a critic and evaluator of centuries old traditions.  The resulting 
pressure precipitated by the need to conceptualise all Islamic tradition with 
direct reference to the mere literal meanings of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth has left 
contemporary scholars of Islam scrambling to justify madhhab legitimacy in 
terms that the Muslim layman can understand.   
Hence, the recent efforts of at least one research house in Dubai43 to 
produce the Mukhtaṣar of al-Dardīr with textual evidence, as well as the work of 
the Moroccan scholar, Aḥmad ibn Ṣiddīq al-Ghumārī (d. 1961) and his students 
to republish Mālikī works with textual evidence.44 Additionally, the four-source 
theory of Islamic juristic reasoning and its extension of generalisation to legal 
schools besides the Shāfi‘ī school has bolstered an intellectual environment 
within Muslim intellectual circles and without that frowns upon the use of 
madhhab based legal rulings not easily conforming to this theory.   
Fadel raises the question of whether the Mālikī madhhab specifically can 
always directly draw from “revelatory sources” for all its legal rulings, as 
evidenced by his study of the legal issue concerning collateral for debt 
                                             
43 Dār al-Buḥuth lī al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya – now defunct, but produced several research 
monographs in the late 90’s and early 2000’s dedicated to the study of the Mālikī madhhab and 
its juristic methodology.  Several of those works have been cited in this study, such as ‘Alī, 
Iṣṭilāḥ Al-Madhhab ‘Ind Al-Mālikiyya. 
44 See Aḥmad Ibn al-Ṣiddīq and ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, 
Masālik Al-Dalālah Fī Sharḥ Matn Al-Risālah (Dimashq: Dār al-Fikr); ʿAbd Allāh Talīdī and 
Aḥmad Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, Itmām Al-Minnah Bi-Sharḥ Minhāj Al-Jannah Fī Fiqh Al-Sunnah, (Bayrūt: 
Dār al-Bashāʼir al-Islāmīyah, 1999). 
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securitisation.45  He alleges that the Mālikī madhhab makes copious use of the 
juristic principle of istiḥsān (juristic preference), based upon the alleged quote of 
Mālik that “istiḥsān is nine tenths of [legal] knowledge.”46  However, it appears 
that Fadel restricts the meaning of “revelatory sources” to literal meanings, and, 
as a result, overstates the use of istiḥsān to account for the lack of direct 
references to the literal purports of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth.  This is concluded 
based upon his (mis)translation of Ibn Rushd the Grandson’s qualifying 
statement regarding the basis for understanding his comparative fiqh manual, 
Bidāyat al-Mujtahid:47 
Ibn Rushd himself is aware of the limited scope of his book, and in his (very brief) introduction 
he reminds his readers that the purpose of the book is limited to “cases having a textual basis in 
revelation or are closely related thereto” (wa hādhihi al-masā’il fī al-akthar hiya al-masā’il al-
manṭūq biha fī al-shar‘ aw tata‘allaq bi al-manṭūq bihi ta‘alluqan qarīban).  While not surprising, 
his failure to explain rules that are not “closely related” to revelatory sources is disappointing 
because it certainly must be the case that, at least in purely quantitative terms, rules derived 
from non-revelatory sources make up the vast majority of actual Islamic law…at least in the 
Mālikī school. 
 
It appears that Fadel fails to appreciate the juristic term of manṭūq 
(explicit meaning), as he completely disregards it in his translation of Ibn 
Rushd’s statement, and limits its meaning to “textual basis”.  Ascribing all legal 
rulings that do not fall within the manṭūq as falling under the principle of istiḥsān 
is an egregious error.  Scriptural hermeneutics found in the classical discipline 
of uṣūl al-fiqh often uses dichotomies to illustrate the rules for extrapolating 
meanings.  The manṭūq-mafhūm (explicit-implicit) dichotomy is one such 
dichotomy, and it cannot be reasonably argued that implicit meanings are akin 
to non-revelatory sources, as Fadel alleges.   
However, Ibn Rushd demonstrates the inherent limitations found in the 
discipline of comparative fiqh, as legal rulings based upon disparate 
                                             
45 Mohammed Fadel, “Istiḥsān is Nine-Tenths of the Law: The Puzzling Relationship of Uṣūl to 
Furū‘ in the Mālikī Madhhab,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard G. Weiss, (Leiden: 
Brill, 2002), 161-76. 
46 Ibid., 164. 
47 Ibid., 171.  
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methodologies – perhaps even disparate paradigms, as may be the case in the 
Mālikī madhhab, in comparison to the other schools– is limited to very basic 
explicit textual inferences.  The mafhūm dalīl is based upon revelatory sources, 
albeit via an implicit inference, rather than an explicit rendering of the textual 
wording.  For example, the Qur’ānic injunction against reviling one’s parents: wa 
lā taqul lahumā uffan wa lā tanharhumā (and do not say to them [one’s parents] 
a word of contempt, and do not revile them)48 denotes an implicit understanding 
that one should also not strike or kill them.49  
The discussion above underscores the uniqueness, as well as difficulty 
that both the ‘ulamā’ and Western academics alike, face in determining the 
dominant legal rulings in the Mālikī school, as well as the basis upon which 
these legal rulings can be identified and justified in light of textual evidence.  
Implicit or “soft” hermeneutical tools that employ judicious use of nuance and 
context are not easily comprehensible to a mind-set looking for explicit, if not 
literal, overtures to Islam’s primary sources. Ibn al-Ḥājib, Khalīl, and al-Dardīr 
were not subject to this particular paradigm, and their works reflect the 
discursive tradition of Islam – namely that they were in a conversation with one 
another as well as their other predecessors and contemporaries.  A closer 
analysis of the Mālikī tradition reveals that rather than forgoing the notion of a 
text-proof based methodology, as with the Shāfi‘ī school, certain social, 
historical, as well as contextual factors led to the way that the Mālikī tradition 
developed in the manner that it did. 
First and foremost, examining the teaching style and personality of Mālik 
himself reveals that he was a muḥaddith, steeply committed to the compilation 
                                             
48 Qur’ān (17:23) 
49 Yaḥyā ibn Mūsā Rahūnī, ʿUthmān ibnʿUmar Ibn al-Ḥājib, Tuḥfat Al-Masʼūl Fī Sharḥ 
Mukhtaṣar Muntahā Al-Sūl, ed. al-Hādī ibn Ḥusayn Shubaylī. (Dubai: Dār al-Buḥūth lil-Dirāsāt 
al-Islāmīyah wa-Iḥyāʼ al-Turāth, 2002), 3:324. 
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and criticism of Prophetic reports.  His book, the Muwaṭṭa, is arguably the first 
book of ḥadīth ever written.  Yet, his manner of transmitting the Prophetic 
reports clearly differed from the way that he transmitted his legal opinions.  ‘Iyāḍ 
narrates that when a person would come to his house looking for him, his 
servant would be instructed to ask: “Are you interested in legal issues (masā’il) 
or ḥadīth?”  If the former, Mālik would answer the person’s query without any 
further delay.  However, if the latter, he would take a purificatory bath, apply his 
finest scents, wear his finest white cloak and turban before narrating any 
ḥadīth.50   
The different chains of narration also reveal a distinction between fiqh 
and ḥadīth transmission.  There are several narrators of the Muwaṭṭa, including 
Ibn al-Qāsim, Mālik’s most renowned student in fiqh, Ibn Wahb, another 
prominent Egyptian student of Mālik.  However, there are many other narrators 
of the Muwaṭṭa, some of whom were not students of Mālik’s jurisprudence, such 
as al-Shaybānī, the companion of Abū Ḥanīfa.  The most widespread narration 
of the Muwaṭṭa throughout its history has been that of Yaḥyā al-Laythī (d. 
224/839), an Andalusian scholar who spent much less time with Mālik than the 
main propagators of Mālik’s jurisprudence.  This indicates that the masā’il were 
transmitted without mention of juristic evidence. Such was the respect and 
deference accorded to Mālik; though this was more of a function of the era and 
place he lived in – second/eighth century Medina, where the stories of the early 
followers of the Prophet Muḥammad were still fresh in the collective mind-set.  
The historian Ibn Isḥāq, a contemporary of Mālik, was able to piece together his 
famous biography of the Prophet, based upon such memories.51   
                                             
50 See introduction in: ‘Iyāḍ, Tartīb Al-Madārik Wa-Taqrīb Al-Masālik, 1:10-35. 
51 ʿAbd al-Malik Ibn Hishām and Muḥammad Ibn Isḥāq, Al-Sīrah Al-Nabawīyah Al-Maʿrūfah Bi-
Sīrat Ibn Hishām, (Beirut: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1996). 
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The polemics and theological tensions that were rife in Iraq were virtually 
non-existent in Medina.  Providing supportive evidence and articulating 
methodology were simply uncharacteristic of the monastery like environment of 
Mālik’s Medina.  Nevertheless, as Wymann-Landgraf asserts, Mālik indeed did 
have a constant and consistent methodology, which he demonstrates in in his 
analysis of the Muwaṭṭa.52  As was demonstrated above, the Mudawwana 
played a larger role in the transmission of Mālik’s legal opinions; a document at 
its core a transcript of Mālik’s majālis in the style of nawāzil (question and 
answer), and devoid of supporting proof-texts.   
The madhhab was then transmitted in this fashion in North Africa and to 
some extent in Egypt, where there was no tradition of jadal and munāẓara as 
there was in the intellectual centres of the East: Kufa, Basra, and later 
Baghdad.  The Iraqi Mālikī school did indeed adopt the style of its intellectual 
environment, but as was noted earlier, died with the passing of its greatest 
exponent, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī in the fifth/twelfth century.53   
This discussion is germane to the overall question of al-Dardīr’s fiqh as it 
is imperative to identify the paradigm that preceded al-Dardīr in order to 
understand the one that he played a role in establishing.  This is further 
analysed in the sections dealing with al-Dardīr’s two specific works in fiqh, al-
Sharḥ al-Kabīr and al-Sharḥ al-Ṣaghīr.  To further establish this paradigm, it is 
important to look at the work of Ibn al-Ḥājib and Khalīl.  He established the 
mukhtaṣar paradigm in the Mālikī tradition, whilst Khalīl wrote its authoritative 
commentary.  Khalīl later extended that paradigm to its fruition in the form of his 
                                             
52 Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina : Islamic Reasoning in the Formative Period, 273-93. 
53 For a more detailed analysis, see: Badawī ‘Abd al-Ṣamad al-Ṭāhir, Manhaj Kitābat Al-Fiqh Al-
Mālikī Bayn Al-Tajrīd Wa Al-Tadlīl (Dubai: Dār al-Buḥūth li al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyaa wa Iḥyā' al-
Turāth, 2002), 43-79. 
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own mukhtaṣar, which became the standard manual at the near exclusion of all 
others in the Mālikī tradition. 
  
 221 
Al-Dardīr’s Commentary on the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl 
 
 The mukhtaṣar of Khalīl ibn Isḥāq al-Jundī (d. 776/1374) represents the 
most comprehensive and authoritative source of Mālikī legal rulings in the 
period after the seventh/fourteenth century, and is easily the most commented 
upon Mālikī legal text, with known commentaries numbering over sixty.54  The 
most famous of these are the commentaries of Bahrām ibn ‘Abd Allāh 
(805/1403), Muḥammad al-Ḥaṭṭāb (d. 954/1547), ‘Alī al-Ujhūrī (d. 1066/1656), 
‘Abd al-Bāqī al-Zurqānī (d. 1099/1688), Muḥammad al-Kharashī (d. 1101/1689), 
and al-Dardīr.55  The Mukhtaṣar essentially replaced the treatise of Ibn al-Ḥājib, 
Jāmi‘ al-Ummahāt, as the premier didactic text for the Mālikī madhhab, in the 
same manner that Jāmi‘ al-Ummahāt replaced Tahdhīb al-Mudawwana before 
it.   
The discursive tradition – as exemplified by the progression from the 
“mother texts” (al-ummahāt), pre-eminently the Mudawwana, to its abridgement 
(the Tahdhīb), to the Jāmi‘ al-Ummahāt of Ibn al-Ḥājib, to the Mukhtaṣar of 
Khalīl, to the Aqrab al-Masālik56 of al-Dardīr – exemplifies a continuous 
transhistorical conversation, as well as a progression, by which textual authority 
was conferred. Undoubtedly the waning political fortunes of the Muslim world 
played a role in the way that didactic and legal texts were produced, but they 
were a factor amongst many, and cannot be singularly specified as the sole 
reason for the intellectual trajectory.  Other, not less significant factors were the 
influence of other intellectual currents in the various Muslim lands, such as the 
North African trend of re-establishing Sunnism in the post-Fatimid period.  
Additionally, the relative dominance the Mālikī madhhab enjoyed in North and 
                                             
54 Khalīl ibn Isḥāq, Al-Tawḍīḥ Fī Sharḥ Al-Mukhtaṣar Al-Far‘ī Li-Ibn Al-Ḥājib, 1:49-50. 
55 All of who were Egyptian except for al-Ḥaṭṭāb, who was Moroccan. 
56 Discussed in the next section. 
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West Africa contributed towards the lack of polemical discussion in many Mālikī 
legal texts, unlike their Ḥanafī and Shāfi‘ī counterparts.  
The Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl was such a widely acclaimed and ubiquitous text 
in the colonised lands of the Maghreb that it piqued the interest of the 
Europeans.  It was translated into French, Italian, and English, all before the 
end of the nineteenth century, save for the English translation which was 
completed in 1919, based upon the earlier French translation.57 Islamic courts 
in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Sudan, 
Nigeria, and Senegal still refer to the Mukhtaṣar as the primary legal manual for 
issuing rulings in personal and family courts.58 The popularity of the Mukhtaṣar 
as a manual for Islamic life in North and West Africa has prompted some to 
remark that the book has supplanted the Qur’ān and ḥadīth as the primary 
source of Islam.59  Indeed, many young seminary students in Mauritania and 
other areas of West Africa commit the Mukhtaṣar to memory using the 
traditional lawḥ (wooden tablet) system.60   
Khalīl ibn Isḥāq al-Jundī was a soldier in the Mamlūk army and renown 
for wearing his soldier’s uniform, even during his lessons at al-Azhar.  Though 
his father was a Ḥanafī, he preferred to study the Mālikī madhhab, at the behest 
and encouragement of his teacher, ‘Abd Allāh al-Manūfī (d. 749/1358).61 The 
Mālikī hagiographer, Ibn Farḥūn, a contemporary of Khalīl, reports that his 
Mukhtaṣar gained wide acceptance and popularity amongst his students during 
his lifetime, as he “attempted to report only the mashhūr (most agreed upon 
                                             
57 Aḥmad Bābā al-Tinbaktī, Kifāyat Al-Muḥtāj Fī Ma‘rifat Man Lays Fī Al-Dībāj (Beirut: Dār Ibn 
Ḥazm, 2002), 126. 
58 Shamil Jeppie, Ebrahim Moosa, and Richard L. Roberts, Muslim Family Law in Sub-Saharan 
Africa : Colonial Legacies and Post-Colonial Challenges (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2010), 143. 
59 al-Ḥijawī, Al-Fikr Al-Sāmī Fī Tāriīkh Al-Fiqh Al-Islāmī, 2:493. 
60 I personally witnessed this on a trip to one of the open-air seminaries (maḥḍaras) in southern 
Mauritania in July 2010. 
61 Musa Ali Ajetunmobi, "A Critical Study of Mukhtaṣar Khalīl," Islamic Studies 25, no. 3 (1986): 
276-77. 
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opinions), and avoid mention of dissenting opinions.”62  Al-Tinbaktī, reporting 
over two centuries later, states that the Mukhtaṣar became virtually the only 
Mālikī text studied in learning centres such as Fez and Marrakesh. He also cites 
this phenomenon as evidence for the waning of knowledge, despite his praise 
for Khalīl and his works.63   
As has been noted by the Mukhtaṣar’s critics, the language of the text is 
cryptic, and routinely ignores the grammatical axioms of proper Arabic, such as 
the usage of double prepositional particles like the bā’ followed by the kāf.  For 
example, in the passage dealing with marriage annulment, Khalīl mentions: “wa 
lahā faqaṭ al-radd bil-judhām al-bayyin wa’l-baraṣ al-muḍirr al-ḥādithayn 
ba‘dahu la bika‘tirāḍ wa bi junūnihimā64 (and she is allowed to annul [the 
marriage] in the case [of the husband] having clear leprosy, or open and 
contagious skin sores that occur after [the marriage contract is concluded], not 
[to be annulled] with something like male impotence.”  The awkwardness of the 
language is obvious, if not by the necessity of extensive use of brackets to fill in 
contextual meaning that would otherwise leave the text unreadable.  It is for this 
reason that it is said that not a single word of the Mukhtaṣar can be omitted or 
substituted without affecting the integrity of the text.65 
Khalīl’s Terminology in the Mukhtaṣar 
 
Like his predecessor, Khalīl also employs a specialist terminology, albeit 
much simpler, as illustrated in the following table:66 
Term Meaning 
Khilāf (Difference) Indicates a difference amongst the 
                                             
62 Ibn Farḥūn, Al-Dībāj Al-Mudhahhab Fī Ma‘rifat ‘Ayān ‘Ulamā' Al-Madhhab, 1:358. 
63 al-Tinbaktī, Kifāyat Al-Muḥtāj Fī Ma‘rifat Man Lays Fī Al-Dībāj, 158. 
64 al-Jundī Khalīl ibn Isḥāq, Mukhtaṣar Khalīl Fī Fiqh Al-Imām Mālik (Miṣr: Maṭbaʿat ‘Īsā al-Bābī 
al-Ḥalabī wa-Shurakāhu), 132. 
65 Bahrām ibn ‘Abd illāh al-Dimīrī, Al-Durar Fī Sharḥ Al-Mukhtaṣar, ed. Ḥāfiẓ ibn ‘Abd al-
Raḥmān Khayr, and Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Karīm Najīb (Qatar: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shi'ūn al-
Islāmiyya Qatar, 2014), 90. 
66 See Khalīl’s introduction: Khalīl ibn Isḥāq, Mukhtaṣar Khalīl Fī Fiqh Al-Imām Mālik, 3-4. 
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Mālikī jurists as regards to the 
mashhūr for a given legal issue 
Taraddud (Hesitation) Hesitation amongst the later Mālikīs to 
cite a specific opinion due to a 
hesitation on the part of the earlier 
scholars or to an absence of a 
narration from one of them indicating a 
particular ruling 
Qawlān, Aqwāl (Differing opinions) Indicates where Khalīl was unable to 
determine which of the cited opinions 
is the mashhūr 
Fī-hā (In it) In the Mudawwana 
Uwwil, ta’wīl, ta’wīlāt (Interpreted) Indicates a difference in interpretation 
amongst the earlier scholars for the 
extension of a particular ruling 
Ikhtiyār (Individual selection) Individual selection of al-Lakhamī (d. 
498/1092) 
Tarjīḥ, arjaḥ (Juristic Preference) Juristic preference of Ibn Yūnus, 
commentator on the Mudawwana (d. 
451/1059) 
Ẓuhūr, aẓhar (Apparent) The legal opinion of Ibn Rushd the 
grandfather  
Qawl, qāl (Opinion) The legal opinion of al-Māzirī (d. 
536/1142) 
Ṣuḥḥiḥ (Verified) Verified contrary to the opinion of 
either al-Lakhamī, Ibn Yūnus, Ibn 
Rushd, or al-Māzirī 
Ustiḥsin (Preferred) Same as ṣuḥḥiḥ 
Law (If) Indicates an opinion contrary to 
another madhhab 
 
As the table illustrates, Khalīl dispenses with most of the terminology that 
characterises Ibn al-Ḥājib’s compendium.  In doing so, he sought to reflect the 
opinions by which the fatwa is issued, stating: “And so it was that a group, may 
God guide them and me to the milestones of [intellectual] verification, and to the 
most beneficial of paths, requested a synopsis according to the madhhab of 
Imam Mālik ibn Anas, designating that by which the fatwa should be issued.”67  
Khalīl manages to do this by primarily limiting his scholarly sources to four: al-
Lakhamī, Ibn Yūnus, Ibn Rushd, and al-Māzirī.  None of these four were 
amongst the direct students of Mālik, such as Ibn al-Qāsim or Ashhab, having 
                                             
67 Ibid., 3. 
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lived a few centuries after them; they all lived in the period the Mālikī tradition 
was in its “developmental” phase, so they were akin to the critical evaluators in 
the ḥadīth tradition, such as al-Bukhārī and Muslim. Al-Dasūqī, in his gloss on 
al-Dardīr’s commentary on Khalīl, states:68 
These four were specifically mentioned because none of the other later scholars 
(muta’khkhirīn) exerted as much effort as they did in critically analysing and synopsising the 
madhhab as they did.  Ibn Yūnus is mentioned specifically with tarjīḥ because most of his efforts 
were towards the opinions of those before him and that which he chose for himself was minimal.  
Ibn Rushd is mentioned specifically with ẓuhūr because he relies on the ostensible purport of 
the [older] narrations…al-Māzirī is mentioned specifically with qawl because of his adroitness in 
the disciplines and his ability to navigate them like the mujtahids; he became someone who can 
issue his own opinions (ṣāhib qawl) that can be relied upon. Al-Lakhamī is mentioned 
specifically with ikhtiyār because he was the boldest amongst (ajra’hum) to do that [issue a 
personal selection].  
 
The oldest of the group, Ibn Yūnus, a Sicilian jurist, wrote an 
encyclopaedic work appropriately entitled Kitāb al-Jāmi‘ li Masā’il al-
Mudawwana wa al-Ummahāt, which as the title suggests, encompasses the 
legal rulings cited in the Mudawwana, the Mukhtaliṭa, the Mustakhrija (‘Utbiyya), 
the Mawwāziyya, and the compilative work of Ibn Abī Zayd, al-Nawādir wa al-
Ziyādāt.69  Al-Lakhamī, who wrote an annotation (ta‘līq) on the Mudawwana 
entitled the Tabṣira, is easily the most controversial of the four.  His “boldness” 
in sometimes dissenting from the dominant opinions of the madhhab earned 
him this reputation, but apparently, the Mālikī tradition looked more favourably 
upon him by the time Khalīl wrote his Mukhtaṣar.70  Al-Māzirī was a polymath 
who also excelled in medicine, and was known for his precision in connecting 
the positive law (furu‘) with their foundational principles (‘uṣūl), to the degree he 
was considered an “imam” in the madhhab capable of deriving legal rulings 
based upon Mālik’s juristic methodology.  He wrote an annotation of the 
Mudawwana as well as primer in uṣūl al-fiqh.71   
                                             
68 Dasūqī, ʿIllaysh, and Dardīr, Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿalā Al-Sharḥ Al-Kabīr, 1:22 
69 ‘Alī, Iṣṭilāḥ Al-Madhhab ‘Ind Al-Mālikiyya, 289-90. 
70 ‘Iyāḍ ibn, Tartīb Al-Madārik Wa-Taqrīb Al-Masālik, 359. 
71 Ibn Farḥūn, Al-Dībāj Al-Mudhahhab Fī Ma‘rifat ‘Ayān ‘Ulamā' Al-Madhhab, 2:250-52. 
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Ibn Rushd, the most renowned of the group, is unanimously agreed upon 
as the greatest jurist of his generation.  His famous grandson of the same 
name, but more commonly referred to as the Philosopher, Averroes, was also a 
jurist, but not of the calibre and prestige accorded to his grandfather.  Ibn Rushd 
the grandfather was considered to have reached the level of mujtahid 
madhhab.72   
Thus, Khalīl’s methodology can be summarised as taking the 
compendium of Ibn al-Ḥājib as a general guide, but then using the four juristic 
sources where the mashhūr was not explicitly cited by him or where he thought 
that the selection of the one of the four sources was the rājiḥ or stronger 
opinion.  Despite his considerable efforts, Khalīl acknowledges that he was not 
always able to designate the dominant opinion for a given legal issue.  The 
following table demonstrates the number of times he uses a term designating 
two or more dominant opinions in the madhhab: 
Term Number of Occurrences 
Khilāf 67 
Taraddud 73 
Uwwil, etc. 107 
Qawlān, 
 Aqwāl 
118 
Arjaḥ 26 
Aẓhar 15 
Aṣaḥḥ 37 
Mukhtār 23 
Total 606 
   
While the table above is not exhaustive (by omitting the rulings where Khalīl 
does report a single opinion), it does demonstrate that Khalīl does not always 
                                             
72 ‘Alī, Iṣṭilāḥ Al-Madhhab ‘Ind Al-Mālikiyya, 316. 
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specify a single fatwa opinion.  It was presumably left to the teacher in the 
majālis al-ta‘līm to do so while reading the Mukhtaṣar.   
Additionally, there is an inherent level of ambiguity in the extension of 
legal rulings or lack thereof as al-Dardīr mentions in the opening lines of his 
commentary on his own mukhtaṣar, Aqrab al-Masālik73 (taqyīd mā aṭlaq wa iṭlāq 
mā qayyad).  This refers to the tendency of Khalīl in some instances to extend a 
legal ruling to a larger group of actions, when there may be qualifying factors 
that render the ruling applicable to a smaller subset of that group.  Conversely, 
he sometimes delimits rulings when they apply to a larger group. Presumably, 
Khalīl might have been aware of these issues and purposefully left them 
ambiguous on the reasonable assumption that the Mukhtaṣar’s didactic value 
cannot be fully realised except as a text to be read in the majlis al-ta’līm, and 
not as a standalone text to be read alone, as that was never the paradigm 
established in the mukhtaṣar tradition.   
Alternatively, it has been noted that Khalīl actually wrote about one third 
of the Mukhtaṣar, and that his students based upon his first draft (musawwada) 
completed the remaining two thirds.  This leaves the possibility, however 
remote, that these were issues that would have been addressed had he lived to 
oversee the production of the final draft.74  Whatever the case may be, the need 
for authoritative commentaries on the Mukhtaṣar was an acute need, for both its 
brilliance, as well as its difficulty.  The number of Mālikī jurists who penned 
commentaries and glosses on the text is a testament to this fact, as there is no 
likely no other mukhtaṣar of any discipline that have had as many 
commentaries and glosses dedicated to it.  
                                             
73 al-Dardīr and al-Ṣawī, Aqrab Al-Masālik 'Alā Al-Sharḥ Al-Ṣaghīr, 1:19. 
74 See introduction in: al-Dimīrī, Al-Durar Fī Sharḥ Al-Mukhtaṣar, 69-70. 
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Other Commentaries of the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl 
 
The Mukhtaṣar enjoyed a level of attention not accorded to any other 
book in the Mālikī tradition, save for the Muwaṭṭa and the Mudawwana.  It can 
even be argued that after the seventh/thirteenth century, the attention accorded 
the Mukhtaṣar via commentaries and glosses surpassed that of the Muwaṭṭa 
and the Mudawwana.  Some of the main commentaries considered authoritative 
include the following:  
1) The minor, major, and middle commentaries of Bahrām al-Dimīrī (d. 
805/1402).  Considered the first commentaries written on the Mukhtaṣar, 
as well as the first multiple commentaries by a single author in the Mālikī 
tradition. 
2) The commentary of ‘Abd Allāh al-Afqahsī (d. 823/1420), a student of 
Khalīl.   
3) The incomplete commentary of Muḥammad ibn Marzūq (d. 842/1438) 
covered only the beginning of the text and two sections near the end. 
4) The major and minor commentaries of Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Mawwāq 
(d. 897/1492). Popular short treatment of the Mukhtaṣar available in 
published form in the margins of al-Ḥaṭṭāb’s commentary.75 
5) The major commentary of the Moroccan jurist Muḥammad al-Ḥaṭṭāb (d. 
953 or 954/1546 or 1547), Mawāhib al-Jalīl. Considered the most 
thorough treatment of the Mukhtaṣar, and second only to the 
commentary of al-Dardīr in its level of authoritativeness in the Mālikī 
tradition.  Widely available in published form.76 
6) The major, minor, and middle commentaries of ‘Alī al-Ujhūrī (d. 
1066/1656). Is generally credited with applying an “Egyptian” approach in 
                                             
75 Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Ḥaṭṭāb, al-Jundī Khalīl ibn Isḥāq, and Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf 
Mawwāq, Mawāhib Al-Jalīl Li-Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar Khalīl, (Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr, 1422). 
76 Ibid. 
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his commentaries that was adopted by his students, al-Zurqānī, and al-
Kharashī.  Moroccan Mālikīs, despite their appreciation for his vast 
scholarship, took issue with the lack of precision in his encyclopaedic like 
commentaries, which also affected the work of his students.  This led 
them to discourage their students from reading the books of the 
“Ujhūriyya” without one of the glosses of either al-Bannānī on al-
Zurqānī’s commentary or that of al-Ṣa‘īdī on al-Kharashī’s 
commentary.77 
7) The commentary of ‘Abd al-Bāqī al-Zurqānī (d. 1099/1688).  A summary 
of his teacher’s commentary, al-Ujhūrī, that found wide acceptance 
except for the perceived mistakes that were carried over from the 
original. 
8) The major and minor commentaries of Muḥammad al-Kharashī (d. 
1101/1690).  A contemporary of al-Zurqānī and student of al-Ujhūrī.  His 
minor commentary found broad appeal and was the principal didactic text 
used in the Maghreb and Egypt before the appearance of the 
commentary of al-Dardīr. 
These commentaries essentially aimed to unlock the meanings of the 
Mukhtaṣar, some in an encyclopaedic manner, others very brief, but the last two 
mentioned became the standard commentaries used over a large area from the 
Maghreb to Egypt.  The ḥāshiya (gloss) was a later development tradition that 
apparently addressed the putative imperfections in the commentaries of al-
Zurqānī and al-Kharashī.78   
                                             
77 See al-Ḥijawī, Al-Fikr Al-Sāmī Fī Tāriīkh Al-Fiqh Al-Islāmī, 2:279. 
78 See El Shamsy’s treatment of the ḥāshiya in the Shāfi‘ī tradition in: Ahmed El Shamsy, "The 
Ḥāshiya in Islamic Law: A Sketch of the Shāfi‘Ī Literature," Oriens 41, no. 3/4 (2013). 
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The following sections provide an analysis of al-Dardīr’s methodology in 
his commentary as well as a comparison between the commentaries of al-
Kharashī of al-Dardīr to illustrate this point further. 
Analysis of al-Dardīr’s Major Commentary on the Mukhtaṣar 
 
Similar to the reception of his predecessor, Ibn Ḥājib, upon releasing his 
compendium, Khalīl’s Mukhtaṣar was virtually adopted by all Mālikīs to the 
degree that almost no other synopses were given much attention in the way of 
commentary or gloss.  Al-Dardīr’s commentary on the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl, often 
referred to as “al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr” (the major commentary), has found wide 
acceptance until the present day and is considered the premier text for the most 
authoritative Mālikī legal opinions.79  He finished writing the commentary in 
1197/1783, only three years before his death. There is no doubt that he 
regularly taught the Mukhtaṣar in his regular classes at al-Azhar and elsewhere, 
indicating the likely possibility he based his commentary on “classroom” 
experience with his students.  This would also lend credibility to the argument 
that al-Dardīr’s primary motivation in writing the commentary was pedagogical, 
rather than legal i.e. producing a work that would aid judges in their court edicts.   
In his introduction, he states his intended outcomes for potential 
beneficiaries of the commentary, namely to “elucidate that which is obscure, to 
qualify that which needs qualification, and to include only the mu‘tamad (relied 
upon opinions) from the legal rulings of the Mālikī jurists.” He further mentions 
that when he mentions a single opinion on any given issue, then that opinion 
represents the rājiḥ (preponderant opinion), and it then becomes obligatory to 
                                             
79 This I heard directly from Dr. Aḥmad Ta Ha Rayyān, the former dean of the Sharī’a college at 
the Azhar University in Cairo, widely regarded as one of the foremost scholars of Mālikī legal 
rulings in the world. 
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issue fatwas based upon this rājiḥ.80  In this language of authority, al-Dardīr 
departs somewhat from the style of his predecessors.   
The commentary of Muḥammad al-Kharashī (d. 1101/1690)81, the 
premier commentary studied in al-Azhar before that of al-Dardīr, does not 
invoke such language.  In his introduction to his minor commentary, al-Kharashī 
states his reasons for penning the major commentary82, which refer to ḥill al-
alfāẓ (deciphering of the text), and including explanation of the original matn’s 
taqyīdāt (qualifying purports), and fawā’id (supporting notes).  No mention is 
made of producing a result that reaches a single fatwa conclusion on each legal 
issue.  Al-Ṣa‘īdī, one of the two principle teachers of al-Dardīr, penned a gloss 
on al-Kharashī’s commentary.  Al-Zabīdī claims that it was the first gloss 
(ḥāshiya) to be written by the Mālikī ‘ulamā’.83 The commentary of Muḥammad 
al-Ḥaṭṭāb (d. 954/1547)84, considered one of the most comprehensive 
commentaries of the Mukhtaṣar, also does not invoke such an authoritative 
stance, but was written as a compendium of several commentaries, including 
the three commentaries of Bahrām.  Al-Ḥaṭṭāb mentions in his prologue to his 
commentary that his major objective was to explicate only those passages that 
might be deemed mushkil (unclear) from the Mukhtaṣar.  However, he then 
realised that clarity is a relative phenomenon, and that it was more beneficial for 
                                             
80 Dasūqī, ʿIllaysh, and Dardīr, Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿalā Al-Sharḥ Al-Kabīr, 1:20. 
81 He was the first shaykh of al-Azhar, and was renowned for both his piety and scholarly 
credentials. See Makhlūf, Shajarat Al-Nūr Al-Zakiyya, 317. 
82 Al-Kharashī authored a major commentary, which he references often in his minor 
commentary.  He offers as a rationale for the writing of the minor commentary the inability of 
less capable students of grasping and understanding the subtleties of the major commentary. 
See Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh Kharshī, al-Jundī Khalīl ibn Isḥāq, and ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad ʿAdawī, 
Sharḥ Al-Muḥaqqiq Al-Jahbidh Al-Fāḍil Al-Mudaqqiq Sīdī Abī ʿabd Allāh Muḥammad Al-
Kharashī ʿalā Al-Mukhtaṣar Al-Jalīl Li-Abī Al-Ḍiyāʼ Sīdī Khalīl ; Wa-Bi-Hāmishihi Ḥāshiyat ʿalī Al-
ʿadawī, (Miṣr: al-Maṭbaʿah al-Khayrīyah, 1307). 
83 al-Zabīdī, Al-Mu’jam Al-Mukhtaṣ, 489. 
84 For biographical reference see: al-Tinbaktī, Kifāyat Al-Muḥtāj Fī Ma‘rifat Man Lays Fī Al-Dībāj, 
468-70. 
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him to author a complete commentary on all of the issues of the Mukhtaṣar, 
rather than just the passages he deemed ambiguous.85   
An analysis of al-Dardīr’s commentary on the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl reveals 
that his focus centres upon three main areas:  
1) Linguistic explication to unlock the terse text of Khalīl,  
2) Designation of the most reliable opinions (al-mu‘tamad), and  
3) “Correcting” Khalīl’s lack of precision in his citing of some legal 
opinions.   
These three areas correspond to the concepts of tabsīṭ (simplification), tarjīḥ 
(weighing of evidence to arrive at the most reliable opinion), and taḥqīq 
(verification).  These concepts define the work of al-Dardīr in general, and can 
be extended to the other disciplines, most notably ‘aqīda and taṣawwuf.86   For 
the most part, al-Dardīr’s commentary, along with the text of Khalīl, reads as 
one contiguous text, focusing on deciphering the words and phrases of the text 
by interlaying his commentary in between them, as in the following:87 
(Sunna) sunnatan mu’akkada (lī musāfir) rajul aw imra’a (ghayr ‘āṣin bihi) ay bi al-safar 
fa ‘umn‘a qasr ‘āṣ bihi ka ābiq wa qāṭi‘ ṭarīq wa ‘āq fa in tāb qaṣar in baqiya ba‘dahā al-masāfa 
wa in ‘aṣa bihi fī athnā’hi atamm wujuban ḥīna’idh fa’in qaṣar lam yu‘id ‘alā al-aṣwab 
 
It is a confirmed (sunna) (for the traveller), whether male or female, (who is not sinning) 
with his travel, for otherwise it would be prohibited to shorten prayers for someone such as a 
runaway [slave] or highway robber or insubordinate [son or daughter to a parent]. If he 
commences such a sin while traveling, then he must by way of obligation pray the un-shortened 
prayer at that point; if he shortens the prayer [nonetheless] than he does not repeat the prayer 
according to the more correct [opinion]. 
 
The interlay style of the commentary is emblematic of al-Dardīr’s approach to 
his commentaries, as it is also the technique used in Aqrab al-Masālik, and his 
commentary on his ‘aqīda, al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya.  Compared to earlier 
commentaries on the Mukhtaṣar, such as the major commentary of Bahrām, 
and the commentary of al-Kharashī, al-Dardīr’s style exemplifies his 
                                             
85 Ḥaṭṭāb, Khalīl ibn Isḥāq, and Mawwāq, Mawāhib Al-Jalīl Li-Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar Khalīl, 1:3. 
86 Discussed at length in chapters 2 and 4. 
87 Dasūqī, ʿIllaysh, and Dardīr, Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿalā Al-Sharḥ Al-Kabīr, 1:358. 
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commitment to simplicity, where the lines of separation between text and 
commentary become blurred, facilitating the reading of the commentary in a 
majlis ta‘līm like environment.   
Stylistically, al-Dardīr also follows the internal division of the Mukhtaṣar 
into abwāb (chapters) and fuṣūl (sub-chapters), but additionally assigns names 
to the headings, something that the original fails to do.  
A comparison between al-Dardīr’s commentary and the commentary of 
al-Kharashī, his principal predecessor, reveals similarities as well as differences 
in style and technique.  Most significantly, al-Kharashī focuses his commentary 
on the Mukhtaṣar’s sentences. Al-Dardīr focuses primarily on the individual 
words.  Interestingly, al-Zurqānī also focuses on words and phrases rather than 
sentences.  Al-Dardīr’s teacher, al-Ṣa‘īdī, in his gloss of al-Kharashī’s 
commentary, also tends to focus on the words of the commentary rather than 
whole sentences.  This style is also adopted by Muḥammad al-Dasūqī (d. 
1230/1815), the author of the gloss on al-Dardīr’s commentary.  This may be a 
reflection of a later development in the Mālikī tradition, in an effort reminiscent 
of the early ummahāt works which were much more readable than later 
mukhtaṣars, specifically those of Khalīl and Ibn al-Ḥājib.  It may also 
demonstrate the intention on the part of al-Dardīr for both the text and 
commentary to be read in the majlis al-‘ilm without differentiation between them.   
In terms of pedagogy, this signifies al-Dardīr’s desire to shift the focus 
from a largely unintelligible mukhtaṣar to a more readable and accessible text-
commentary combination.  He also follows a similar pattern in Aqrab al-Masālik, 
as well as the Kharīda, though he is the author of both text and commentary in 
both works.  For al-Dardīr, the matn and sharḥ were predominant genres that 
he may have felt somewhat beholden.  However, this did not preclude him from 
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shifting the paradigm in the audition of the lesson, audibly reading the matn and 
sharḥ as if they were a single text.  The ḥāshiya then replaced the sharḥ of the 
earlier period as the “commentary” on the new “combined” text.  
Though he does not expressly articulate his methodology, it can be 
gleaned by comparing al-Dardīr’s commentary to those of his predecessors, 
especially to the commentary of al-Kharashī, which al-Dardīr used as a 
baseline.  The commentary of al-Kharashī was the standard commentary of the 
Mukhtaṣar until al-Dardīr wrote his own commentary.  Al-Kharashī was the first 
shaykh of al-Azhar, and was the recipient of wide praise from al-Ṣa‘īdī, who 
penned a gloss on his commentary.  He mentions that at the end of his life, 
there only remained his students and students of his students, as well as his 
pious devotion and sense of humour as amongst his particular characteristics.88  
Al-Kharashī’s main teacher in Mālikī fiqh was ‘Alī al-Ujhūrī (d. 1066/1655), who 
in addition to al-Kharashī, was the principal teacher of ‘Abd al-Bāqī al-Zurqānī 
(d. 1099/1687), and Ibrāhīm al-Shabrakhītī (d. 1106/1694), both of whom 
penned commentaries on the Mukhtaṣar.89  The three students’ commentaries 
of the Mukhtaṣar did not depart from the style and methodology of their master, 
al-Ujhūrī, and became the standard commentary for the Mālikī scholars of al-
Azhar, particularly those of al-Zurqānī and al-Kharashī.   
However, these commentaries were not without their detractors, 
specifically the Mālikī scholars of the Maghreb.  Their main gripe with the 
Ujhūrīan methodology was the issue of the mashhūr or rājiḥ opinions cited by 
al-Ujhūrī and his students.  Their distrust of this particular Egyptian school of 
jurisprudence led them to censure the use of the commentaries without 
                                             
88 Kharshī, Khalīl ibn Isḥāq, and ʿAdawī, Sharḥ Al-Muḥaqqiq Al-Jahbidh Al-Fāḍil Al-Mudaqqiq 
Sīdī Abī ʿabd Allāh Muḥammad Al-Kharashī ʿalā Al-Mukhtaṣar Al-Jalīl Li-Abī Al-Ḍiyāʼ Sīdī Khalīl ; 
Wa-Bi-Hāmishihi Ḥāshiyat ʿAlī Al-ʿadawī, 1:2. 
89 ‘Alī, Iṣṭilāḥ Al-Madhhab ‘Ind Al-Mālikiyya, 575. 
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accompanying elucidating glosses that would point out where the “Ujhūrīs” had 
erred.  The most renown of these glosses was by the Moroccan jurist from Fes, 
Muḥammad al-Bannānī (d. 1194/1780), a contemporary of al-Dardīr, who 
penned a gloss on al-Zurqānī’s commentary, aptly titled al-Fatḥ al-Rabbānī 
Fīmā Dhahal ‘Anhu al-Zurqānī (The Divine Opening in that which al-Zurqānī has 
Overlooked).90  
The gloss penned by al-Ṣa‘īdī on the commentary of al-Kharashī was 
more charitable, simply titled Ḥāshiyat al-‘Adawī.91  The Moroccan discomfort 
with the Ujhūrīan commentaries underlies the difficulty in ascertaining the Mālikī 
madhhab’s most relied upon opinions, as well as the regional bias involved 
regarding the approach to ascertaining those opinions.  It is for this reason that 
al-Dardīr departed from the modus operandi of his predecessors by dispensing 
with the inherited terminology and conventions of the Khalīl commentaries by 
providing the legal opinion without reference to a particular authoritative source.  
This phenomenon is even more apparent in his mukhtaṣar, Aqrab al-Masālik, 
discussed further below.   
As far as his commentary on Khalīl’s Mukhtaṣar is concerned, however, 
al-Dardīr sought to simplify access to the school’s legal rulings by avoiding the 
use of divergent opinions and mentioning only the mu‘tamad or muftā bi-hi.   
Al-Dardīr’s methodology can be gleaned from the matter of his engagement 
with the Mukhtaṣar. It can be summarised in the following ways: 
1) Linguistic analysis – including grammatical, linguistic, and rhetorical 
analyses 
                                             
90 Ibid., 579. 
91 Kharshī, Khalīl ibn Isḥāq, and ʿAdawī, Sharḥ Al-Muḥaqqiq Al-Jahbidh Al-Fāḍil Al-Mudaqqiq 
Sīdī Abī ʿabd Allāh Muḥammad Al-Kharashī ʿalā Al-Mukhtaṣar Al-Jalīl Li-Abī Al-Ḍiyāʼ Sīdī Khalīl ; 
Wa-Bi-Hāmishihi Ḥāshiyat ʿAlī al-ʿAdawī. 
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2) Textual clarification – addition of words in the interlay style to render the 
Mukhtaṣar more readable  
3) Illustrative examples of legal rulings – practical scenarios used to 
illustrate an abstract ruling 
4) Legal ruling clarification – where he finds that Khalīl has unnecessarily or 
unwittingly delimits the extension of a ruling, or the opposite, where 
Khalīl generalises the extension of a ruling where it should be delimited 
5) Tarjīḥ (selecting or designating the more reliable opinion) where the text 
does not expressly do so 
The following sections provide several illustrative examples of each. 
Linguistic Analysis 
 
Al-Dardīr’s commentary employs grammatical as well as rhetorical 
analysis on a need basis, and not as a general rule throughout the commentary, 
such as is the case in the commentary of al-Kharashī.  For example, in 
commenting on Khalīl’s introduction, which includes an acknowledgement of his 
shortcomings and a plea for others to correct the text as needed, he states: wa 
as’al bi lisān al-taḍarru‘ (and I ask with the tongue of entreaty).  Al-Dardīr 
comments: “He omitted the direct object i.e. them [the scholars] as they are the 
people he is asking; [and tongue] as in a tongue of entreaty, or he himself is the 
entreaty in an hyperbolic sense, or the intent is “the entreating and reverent 
one” the same principle [when one says] Zayd is justice, or the intent is with “the 
tongue of entreaty” is “my humility”, in which case there [is use of the rhetorical 
device of] metaphor by the way of metonymy.”92   
                                             
92 Dasūqī, ʿIllaysh, and Dardīr, Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿalā Al-Sharḥ Al-Kabīr, 1:28. 
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In another instance, he defines terms such as al-fajr al-ṣādiq (true 
dawn):93  
…and it is the diffused light (mustaṭīr) that encompasses the whole horizon, as opposed 
to the al-kādhib (false dawn), which is oblong (mustaṭīl) and does not diffuse [into the whole 
horizon], but rather appears in the middle of the sky as a thin [strand] that resembles a wolf’s 
tail.  It does not appear [the false dawn] all times of the year but only in winter, and after it 
darkness appears followed by the appearance of the true dawn. 
 
An example of grammatical analysis occurs when explaining the legal 
rulings for zakat, specifically what is payable on repaid debts in a scenario when 
one has received repayment of a debt that, when combined with other cash 
holdings, meets the minimum “zakatable amount” (niṣāb).  However, for 
whatever reason, part of that is lost or spent, rendering it below the niṣāb level 
before paying the zakat.  One is still required, nonetheless, to pay zakat on that 
amount assuming all other conditions have been met.  The Mukhtaṣar’s wording 
for this scenario is wa law talaf al-mutamm (and even if the completing amount 
is lost).  In the Arabic, the word mutamm can be read as mutimm or mutamm, 
the first denoting the meaning of the actor and the latter the recipient.  Al-Dardīr 
confirms the latter meaning, namely the recipient, as the former meaning would 
change the ruling cited by Khalīl, as if the original holding  - not from the repaid 
debt – in this case the mutamm, then one is still obligated to pay the zakat.  
However, al-Dardīr confirms that whether the original holdings are lost, or the 
repaid debt or both is immaterial, as the zakat would be obligatory in all three 
scenarios, despite Khalīl’s wording to the contrary.94 
Textual Clarification 
 
                                             
93 Ibid., 1:178-79. 
94 Ibid., 1:467-68. 
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Examples of textual clarification are copious and make up the bulk of al-
Dardīr’s commentary.  The following passage from the chapter on divorce 
illustrates this point (Mukhtaṣar within parentheses and commentary without):95 
(Chapter: Sunna Divorce) As in the divorce that the sunna conferred as permissible, as the 
intent is not that divorce is sunna, as it is the most detested of permissible acts to God, even if 
only once.  What he meant was sunna as opposed to [reprehensible] innovation, and that which 
is of an innovation is deemed makrūh or ḥarām as will be demonstrated. ..And he demonstrates 
its conditions with the following:  (one) complete [pronouncement of divorce] (in a period of 
purity where he has not touched her) as in not had sexual intercourse (without) adding [another 
divorce pronouncement] in the (waiting period [from a previous divorce]) and there remains one 
more condition, that the pronouncement should fall on the woman in her entirety not part of her 
[not something like “your left arm is divorced”] (or otherwise) if the pronouncement of divorce 
does not entail all of these qualifiers as if some are ignored like if he pronounces more than 
one, or part of one or during the menstrual cycle or post-partum bleeding or in a period of purity 
where he had sexual intercourse with her or he pronounced another divorce during the waiting 
period of a revocable divorce (then it is an innovation). 
 
As demonstrated with the previous example, even with the commentary of al-
Dardīr, the text remains somewhat inaccessible for the average reader. As 
mentioned earlier regarding he comments of Ibn Khaldūn, Khalīl’s text was not 
intended to be read as a stand alone pedagogical tool, but rather sought to 
function as an index of the madhhab’s rulings.  Al-Dardīr in his commentary 
seeks to eliminate the need to refer back to the larger works by supplying 
enough commentary to obviate the need to refer back to the larger works.  
Nevertheless, scholars like al-Dardīr and others were writing for the students of 
their day in an effort to ensure continuity of the particular tradition they aimed to 
transmit.  In the case of the Mālikī tradition, the paradigm of Khalīl defined it 
during the time of al-Dardīr and as such, his efforts were focused towards 
working within that paradigm of commentary on the Mukhtaṣar.  His Aqrab al-
Masālik sought to shift that paradigm somewhat, as is demonstrated in the next 
section. 
Illustrative Examples of Legal Rulings 
 
                                             
95 Ibid., 2:361. 
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 The terse nature of the Mukhtaṣar leaves little room for illustrating 
abstract or obfuscatory passages.   The ummahāt works were encyclopaedic in 
their length, but virtually all legal rulings mentioned therein were expressed via 
practical examples, as they originated in the form of question and answer.  
Khalīl, in “indexing” the rulings of the madhhab was forced to dispense with 
most examples, thereby precipitating the need in the commentaries.  For 
example, in the chapter on usurious sales, Khalīl states in a few words the 
conditions for gold and silver exchanges, namely that the exchange should be 
immediate without undue delay, except in a few situations where it is 
permissible, such as muwāda‘a (mutual agreement to meet).  Khalīl does not 
expound further than the single word, but al-Dardīr provides an explanation and 
example:96  
 …(mutual agreement) whereas it is the cause [of the delay in exchange] for then they 
[functionally] declare it [the mutual agreement to meet] a binding contact where one says: 
“come with me to the market where we can exchange the dirhams or weigh them, and if they 
are acceptable I will conclude the deal by paying you one dinar for X amount of dirhams”; the 
second party then accepts .  However, it is said [in the Mudawwana] that in order [to make the 
transaction acceptable] the second party is accompany the first to the market, but without 
promise or agreement [to conclude the transaction]; as in both parties must not agree, as that is 
the definition of mutual agreement, so one would say to the other: “come with me to the market 
to exchange”, and the second party proceeds with him, at which point they renew their 
agreement to exchange after the coins have been processed – then this is permissible.  
 
This also illustrates how al-Dardīr, on occasion, will return to one of the 
ummahāt texts to illustrate what may have been otherwise obtuse from the text 
of the Mukhtaṣar.  He uses the same preposition-pronoun construct as Khalīl to 
refer to the Mudawwana (fī-hā), as a citation from the Mudawwana in the Mālikī 
tradition.   This is akin to citation of a Prophetic report in the ḥadīth tradition or 
an Aristotelian syllogism in the kalām/‘aqīda tradition.  As was demonstrated 
earlier, Mālik played a formative role in both the ḥadīth and fiqh traditions, thus 
accounting for the two different approaches, and later two distinct trajectories in 
the development of the ḥadīth and fiqh traditions. 
                                             
96 Ibid., 3:30. 
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Legal Ruling Clarification 
 
Legal ruling clarification is the area by which the commentary of al-Dardīr found 
wide acceptance, unaided by a ḥāshiya (gloss).  Though the student of al-
Dardīr, al-Muḥammad ‘Arafa al-Dasūqī (d. 1230/1815), wrote a gloss on al-
Dardīr’s commentary.  It was unlike the glosses of al-Bannānī and al-Ṣa‘īdī, 
both of which provided critical editions of the commentaries of al-Zurqānī and 
al-Kharashī, respectively.  Al-Dasūqī was renowned for his mind-mapping like 
illustration of commentary texts, whether the commentary of al-Dardīr in fiqh, or 
the magisterial book of Ibn Ḥishām (d. 761/1359), Mughnī al-Labīb, in Arabic 
grammar and linguistics.97  He rarely, if ever, corrects or mitigates the 
understanding of al-Dardīr in his commentary.  Al-Dardīr, in terms of legal 
rulings, does not correct Khalīl, but rather issues authoritative opinions where 
Khalīl declined to do so, when he uses the terms of taraddud, khilāf, qawlān, 
etc.   
For example, on the issue of facing the qibla (prayer direction), Khalīl 
reports a khilāf between the Mālikī jurists as to whether the person who omits 
ascertaining the qibla, out of sheer forgetfulness, but then recalls after the 
prayer is finished, should repeat the prayer as long as its time is valid, or is 
required to repeat the prayer outright due to its invalidity.  Al-Dardīr reports that 
Ibn al-Ḥājib reported the latter as the mashhūr.  However, he reports the former 
as the mu‘awwal alayhi (the reliable opinion), thus declaring his personal 
preference.98 
 On rare occasion, al-Dardīr will point out inconsistencies in Khalīl’s use 
of his own terminology.  For example, in the ruling regarding the purificatory 
bath (ghusl), Khalīl uses the term khilāf when citing two opinions regarding a 
                                             
97 See Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Dasūqī and ʿAbd Allāh ibn Yūsuf Ibn Hishām, Ḥāshiyat Al-Shaykh 
Al-Dasūqī ʿalā Matn Mughnī Al-Labīb Li-Ibn Hishām Al-Anṣārī, (Būlāq: Dār al-Ṭibāʿah, 1301). 
98 Dasūqī, ʿIllaysh, and Dardīr, Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿalā Al-Sharḥ Al-Kabīr, 1:228. 
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fourth washing of a limb beyond the recommended three as either 
reprehensible (makrūh), or prohibited (ḥarām).  As noted earlier, Khalīl uses the 
term khilāf when there is a difference of opinion regarding the mashhūr, which, 
according to al-Dardīr, in this case is inappropriate as the more appropriate 
term would have been taraddud, indicating a difference regarding the 
transmission of a narration from the early Mālikī scholars.  Though he does not 
expressly state why he believes this to be the case, the glossator of al-Dardīr’s 
commentary, al-Dasūqī, explains that the first opinion is Ibn Rushd’s narration, 
and the second is that of al-Lakhamī, hence the appropriateness of taraddud 
over khilāf.99 
Tarjīḥ 
 
 Tarjīḥ is a term that al-Dardīr uses in his commentary when he expresses 
an opinion that runs contrary to the text of the Mukhtaṣar.  The following 
examples are illustrative of this singularity: 
 Example A: Al-Dardīr expresses an opinion that differs with other 
commentators, specifically on the issue of removal of a state of ritual impurity.  
The Mālikīs view ritual impurity of as of two types: (1) that which affects the 
person performing a ritually devotional act, and (2) that which affects his body, 
clothing, and place of prayer.  He disputes the notion that purifying water is the 
sole agent that removes ritual impurity, whether of type (1) or (2), based on the 
notion that dry ablution (tayammum), a method of removing ritual impurity of 
type (1), and tanning and fire are methods by which impurities of type (2) can be 
removed.  It appears that his reasoning here is purely based on logic, because 
the opposing opinion states that dry ablution merely makes devotional acts 
such as prayer permissible, despite the fact that the state of impurity is not 
                                             
99 Ibid., 1:102. 
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lifted.  Al-Dardīr finds this argument fallacious because of its logical 
impossibility, as something cannot be both permissible and impermissible 
simultaneously, as in the case of the prayer here.100 
Example B: In the chapter on water used for ritual purification, Khalīl states that 
a copious amount of water, when mixed with a ritually impure substance that 
does not alter one if its three properties of colour, taste, or smell, remains 
ritually purifying, and retains its use for ritual ablutions.  Al-Dardīr states that this 
is also true for a small amount of water, as the criteria is the alteration of the 
water, regardless of amount.  Al-Dasūqī in his gloss states that the former 
opinion, upon which Khalīl followed in this ruling, was the opinion of Ibn al-
Qāsim, whose opinion normally would be considered authoritative.  In this 
particular instance, al-Dardīr preferred to follow the principle i.e. the criteria 
being the alteration of the properties or lack thereof, rather than follow the 
opinion of the most authoritative scholar in the tradition after Mālik.101 
Example C: On occasion al-Dardīr will mention that al-Khalīl should have cited 
merely one opinion instead of two, due to the precise meaning of the ruling.  For 
example, in the chapter on conditional divorce pronouncements, Khalīl 
mentions qawlān (two opinions) regarding the issue of negative conditional 
divorce pronouncements using a third party, such as if a husband were to say 
to his wife: “If Tom (a third party) does not enter the house, then you are 
divorced.” In this case, with an unspecified time expiry, the judge would either 
(1) allow a time period equivalent to that reserved when a husband forswears 
intimate relations with his wife i.e. four months, after which if the condition does 
occur i.e. Tom enters the house then his pronouncement is fulfilled and no 
divorce occurs or (2) allow a time period at his discretion based upon his 
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reading of the husband’s intent, after which if the condition does occur i.e. Tom 
enters the house, then the pronouncement is fulfilled and no divorce occurs.  
According to both opinions, if Tom enters the house within the allotted time, 
then a divorce occurs.  Al-Dardīr states that there was no need for Khalīl to 
mention the first opinion, as the narration of Ibn al-Qāsim in the Mudawwana 
only mentions the second.102  Al-Dardīr makes this statement, as amongst the 
principles of determining the mashhūr or rājiḥ opinion in the Mālikī tradition is 
that the opinion of Ibn al-Qāsim in the Mudawwana takes precedence over 
other opinions in the Mudawwana (save for Mālik’s opinion), as well as other 
opinions, including his own, in other ummahāt sources other than the 
Mudawwana. 
Example D: Regarding the issue on dissolution of marriage due to a lost 
husband during a battle between two Muslim armies103, where the body was not 
recovered, a woman is either to start her waiting period from the day of the 
battle (characterised as the mu’tamad in the madhhab by al-Dardīr) due to the 
narrations from Mālik and Ibn al-Qāsim, or from the day the two armies 
separated, indicating the end of the battle (characterised as the aḥwaṭ (more 
religiously precautionary) opinion).  The latter opinion was the one favoured by 
both Ibn al-Ḥājib and Khalīl, and al-Dardīr follows them in that regard. 
 
                                             
102 Ibid., 2:482-83. 
103 As opposed to a battle between a Muslim and non-Muslim army, where the assumption is 
that he might be held captive, in which case the Muslim authority must exhaust all efforts to 
recover him.  In a battle between two Muslims armies the assumption apparently is that he 
would not be held captive and would be either executed or returned. See ibid., 2:399. 
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Al-Dardīr’s Mukhtaṣar: Aqrab al-Masālik 
 
 Though the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl has received substantial attention from 
Western academics, by contrast, no mention is made of al-Dardīr’s mukhtaṣar, 
despite its prominence in the Mālikī tradition, specifically in Egypt, and to a 
lesser extent in the Maghreb.  Some have even claimed that there were no 
“mukhtaṣarāt published for the Mālikīs after Khalīl, only commentaries on 
him.”104  It would be easy to dismiss al-Dardīr’s synopsis as a simple, uneventful 
rehash of Khalīl’s Mukhtaṣar, as many have alleged regarding the entire 
synopsis-commentary-gloss genre itself, but few have actually undertaken a 
close analysis of the texts to reach such conclusions.  The following analysis 
reveals incremental, yet significant departures of al-Dardīr from Khalīl’s text, 
with viable justifications for doing so that are best explained by the salient 
features of the transmission tradition paradigm that provides the theoretical 
framework to advance such claims. 
Despite the claims that Khalīl’s Mukhtaṣar sufficed itself with noting the 
mashhūr legal opinions, the analysis in the previous section demonstrated this 
not to be case.  One would have to wonder if it were, why would al-Dardīr feel 
compelled to pen his own mukhtaṣar, after his commentary on that of Khalīl 
received widespread acceptance and dissemination, if notoriety could be 
considered a possible motivation.  Al-Dardīr does not specifically mention when 
he wrote either the mukhtaṣar or its commentary – referred to as al-Sharḥ al-
Ṣaghīr (the minor commentary), but it would appear they were both written after 
he wrote the commentary on Khalīl’s Mukhtaṣar, as al-Ṣāwī refers to it in his 
ḥāshiya (gloss) as al-aṣl (the original) of the Sharḥ al-Ṣaghīr.105  This would 
                                             
104 Knut S. Vikør, Between God and the Sultan : A History of Islamic Law (London: Hurst & Co., 
2005), 162. 
105 al-Dardīr and al-Ṣawī, Aqrab Al-Masālik 'Alā Al-Sharḥ Al-Ṣaghīr, 1:5. 
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indicate he wrote them in the few last years of his life, as the Sharḥ al-Kabīr was 
written three years before his death.   
Additionally, the commentary on Aqrab al-Masālik was written sometime 
after it, as al-Dardīr mentions his mukhtaṣar, referring to “his copy” regarding a 
particular legal ruling differing from another available copy.  This indicates that 
the synopsis had circulated for some time amongst students at al-Azhar, before 
he wrote the commentary, a point that al-Ṣāwī confirms.106 In writing a 
commentary on his own synopsis, he follows a similar path pursued with his 
commentary on his text in ‘aqīda, al-Kharīda al-Bahiyya.107  A general survey of 
synopses in the ‘aqīda tradition and Mālikī traditions reveals that no other 
scholar penned their own commentaries on synopses they composed, except 
for al-Sanūsī and al-Laqqānī.108  This is a significant point, since it would lend 
credence to the theory that the mukhtaṣar-sharḥ-ḥāshiya genre had reached a 
crossroads by the time of al-Dardīr, and may have been suffering under its own 
weight, losing sight of its original purpose, as had been warned by critics of the 
genre.   
Al-Dardīr may have been submitting to the dominant paradigm of his day, 
releasing his most important works in the mukhtaṣar-sharḥ form, when, from a 
practical point of view, he could have more easily released them in a different 
form.  This form would not be bounded by the synopsis-commentary genre, 
especially in light of his interlay commentary style, as his works read as one 
contiguous text.  Therefore, Aqrab al-Masālik and its commentary, were 
                                             
106 Ibid. 
107 See chapter 3 
108 In the ‘aqīda tradition, see: Sanūsī and Bannānī, Sharḥ Sughrā Al-Sughrā Fī ʿilm Al-Tawḥīd; 
Ibrāhīm al-Laqqānī, Sharḥ Al-Nāẓim ‘Alā Jawharat Al-Tawḥīd, (Cairo: Dār al-Baṣā'ir, 2009). 
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perhaps an attempt at shifting the pedagogical paradigm to a more accessible 
form.109 
Like his introduction to his commentary on Khalīl, al-Dardīr expresses 
similar sentiments about his motivations:110 
…this is a noble book that I picked from the fruit of the Mukhtaṣar of Imam Khalīl in the school 
of the Imam of imams of the abode of revelation; I restricted it to [encompass only] the most 
preponderant (arjaḥ) of legal opinions, substituting therein the opinions that are not dominant 
with those that are, in addition to qualifying that which he stated categorically, as well as the 
opposite [categorising that which he qualified] to facilitate [accessibility].  
 
This statement resembles his statement regarding the impetus for his major 
commentary (al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr), except that it would appear al-Dardīr wished to 
facilitate easier access to the Mālikī tradition by eliminating dissenting opinions 
except where two opinions were equally acceptable.  He also sought to 
explicate rulings within the mukhtaṣar itself, rather than in the commentary, as 
he did with the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl.   
The positions that al-Dardīr occupied at this point in his life when he 
wrote his fiqh works, namely the muftiship of the Mālikīs, the rectorship of the 
Upper Egypt dormitory at al-Azhar, the professorship at al-Azhar, the leadership 
of the Khalwatī ṭarīqa, and the conscience of the ruling elite, accorded him a 
unique perspective on the status of social and religious life in Cairo.  Therefore, 
it is reasonable to surmise that changes in students’ aptitudes and aspirations, 
as well as the growing gulf between ruler and the ruled – contributing to greater 
instability in society – would impel him to leave a legacy that would facilitate 
accessibility to a tradition that seemed to be in danger of losing its ability to 
redefine itself, and adapt to circumstances that were now resisting the old 
assumptions.   
The notion of the intellectual and economic pre-eminence of the Muslim 
world was now clearly no longer viable, with the Napoleonic invasion less than 
                                             
109 Al-Dardīr’s educational method and legacy are more thoroughly treated in chapter 2. 
110 al-Dardīr and al-Ṣawī, Aqrab Al-Masālik 'Alā Al-Sharḥ Al-Ṣaghīr, 1:19. 
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two decades away, and the Ottoman hold on its Arab provinces more 
ceremonial than functional.  The following sections analyse al-Dardīr’s 
methodology in the synopsis and commentary known as al-Sharḥ al-Ṣaghīr, 
with reference to the objectives mentioned in his introduction. 
Structure  
 
 The overall structure of Aqrab al-Masālik closely follows that of Khalīl’s 
Mukhtaṣar in terms of subject order, with slight changes that appear to be borne 
out of a desire to commit to a more logical presentation than that of the 
Mukhtaṣar.  For example, al-Dardīr in the chapter on ritual purification and 
water departs from Khalīl by placing the subsection on bathroom etiquettes 
immediately after the section on removing physical impurities and before the 
section on ritual ablution, whereas Khalīl places this section after the section on 
ritual ablution.  From a logical perspective, al-Dardīr’s order is sounder for 
obvious reasons.111   
Al-Dardīr applies themes from logic (manṭiq) via his ḥudūd or ta‘rīfāt 
(logical definitions) for juristic concepts to arrive at precise definitions.  He 
prefaces nearly every chapter with a definition of the subject at hand.  For 
example, he defines ritual purity (ṭahāra) as: “a designated attribute (ṣifa 
hukmiyya) by which permissibility [is conferred] for that which ritual impurity 
(ḥadath), or the ruling of physical impurity (khabath), has prohibited.”112  He 
explains in the commentary his reasoning behind the definition, explaining that 
ritual purity is an attribute possessed by the ritually pure object, and only 
perceived by the intellect. It follows that it is then considered from amongst the 
                                             
111 As in one relieves oneself first before performing ritual ablution. Improperly washing after 
relieving oneself could nullify the ritual ablution if urine or other bodily excretions continue to 
flow. 
112 al-Dardīr and al-Ṣawī, Aqrab Al-Masālik 'Alā Al-Sharḥ Al-Ṣaghīr, 1:25. 
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attributes of aḥwāl (states),113 being a purely mental construct devoid of an 
extra-mental reality.  He also offers an alternate explanation for those who do 
not affirm ṣifāt al-aḥwāl but still assert the notion of extra-mental construct, 
referring to ritual purity as a ṣifa ‘itibāriyya (mentally designated attribute).  The 
difference being the two terms is that ṣifāt aḥwāl do exist, albeit in a state 
between extra-mental and merely mental existence, whereas ṣifāt ‘itibāriyya do 
not exist at all – as existence can only be extra-mental in this scheme – and 
therefore is a mentally designated construct, with no real existence.   
Al-Dardīr borrows from rational theology, in a manner he favours in his 
works of ‘aqīda, such as the Kharīda, and employs them here for a discussion 
on ritual purity.  While this may seem oft-putting – to mix disciplines, as it were – 
for al-Dardīr, the precepts of the taḥqīq tradition demand the unity of the Islamic 
disciplines and the sub-traditions that proceeded from them, an essential 
concept, though it may occasionally be obfuscated within the multi-layered 
complexity of terminologies and conceptual frameworks that shape the Islamic 
tradition as a whole.  Therefore, the use of frameworks from the kalām tradition 
is not out of order in al-Dardīr’s universe, as the same epistemological 
framework that informs the understanding of the Qur’ān and the ḥadīth, and 
articulates the meanings of divinity and prophecy, is also the one that informs 
and articulates the actions of the morally responsible (af‘āl al-mukallafīn), the 
subject matter of fiqh.   
                                             
113 Ṣifat al-Ḥāl is an attribute assigned by the intellect, though it has no existence outside of the 
intellect.  It was affirmed by some Ash‘arī ‘ulamā’ of kalām, specifically when referring to the 
positive divine attributes (al-ṣifāt al-ma‘nawiyyaī), such as God’s essence being omnipotent, 
knowledgeable, and wilful.  These attributes cannot be seen extra-mentally, but exist as 
exclusively mental constructs.  Others, such as al-Dardīr, did not prefer a state between 
“existence and non-existence”, and therefore dispensed with the notion of ṣifāt aḥwāl 
altogether, though he mentions it in his works as a contrasting opinion.  See al-Dardīr, Ḥāshiyat 
Al-Ṣāwī ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 354. 
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Other instances of this approach include his definition of buying as “a 
transactional exchange for other than [right of] use.”114  In the section regarding 
criminal punishments, he defines sariqa (theft) as: “the taking of a morally 
responsible person something of value equal to or greater than the minimum 
amount for designated punishment (niṣāb) from someone whose property is 
inviolable, without a strong mitigating factor [on the part of the thief], doing so 
surreptitiously from a secured area without permission [of the owner].”115  Al-
Dardīr then goes on to specify what each qualifier from the definition is meant to 
exclude, such as usurpation (ghaṣb), which although a form of theft, is 
accompanied by a claim of ownership, and hence not punishable by the ḥadd 
(mandatory) punishment. 
 Al-Dardīr also includes an extra section at the end of the synopsis, 
entitled: “Addendum of Various Issues and an Auspicious Conclusion”, which 
he begins by: “Gratitude to God is a legal obligation.”116  This addendum 
comprises primarily of taṣawwuf related issues, such as the importance of dhikr, 
supplicating for one’s parents, visiting the sick, the permissibility of cupping 
(ḥijāma), the affirmation that God alone is the author of all acts, and the virtue of 
true dreams.  In this, he appeals to an earlier style in the Mālikī tradition, 
initiated by Mālik himself, where a chapter of seemingly disparate issues are 
combined into a single chapter, usually called bāb jām‘ (chapter of various 
issues), as was in the case in the Muwaṭṭa, and the Risāla of Ibn Abī Zayd.117   
                                             
114 In the broader sense, as it also includes other transactions that include tamlīk al-‘ayn 
(transfer of ownership of property) for exchange, such as exchange of currency, whilst 
excluding leasing as it is an exchange for use, not ownership, and gift giving, as there is no 
exchange though there is transfer of ownership.  See al-Dardīr and al-Ṣawī, Aqrab Al-Masālik 
'Alā Al-Sharḥ Al-Ṣaghīr, 3:12. 
115 Ibid., 4:470-71. 
116 Ibid., 4:729. 
117 See Mālik Ibn Anas, Muwaṭṭa Mālik, ed. Muḥammad Fu'ād ‘Abd al-Bāqī (Cairo: Muṣtafa Bāb 
al-Ḥalabī, 1985); al-Qayrawānī, Al-Risāla Al-Fiqhiyya. 
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This section appears primarily as a plea for basic etiquettes and 
benevolence to others.  Al-Dardīr even mentions the importance of kindness 
and refraining from harming non-Muslim minorities.  The addendum to the 
Kharīda is strikingly similar, as if al-Dardīr is endeavouring to communicate the 
message that though these disciplines are important for the preservation and 
continuity of the tradition, it is equally, if not more important, to remember the 
basic values and principles that epitomise the tradition.  In this he is not 
dissimilar to al-Ghazālī, who wrote his magnum opus, the Iḥyā’, on the premise 
that peoples’ religious commitments had waned, and that a commitment to 
learning the Islamic disciplines as a mere matter of vocation is no guarantee 
that one will actualise the moral behaviours and principles that they are meant 
to instil. 
Departure from the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl 
 
 As al-Dardīr meant Aqrab al-Masālik to be an improvement upon Khalīl’s 
Mukhtaṣar, his legal clarifications and repositioning of textual references reveal 
his methodology.  As mentioned in his opening introduction, al-Dardīr states 
that the Mukhtaṣar suffered from ambiguities in the extension of its legal rulings 
i.e. whether a legal ruling encompasses all those who should be subject to it, as 
well as excluding all those who should not.  The following examples clarify the 
manner in which al-Dardīr endeavoured to make those clarifications.  
Example 1: In the chapter on the ownership of gold and silver vases, a 
distinction is made between (1) Vases made from gold and silver, (2) Vases 
made from gold or silver but plated on its surface with another substance such 
as brass or copper, (3) Vases made from wood or some other permissible 
substance, but pieced and held together by either gold or silver, and (4) Vases 
made from a permissible substance such as copper or iron, but plated with gold 
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or silver.  Khalīl mentions two opinions for each of the four cases, prohibition 
and reprehensibility, without claiming the rājiḥ (preponderant opinion).  Al-Dardīr 
states that the two opinions do not apply to all four cases, but only the last one 
(4), as the single dominant opinion for the first three cases is prohibition, and 
the rājiḥ for the last case is prohibition as well.118  
Example 2: In the chapter on wiping over leather socks in lieu of washing the 
feet for ritual ablution, Khalīl mentions that this is only permissible in travel not 
sanctioned by the sharī‘a i.e. a highway robber or runaway slave would not be 
permitted to do so.  Al-Dardīr counters this by refuting this qualifying factor as 
weak (ḍa‘īf), stating the general principle: “every dispensation permissible while 
resident is also permissible during travel”, and “every dispensation not 
permissible while resident is only permissible during lawful travel, such as 
breaking one’s fast during Ramaḍān, permissible only during lawful travel.”119 
Example 3: In the chapter on conditions of validity for the ritual prayer, 
specifically facing the direction of Mecca, Khalīl mentions this as an obligation 
on the condition that one faces no danger in doing so i.e. from an animal or 
assailant and the like, whereas as al-Dardīr adds an additional condition, the 
ability to turn towards the prayer direction.  Thus, someone infirm or 
incapacitated, and unable to turn towards Mecca is not obligated to do so, and 
their prayer remains valid.120   
Example 4: In the chapter on jihad, specifically the spoils of war, Khalīl 
mentions that a soldier who becomes separated from the army in enemy 
territory before the battle will nonetheless receive his share from the spoils, 
whereas if the separation happens in friendly territory, he forfeits his share.  Al-
                                             
118 al-Dardīr and al-Ṣawī, Aqrab Al-Masālik 'Alā Al-Sharḥ Al-Ṣaghīr, 1:61-62. 
119 Ibid., 1:153. 
120 Ibid., 1:293. 
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Dardīr counters that even if separation occurs in friendly territory, he receives 
his share nonetheless, based upon Mālik’s ruling in the Mudawwana.121 
Example 5: In the chapter on attestations for debts (iqrār), Khalīl states that if 
two or more attestations exist, whether oral or written, and the debt amounts are 
identical, then the attester is only bound by the single debt amount.  Al-Dardīr 
counters that this is the case only for verbal attestations.  For written 
attestations, each one is counted separately, and the attester is responsible for 
the sum, as the opinion of Ibn al-Qāsim and Aṣbagh is that written attestations 
are equivalent to monetary notes, and thus uniquely identified.122 
Example 6: In the chapter on endowments (awqāf), al-Dardīr mentions that an 
animal, food, or gold and silver are eligible to be dedicated to an endowment, 
though Khalīl reports taraddud, indicating lack of a clear opinion on the issue.  
Al-Dardīr counters this by stating that the Mudawwana is clear in its 
endorsement of the opinion of permissibility.  He favours this interpretation 
despite the fact that Ibn Rushd reported reprehensibility and Ibn Shās 
prohibition, reiterating that the narration in the Mudawwana takes precedence 
over the interpretations of later scholars.123 
Example 7: In the chapter on the forswearing a husband of his wife he 
suspects of adultery, the normal procedure is for the husband and wife to swear 
four times with the fifth invoking the curse of God and the wrath of God, 
respectively.  The husband is to begin, as he is the claimant.  However, if the 
wife begins before the husband, Khalīl, citing the opinion of Ibn al-Qāsim, posits 
that she need not repeat her disavowal swearing.  Al-Dardīr counters that even 
though it is the opinion of Ibn al-Qāsim, no one made tarjīḥ of his opinion, and 
                                             
121 Ibid., 2:299. 
122 Ibid., 3:537. 
123 Ibid., 4:102. 
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thus, the dominant opinion is that her first disavowal is disregarded, and she 
must repeat the initial disavowal.124 
Al-Dardīr’s Methodology of Legal Plurality Minimisation 
 
 Al-Dardīr’s approach to legal rule determination by minimising, and in 
most cases eliminating all legal opinions except the muftā bi-hi, as he declares 
in both his commentaries (al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr and al-Sharḥ al-Ṣaghīr), is best 
defined as tarjiḥ.  This is a legal term used by jurists across the four schools to 
weigh often conflicting opinions of a madhhab’s jurisconsults – those who are 
recognised as capable of using the eponymous imam’s methodology to derive 
legal rulings from the primary sources of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth.   
Hallaq posits that the process that created legal pluralism i.e. the 
discovery of the law by both purely hermeneutical and completely individualistic 
means led to the realisation that a similar process had to be adopted to reduce 
plurality to a minimum. Tarjīḥ is the process by which these different opinions on 
a given legal issue were evaluated in order to determine the soundest or the 
weightiest from an epistemological perspective.125  
It has been demonstrated that the Mālikī tradition employed a 
sophisticated system predicated on the use of terms such as mashhūr, rājiḥ, 
ṣaḥīḥ, etc., to assign epistemic values to conflicting legal opinions.  This work 
was largely done by Ibn al-Ḥājib in Jāmi‘ al-Ummahāt, but reached its 
cumulative pinnacle in Khalīl’s Mukhtaṣar.  The overall process by which these 
values are assigned is known in the larger fiqh tradition as tarjīḥ, 
notwithstanding the specific term used by the Mālikīs, i.e. the rājiḥ in ascribing a 
specific epistemic value to the “weightiest” opinion in terms of the 
preponderance of the juristic evidence supporting it (mā qawiya dalīluhu).  It 
                                             
124 Ibid., 2:664. 
125 Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law, 127. 
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should not be conflated with the same term used in the uṣūl al-fiqh tradition, 
where tarjīḥ is defined as “favouring some juristic evidentiary indications over 
others to produce a higher probabilistic outcome.”126   
Juristic evidentiary indications (amārāt) are words carefully crafted to 
avoid the notion that the texts of the primary sources of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth 
could possibly contradict one another.  The process of tarjīḥ in the uṣūl al-fiqh 
tradition is the means by which human limitations in interpretations of the texts 
can be minimised using a set of epistemological rules.  This process, while 
similar to the tarjīḥ in the fiqh tradition, is not identical, and it appears that Hallaq 
conflates them, where, in the discussion of tarjīḥ in the fiqh tradition (positive 
law) he lists the hierarchy of juristic evidence: consensus, Qur’ān, multiply 
transmitted traditions, solitary traditions, and qiyās.127  This epistemic hierarchy 
clearly refers to tarjīḥ in the uṣūl al-fiqh tradition.   
While the fiqh tradition shares a similar objective – the weighing of 
evidence – the nature of that evidence is markedly different.  In the Mālikī 
tradition, tarjīḥ, as defined by Ibn Farḥūn, is the weighing via a set of epistemic 
rules of two or more legal opinions attributed to the early Mālikī jurisconsults.  
These rules are based on the value of specific narrations of specific scholars in 
the ummahāt.  These rules, which crystallised in the Mālikī tradition after Ibn al-
Ḥājib, are summarised as follows:128 
Hierarchal 
Priority  
Rule 
1 Mālik’s opinion as narrated by Ibn al-Qāsim in the 
Mudawwana 
2 Malik’s opinion as narrated by others in the Mudawwana 
3 Ibn al-Qāsim’s opinion in the Mudawwana 
4 Others’ opinions in the Mudawwana 
5 Mālik’s opinion as narrated by Ibn al-Qāsim in other than the 
                                             
126 Aḥmad ibn Zikrī al-Tilimsānī, Ghāyat Al-Marām Fī Sharḥ Muqadimmat Al-Imām (Beirut: Dār 
Ibn Ḥazm, 2005), 2:749. 
127 Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law, 127-28. 
128 ‘Alī, Iṣṭilāḥ Al-Madhhab ‘Ind Al-Mālikiyya, 387. 
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Mudawwana 
6 Mālik’s opinion as narrated by other than Ibn al-Qāsim in 
other than the Mudawwana 
7 Ibn al-Qāsim’s opinion in other than the Mudawwana 
8 The opinions of other jurisconsults in the madhhab 
 
Despite the Mālikīs agreement on the rules of tarjīḥ, there remained several 
issues where they did not reach agreement.  Chief amongst these is the 
definition of the mashhūr.  Despite their general consensus on the obligation of 
issuing fatwas according to the mashhūr, they differed about its precise 
meaning along three broad lines: (1) The opinion with the most voices in 
support of it, (2) the opinion with the strongest evidence (dalīl), and (3) the 
narration of Ibn al-Qāsim in the Mudawwana.  Of the three, al-Dardīr and others 
report the first opinion as the mu‘tamad (most relied upon).  The second opinion 
equates the rājiḥ with the mashhūr.  Al-Dardīr mentions in his commentary on 
Khalīl that the fatwa should only be issued with either the mashhūr or rājiḥ, 
thereby clarifying his opinion on the matter, as al-Dasūqī confirms in the 
gloss.129   
Nevertheless, there remains disagreement amongst the Mālikīs 
regarding the reporting of the mashhūr, and the legal opinions where there is no 
identifiable narration from either Mālik, Ibn al-Qāsim, or any of the other 
jurisconsults of the first degree.  Khalīl mentions this in his introduction to the 
Mukhtaṣar, where he uses the term khilāf for difference of opinion regarding the 
tashhīr (the reporting of the mashhūr).  Khalīl designated the four scholars 
mentioned in the previous section as his sources for reporting the mashhūr, but 
as has been demonstrated, he was often not successful in ascertaining the 
mashhūr or rājiḥ opinion, hence the need for his epistemic terms to indicate the 
reason that prevented him from doing so. 
                                             
129 Dasūqī, ʿIllaysh, and Dardīr, Ḥāshiyat Al-Dasūqī ʿalā Al-Sharḥ Al-Kabīr, 1:20. 
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 Al-Dardīr, conversely, reports the mashhūr or rājiḥ, on every single issue.  
The question remains as to what methodology, if any, did he avail himself to 
arrive at single fatwa legal opinions.  Based upon the examples in the previous 
two sections, it is our contention that a methodology of minimisation of plurality 
of legal rulings can be discerned as follows: 
1) Taṣḥīḥ al-Riwāya (Correction of the narration): Al-Dardīr eliminates 
plurality of opinion by correcting the narration as cited in the 
Mudawwana.  Where Khalīl reports difference of opinion, al-Dardīr 
corrects him when the narration from the Mudawwana is explicit.  See 
example 6. 
2) Takhrīj ‘alā al-Qā‘ida al-Fiqhiyya (Extrapolating based upon a Positive 
Law Maxim): The legal maxim, based upon a holistic reading of positive 
law (furū‘), differs from the juristic maxim (qā‘ida uṣūliyya).  The latter is a 
hermeneutical principle for the interpretation of the primary sources of 
the Qur’ān and ḥadīth, whilst the former is a universal maxim that 
combines particular instances of positive law.130  Al-Dardīr resorts to this 
when a reading of legal opinion is imprecise, according to the primacy of 
the legal maxim.  See example 2. 
3) Application of Logical Principles: When the recorded opinion defies a 
logical principle, al-Dardīr prefers the logical principle, such as the 
example regarding the alteration of a small amount of water in the 
commentary on Khalīl.  
4) Takhrīj (Extrapolating a legal opinion based upon another legal opinion 
that resembles it): Al-Dardīr does not use this term in his fiqh works, but 
instances of its functional use are abundant.  Hallaq mentions the dearth 
                                             
130 For a thorough discussion of the differences see Aḥmad ibn Idrīs Qarāfī, Al-Furūq, ed. 
Qāsim ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Shāṭṭ, and Muḥammad ʿAlī ibn Ḥusayn Mālikī (Bayrūt: ʿĀlam al-
Kutub, 1985), 1:2-3. 
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of research on this particular term.131  It was demonstrated above that 
Ibn al-Ḥājib refers to this term in juxtaposition to the epistemic term 
manṣūṣ (documented), referring to the existence of a documented 
opinion of Mālik, or one of the early jurisconsults.  The mukharraj, as 
defined by Ibn Farḥūn, is of three types: (1) the extrapolation of a ruling 
(where no documented ruling from the early Mālikī jurisconsults exists) 
from a documented ruling, (2) the extrapolation of a ruling, where a 
documented ruling exists, from another documented ruling contrary to it, 
and (3) the extrapolation of a ruling, where a documented ruling exists, 
from an identical documented ruling contrary to it, to produce two 
opinions each for the two rulings: one manṣūṣ (documented), and the 
other, mukharraj (extrapolated).132  Al-Dardīr makes use of the first type 
(1) regarding his ruling on the facing of the direction in prayer as being 
conditional on the ability to turn towards it, extrapolating the ruling from 
the removal of filth from one’s clothing, person, and place of prayer, and 
the covering of one’s nakedness, both of which are conditional on one’s 
ability to do so.  Since both are conditions of the validity of the prayer, 
and require action on the part of the performer, then the third aspect – 
namely the physical ability for performance, is also extended to facing 
the prayer direction.  See Example 3. 
5) Al-Akhdh bi-al-aḥwaṭ (Preference for the more religiously precautionary 
opinion): On occasion where multiple opinions are present in the 
madhhab on a single issue, al-Dardīr will favour what he refers to as al-
aḥwaṭ, without specific reference to a textual reference or jurisconsult.  
See example D. 
                                             
131 Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law, 45. 
132 Ibn Farḥūn, Kashf Al-Niqāb Al-Ḥājib Min Muṣṭalaḥ Ibn Al-Hājib, 104-05. 
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Hence, al-Dardīr’s methodology, while similar to his predecessors regarding 
the pre-eminence of Mālik’s opinion and Ibn al-Qāsim’s narrations and opinions, 
also includes application of logical principles, as well as legal maxims, and 
corrections of narrations by returning to the ummahāt sources, rather than 
relying on the interpretations of later jurisconsults.  Al-Dardīr did not simply 
rehash, but rather approached the inherited cumulative knowledge with a 
discerning eye, in the tradition of taḥqīq (verification), in a manner similar to his 
approach to the inherited kalām tradition.  This approach also characterised his 
political and social relationships, as the cumulative tradition informed the nature 
of the societal relationships of the ‘ulamā’ with the ruling elite and the masses.  
The manner by which al-Dardīr applied his understandings of the tradition in his 
societal roles as a member of the ‘ulamā’ is analysed in the next chapter. 
Chapter Five:  Al-Dardīr: ‘Ālim, Sufi, and Intercessor for the 
Masses 
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses al-Dardīr’s societal roles, specifically his relationships 
with the ruling elite, and the greater populace.  Its purpose is to evaluate the 
role of an early modern ‘ālim, such as al-Dardīr, in order to address the question 
stated in the introduction, as to what degree the societal roles exercised by al-
Dardīr reflect a tradition of engagement, collusion, or cooperation with the 
political elites.  This is significant to the purposes of this study, as the 
overarching contention is that the changing relationship of the spiritual elite – 
the ‘ulamā’ - with the ruling elite, as well as the general populace over the 
course of the post-classical period, was subject to the dictates of tradition, in 
that the ‘ulamā’ sought to ensure the transmission of the Islamic tradition and its 
intellectual sub-traditions, and engagement with both the ruling elite and the 
general populace was essential to succeeding in doing so.  Zarrūq cites as the 
eighty-ninth principle of Sufism the following:1 
The preservation of order is obligatory, and the maintenance of the public interest is 
necessary. For this reason, they reached consensus on the prohibition of rebelling against the 
ruler, either by word or deed, to the degree that they sanctioned prayers behind every just or 
corrupt leader, provided their corruption was not in the [acts] of the prayer…and the Prophet 
Muḥammad stated: “a people have not cursed their leader except that they are deprived of his 
good.” 
 
The preservation of order and maintenance of the public interest was the 
primary motivation (at least for ‘ulamā’ of integrity, as appears the case with 
Zarrūq and al-Dardīr), and not necessarily more personal motivations such as 
currying favour with the political elite or maintaining a monopoly on knowledge 
production, though such might have been the case with lesser known members 
                                             
1 Aḥmad Zarrūq, Qawā’id Al-Taṣawwuf , 125-6. 
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of the ‘ulamā’.  For the purposes of this study, al-Dardīr is analysed as a 
representative of a particular tradition amongst the ‘ulamā’, not as a unique 
case, nor as a typical example of all the ‘ulamā’ of his era. 
Al-Dardīr enjoyed a number of official positions within the Azhar 
hierarchy, as well as unofficial roles as defender and interlocutor for Cairo’s 
disenfranchised classes.  The extent to which the ‘ulamā’ form a distinct social 
class and their level of collaboration, collusion, or opposition to the ruling elites, 
has been widely debated in the academy, with no particular consensus 
reached.2  Following the framework of this thesis, it will be demonstrated that it 
is essential to examine the roles of the ‘ulamā’ under the construct of historical 
context.  Moreover, the transmission tradition paradigm provides a useful 
conceptual framework for understanding the continuity as well as departures of 
a figure such as al-Dardīr with and from his predecessors.  This chapter 
endeavours to address the question of the effect of his historical circumstances 
on his societal roles, as well address the larger question of the lacunae 
regarding the position of the ‘ulamā’ in the pre-colonial eighteenth century.    
The positioning of the ‘ulamā’ as a distinct, or even essential social class 
in pre-modern Muslim societies is one that has been widely adopted, and 
consequently, assumed by the majority of Western scholarship.3  The ‘ulamā’ in 
this paradigm functioned as guardians and interpreters of the sharī‘a, and their 
legitimacy amongst the masses facilitated their roles as interlocutors with the 
political elite, as well as defenders of the disenfranchised.  Their dependence 
                                             
2 See, for example: Meir Hatina, 'Ulama', Politics, and the Public Sphere : An Egyptian 
Perspective, Utah Series in Turkish and Islamic Studies (Salt Lake City: University of Utah 
Press, 2010); Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam : Custodians of 
Change (Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002); Chih, "Autorité Religieuse 
Et Rôle Public D’un Ouléma D’al-Azhar Au Xviiie Siècle : Vie Et Carrière Du Cheikh Ahmad Al-
Dardîr (1715-1786)."; I. Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolution 
of Modern Sunni Islam (London: Taurus Academic Studies, 2009). 
3 See for example: Winter, Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule: 1517-1798; Ira M. Lapidus, A 
History of Islamic Societies / Ira M. Lapidus  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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on the sultans and emirs for patronage, however, curbed the ‘ulamā’s ability to 
act as foil to the excesses of the rulers; some even alleged that they actively 
colluded with the ruling elite to pacify otherwise restive populations who often 
suffered under the stresses of authoritarian rule.4  The problem with this 
particular generalisation is that it assumes an essentialist nature to the social 
classes, including that of the political and scholarly elites in pre-modern Muslim 
societies that span several centuries as well as several languages and 
geographic regions. Indeed, some, such as al-Azmeh, has challenged the 
assumption that the ‘ulamā’ constitute a distinct corporate group:  
The ‘ulamā’ were not, sociologically speaking, a corporate group.  Moreover, they neither 
represented ‘society’ as such, nor the state, but different denominations had positions within 
both…Prior to the establishment of the Colleges, scholarship was not always a profession, and 
was most often combined with a different occupation… 
 
The division of Muslim societies that often accompanies this 
characterisation is composed along three major classes: (1) the ruling elite, (2) 
the scholarly elite, and (3) the masses (essentially everyone else).  
Furthermore, the Islam practiced by each is often generalised into a sort of 
nominal Islam for the political elite, “orthodox Islam” for the scholarly elite, and 
“popular” or “folk” Islam for the masses, of which most Sufi practices would fall, 
sometimes encompassing overtures to the occult.5   
For example, Gellner posits a framework of a “literate great tradition” of 
that included urban elites and the ‘ulamā’, and an “emotive and ecstatic little 
tradition” that included the Sufi ṭarīqas and the general masses that followed 
them.6  These two traditions were often in periods of tension with one another.  
Though Gellner ostensibly uses Morocco as a case study, he does not identify 
what era he refers to, and he assumes his theories work for all Muslim 
                                             
4 See Marsot, "The Political and Economic Functions of the 'Ulamā' in the 18th Century." 
5 See, for example: Lane and Poole, An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern 
Egyptians. 
6 Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 80-81. 
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societies, leaving one with the impression that “Muslim society” for him is an 
essentialist category that pervades all Muslim societies.  Furthermore, he draws 
a clear distinction between the “legalistic, restrained, arid Islam of the ‘ulamā” 
citing “urban Sufi mysticism” as its “alternative”, and “rural and tribal Sufi 
mysticism” as its “substitute”.7  Thus, the essentialising of Muslims extends to 
geography, class, and educational levels for Gellner.  The inherent difficulty, as 
Talal Asad has noted, is found in conceptualising a framework for Islam’s 
diversity – in all its facets – spanning geography, history, religious practice, 
scriptural hermeneutics, and language.  An often over looked fact is that the 
“Muslim world” has sizable Christian, Jewish, Druze, and Zoroastrian minorities, 
who constituted the majority in the early centuries of Islam.8  
As the framework of a transmission tradition has been the 
conceptualising method of this study in terms of inherited literary and scholarly 
traditions, this same framework is more useful for understanding a figure such 
al-Dardīr, a ‘ālim of the early modern era, and placing him in historical context 
with his predecessors, specifically in the different societal roles he assumed.  
Asad outlines a conceptual framework that can be used as starting point for the 
exploration of a figure such as al-Dardīr and his relationship to his society:9 
1) Narratives about culturally distinctive actors must try to translate and represent the 
historically-situated discourses of such actors as responses to the discourse of 
others, instead of schematizing and de-historicizing their actions. 
2) Anthropological analyses of social structure should focus not on typical actors but 
on the changing patterns of institutional relations and conditions (especially those 
we call political economies).  
3) The analysis of Middle Eastern political economies and the representation of 
Islamic "dramas" are essentially different kinds of discursive exercise which cannot 
be substituted for each other, although they can be significantly embedded in the 
same narrative, precisely because they are discourses.  
4) It is wrong to represent types of Islam as being correlated with types of social 
structure, on the implicit analogy with (ideological) superstructure and (social) base. 
5) Islam as the object of anthropological understanding should be approached as a 
                                             
7 Ibid. 
8 See Bulliet’s study on conversion to Islam in: Richard W. Bulliet, Conversion to Islam in the 
Medieval Period : An Essay in Quantitative History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1979). 
9 Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam. 
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discursive tradition that connects variously with the formation of moral selves, the 
manipulation of populations (or resistance to it), and the production of appropriate 
knowledges. 
 
For our purposes in the analysis of al-Dardīr’s societal roles as a 
member of the ‘ulamā’, points 1,2, and 5 are apposite.  Specifically, by 
analysing the development of the concept of the ‘ālim, which took on distinct 
meanings over different historical periods is essential to understanding al-Dardīr 
and his relationships with different elements of late eighteenth century Egyptian 
society.  The complicated relationship of the ‘ulamā’ with political authorities, for 
example, cannot be de-historicised without committing to an essentialisation of 
the ‘ulamā’ “class” (point 1).  Understanding the changing nature of religious 
and political authority in the period that led up the paradigm of confrontation in 
al-Dardīr’s context is crucial to analysing his “political” stances and motivations 
(point 2).  Noting that the primary concern of ‘ulamā’ such as al-Dardīr was the 
preservation of the tradition and its transmission, the analysis of his 
pedagogical approaches may be viewed in that light, rather than essentialising 
the behaviour of the ‘ulamā’ according to some form of their own self-interest, 
such as self-preservation (point 5).  While such a position may not be justifiable 
for all who were considered to be members of the ‘ulamā’, it is our contention 
that al-Dardīr, regardless of whether we consider him to be typical in that 
respect, or an exception to the rule, was indeed at least partially motivated by 
the aforementioned aims, as has been demonstrated in the previous chapters 
as regards his methodology in his works of theology, Sufism, and jurisprudence. 
 Asad criticises Gellner and Geertz for their essentialisation of the social 
classes in Muslim societies, principally in the notion of the contrast between the 
heterodox village Islam spearheaded by the Muslim saint, and the orthodox 
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urbane Islam of the city, anchored by the state aligned ‘ulamā’.10  This criticism 
seems entirely appropriate when considering al-Dardīr, who seems to defy the 
rigidity of these social structures.  Al-Dardīr was undoubtedly amongst the elite 
urban ‘ulamā’ of Cairo, but also a Sufi murshid and patron saint of the less 
“orthodox” urban poor.  Whether al-Dardīr was atypical in crossing these 
posited structural lines is beyond the scope of this study, but it appears that the 
Sufi ‘ulamā’ of the Ottoman period, beginning with Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī, and 
including his pupil, al-Sha’rānī, as well as al-Nābulusī, and al-Bakrī, all 
represented a tradition of a strong commitment to Sufism, especially Akbarian 
Sufism, coupled with an equally strong commitment to the Ash‘arī / four 
madhhabs understanding of orthodoxy / Sunni Islam.  Of these five figures, al-
Dardīr was most likely the most “establishment” ‘ālim, having occupied official 
positions at al-Azhar, but also most likely had the most antagonistic relationship 
with the political elite, having led urban protests against them on multiple 
occasions.   
Yet, it would be difficult to attribute the apparent paradoxes with al-Dardīr 
to purely social or historical factors; following Asad’s line of reasoning stated 
above, it would be apt to investigate al-Dardīr’s motivations by looking within his 
inherited traditions, rather than correlating typical social structures, such as the 
heterodox Sufi / orthodox ‘ālim dichotomy posited by Gellner and Geertz.  
Towards this end, a useful starting point may be to utilise a frame of 
reference expressed by the ‘ulamā’, namely the notion of hierarchy. Though the 
Qur’ān emphasises the equality of all humans before God in terms of the 
manner of how they will ultimately be judged by God in the afterlife,11 it also 
                                             
10 Ibid. 
11 See Qur’ān (2:253), (3:163), (6:165), (12:76), (58:11) for example. 
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speaks of varying ranks and degrees, for Prophets12, as well as for believers.13  
These ranks and degrees are based upon behaviour and moral excellence, not 
tribal or ethnic affiliations, or even gender.  The Prophet Muḥammad is reported 
to have proclaimed: “There is no degree for a white over a black, or a black over 
a white …except [in the realm] of understanding (taqwa) of God.”14   
This hierarchical taxonomy permeated Muslim worldviews of the Islamic 
disciplines as well as societal roles.  For example, depending upon a scholar’s 
level of mastery of the tools of juristic reasoning, he was ranked from mujtahid 
muṭlaq – the highest rank, to muqallid, the lowest.  The classification of ḥadīth 
narrators, Qur’ān exegetes, and the juristic, grammarian, and Sufi ṭabaqāt 
literature all are a further testament to the deep-seated nature of hierarchical 
consciousness in Islamic thought.  Al-Azmeh alleges that this hierarchical 
consciousness begin with the notion of being itself, with God occupying the 
highest category, in that His being is necessary, self-sufficient, timeless, 
endless, and indivisible, a notion obviously shared by the ‘ulamā’ of kalām.15 
Similarly, the taxonomy of hierarchies was applied to societal roles.  Nāsir al-
Dīn Ṭūsī’s quadripartite hierarchy in the seventh/thirteenth century of (1) people 
of knowledge and wisdom, (2) soldiers, (3) merchants, and (4) agrarians, 
corresponding to the four elements of water, fire, air, and earth is an example of 
hierarchical consciousness applied to societal roles.16  Ibn Khaldūn posits that 
                                             
12 Qur’ān (2:253) 
13 See Qur’ān (4:96), (6:165), (46:19) for example. 
14 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ḥanbal , Al-Musnad, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir (Miṣr: Dār al-
Maʿārif, 1972), #23972. 
15 Aziz al-Azmeh, Arabic Thought and Islamic Societies, Routledge Library Editions Politics of 
Islam Volume 1 (London: Routledge, 2013), ix, 295 pages, 1-9. 
16 Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, Being the Second Edition of the Sociology of 
Islam (Cambridge Eng.: University Press, 1957), 228-31. 
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the interdependent nature of societal relationships falls along hierarchal lines, 
with statesmen and scholars occupying the highest category.17   
Though this hierarchical consciousness, in keeping with the Qur’ānic and 
prophetic imperative, was based on meritocratic principles, and largely 
observed by the direct companions of Muhammad, the paradigm shifted with 
the onset of dynastic rule with the Umayyad Empire.  Authority, at least in the 
realm of political leadership, was conceded, even if acquired by force, in the 
interest of preserving societal harmony and in keeping with the maqāsid 
principle of “repelling of harm takes precedence of acquisition of benefit.”18  In 
an earlier period it would have been untenable to acquiesce to a violent and 
corrupt seizure of power, but in the interest of avoiding a greater harm, 
consensus amongst the ‘ulamā’ was reached regarding the prohibition of 
rebelling against even a corrupt ruler, provided the basic tenets of his Islamic 
practice were not contravened.19  Hence, the division along meritocratic lines for 
the imamate, or spiritual authority, and the caliphate, along dynastic lines, 
crystallised, and the ‘ulamā’ emerged as a separate entity from the political 
leadership. They additionally formed their counterpart as part of the category of 
the khawāṣṣ, or elite.   
In the commentary on the ḥadīth of al-naṣīha (counsel), al-Shabrakhītī (d. 
1106/1694), an Egyptian scholar who wrote a commentary on the Mukhtaṣar of 
Khalīl in addition to the forty ḥadīth of al-Nawawī, states that the imamate is of 
four types: (1) of revelation i.e. prophethood, (2) of [spiritual] inheritance i.e. 
knowledge, (3) of ritual devotion i.e. prayer, and (4) community and general 
                                             
17 Louise Marlow, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism in Islamic Thought, Cambridge Studies in 
Islamic Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 7. 
18 This particular issue of political authority made its way into the kalām literature due to the 
early civil strife brought about over the issue of succession.  See Josef van Ess, The Flowering 
of Muslim Theology (Cambridge, MA ; London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 125-28. 
19 See quote of Zarrūq cited at the beginning of this chapter. 
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interest i.e. khilāfa.  He further lists the responsibilities specifically towards (2) 
and (4), stating that from amongst the rights of the rulers upon the people are to 
help them to uphold the truth, to remind them gently about matters they may 
have overlooked regarding the affairs of the Muslims, to supplicate for their 
success and uprightness, and to abandon openly rebelling against them.   
As for the ‘ulamā’, one should accept that which they narrate, follow their juristic 
rulings, publicise their virtues, and maintain a good opinion of them.20   
Hence, the role of the ‘ulamā’ in the post-caliphate period was viewed 
primarily as a foil to counter the excesses of the rulers, but in a manner that 
would not bring about a greater harm.  Al-Shabrakhītī also mentions some 
supporting statements from Sahl ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Tustarī (d. 283/896), the 
renown Persian mystic and scholar who stated: “People will remain in a state as 
long as they revere the ruler and the scholars, and if they revere these two, God 
will rectify their worldly life and their afterlife, but if they belittle these two, He will 
ruin their worldly life and their afterlife.”21  Therefore, it appears in addition to the 
concerns of societal harmony and protection of life, a theology of acquiescing to 
the ruler, even if unjust, was pleasing to God, and that the manner by which 
their rectification could be courted was via pious supplication and provision of 
counsel, and not via open rebellion. 
Talal Asad alleges that the concept of “religion” as an anthropological 
category was one defined in post-Reformation Europe, where religion was a 
“transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon.”  Religion was infused with 
politics and held mass ramifications for society as well as the individual.  Now it 
                                             
20 Ibrāhīm ibn Marʿī Shabrakhītī and Aḥmad ibn Ḥijāzī Fashnī, Kitāb Al-Futūḥāt Al-Wahbīyah Bi-
Sharḥ Al-Arbaʻīn Ḥadīthan Al-Nawawīyya, (Miṣr: Maṭbaʻah al-Khayrīyah, 1304), 115. 
21 Ibid. 
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is the sole province of the individual, but essentially the same as it was before.22  
The challenge is not merely exposing this historical and conceptual 
anachronism, but rather conceptualising categories such as religion, legitimacy, 
authority, and the like, in distinct pre-modern Muslim societies over a period of 
centuries.  While this study is particularly concerned with the early modern 
period and specifically the figure of al-Dardīr, it is necessary to make some 
reference to the aforementioned categories over these historical periods and 
the manner by which they developed leading into the last period of rule in the 
Muslim world before the incursion of foreign occupying armies.   The demise of 
the Prophet Muhammad signified the end of an absolute, unmitigated union of 
legitimacy and authority, as subsequent periods were often defined by conflict 
between these themes.  Without legitimacy, one cannot claim authority, and 
without authority, legitimacy is impotent. 
The relationship between the ruling elite and scholarly elite in the Islamic 
world is a complex one that has witnessed periods of cooperation, 
confrontation, and measured parleys to achieve political and societal 
equilibriums.  The influence of theological polemics and societal discourse on 
political authority cannot be ignored.  Early sectarianism in the Islamic world 
that grew out of conflict over succession eventually developed into theological 
divides as well, where sectarian rebellions challenged the authority of the state 
throughout the Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, and Ottoman empires.  Such 
divides, were unknown during the Prophetic era. The Prophet Muḥammad was 
the sole source for interpreting scripture and implementing its practical 
application across all realms, including social, moral, and political spheres.  
Even throughout the period of the “rightly guided” caliphates of Abū Bakr, 
                                             
22 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam (Baltimore ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 28. 
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‘Umar, and to a lesser extent those of ‘Uthmān and ‘Alī, authority as regards to 
the responsibility for interpretation of scripture and executive power were united 
in the office of the Caliph.  As the four caliphs were all senior companions and 
lieutenants of the Prophet Muḥammad, their authority as leaders of the faithful, 
both outwardly (al-khilāfa al-ẓāhira) and inwardly (al-khilāfa al-bāṭina) were 
never seriously challenged.23   
The fitna that began towards the end of ‘Uthmān’s reign, and continued 
after his assassination into the reign of ‘Alī, was of a strictly political nature.  It 
did not evolve into a theological one, questioning the religious legitimacy of the 
caliph, until armies were assembled on both sides of the political divide and 
sectarian offshoots emerged to challenge the appropriateness of Muslims 
bearing arms against each other.  Thereafter, distinct theological groups 
appeared, such as the Ahl al-Sunna w’al-Jamā‘a, the Khawārij and the Shī’a 
(Party) of ‘Alī.  
Thereafter a paradigm with distinct political and religious lines replaced 
one of a single political and religious authority.  The fortunes of one did not 
always follow the fortunes of the other, but there is little doubt that the two were 
inextricably linked.  The era of al-Dardīr witnessed a complex relationship, 
where the ‘ulamā’ retained their position as vanguards of societal justice, but 
were dependent upon the ruling elites’ patronage for survival.  As al-Jabartī 
laments, some of the ‘ulamā’ actively sought to avail themselves of the emirs’ 
patronage, while others, such as al-Dardīr and al-Ṣa‘īdī, openly resisted and 
deemed it an affront to subject themselves to such indignities.  Such stances 
bolstered their credibility and sway with the masses, earning the respect of the 
emirs who realised their counterparts could not be bought or trifled with. 
                                             
23 Al-Khilāfa al-bāṭina and al-khilāfa al-ẓāhira: terms used by the Andalusian scholar and mystic, 
Ibn ‘Arabī to denote the split between the two that occurred after the assassination of ‘Alī.  This 
concept is expanded further below. 
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Napoleon realised the significance of the Azhar ‘ulamā’ upon his invasion 
of Egypt in 1798 (twelve years after al-Dardīr’s death) and hastily formed a 
“dīwān” council, consisting of members of the Azhar elite, such as the then 
rector of al-Azhar, ‘Abd Allah al-Sharqāwī (d. 1227/1812).24 The Azharīs in all 
likelihood made a calculated decision that cooperating with the invading force 
was preferable to risking complete annihilation.  The cooperative era, however, 
was short-lived, as the urban population grew restive and outright rebellion 
became a more tenable option.  On the morning of the 22nd of October 1798, 
the Egyptian uprising began in earnest.25  Napoleon aimed his canons at al-
Azhar itself, the apparent source of the uprising.  After the quelling of the 
rebellion, some five or six thousand people were killed in or around al-Azhar; its 
‘ulamā’ were then routinely executed by Napoleon’s orders for months 
thereafter.26  
The succeeding period, beginning with the ascendancy of Muḥammad 
‘Alī Pasha, witnessed the emergence of a new paradigm where the ‘ulamā’s 
pre-eminence in intellectual and societal circles began to be seriously 
challenged by the instruments of modernity: enlightenment, industrialism, and 
nationalism.27  A parallel educational system was instituted to train a cadre of 
civil servants to run the new bureaucracy, while the religious endowment 
infrastructure that had for centuries safeguarded the scholarly class’s interest 
and separation from the ruling class, was now usurped under the pretext of a 
systematic nationalisation regime.28  The ‘ulamā’ did not capitulate without a 
                                             
24 Petry and Daly, The Cambridge History of Egypt, 2:125. 
25 Muḥammad Jalāl Kishk, Wa-Dakhalat Al-Khayl Al-Azhar, (Bayrūt: al-Dār al-ʿIlmīyah, 1972). 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali. Though this three-pronged 
paradigm shift is used to characterise Europe’s foray into the Modern age from 1600-1800, a 
similar phenomenon occurred in the Muslim world, specifically Egypt, albeit about one hundred 
years later.  
28 See Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt. 
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fight, as has been documented by Hatina29 and Gesink30, but the old paradigm 
was gone forever.  No longer would the ruling elite pander to the demands of 
the ‘ulamā’ as advocates for social justice.  The urban masses that had 
heretofore depended upon the moral and political influence of the Azhar elite, 
had to now forge new heroes.  Thus, the liberal age was ushered in and the 
secular public intellectual made his first appearance.  Figures such as Taha 
Ḥusayn, who were Azharīs by training, nevertheless engaged with the public on 
a completely new level, via print, in a matter that openly challenged the 
obsolescent ways of the Azhar vanguard, with their flowing robes and country 
accents.   
The new exemplar was urbane, and complemented his fluency in French 
with English tailored ensembles, though he retained the fez as a gesture to 
Egyptian nationalism.  Others, such as Rifā‘a al-Ṭaḥṭāwī (d. 1290/1873), 
learned the French tongue, but retained the flowing robes and turban, in an 
effort to reconcile the political and military superiority of the European colonist, 
and the pre-eminence of the sacred Islamic texts and divine favour of the 
Muslim community.   
Muḥammad Abdu (d. 1905), perhaps the most iconic figure of the 
Egyptian nineteenth century, took up the mantle of reform, specifically that of 
the Azhar institution itself, in an effort to modernise and cast off the traditional 
methods, a leading contributor of Islamic and Arab backwardness, in his 
estimation.31  His reformist agenda was opposed by Muḥammad ‘Ilīsh (d. 
1299/1882), the heir apparent of the ‘ulamā’ of pre-Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha 
Egypt, with more than a passing resemblance to al-Dardīr (subscribing to the 
                                             
29 Hatina, 'Ulama', Politics, and the Public Sphere : An Egyptian Perspective, 28-39. 
30 Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolution of Modern Sunni 
Islam, 89-109. 
31 See Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939, 130-60. 
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Mālikī school and having penned a gloss on al-Dardīr’s main treatise in 
jurisprudence), who openly questioned Abdu’s scholarly credentials.32  His more 
conservative peers viewed Abdu not as a challenging peer, but rather an 
illegitimate interloper and upstart.  To what extent the lack of respect accorded 
to him by the Azhar elite fuelled his reform project may never truly be known, 
but there is little doubt he harboured more than an insignificant amount of 
resentment to the “club” that never endorsed his membership.  
This chapter analyses the question of the societal role of al-Dardīr, in 
terms of his contemporaries, as well as within the historical narrative of a 
distinct category of the ‘ālim, a figure invested with spiritual authority and 
inheritor of the Prophetic tradition, but also a member of society’s elite, a status 
shared only with the rulers. In order to properly contextualise al-Dardīr’s position 
as both scholar, a member of society’s elite, and patron saint and champion of 
the disenfranchised, a paradigm establishing the relationship of Muslim scholars 
with their societies in preceding eras is in order.   
The traditional taxonomies of “intellectual Islam” and “popular Islam”, of 
“arid and rigid ‘ulamā’” and “emotive Sufi shaykhs” are questioned in this 
chapter as a useful approach to understanding the diversity within Islam, both in 
its breadth of locales and history, as well as the practices and motivations of its 
adherents. The discursive tradition that theorises the motivations and actions of 
Islam’s intellectual elite is also a viable framework for the evaluation of their 
societal roles. The period of Prophetic revelation, of the four caliphs, of the 
Umayyad dynasty and the Abbasid dynasties, of the Ayyubid and Mamlūk 
dynasties, and of al-Dardīr, are analysed, in order to demonstrate the evolving 
response to contextual circumstances.  It is our contention this developed in a 
                                             
32 See Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolution of Modern Sunni 
Islam, 94-95. 
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similar manner to their approach in preserving and transmitting the Islamic 
disciplines. 
Indeed, the succeeding period marked the paradigmatic shift of the 
millennium, in the era of nation-state formation and the ascendancy of 
institutionalised government, as well as the emergence of intellectual elites 
outside of the Islamic literary tradition. This chapter demonstrates that al-Dardīr 
occupied a unique period in Islamic history, a transitional one, where the 
intercession of the ‘ulamā’ proved ineffective, though the general deference and 
respect to the ‘ulamā’ was preserved.  Furthermore, it challenges the prevailing 
paradigm and makes the case for an alternative framework to assess the role of 
the Muslim scholar as one of response to a set of complex societal and 
intellectual factors, rather than an essentialist “Islamic” response.  
 
  
 274 
The ‘Ulamā’ in the Ottoman Egypt of al-Dardīr 
 
 When Sultan Selim deposed the Mamlūk authorities in 1517, as part of a 
broader campaign that saw Islam’s traditional centres of scholarly influence, 
Cairo, Damascus, and the Hejaz, come under Ottoman suzerainty, he was no 
doubt aware of the scholarly heritage he was inheriting.  Today, the Suleymanie 
library in Istanbul remains the largest depository of Islamic manuscripts in the 
Muslim world, with 68,000 manuscripts of mostly Arabic and some of Ottoman 
Turkish origin.  Many of these manuscripts were carried from Cairo and 
Damascus; recognition of the scholarly production and calibre of the newly 
acquired provinces was emblematic of the new Ottoman regime.  Nevertheless, 
the Ottomans wasted little time in installing a chief judge  - appointed in Istanbul 
– to oversee all judicial affairs in Egypt.   
This represented a break from the Mamlūk tradition of appointing native 
Egyptians to the post.  Additionally, the qāḍī ‘askar was always of the Ḥanafī 
school, where in Egypt the dominant schools were the Shāfi’ī and Mālikī 
schools.33  It appears that the Egyptian ‘ulamā’ had little respect for the 
scholarly credential of their Turkish counterparts sent to Cairo.  Al-Dardīr on 
several occasions laments the state of the judicial system.34  The Ottomans 
also instituted other unpopular measures at the outset of their rule, in ways that 
incensed the local Egyptian ‘ulamā’, as well as the general populace.35  
Ottoman authorities collected new taxes on marriages and divorces.  Most 
circumvented these new levies by electing to not record their marriages and 
                                             
33 Doris Behrens-Abouseif, Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule : Institutions, Waqf and 
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34 See, for example: al-Dardīr and al-Ṣawī, Aqrab Al-Masālik 'Alā Al-Sharḥ Al-Ṣaghīr, 4:191-92. 
35 Behrens-Abouseif, Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule : Institutions, Waqf and Architecture 
in Cairo (16th and 17th Centuries), 70-75. 
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divorces with the state.36  The Ottomans also attempted to install some 
borrowed cultural practices from Istanbul in Cairo, such as the prohibition of 
women riding donkeys or leaving their homes, or visiting the ḥammām or the 
cemetery.37  These prohibitions were a product of the strict Ḥanafī code that the 
Ottomans abided by and reproduced for the newly acquired Egyptian province 
in the Qānūn Nāma.38  Most Egyptians, on the other hand, adhered to either the 
Mālikī or Shāfi‘ī schools of jurisprudence, and were unaccustomed to the stricter 
Ḥanafī precepts, especially in matters concerning women and public morality.   
 Abd al-Ghānī al-Nābulusī is one of the most celebrated scholars of the 
Ottoman era.  Al-Dardīr traces his Sufi pedigree to him via his direct student, 
Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī.  He offers a glimpse into the international scholarly culture 
that developed in the Ottoman period, recounting his longest excursion outside 
his native city of Damascus in his travel journal: al-Ḥaqīqa wa’l-Majāz fī al-Riḥla 
ilā Bilād al-Shām wa Miṣr wa al-Ḥijāz (Literalness and Metaphor in the Journey 
to the Lands of Greater Syria, Egypt, and the Hejaz).   
Al-Nābulusī visited Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt and the Hejaz over a 
period of 388 days, making it the longest continuous trip of his life.39  His 
accounts mostly include majālis with local Egyptian ‘ulamā’ and ziyārāt to the 
various mausoleums in the vast cemetery in central Cairo known as al-Qarāfa.  
However, he offers a glimpse into the ‘ulamā’ interactions with the ruling elite, 
whom he refers to as the “wazīr of Egypt” – most likely a reference to the 
Ottoman viceroy.  He mentions that his host in Cairo, Shaykh Zayn al-‘Abidīn al-
Bakrī al-Ṣiddīqī, the leader of the influential sharifan Bakrī clan, was summoned 
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every Saturday by the Ottoman viceroy for consultative talks.  Al-Nābulusī 
accompanied the shaykh on one of these appointments, by the shaykh’s 
request, and makes a comment about the experience much more telling than 
the sum of its words:40 
As I used to go with him (Shaykh al-Bakrī) and we would spends our day [discussing] scholarly 
issues as well as jurisprudential ones and all that which would be appropriate for consultation 
with the State that are of benefit according to consensus.  [This] is done with honest counsel, 
eloquent and gentle words, taken from the [maxim] of “use the words of the speaker” and “use 
gentle persuasion as long as you are in their home” (dārihim mā dumta fī dārihim) and “please 
them as long as you are in their lands” (arḍihim mā dumta fī arḍihim) and “salute them as long 
as you are in their neighbourhood” (ḥayyihim mā dumta fī ḥayyihim); as direct verbal censure is 
more difficult on the souls than the stab of a dagger, especially when dealing with the elite 
(akābir), for the admonition of sincere states is more articulate than the pronounced words of 
the pulpits. 
 
Al-Nābulusī summarises the attitude of the ‘ulamā’ of his time (and one would 
suspect shortly before his time as well) as regards to their relationship with 
political elites.  Despite his outward admiration for the Ottomans, it was not lost 
on al-Nābulusī the fickleness of authoritarian rule; his reference to proverbs that 
are reminiscent of Bedouin tribal relations offers a glimpse into the 
understanding of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in pre-modern 
Muslim societies: the concept of rā‘ī and ra‘iyya (shepherd and flock).  The ruler 
was entrusted with the fulfilment of the rights of those he rules (which more or 
less amounted to dispute adjudication and dispensing of criminal justice), and it 
is by his good graces that such rights could be fulfilled.   
There was no inherent system of checks and balances to limit the ruler’s 
power, with the only restraint being the counsel and influence of the ‘ulamā’, 
who acted as guardians and interpreters of scripture and tradition.  As a guest, 
al-Nābulusī, was interested in urging him to uphold justice and moral principles, 
rather than having a fear of the ruler’s wrath.  This was part of the broader 
understanding of communal benefit and harm (maṣlaḥa and mafsada).  Others 
have posited that the ‘ulamā’ were in collusion with the ruling elites, as the 
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exchange of patronage for help in governance and quelling the public defined 
the symbiotic relationship between them.41  While even al-Jabartī acknowledges 
the presence of unscrupulous pretenders amongst the ranks of the scholarly 
elite, one is left with the impression that this was the exception rather than the 
rule, especially at the highest levels of the scholarly elite, such as the muftiships 
and the rectorship of al-Azhar.  Al-Jabartī mentions ‘ulamā’ such as al-Ḥifnī, al-
Ṣa‘īdī, and al-Dardīr as figures that commanded the respect of the Mamlūk 
emirs, if not outright fear.  While many of the ‘ulamā’ were dependent upon the 
graces of the political elite for survival, the relationship withstands further 
scrutiny.  Al-Dardīr, for example, and his teacher before him, al-Ṣa‘īdī, were 
beneficiaries of the expansion of the Azhar mosque (which nearly doubled its 
size) and establishment of the Upper Egypt dormitory (riwāq al-ṣa‘ida) by ‘Abd 
al-Raḥmān Katuhkdā (d. 1190/1776), a Mamlūk emir who eschewed political 
squabbling for major infrastructure works.  The extent of his spending easily 
made him the most prolific patron of mosques, madrasas, and sabīls in the 
Ottoman era.42   
Al-Jabartī does not fall short in praise of Katuhkdā, and blames factional 
squabbling for his failure to command the political authority in Egypt.  Whether 
he was trying to acquire political capital via his various building projects, or 
forge a new legacy outside of politics, it appears, in any case, that Katuhkdā 
was not necessarily trying to curry favour with the ‘ulamā’ as a means to 
procure their loyalty and raise his political standing.  Al-Jabartī does not 
insinuate that the ‘ulamā’ ever interfered in issues of succession and Mamlūk 
factionalism, so such a motive on the part of this particular Mamlūk emir 
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appears unlikely.  Al-Dardīr was also the beneficiary of the patronage of the 
Sultan of Morocco as previously noted.  Such a relationship could not have 
been predicated on any ability of al-Dardīr to legitimise the Sultan’s rule in 
Morocco.  Al-Dardīr was not the only beneficiary, as other Mālikī scholars 
received yearly stipends, due to their jurisprudential affiliation, as the school of 
Mālik was the dominant school in North Africa. An argument could be made for 
religious legitimation, as the Sultan of Morocco at the time of al-Dardīr was 
facing entanglements with his own ‘ulamā’, and sought to dictate the curriculum 
to be taught at Morocco’s counterpart to al-Azhar, al-Qarawiyyīn.   He even sent 
a questionnaire to the Egyptian ‘ulamā’, almost certainly including al-Dardīr, 
soliciting their opinion as regards to the curriculum he selected for Morocco’s 
most prestigious institution of learning.43    
The same Sultan also had a notable encounter with al-Dardīr’s friend and 
contemporary, Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī, where he rebuked him for wasting his time 
penning a commentary on al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’, even penning a polemical treatise 
against the book. This particular attitude of Sultan Muḥammad “was related to 
his struggle against the religious autonomy of the Fez scholars whom he saw as 
a challenge to his claim as caliphal ruler and who were at the same time 
strongly committed to that book.”44  Thus, it would seem that in the Ottoman 
period there was a diversification of both the ruling elites and the religious 
scholars.  The Mamlūks of Egypt, after resurging to prominence after their 
disastrous defeat at the hands of the Ottomans, retained their relative ignorance 
of Islamic intellectual sensitivities and had no designs on divesting the ‘ulamā’ 
of their political and social influence.  The Ottoman rulers were more attuned to 
the significance of the ‘ulamā’ and may have had a genuine appreciation, 
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underscored by their commitment to patronising cultural institutions in their Arab 
provinces, such as the mausoleum and complex of Ibn al-‘Arabī in Damascus 
and the Khusrawiyya madrasa and complex in Aleppo.45  Yet, the Mamlūk 
renaissance, as it were, would be short lived. The weakening of the Ottoman 
hold on Egypt in the face of growing conflicts at home, left a quasi-sanctioned 
transference of power to the Mamlūks, who were growing in despotism as well 
as incompetence due to political ambitions and infighting.   
The older paradigm of measured engagement on the part of the ‘ulamā’ 
was no longer sustainable in the wake of wide-scale suffering and loosening of 
morals on the part of the common populace.  Scholars such as al-Ṣa‘īdī, al-
Ḥifnī, and most notably al-Dardīr, adopted more aggressive stances towards 
Mamlūk malfeasance, as well as greater engagement with the beleaguered 
population, most significantly via the propagation of the Sufi brotherhoods, and 
intercession on their behalf to address grievances with the Mamlūk elites.  The 
following sections analyse al-Dardīr’s roles in these areas, in light of the 
paradigm shift that rendered the older paradigms obsolete.   
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Al-Dardīr: Quietest or Activist? 
 
Al-Dardīr represented the last generation of ‘ulamā’ who wielded 
considerable societal influence in multiple spheres, in addition to their traditional 
scholarly output.  After the Napoleonic invasion, and subsequent evacuation of 
the French forces by combined Anglo-Ottoman forces, a new era was ushered 
in with the ascendancy of the Albanian army officer, Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha, as 
ruler of Egypt.  Though the Azhar elite initially supported his campaign to be 
sole ruler of Egypt, likely due to their belief that he would be able to restore 
economic and political order in the wake of the tumult of the past decade, as 
has been suggested,46 it became apparent that their pre-Napoleon levels of 
influence would end with the new leadership.  Often touted as the “founder of 
modern Egypt”, Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha would go on to institute reforms that 
directly challenged the authority of the Azhar ‘ulamā’, such as establishing a 
parallel education system.  This included an institution that was a clear 
challenge to the monopoly on Islamic higher learning that the Azhar enjoyed, in 
the form of Dār al-‘Ulūm, and more significantly, the appropriation of the Azhar’s 
lifeline, its many charitable endowments.47  
Al-Dardīr had a notable relationship with the ruling elite of his time.  This 
relationship was primarily with the Mamlūk elites, as the provincial governor 
sent by Istanbul, or “wazīr of Egypt” as referred to in an earlier epoch by al-
Nābulusī, carried little influence or power, and was a titular figurehead.  The real 
political authority rested with Shaykh al-Balad, a Mamlūk emir vested with the 
supervision of revenue from tax farms (iltizāms) and the appointment of the emir 
al-hajj as well as other positions of prestige and influence.  At the time of al-
Dardīr, after he had assumed his main positions of influence, namely the Mufti 
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of the Mālikī school, the supervisor of the Upper Egypt dormitory at al-Azhar, 
and the shaykh of the Khalwatī Sufi ṭarīqa, the Mamlūk balance of power 
disintegrated into a duumvirate between two competing Mamlūk emirs: Ibrāhīm 
Bey (d. 1816) and Murād Bey (d.1801).  The period preceding the duumvirate 
by their master, Muḥammad Bey Abū Dhahab (d. 1775) was one of relative 
stability.  The “dispenser of gold” was well liked by the public and the elite alike.  
It was upon his demise, and the splitting of authority between Ibrāhīm and 
Murād that the question of political authority, as well as legitimacy, were brought 
to the forefront once more.   
The duumvirate’s refusal to pay their yearly tribute to the Sublime Porte 
precipitated its wrath and prompted a military invasion led by the Ottoman 
admiral Ḥasan Ghazi Pasha in 1786, the year of al-Dardīr’s death.  Perhaps 
one of al-Dardīr’s last acts as patron saint was his request of the admiral to 
reconsider the military operation, so as to spare the Cairo populace further 
instability and bloodshed, a request that was denied.48  Ibrāhīm and Murād Bey 
fled to the hinterlands of Upper Egypt, a place considered the traditional 
province of self-exile.  Yet, upon the admiral’s return to Istanbul, they quickly 
deposed the Mamlūk emir installed by the Ottoman suzerainty and reassumed 
the reins of power, until their final deposition fourteen years later by Napoleon 
Bonaparte.  
 Al-Jabartī, the near exclusive authority on the historical period of al-
Dardīr, records several notable interactions with the Mamlūk emirs.  In 
1191/1777, a dispute arose between two factions of Moroccans from the 
mujāwirīn at the Azhar mosque regarding a charitable endowment (waqf) that 
one faction had usurped at the expense of another.  The issue was resolved in 
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the courts for the faction with the proper waqf deed, but the losing faction had 
solicited the help of one of the Mamlūk emirs, Yūsuf Bey.  Unable to prove 
effective in the dispute, he became indignant and sent a party of his men to 
arrest a man referred to as Shaykh ‘Abbās, the leader of the winning faction 
and the object of his scorn.  Consequently, he and his group of Moroccans – 
who had won their right in the Ottoman court – were forcibly removed from al-
Azhar by Yūsuf Bey’s men.   
Consequently, they informed al-Dardīr, who then sent a letter to Yūsuf 
Bey advising him to honour the court ruling and to desist from molesting the 
people of scholarly knowledge and repute.  Yūsuf Bey met his letter with anger 
as he imprisoned the carriers of the letter.  The next morning, after informed of 
Yūsuf Bey’s actions, al-Dardīr interrupted all activities at al-Azhar, including 
congregational prayers, and locked the doors to the mosque-compound.  He 
and a number of other Azharī shaykhs sat in the old prayer niche while the 
younger students stood atop the manāra (raised platform to call the adhān) and 
raised their voices in supplication against the emirs.  Traders in the surrounding 
shops also closed and the escalation initiated by al-Dardīr forced Yūsuf Bey to 
free the prisoners.  Other Mamlūk emirs became involved and after some 
bloodshed, and the death of three of the Moroccans, the situation calmed, as 
one of the emirs, Ibrāhīm Bey, one of the two leaders of the duumvirate, offered 
terms of truce between them and the shaykhs.   
This offer was predicated on the assumption of the security affairs of al-
Azhar in lieu of the Agha, the security representative of the Ottoman vizier 
(pasha), as well as denying access to Ottoman officials from using the access 
street to al-Azhar.  The shaykhs, including al-Dardīr, presumably, rejected this 
offer, voicing their objection aggressively by proclaiming: “There is no basis for 
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this!” and stating that the street is open to all, both the upright and corrupt, and 
no one has the right to deny passage.  After some time, al-Jabartī mentions that 
both the Agha and the Pasha accessed the street, thereby rendering the 
Mamlūk request a moot point.49 
 This anecdote is particularly telling, as it demonstrates the degree of 
influence and interaction of the scholars of al-Azhar, specifically for al-Dardīr, as 
he was viewed as their de-facto leader.  Though the rector (Shaykh) of al-Azhar 
was a powerful figure, and ostensibly should have wielded greater influence, it 
was al-Dardīr that the disenfranchised populace of Cairo would seek out for 
intercession on their behalf for the egregious trespasses of the Mamlūk emirs.  
The extent that al-Dardīr was willing to act on their behalf appears initially 
shocking; some modern Arab historians have referred to his actions as 
“uprisings”, which, when viewed in light of the disruption that they caused may 
not seem far fetched.50   
However, when taken in light of the view that al-Dardīr held of the 
Mamlūk emirs, that of usurpers and muḥāribīn (enemy combatants), then the 
extent of his actions seems commensurate with his convictions.  In the chapter 
on ḥirāba in the Sharḥ al-Kabīr– defined as the prevention or terrorising of a 
person or group from using a public road [or any public place where public 
access is assumed], whether for forced robbery, rape, or otherwise, in a manner 
where repelling them by force, law, or otherwise is of no avail.  Al-Dardīr then 
proceeds to provide an example, where he states after the previous definition: 
“and the despots from amongst Egypt’s rulers and others of their ilk usurp the 
wealth of the Muslims and prevent them from their livelihoods, negatively 
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impacting their country; and the seeking of intercession from the ‘ulamā’ or 
others proves futile.”51   
Al-Dasūqī, in his gloss, states that the ‘ulamā’ are ahl al-ḥall wa’l-‘aqd 
(the people of dissolution and accord).  The concept of ahl al-ḥall wa’l-‘aqd 
traces its origins to the early days of Islam, specifically when a khalīfa was 
chosen after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad.  The people recognised as 
leaders and of power and influence – they alone were the deciders of 
succession.  As the term indicates, theoretically they could also “dissolve” 
leaders and remove them from power.  However, after dynastic rule supplanted 
the caliphate, this in effect, never occurred.  Nevertheless, the notion of 
declaring the Mamlūk emirs as “enemy combatants” is predicated on two 
developments that were emblematic of al-Dardīr’s Egypt: (1) the Mamlūks were 
viewed as illegitimate usurpers of the Ottoman vizier’s authority, and (2) where 
once the respect accorded to the ‘ulamā’ was enough of a deterrent for political 
elites to at least ostensibly abide by the precepts of the sharī‘a, in the case of 
the Mamlūk Beys, and more specifically Murād and Ibrāhīm Bey, this was 
clearly no longer the case.   
With the death of both Muḥammad Abū Dhahab, whom al-Jabartī 
describes as one of the best emirs he knew in valour, courage, determination, 
wisdom, magnanimity, forbearance and as a lover of the ‘ulamā’ such as ‘Alī al-
Ṣa‘īdī52, the old paradigm of benevolent, if flawed, ruler, and intrepid scholar to 
keep him in check had ended.  The fickle and destructive duumvirate of Murād 
and Ibrāhīm Bey had begun, and a new paradigm emerged.  Al-Dardīr and his 
fellow Azharīs felt fully justified in causing severe public disruption, if not 
disorder, in order to secure the rights of the hapless Cairenes who were at the 
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mercy of the Beys, their continuous infighting, and their unsanctioned taxes to 
fund their internecine rivalry.  The malfeasance reached its apex in 1785, 
months before al-Dardīr’s death, but not before several significant events 
occurred that would come to define his legacy among the inhabitants of Egypt’s 
most populous city. 
 The first, as narrated by al-Jabartī, occurred when a group of marauding 
emirs ravaged the countryside of the delta region in northern Egypt, pillaging 
the cities of Rashīd, Dasūq, and Zanklūn, amongst others, in addition to the 
burning of churches and Coptic villages razed to the ground.  Amongst these 
emirs was Ḥusayn Bey, who then advanced his reign of pillage to Cairo, 
specifically the Ḥusayniyya district.  There he came upon the household of one 
of the servants of the shaykhs of al-Azhar and he emptied the house of 
everything in it, including bedding and the unmentionables of the female 
members of the household.   
The following morning the residents of the Ḥusayniyya district, armed 
with rods, sticks, and drums, marched to al-Azhar to speak to al-Dardīr.  Al-
Dardīr listened and assuaged them by saying: “I am with you.”  They then 
proceeded outside of al-Azhar, closing its gates behind them, and then forcing 
all surrounding shops to close as well in a manner that al-Jabartī describes as 
contemptible (munkara).  Al-Dardīr then proclaimed to the crowd: “Tomorrow we 
will summon the people of the surrounding areas in Bulāq and Old Cairo (al-
Fusṭāṭ); then I will ride out with you and we will plunder their houses as they 
plundered ours; we will either die as martyrs or God will grant us victory over 
them.”53  This attracted the attention of the emirs as well as the Ottoman aghas, 
who rode out to al-Dardīr and requested a list of all the stolen items and then 
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promised to return it all to its proper owners. When Ibrāhīm Bey spoke to 
Ḥusayn Bey about returning the stolen items, he replied sardonically: “We are 
all plunderers; you plunder, Murād Bey plunders, and I plunder.”  Al-Jabartī then 
reports that the tensions dissipated, but with nothing resolved, and the items 
remaining unreturned.54   
A few days later, a similar incident occurred, where a ship carrying 
foodstuffs for the residents of the Upper Egypt dormitory at al-Azhar one of the 
Mamlūk beys appropriated the shipment.  The dormitory residents rebelled and 
solicited the intercession of al-Dardīr, the official leader of the Upper Egypt 
dormitory.  He then rode out with two other Azhar shaykhs, and after some 
heated negotiations, some of the foodstuffs were returned, while the Mamlūk 
Bey kept most of the cargo.55   
 Another incident narrated by al-Jabartī occurred during the annual 
mawlid festival in the Delta city of Ṭanṭā, where al-Dardīr attended to visit the 
tomb of Aḥmad al-Badawī, the city’s patron saint.  The kāshif (local 
administrator) imposed a duty of half a French riyal on each camel sold at the 
market; in the last days of the mawlid, some agents of the kāshif seized some 
camels belonging to some sharīfs (people who share lineage with the Prophet 
Muḥammad).  They complained to al-Dardīr seeking his intercession; he rode 
out personally to the kāshif and rebuked him, proclaiming: “You do not fear 
God!”  A large group formed behind him, and one of the mawlid attendees 
attacked the kāshif with a club, and received a beating by his guards.  The 
situation calmed after al-Dardīr withdrew, with Ibrāhīm Bey making a personal 
visit to reassure him of their commitment to peace and security.”56  This incident 
highlights the social currency of a figure such as al-Dardīr, but also the failure of 
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that currency during the reign of the duumvirate to prove effective in 
contributing to societal solidarity, as it had done in years before.  
 Al-Dardīr’s interactions with the political elite were not limited to Ottoman 
and Mamlūk officials.  He was one of the recipients of an annual stipend that 
Sultan Muḥammad III of Morocco sent to Azhar ‘ulamā’ of the Mālikī tradition. 
He was a reformist monarch particularly interested in the Mālikī tradition, writing 
his own treatise on the subject.57  Egypt was a rest stop for pilgrims coming 
form North and West Africa on their way to the pilgrimage in Mecca, and thus 
the exchange of ideas carried with returning pilgrims indicates there were 
extensive relations across the Muslim world, specifically in circles of Islamic 
scholarship.58  Sultan Muḥammad III actively participated in the intellectual life 
of the land he ruled, and his book, Ṭabaq al-Arṭāb, is a compilation of legal 
opinions from the major books in the Mālikī tradition, with specific emphasis on 
the works of Ibn Abī Zayd and al-Ḥaṭṭāb.59  The origins of his relationship with 
al-Dardīr are unclear, but it is likely that the reputation of al-Azhar in tandem 
with al-Dardīr’s pre-eminent position as the Mufti of the Mālikiyya in Egypt 
contributed to his patronage of al-Dardīr, by which al-Dardīr was able to fund his 
pilgrimage to Mecca and build his zāwiya behind the Azhar mosque.60 
 Al-Jabartī’s anecdotes challenge the characterisation by some that the 
‘ulamā’ of eighteenth century Egypt were in some form either collaborators or 
colluders with the political elites.61  Others have been more charitable, positing 
that the ‘ulamā’ were “more generally occupied in placating an irate population 
                                             
57 See ‘Alawī and Mīghā, Ṭabaq Al-Arṭāb. 
58 This phenomenon during the eighteenth century is extensively documented in Reichmuth, 
The World of Murtada  Al-Zabidi (1732-91): Life, Networks, and Writings. 
59 ‘Alawī and Mīghā, Ṭabaq Al-Arṭāb. 
60 Already mentioned in chapter 1.  
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than occupied wresting justice from the Mamlūks.”62 This was because they 
were dependent on the Mamlūks for their livelihoods, and thus found 
themselves in a “weak position.”63  While undoubtedly there were some 
associates of al-Azhar who fit Marsot’s characterisation, it is a tenuous 
depicture of al-Dardīr.  For al-Dardīr, wresting justice appears to be the primary 
motivation and impetus for his repeated intercessions on behalf of Cairo’s 
downtrodden with the Beys – to the extent of putting his own life at risk in an 
effort to do so.   
After limited success in his intercessions, when previous Azhar ‘ulamā’ 
like his teacher, al-Ṣa‘īdī, were more effective with more benevolent and 
forgiving Mamlūks, al-Dardīr concluded that the emirs were no more than 
lawless brigands, fitting the legal prescription of muḥāribīn. As part of the 
definition of muḥāraba stipulates that its victims pleas for help are futile, al-
Dardīr concludes that even the intercession of the ‘ulamā’, which in previous 
eras were heeded, were now limited, if not completely ineffective in curbing the 
excesses of the Mamlūk emirs, the effective rulers in light of the Ottoman 
Pasha’s figurehead role.  
Thus, al-Dardīr resigned himself to the fact that his intercessions and 
calling to account of the political leadership had entered a new, unprecedented 
era of ineffectiveness.  He made several personal efforts to quell the infighting 
between Murād and Ibrāhīm Bey, only to see agreements rescinded unilaterally 
and interruptive hostilities renewed.64  Nevertheless, he continued his 
admonitions of the Mamlūk emirs when requested by Cairo’s denizens. He 
appeared to be willing to take the risk of provoking armed insurrection in the 
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face of a recalcitrant and essentially lawless ruler class that continually 
challenged the legitimate authority of the Ottoman suzerainty.  
 The state of Ottoman frustration with the Mamlūk duumvirate, stemming 
largely from their refusal to pay the Egyptian tribute to Istanbul and the holy 
cities, as well as their continuous feuding, reached a fever pitch when the 
Sublime Porte dispatched its most effective general, Admiral Ḥasan Ghāzī, in 
June of 1786.  In the previous year, he had successfully quelled the open 
rebellion in Palestine and restored Ottoman suzerainty, killing the leader of the 
rebellion, Ẓāhīr Āl-‘Umar (d.1189/1775).65 He was now tasked with doing the 
same with Murād and Ibrāhīm Bey.  From al-Jabartī’s description, it appears the 
Egyptians were somewhat relieved at this news, but had reservations about the 
extent of destruction the Ottoman invasion would bring.66  This led to al-Dardīr 
making his last major intercession of his life, to convince the admiral that 
peaceful means would bring about a more salutary result, but the admiral was 
sent to quell a rebellion, not to offer concessions, and the request was flatly 
denied.   
Despite the incidents mentioned, al-Dardīr never called for open rebellion 
against the Mamlūk emirs.  It appears that securing the diminishing rights of the 
disenfranchised was his main concern, using coercive means to do so.  This 
was in reaction to a judiciary system that was corrupt and failing. ‘Ulamā’ 
intercessions were no longer effective, and the threat of civil disruption took its 
place as foil to the ruling elites’ excesses.  In the final summation, al-Dardīr was 
neither a quietest nor a fomenter of rebellion, but an influential and concerned 
member of a society in political turmoil.  Thus the nature of al-Dardīr’s 
relationship with the political elites of his day seemed to be of a genuine interest 
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towards the amelioration of the conditions of the common people of Cairo’s 
urban quarters, in turn earning him his famous epithet Abū al-Barakāt (the 
dispenser of blessings). 
Al-Dardīr the Mufti and Leader of al-Azhar 
 
Al-Dardīr never became Shaykh al-Azhar, the position bestowed with the 
supervision of al-Azhar’s many lucrative endowments (awqāf).  Al-Azhar was 
unique in this aspect, as the madrasas founded by the Mamlūks invariably had 
a single waqf, often founded by an emir for the study of a particular legal school 
(with the exception of Sultan Ḥasan as cited above).67  However, al-Azhar was 
entirely different and did not fit into the mould of madrasa, or pure mosque.  It 
enjoyed shrine like status, though there are no associated mausoleums of 
Muslim saints, as is the case with the mosque of al-Ḥusayn, or al-Shāfi‘ī.  
Nevertheless, ‘Alī Mubarak, commenting on al-Azhar in the nineteenth century, 
describes it as a place of immense blessing (baraka), and mentions the 
prevalence of al-mujāwirīn (pilgrims), those who spend their days from amongst 
the Cairo residents as well as visitors, listening to the lectures at the pillars, 
praying, reciting the Qur’ān, or merely sitting in contemplation.68  The Ottomans 
perceived al-Azhar a pre-Mamlūk institution that subsequently enjoyed the 
respect and admiration of the ‘ulamā’, a group they did not wish to antagonise, 
and hence not a major threat to their authority.  Other pre-Ottoman institutions 
were allowed to decline, and fall into disrepair and decrepitude.   
The dormitory residences (arwiqa) were a distinguishing aspect of al-
Azhar.  These were organised primarily according to geographic region, such as 
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for the Levant, North Africa, Upper Egypt, etc. but there were occasional 
endowed residences for special groups such as the blind, or those studying a 
particular legal school.69  Senior scholars at al-Azhar were assigned supervision 
of these dormitories, with the main responsibility the overseeing of food rations 
and stipends, as well as maintaining the general order.  Al-Dardīr was assigned 
this position for the Upper Egypt dormitory, after the passing of his mentor, al-
Ṣa‘īdī (also inheriting the muftiship of the Mālikīs, to be discussed below).  This 
was an influential role that carried with it not only influence over a significant 
body of students, but also provided a anchor into the restive neighbouring 
Ḥusayniyya district, whose denizens would march upon al-Azhar seeking 
intercession from the shaykhs for the address of grievances with the ruing elite. 
The dormitories served as safe houses where students (and probably the 
mujāwirīn as well) could find a place to congregate and commiserate.  This also 
added to al-Azhar’s reputation as more than mosque, madrasa, or shrine – but 
the very pulse of Cairo itself.  Its role as a potential centre of resistance during 
the French occupation was recognised by Bonaparte and therein lies the 
reasoning by his attempted co-opting of the Azhar ‘ulamā’ by including them in 
the executive dīwān and insisting upon their donning of sashes bearing the 
French tricolours during official ceremonies.70   
 Al-Dardīr’s role as head of the Upper Egypt riwāq raised his profile 
amongst the Azhar elite as well as the urban residents of Cairo.  On more than 
one occasion, as al-Jabartī documents, he was the sole scholar of Azhar 
solicited to address grievances against one of the Mamlūk emirs.  Al-Dardīr 
commanded a particular authority, as he was able to close the marketplace 
neighbouring al-Azhar in an effort to apply pressure for redress of these 
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grievances.  Al-Jabartī notes that in earlier times, marching upon the Pasha’s 
residence occurred routinely.  No doubt, the impotence of the Pasha to exert 
much influence upon the Mamlūk emirs led the populace to seek intercession 
from somewhere else.71  Al-Dardīr’s supervisory role of the Azhar students 
enabled him to appreciate their daily struggles.  His attempts at simplification 
and facilitation of the core disciplines (tabsīṭ) in his pedagogical style were likely 
influenced by this daily interaction.  He was close to the masses in a more than 
superficial sense.  He was thus not merely a scholar of Islam, but also a patron-
saint, and a fulfiller of needs. 
Al-Dardīr, in his capacity of mufti of the Mālikī tradition, also brought him 
closer to the masses. The mufti is defined by the classical tradition as the 
scholar capable of issuing a fatwa, or nonbinding advisory legal opinion.  This is 
contrast to the ḥukm (binding legal opinion), issued by a qāḍī (judge), and 
whose ruling has the investiture of state enforcement, as opposed to the fatwa, 
which developed independent of the state for most of its history.  However, they 
both share a common source of legal opinions, namely the substantive law 
literature, which include the mukhtaṣars, commentaries, and glosses by which 
the dominant legal opinions may be determined.   
Winter alleges that as the Mamlūks grew in their retention of control in 
Egypt, the number of Turkish judges diminished proportionally to the increase in 
Egyptian judges.72  Winter fails to cite any primary sources for this allegation, 
insisting also that Arabic replaced Turkish as the language of the courts, and 
further alleging that by 1798, only six Turkish judges remained.  El-Nahal, one 
of the secondary sources cited by Winter, examined Ottoman court records 
from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cites another secondary source 
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that the nā’ibs (deputy judges) were mostly Egyptian, though the primary judges 
were always appointed by Istanbul.  Furthermore, al-Jabartī does not mention in 
his necrologies judgeships for any of the Egyptian ‘ulamā save for three judges 
of Moroccan origin.73  Al-Dardīr also expresses his lack of confidence in the 
judges of his day, though he does not mention their ethnic origin.74   
Whatever the case may be, it remains highly uncertain if Egyptians 
assumed substantial roles in the Ottoman court system as judges invested with 
authority from the Pasha; the more likely scenario is that they functioned in 
some role of court officiating, more as deputies and assistants to the Ottoman 
judges.75  This point is significant, for it would indicate a parallel system to the 
official Ottoman judiciary, where the three Egyptian muftis resolved disputes in 
unofficial capacities, specifically in matters where state authority was not 
required to adjudicate payments and fines or transfers of ownership.  These 
public muftiships further blurred the lines of separation between the elite ‘ulamā’ 
and the general populace. 
Since the time of al-Ẓāhir Baybars, the rulers in Egypt have recognised 
muftis for each school of jurisprudence.  Though Baybars inaugurated a 
Ḥanbalī muftiship, it appears that sometime before the Ottoman conquest of 
Egypt that the office fell out of use, most likely due to a dearth of adherents, as 
the Ḥanbalī school never found currency outside of Iraq and central Arabia.  
Thus the other three schools remained, namely the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, and Shāfi‘ī, 
with each finding footing for disparate reasons.  The Ḥanafī school, the official 
school of the Ottoman empire, grew in prominence with the Ottoman conquests 
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of the Arab provinces and was generally the school by which the Ottoman 
judges ruled in their courts.   
The Shāfi’ī School, having found initial footing in Cairo with al-Shāfi’ī 
himself, grew in prominence after Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s ambitious programme of 
institution building in the wake of the dissolution of the Fatimid Empire.  As for 
the Mālīkī school, it is the oldest in Egypt, with the students of Mālik, namely Ibn 
al-Qāsim, Ashhab, and Ibn Wahb institutionalising a fiqh tradition that hitherto 
did not exist in Egypt in the second/eighth century. 
As for the muftiship in the time of al-Dardīr, it is clear that the three 
schools were represented.  The Ḥanbalī school fell out of favour some time 
after the Ottoman conquest.76  The muftiship was not an official Ottoman office, 
but appears to have received Ottoman recognition, in a manner similar to the 
office of shaykh al-balad.  Al-Jabartī’s anecdotes reveal that with the arrival of 
new Pashas to the citadel, all people of rank would be in attendance, such as 
the heads of the Bakrī and Wafā’ī families, later represented by the naqīb al-
ashrāf, as well as the three muftis and the Shaykh of al-Azhar.77  All of these 
“offices” were Mamlūk in origin (or Ayyubid in the case of the muftis), but 
nevertheless of substantial influence in Ottoman Egypt.  Al-Jabartī relates that 
Muḥammad Bey Abū Dhahab built a school and mosque to house the offices of 
the three muftis, al-Dardīr the Mālikī representative, and that they would receive 
people on a daily basis to answer their religious questions.  This was completely 
outside of the purview of Ottoman officials, indicating that the spiritual authority 
rested with the Egyptian ‘ulamā’, rather than any Ottoman office.  The Ottomans 
did not interfere with such affairs, and indeed, perhaps they even encouraged it, 
as little could be gained from co-opting the Azhar, or its scholars.  They were 
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also the sole interlocutors who could be relied upon to temper the Mamlūk emir 
excesses.   
The muftis, including al-Dardīr, may have even assumed the role of 
judge on some issues where state enforcement was unnecessary.  In Aqrab al-
Masālik, al-Dardīr expressly lists the issues a just and trustworthy person (‘adl) 
may arbitrate between disputing parties without the validation of state authority 
as including: (1) issues of financial disputation, specifically evaluation of buying, 
selling, and debts, as to their permissibility and completion, not in contractual 
validity or lack thereof of, and (2) personal injury retribution.  He may not 
arbitrate in mandatory criminal punishments, murder, manslaughter, 
conservatorships, divorce, annulments, or issues concerning anything that 
cannot be brought to the arbitration table, due to its absence.  All of the 
preceding affect the rights of others or the “rights of God”, and therefore require 
state authority to adjudicate.78  As indicated earlier, the Ottoman administration 
introduced certain judicial measures borne out of the Qānūn Nāma, placing 
arbitrary difficultly in registering marriages and the like.  This upset many 
Cairenes, likely leading to them seeking the “unofficial” offices of the muftis to 
preside over cases they preferred not to subject to Ottoman bureaucracy.79  
As for the interaction between the muftis and the Ottoman judges, al-
Dardīr maintains that judges should seek the counsel of the ‘ulamā’, especially 
on matters that are not easily referenced in the fiqh manuals.  He proclaims, 
“…he should not unilaterally depend upon his opinion, even if he is a mujtahid, 
as what is correct is not limited to him, as perhaps it may even be found with an 
ignorant (unlearned) person.”80  Furthermore, the ahl al-‘ilm are recommended 
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to be present at the judiciary hearings, so that the judge can easily solicit their 
opinions in order to make a just ruling.81  Whether this actually happened in 
practice seems circumspect, as al-Dardīr laments the state of the judges of his 
time – most likely referring to the Egyptian deputy judges – as he comments:82  
Egypt’s judges spend money [to buy their judgeship] in order to usurp peoples’ wealth 
unjustly, seemingly under the auspices of the law, especially from orphans and the weak.  And 
thus, the judges leave nothing for them of their wealth except very little, so we ask God for well-
being. Thus, their rulings are illegitimate, as “the judge of Cairo”83 rarely hears a complaint and 
is oblivious to its reality. A court witness from amongst the court witnesses records [the 
proceedings] of the case and brings it to the judge [of Cairo] to sign and validate, without adding 
anything [to the case file].  
 
Al-Ṣāwī, in his gloss in reference to the illegitimacy of the judges’ rulings, 
remarks: “The muftis have remained silent on this [issue] due to their inability to 
speak the truth [openly] as some of the ‘ārifīn (knowers of God) have said: ‘The 
time [we are living in] is a time of silence, of remaining in one’s house, and of 
contenting oneself with the most meagre of sustenance, as the one who states 
the truth in this [time] dies.’”84  Clearly, al-Ṣāwī was invoking the principle of 
avoidance of the greater of two evils, and it provides insight into the minds of 
the Egyptian ‘ulamā’ who felt that the system of governance and justice had all 
but completely broken down because of Ottoman powerlessness and Mamlūk 
usurpation.   
In the face of this inability of state authority to competently address the 
communal needs of an increasingly disenfranchised population, the Sufi ṭarīqa 
expanded its role by emphasising the merits of reconciling everyday 
obstructions with the divine will and power, as well as providing a space where 
the rights of community and brotherhood could be re-established.  Al-Dardīr 
made a significant contribution in these areas, as analysed in the following 
section. 
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Al-Dardīr the Sufi Murshid  
 
 Sufism as a social phenomenon has received a great deal of attention in 
the literature.85  Neo-Sufism was discussed earlier, as a post-classical 
phenomenon, hence the qualifying prefix.86  It is predicated on the traditional 
dichotomy of “sober Sufism” and “ecstatic Sufism”, where the former is the 
province of the “orthodox” ‘ulamā’, whilst the latter affiliated with “folk Islam” or 
the heterodox peasant class and urban dwellers.  Neo-Sufism, as a concept, 
was coined by Fazlur Rahman to conceptualise the late eighteenth century 
surge of North African Sufism, characterised by an emphasis on social reform 
rather than individual piety, often associated with figures such as Aḥmad ibn 
Idrīs (d. 1253/1837), Muḥammad al-Sammān (d. 1189/1775), and Aḥmad al-
Tijānī (d. 1230/1815).  O’Fahey and Radtke question the utility of term, given 
that many of its core assumptions, such as rejection of Ibn ‘Arabī’s teachings, 
rejection of the murshid/murīd relationship, as well as rejection of taqlīd and the 
assertion of ijtihād, do not hold under scrutiny.87  
Additionally, the French colonial prejudice in their encounters of militant 
Sufi brotherhoods in the colonised North and West African lands contributed to 
the categorisation of these brotherhoods as reactionary and as a social 
phenomena, in a manner where this dichotomy between quietest and 
reactionary Sufi brotherhoods became emblematic of the literature on the 
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subject.88 Voll counters their arguments by claiming they exclusively referenced 
the Idrīsī tradition, where many of their assertions may be true, but failed to 
consider other Sufi traditions that were prominent in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries.  Additionally, he defends the use of the term Neo-
Sufism, as new structures in the brotherhoods were introduced and not merely 
a continuation of pre-modern Sufi devotional practices.  Furthermore, the 
rejection of Ibn ‘Arabī may be an exaggeration, as he suggests his thoughts 
may have enjoyed less attention as compared to al-Ghazālī, who features 
prominently in the thought of al-Zabīdī, also considered a Neo-Sufi.89  
The literature has not sufficiently addressed where al-Dardīr fits in the 
so-called neo-Sufi revival of the eighteenth century.  Levtzion and Voll give 
scant mention in their edited volume “Eighteenth Century Renewal and Reform 
in Islam”.  He is neither addressed in the context of the Sufi backgrounds of the 
West African anti-colonial secessionist movements by the likes of ‘Uthmān Dan 
Fodio nor in the context of a claimed Khalwatiyya revival in Egypt, led by the 
students of Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī, such as al-Ḥifnī, and al-Ḥifnī’s student, al-Dardīr.90  
For example, Dan Fodio was initiated into the Khalwatiyya by Jibrīl ibn ‘Umar, 
who accepted the wird in Cairo from al-Dardīr.91  De Jong gives more significant 
attention in the same volume to the merits of a Khalwatiyya revival in the 
eighteenth century by the leadership of Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī.  He concludes that 
according to the criteria of (1) number of adherents, (2) geographical 
expansion, (3) reorganisation of the order, (4) increased political significance, 
and (5) intellectual production of writings on the precepts of the order or related 
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themes, that al-Bakrī was neither a reviver or reformer, and that such a notion 
should be discarded.92   
Al-Dardīr’s place in the Sufi tradition is known primarily via his writings, 
as al-Jabartī makes little mention of al-Dardīr in the Khalwatī tradition, even 
though he himself was a disciple of al-Ḥifnī, as was al-Dardīr.93  Al-Dardīr 
defines taṣawwuf as: “The knowledge of the principles by which the heart can 
be rectified, as well as all of the senses.”94 Additionally, he maintains that 
taṣawwuf from a practical standpoint entails “choosing the religiously 
precautionary path in terms of fulfilment of obligations, avoidance of 
prohibitions, and sufficing oneself with only that which is necessary from 
permissible acts.”95  Al-Dardīr advocates a Sufism predicated on the outward 
observance (ṭarīqa) of the sharī‘a (Islam’s legal rulings) in order to arrive at the 
ḥaqīqa.  He defines ḥaqīqa in this context as “secrets of the sharī‘a and the 
results of the ṭarīqa - knowledge gained by the hearts of the sālikīn (spiritual 
wayfarers), after they have become purified from the impurities of human 
shortcomings.”96   
The emphasis on following the precepts of the sharī‘a is a theme shared 
by his teachers, most notably Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī, who blamed the would-be Sufis 
or mutaṣawiffa, for the loss of religious piety amongst the masses.97  Al-Dardīr 
voices a similar concern, warning his students to avoid those who merely dress 
and speak the language of the true Sufi guides, as they are opportunistic 
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charlatans who take advantage of peoples’ good will to fill their coffers.98 
Hence, the importance of a legitimate guide as a path to God, without which 
one would be helpless to realise their own shortcomings and incapable of 
reaching God alone.99  The importance of the shaykh or guide takes a central 
role in al-Dardīr’s writings.  The putative malfeasance of the false guides has 
heightened the essentiality of the legitimate guide.  As a result, ultimate spiritual 
cognition is not normally possible without the guiding hand of the shaykh. 
Al-Dardīr’s main work in taṣawwuf, specifically in the form of the genre of 
the etiquettes of the murīd (disciple), is Tuḥfat al-Ikhwān fī Bayān Ṭarīq Ahl al-
‘Irfān (The Treasure of the Brotherhood in the Elucidation of the Way of the 
People of Gnosis).  He describes it as a short treatise on the elucidation of the 
path to God, written as a guide for his ikhwān (students) and as a reminder for 
his khillān (peers).100 It is relatively short, only forty-four manuscript folios, but it 
was designed as a primer for the aspiring disciple.  Its contents consist of an 
introduction on divine commandments, where al-Dardīr posits they are of four 
types: the (1) Outward (ẓāhir) command, (2) Inward (bāṭin) command, (3) 
Outward (ẓāhir) prohibition, and (4) Inward (bāṭin) prohibition.  
Examples of (1) is the ritual prayer and the remaining four pillars of 
Islam, and all associated with those pillars; examples of (2) include belief in God 
and His Prophet, accepting the legal rulings of the sharī’a, patience in the face 
of adversity, and relying upon God in all of one’s affairs; examples of (3) include 
the avoidance of fornication, intoxicating drink, backbiting, spreading of false 
rumours, and harming people in general; examples of (4) include removal of 
avarice, envy, self-aggrandisement, and love of power, status, and prestige. 
                                             
98 al-Dardīr, Ḥāshiyat Al-Shaykh Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Al-Sibā‘Ī ‘Alā Sharḥ Al-Kharīda Al-Bahiyya, 
659-60. 
99 See ibid., 660; al-Dardīr, "Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān Fī Bayān Ṭarīq Ahl Al-‘Irfān," 5-6. 
100 "Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān Fī Bayān Ṭarīq Ahl Al-‘Irfān," 2. 
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Deviating from these four imperatives will rob one of taqwa (God 
consciousness), the key to attaining the ‘irfān (gnosis) of the elite.101   
This state of taqwa cannot be realised in its most complete sense except 
by availing oneself of six foundational principles: (1) voluntary hunger, (2) 
voluntary isolation, (3) silence outwardly and inwardly except for the 
remembrance of God, (4) night vigil, (5) maintain the dhikr that one receives 
from one’s shaykh, and (6) the shaykh, who has already traversed this path to 
God.102  In these six principles, al-Dardīr follows al-Ghazālī in the first four, but 
adds the latter two, namely those principles that are specific to the ṭarīqa, a 
concept that generally appeared after the seventh/thirteenth century, at least a 
century after al-Ghazālī.103  The emphasis on the essentialness of the 
shaykh/murshid for attaining higher spiritual realisations is predicated on the 
notion that one cannot rid oneself of the hegemony of one’s lower passions and 
appetites on one’s own, a prerequisite for attaining these spiritual realisations.  
The ego will always make excuses for one’s shortcomings, so the guidance of a 
third party in the form of the shaykh becomes necessary.104  As a result, certain 
etiquettes must be observed in order for the main objective of the shaykh/murīd 
relationship to be realised.  Al-Dardīr counts amongst these etiquettes the 
following:105 
1) Complete respect and veneration for the shaykh, to the degree that none 
of his actions should be questioned, and if something appears to 
contravene the sharī‘a, then if it is an ambiguous issue it should be 
interpreted in a manner that does not contravene the sharī‘a. 
                                             
101 Ibid., 4. 
102 Ibid., 4-5. 
103 Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, 10. 
104 al-Dardīr, "Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān Fī Bayān Ṭarīq Ahl Al-‘Irfān," 5. 
105 Ibid., 5-7. 
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2) Preferring the shaykh to all others from amongst the ṣāliḥīn, including 
refraining from attending their circles, visiting them and listening to them 
until one has maximised their benefit from one’s shaykh.  Al-Dardīr notes 
that this etiquette is specific for those who are serious in their spiritual 
wayfaring, not those who receive the ṭarīqa’s litany for purposes of 
tabarruk (merely seeking blessing). 
3) One should not stand while the shaykh is sitting, or sleep in his presence 
except by his permission, or speak unnecessarily, or sit in his place, or to 
travel, marry, or do anything of consequence in their life without the 
shaykh’s permission. 
4) To protect the shaykh in his absence as in his presence, to recall him in 
one’s heart at all times to receive his baraka (blessing), and to love those 
he loves and reject those he rejects. 
5) To perceive that all blessings that come to him are a result of the baraka 
(blessing) of the shaykh, and to understand that the shaykh may test his 
resolve from time to time to ascertain if they will remain on the path 
6) To maintain the recitation of the litany prescribed by the shaykh, as the 
madad (spiritual increase) of the shaykh is in the recitation of his 
prescribed litany (wird), so one becomes remiss in its recitation will be 
deprived of the shaykh’s madad. 
7) To refrain from spying on the shaykh to see his ritual devotions or 
general habits, for this will lead to the murīd’s destruction. 
8) To love the shaykh and always maintain a good opinion of him. 
The points noted by al-Dardīr are not specific to the Khalwatī ṭarīqa, but they do 
reflect his personal convictions regarding the relationship between master and 
disciple.  The degree by which the murīd is to surrender his will to that of the 
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shaykh appears imprudent and potentially rife for abuse.  Al-Jabartī’s annals 
are full of tales that recount such abuses, but al-Dardīr, as others before him, 
draws a distinction between the “true” shaykh and the “false” one.  Al-Bakrī 
devotes an entire book to drawing this distinction,106 as the proliferation of 
whom they considered false Sufis was emblematic of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.   
Al-Dardīr mentions that the true shaykh would not insist that all who 
receive the wird from him to devote themselves exclusively to him; one who 
does so is not a “shaykh for the path to God.”107  Indeed, it was not uncommon 
for scholars of this period to affiliate with multiple ṭarīqas, as al-Dardīr appears 
to have also been affiliated with the Aḥmadī-Shanawī, Shādhilī, and 
Naqshabandī ṭarīqas.108   His initiation into these other ṭarīqas may have been 
more than ceremonial, as he reportedly was initiated into the Aḥmadī-Shanawī 
ṭarīqa by his principal Shaykh, ‘Alī al-Ṣa‘īdī, who in his ijāza, gave permission 
for al-Dardīr to hold gatherings of dhikr and to take on murīds (disciples).109   
The rest of the section on ādāb outlines the etiquettes towards one’s 
brothers in the ṭarīqa, towards oneself, and towards the ‘awām (general 
populace).  Etiquettes towards the ṭarīqa brothers include preferring them to 
oneself in mundane matters, loving them, visiting them when they are sick, and 
forgiving them of any perceived offences.  He also lists his recommendations of 
books that should be read in order to avail oneself of “the etiquettes of the [Sufi] 
folk”; they include the books of Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī al-Ṣidīqī, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-
Sha‘rānī, the Iḥyā’ of al-Ghazālī, the Risāla of al-Qushayrī, and the Ḥikam of Ibn 
‘Aṭā’ illāh al-Sakandarī.  
                                             
106 Bakrī, Al-Suyūf Al-Ḥidād Fī ‘Anāq Ahl Al-Zandaqa W’aL-Ilḥād. 
107 al-Dardīr, "Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān Fī Bayān Ṭarīq Ahl Al-‘Irfān," 12. 
108 ʻAdawī, Tarīkh Banī ‘Adī, 40. 
109 Ibid. 
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The diverse selection of books from various Sufi paths demonstrates al-
Dardīr’s commitment to eclecticism in method, as well as his dedication to 
taḥqīq, by incorporating the best of sources, regardless of juristic or esoteric 
affiliation.   Most significantly, al-Dardīr demonstrates this in the manner by 
which the dhikr of the ṭarīqa is conducted.  He emphasises the importance of 
dhikr, stating that the aforementioned etiquettes comprise the warp of the path 
to dhikr that comprises its weft.110 The dhikr consists of the following 
etiquettes111: 
1) To be in a state of physical and ritual purity 
2) Facing the qibla (prayer direction) if alone 
3) Sitting in a circle if in a group, or in lines if space is limited 
4) Recalling the shaykh during the dhikr so as to be his companion on the 
path 
5) Emptying the heart of all except God, including thoughts of Paradise, 
Hell, and even illumination 
6) Closing of the eyes 
7) Sitting in complete darkness 
8) Saying “lā ilāha illā Allāh” in complete contemplation and swaying the 
head from right to left, pausing at the chest 
9) Repeating the same with the second name “Allāh” 
10) Avoidance of drink during the dhikr or immediately after, as the dhikr is 
akin to heat and water extinguishes it 
11) Awaiting the wārid (spiritual inspiration) that accompanies a successful 
wird (dhikr).  This can take the form of an enlightening for a particular 
spiritual station, such as maḥabba (love), riḍā (contentment), etc.  Once 
                                             
110 al-Dardīr, "Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān Fī Bayān Ṭarīq Ahl Al-‘Irfān," 10. 
111 Ibid., 11-12 
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the wārid appears, one should remain motionless so that it may 
penetrate all aspects of his spiritual being and take hold, otherwise it 
dissipates 
The preceding etiquettes al-Dardīr mentions as general to the Sufi path, and not 
particular to the Khalwatī ṭarīqa, for which he includes a separate section that 
details the daily awrād (litanies) that are to be recited by the Khalwatī aspirant.  
These litanies consists of specific chapters and verses from the Qur’ān to be 
read within the supererogatory ritual prayers as well without.  Al-Dardīr 
mentioned the wird al-saḥar of Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī as essential for the Khalwatī 
aspirant, recited in the early morning hours before dawn, and after the night vigil 
prayer.112  More importantly, the Khalwatī method of initiation and shaykh-
aspirant relationship is emphasised by al-Dardīr.  These include the seven 
litanies that correspond to the seven degrees of the soul, as outlined in the 
following table:113 
Degree of the Soul (English) Maqām Litany 
Al-Nafs al-Ammāra The Inciting Soul Dhulumāt al-
Aghyār 
Lā ilāha illā Allāh 
Al-Nafs al-Lawwāma The Reproachful Soul Al-Anwār Allāh 
Al-Nafs al-Mulhama The Inspired Soul Al-Asrār Huwa (Him) 
Al-Nafs Al-Muṭma’inna The Serene Soul Al-Kamāl Ḥaqq (Real) 
Al-Nafs al-Rāḍiya The Contented Soul Al-Wiṣāl Ḥayy (Alive) 
Al-Nafs al-Marḍiya The Found Pleasing 
Soul 
Tajallīyāt al-Af‘āl Qayyūm (Sustaining) 
Al-Nafs al-Kāmila The Perfect Soul Tajalliyāt al-Asmā’ 
wa al-Ṣifāt 
Qahhār (Compelling) 
 
This classification of the souls with the corresponding litanies predates al-
Dardīr, as well as al-Bakrī, found in one of the reference works recommended 
by al-Dardīr, Al-Sayr wa’l-Sulūk ilā Mālik al-Mulūk, by Al-Qāsim al-Khānī (d. 
1109/1697).114  Little biographical information is available on al-Khānī, except 
                                             
112 al-Dardīr, "Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān Fī Bayān Ṭarīq Ahl Al-‘Irfān," 11-12.  
113 Ibid., 42-44. 
114 Qāsim ibn Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khānī , Al-Sayr W 'Al-Sulūk Ilā Malik Al-Mulūk, ed. Ibrāhīm Shams 
al-Dīn (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2002). 
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that he was a former merchant who travelled for ten years between Istanbul, 
Iraq, and the Hejaz before returning to Aleppo and dedicating his life to religious 
study.115  Al-Dardīr recounts his own experience with the seven names and 
states and the talqīn (induction of the divine names) of his master, al-Ḥifnī, who 
authorised him to induct others in the Khalwatī path on the 18th of Muḥarram 
1172 / 29th of July 1763, at approximately 43 years of age.116  
Al-Dardīr mentions he received the litany of the Khalwatī path from al-
Ḥifnī in 1760 and the first divine name – Lā illāh illā Allah – which he continued 
to recite for six months until the divine remembrance “burned his body and 
removed his flesh until he was nothing more than skin on bones.”  He then 
received the second name - Allah – after six months and in Ramadan of 1163, 
he received the third name – Huwa – after which he was in a state of spiritual 
ecstasy infused with periods of deep contemplation.  A few months later, al-
Dardīr received the fourth name - Ḥaqq; cited by al-Ḥifnī as the first maqām of 
the murīd towards the path of the folk of Allah.  In 1164, he received the fifth 
name - Ḥayy.  In the same year, he received the sixth name – Qayyūm.  During 
these last few stations, al-Dardīr mentions that he was in a complete state of 
spiritual intoxication and not fully cognisant of his state or surroundings, though 
outwardly he appeared normal to all those who spoke to him.  This is a “strange 
matter, only known to those who have tasted it.”117  Two years later, on the 26th 
of Ramadan 1165, he received the seventh and final divine name – Qahhār - 
after which al-Dardīr returned to a state of ṣaḥw (awakening) and arrived at the 
                                             
115 Abraham Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth 
Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 247; Murādī, Kitāb Silk Al-Durar Fī Aʿyān 
Al-Qarn Al-Thānī ʿAshar, 4:9-10. 
116 al-Dardīr, "Tuḥfat Al-Ikhwān Fī Bayān Ṭarīq Ahl Al-‘Irfān," 39. 
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ḥaḍrat al-ḥaḍrāt (the epitome of divine awareness), after which there is no 
further level of awareness.118   
In addition to al-Dardīr, al-Ḥifnī authorised a few others to initiate others 
into the Khalwatī way, the most notable of which was Maḥmūd al-Kurdī, who 
went on to initiate Aḥmad al-Tijānī (d. 1230/1815), who formed his own ṭarīqa, 
and Muḥammad al-Sammān (d. 1189/1775), who did the same in the Sudan.119  
Al-Dardīr appeared to have authorised two major figures, both of whom were 
fellow clansmen from Banī ‘Adī.  They were his main pupil and glosser of his 
commentaries in theology and jurisprudence, Aḥmad al-Ṣāwī, as well as his 
main disciple who propagated the Khalwatiyya-Dardīriyya after him, Ṣāliḥ al-
Sibā‘ī (d. 1221/1806).  The spiritual heirs of al-Dardīr, including Ṣāliḥ al-Sibā‘ī, 
and his son, Muḥammad, continued the inclusion of al-Dardīr’s litanies in their 
gatherings, such as the Ṣalawāt al-Dardīriyya and Ṇaẓm fi Asmā’ Allāh al-
Ḥusnā, though most of the activities of this sub-order of the Khalwatī ṭarīqa 
were centred in Upper Egypt.120   
Therefore, it appears that much of al-Dardīr’s focus in the propagation of 
the ṭarīqa was on his direct students at al-Azhar who went on to bring the rituals 
and teachings to their villages in Upper Egypt.  This would fit into a similar 
pattern that al-Dardīr followed in his writings, namely to facilitate the 
accessibility of the tradition, whether in fiqh, ‘aqīda, or taṣawwuf, for a greater 
number of adherents.  His concise and simple litanies seem designed to be 
recited in a group, with language and metre easily memorised. His readiness to 
                                             
118 Ibid. 
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120 I attended a gathering of the Khalwatī-Dardīrī order in al-Dardīr’s zāwiya in Cairo in the 
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intervene on behalf of Cairo’s disenfranchised when the situation warranted 
thus appears to be part of a larger project, if such a term suffices, on the part of 
al-Dardīr, to preserve a tradition that was under stress if not direct threat from 
external forces, by making it more easily accessible and applicable. 
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Conclusion 
 
The central focus of this study analyses the relationship of the early 
modern scholar Aḥmad al-Dardīr with the encapsulation of the teachings of 
Islam in tradition.  The role of the interpreters and gatekeepers of the tradition, 
the intellectual elite, is to use the tools of the tradition to arrive at the same 
conclusions as regards the essential unity of truth and reality as their 
predecessors.  In keeping with this objective, the manner by which these 
conclusions are reached will necessarily change and adapt to different historical 
and local contexts.   
This process is also manifested in the realm of social relationships, as all 
religions are communal to some degree, and thus the preservation of the 
tradition in the individual does not equate to its preservation throughout 
society’s members.  Hence, the changing relationship between the political and 
scholarly elites, as well as the general populace, proved to be a central element 
in the manner by which the tradition was interpreted and practiced.  Therefore, 
in the Prophetic and early caliphal period, there was a general unity of the 
political and intellectual/spiritual elite in the person of the Prophet Muḥammad 
and the office of the caliph.  The gatekeepers of the tradition in that period 
focused on the preservation of the archetype – whether the Sunna of the 
Prophet Muḥammad or the practice of his companions.   
At the onset of the Umayyad Empire, the disillusionment over the 
departure of Prophetic practice as regards succession in the nascent 
community precipitated the emergence of political sects.  Positions ranging from 
open rebellion to collusion with the Umayyads, and later, the Abbasids, were 
found amongst the ‘ulamā’.  This diversity of opinion, brought about by the 
spectre of political tyranny, divided the scholarly elite as regards to the optimal 
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tools and criteria for keeping the tradition alive, whether the rarefied tools of the 
intellect or the ostensible textual purport of the Qur’ān and ḥadīth.  A third set of 
tools emerged during the Abbasid Empire, spiritual cognition, touted by the likes 
of al-Ghazālī.  These tools neither fit into the strictly delineated regime of 
rationality, nor conformed to the more literalist methodology of interpreting the 
sacred texts.    
On the social front, the emergence of sects likely strengthened dynastic 
rule, as the ideal of a moral caliph sanctioned by the ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd (the 
people of dissolution and accord) was hopelessly abandoned, as the scholarly 
and spiritual elite no longer represented a unified political force.  As a result, a 
new paradigm emerged after the maturation of Abbasid rule, one characterised 
by a weariness on the part of the ‘ulamā’ to engage with the rulers for fear of 
manipulation or co-optation, but yet a realisation that a return to moral caliphal 
rule was unlikely, and that attempts to bring about such a return by force almost 
always ended in failure.   
Thus began a long period of mutual if not always cordial symbiosis 
between the ‘ulamā’ and the dynastic rulers where the unwritten rule stated that 
the ‘ulamā’ would honour their rulers as long as they did not contravene the 
main tenets of Islam in a manner that would put their commitment to Islam in 
question.  Concomitantly, the rulers continued to patronise madrasas and build 
mosques and other endowed institutions, not concerning themselves with the 
educational activities hosted within them.  The Ottomans in particular did not 
attempt to influence the manner by which the tradition was taught or interpreted 
in their Arab provinces, leaving these affairs to the indigenous ‘ulamā’.  
The Sufi ṭarīqa emerged in the seventh/thirteenth century as a new social 
institution in the wake of declining political fortunes after the de-facto dissolution 
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of the Abbasid Empire in 1258.  Merchant guilds also began to grow in the 
intellectual centres of Cairo and Damascus, and it would appear that the urban 
based ṭarīqa was closely associated, if not modelled, after the nascent guilds.121  
Amid the flourishing of this new social order centred on ṭarīqas and institutions 
of learning, the gap between the dynastic rulers and the common populace 
widened, such as that Egypt did not witness indigenous rule from the time of the 
last Fatimid caliph until the military coup that removed King Fārūq in 1952.   
The cultural and linguistic divide between the rulers and the ruled, in 
addition to corruption and usurpation, fuelled tensions in the eighteenth century.  
It appears, that for al-Dardīr, the ancient symbiosis between the scholarly and 
political elites was no longer justified as Cairo’s poorer population suffered 
under the yolk of often arbitrary and rash decision making, as well as damaging 
infighting during the days of the duumvirate of Ibrāhīm and Murād Bey.  As a 
result, al-Dardīr adopted a more aggressive stance towards the ruling class, not 
hesitating to cause minor civil strife to see grievances addressed.   
He also lamented the state of some his colleagues, those who “would 
sell their soul” in order to apprise themselves of a judiciary post, despite their 
lack of qualifications.  The social aspects of al-Dardīr’s position as Sufi murshid, 
with the recitation of group litanies and emphasis on accessibility further 
underscores his commitment to the maintaining of the tradition, even under less 
than ideal conditions.  Furthermore, the old thesis of scholarly stagnation and 
decrepitude must be re-evaluated in light of the social and political changes that 
not only altered the rituals and practices of Muslim societies, but also the means 
and methodology by which the gatekeepers of tradition, the ‘ulamā’, adopted to 
insure its survival and relevance. 
                                             
121 Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, 28. 
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Conclusions 
 
 This study endeavoured to address the subject of early modern Islamic 
scholarship and its relationship with the transmission and articulation of the 
Islamic intellectual traditions in the broader sense, and the role of Aḥmad al-
Dardīr in upholding and sustaining those traditions in the more specific sense.  
Al-Dardīr is an important figure worthy of study despite the fact that his 
“originality” is unconventional in that his intellectual contributions were more 
pedagogical and synthesising of previous intellectual currents within Islam, 
rather than new and ground-breaking.  He made the Islamic intellectual 
disciplines of theology, jurisprudence, and Sufism in a way more accessible to 
the perhaps less driven and cognitively acute students of his day, to the degree 
that his works form the canon of madrasas from Morocco to Indonesia, 
including al-Azhar in Cairo.  Additionally, he arguably revitalised the study of 
Islamic theology by synthesising its epistemological underpinnings with that of 
the Sufi cognitive tradition, and was part of a process of reorientation of the 
discipline that started a few centuries earlier with al-Sanūsī by rendering it an 
essential subject of study for all Muslims as an ingress to higher spiritual 
practice, after it mainly served as a polemical tool for addressing dissenting 
points of creed.  As regards his public role as a ‘ālim of the Azhar, Mufti, and 
Sufi murshid, he broke with previous tradition to some degree and pushed the 
envelope as regards public opposition to the ruling elite, to the degree of 
leading public protests and delegitimising their judges’ rulings due to perceived 
malfeasance and incompetence.   
Moreover, the specific research questions addressed as mentioned in the 
opening chapter were:  
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1) How did al-Dardīr interact with the Islamic tradition, and what degree of 
influence did the interpretive tradition have in informing this interaction? 
2) How did al-Dardīr’s approach to the transmission of knowledge reflect 
the educational paradigm established by the cumulative discursive 
Islamic tradition, and in what way did he represent its culmination? 
3)  How did al-Dardīr epitomise the core Islamic disciplines of creedal 
theology, jurisprudence, and taṣawwuf? 
4) To what degree did the societal roles exercised by al-Dardīr reflect a 
tradition of engagement, collusion, or cooperation with the political elites? 
To address these questions, the Islamic tradition was defined, building upon 
some of the concepts in the theoretical frameworks of MacIntyre, Asad, and 
Shils, as one that was subject to historical and contextual factors.  The old trope 
of essential juxtaposition of reason and revelation, and tradition and innovation, 
is less useful for assessing the contribution of ‘ulamā’ such as al-Dardīr to the 
intellectual production of Muslim societies.  In order to illustrate this point, 
paradigms for the eras preceding al-Dardīr were established to contextualise 
the value of scholarly production by the likes of an early modern scholar such 
as al-Dardīr, when the Islamic tradition was at the apex into its maturity.  
Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the societal roles of the ‘ulamā’ followed 
a similar trajectory, in as much as that these also were subject to episodic 
paradigms that were affected by historical inputs, rather than adopting an 
essentialist leitmotif as to what a ‘ālim is or should be.   
 Therefore, the contribution of al-Dardīr to the Islamic disciplines, as were 
products of and subject to the needs of transmitting the tradition, was in the 
form of epitomisation, verification, weighted preference, and facilitation, 
corresponding to ikhtiṣār, taḥqīq, tarjīḥ, and tabsīṭ.  These four terms are 
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meaningless outside of a discursive framework, as they could only exist after 
several iterative paradigms of formation, compilation, and stratification.  
 In the disciplines of creedal theology and taṣawwuf, both of which 
developed from a broader narrative of the development of the Islamic 
disciplines analysed in chapter 2, the final episodic paradigm came in the form 
of taḥqīq (verification).  This is a tradition that al-Dardīr used to exposit the 
synthesis of Akbarian metaphysics with Ash‘arī theology, in the form of the 
sharī‘a - ṭarīqa - ḥaqīqa paradigm.  The discipline of jurisprudence, after several 
episodic paradigms, matured to a degree where al-Dardīr applied a 
methodology of tarjīḥ to weigh a plethora of opinions.  He arrived at a single 
fatwa opinion; this also had the intended objective of epitomisation and tabsīṭ 
(facilitation), two themes that ran throughout all of al-Dardīr’s works.  Access to 
the scholarly tradition was encumbered under its own weight.  The need for 
such a project at the time is evidenced by the durability of his works in the three 
core disciplines, as they remain widely studied in the circles of al-Azhar and 
elsewhere in the Muslim world.  The objective of tabsīṭ also was prevalent in al-
Dardīr’s societal roles, though of a different mode and degree.  The continued 
suffering and disenfranchisement of Cairo’s denizens rendered the existing 
social contract – to borrow a term from Rousseau, a contemporary of al-Dardīr 
– precipitated the departure from previous paradigmatic schemes of political 
quietism to a more aggressive engagement to address grievances by way of 
intercession and threats of civil strife.  While this cannot be construed as 
advocacy of open rebellion, it is nonetheless a significant departure from a 
paradigm where the ‘ulamā’ acted as the de-facto counterweight to authoritarian 
excesses, but never resorting to provoking potential civil unrest to do so. 
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 This study does not claim to have exhausted the topic of post-classical 
Islamic scholarship, or provided a history of Islamic theology, Sufism, or 
jurisprudence, or the commentary-gloss genre.  What I believe it has done is 
originally contributed to the methodology of study of Islamic scholarship, by 
challenging some of the prevailing paradigms regarding the post-classical 
period, as well as the application of such methodology to a heretofore unstudied 
figure in the person of Aḥmad al-Dardīr.  Furthermore, the application of the 
tradition based methodology adopted for this study has not been applied 
towards the social and political realm in the existing literature, as it was in 
interpreting and analysing al-Dardīr’s societal roles in this study.  As a result, I 
believe our understanding of Islamic scholarship in pre-colonial societies in 
particular has been enriched by the conclusions reached in this study, 
specifically in the interdependence and symbiosis between the various Islamic 
disciplines united by a single ontology and epistemology, despite the diversity 
and breadth of articulations of their various facets.  Much work in these areas 
remains to be explored, specifically in the works of the thirteenth through 
seventeenth centuries, in the disciplines of theology, jurisprudence, and 
taṣawwuf, as well as the functions of the ‘ulamā’ in various historic and regional 
societies.  Furthermore, the alternative methodology utilised in this study for 
evaluating al-Dardīr’s intellectual legacy and contributions is by no means 
unique, nor does this researcher make the claim that it is without its limits and 
detractions.  However, it is hoped that other methodologies may be used in 
future research as part of the continuing attempt to reassess Islamic intellectual 
history without being beholden to previous methodologies extrapolated from 
historical currents foreign to Islam.  While innovation, originality, and creativity 
are important aspects of any worthy research project, it should not preclude us 
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from recognising the importance of tradition and continuity within the Islamic 
ethos, so as not to overlook significant aspects of Islamic intellectual history.    
 
 
 
Appendix: Translation of al-Dardīr’s Minor Creed 
 
 
1. It is obligatory for the religiously responsible to know that which is necessary 
for God, His Prophets, and His Angels 
2. Thus, there are twenty necessary attributes of God 
3. And they are: Existence, Pre-existence, Everlastingness, Dissimilarity from 
temporal things, Self-sufficiency, Oneness, Life, Knowledge, Will, Power, 
Hearing, Seeing, and Speech. 
4. And that He is Alive, Knowledgeable, Wilful, Powerful, Hearing, Seeing, and 
Speaking. 
5. These are twenty attributes, the first is an ontological attribute, the next five 
are negative attributes, the next seven are of substance, and the last seven 
are substantive attributes. 
6. Hence, God’s existence is necessary 
7. And He is Eternal without beginning, 
8. Eternal without end, 
9. Dissimilar in His essence from all of creation, 
10.  Thus, He is not a body, or an accident;  
11.  And [the concepts of] place, time, right, left, behind, or in front cannot 
describe Him. 
12.  He is self-sufficient; 
13. One in His essence, attributes, and actions. 
14. He is Alive, 
15. Knowledgeable of all that has been, all that ever will be, and all that will ever 
not be in the worlds that only God knows the true number of which; 
16. Wilful of all of all that occurs and appears in the worlds 
17. Sole Enactor and Nullifier of all possible things. 
18. He is Hearing, Seeing, and Speaking with pre-eternal speech exclusive of 
sound and letter. 
19. And it is necessary for all the Prophets: Infallibility, that no transgression 
against God in his commandments and prohibitions is possible, and the 
same for the Angels. 
20. And it is necessary for all the Messengers to convey all that they have been 
commanded to convey to creation, including legal rulings, and other things 
such as the events of the Last Day and what it entails of the Reckoning, the 
Chastisement, the Path, The Scale, Paradise, Hellfire, the Throne, the Chair; 
21. And the Revealed Books, the Messengers, and what happened between 
them and their nations. 
22. And it is obligatory to believe in the Houris,  
23. And it is obligatory to believe in the Children of Paradise, 
24. And it is obligatory to believe in the saints 
25. And it is obligatory to believe in the Night Journey and Ascension of the 
Prophet Muhammad. 
26. It is obligatory to believe in the intercession of our Master Muhammad, 
27. And it is obligatory to believe in the Signs of the Hour: 
28. The first: the release of the Antichrist 
29. The second: the descent of our Master Jesus the son of Mary, 
30. The third: the release of Gog and Magog, 
31. The fourth: the release of the Beast, 
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32. The fifth: The rise of the Sun from the West for three days. 
33. It is from amongst the obligatory [acts] to renew repentance. 
34. It is obligatory to believe in and be content with the Decree and Destiny. 
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